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ABSTRACT
The issue relating to contempt of court has caught the attention of people from all
walks of life in Malaysia, particularly, after the controversial incidents of the removal
of Tun Salleh Abbas, the then Lord President, in 1988 and the dismissal of the former
Deputy Prime Minister, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998. The judiciary is attacked
and its independence is questioned. The lawyers are placed under the threat of
contempt proceedings when they tried to exercise their right to freedom of speech and
expression and to exercise their duty to act for their clients without fear or favour. The
Bar feels that the right to freedom of speech and expression is infringed. The Bar
perceives that the contempt power was being misused by the judges.
The Malaysian law of contempt of court is derived from the English common law
tradition and is characterised by substantial flexibility. This flexibility results in
variable approaches and perceptions by judges that leave uncertainties in this area of
law. Consequently, a draft of Contempt of Court Act 1999 has been proposed to the
Malaysian government with the main intention of overcoming uncertainties in the
law. Placing the comprehensive rules in a statute will allow easier access to and
greater clarity of the law because all the rules and procedures would be found in one
piece of legislation.
This thesis aims to state and explain the law and the practice of contempt of court in
Malaysia. This study will examine the anomalies that derived from the substantial
flexibility approaches by the judges in this area of law. Thorough examination and
analysis would help identifying the problems and dilemma and the way that the draft
Contempt of Court Act 1999 could provide remedies for the predicaments. To
illuminate the understanding of the actual practical problem, this study incorporates
in-depth interviews together with questionnaire surveys. A total of 15 in-depth
interviews have been conducted among the Malaysian judicial officers, advocates and
prosecutors. This is further complemented by postal questionnaires sent to these
selected legal actors chosen at random in accordance with their seniority, aiming at
eliciting their knowledge and opinion on the subject matter at hand. The combinations
of theoretical discussion on contempt of court, together with the empirical study, have
proved to yield a valuable insight into the re-evaluation of the Malaysian law and
practice of contempt of court.
This research reveals that the uncertainties in the law of contempt of court in
Malaysia were ‘caused’ by the inconsistencies in the application and approaches by
the judges. The judges have unfettered discretion in determining contempt cases. The
majority of the Malaysian legal actors support the idea of placing the law of contempt
in a piece of legislation in order to overcome these arbitrariness and uncertainties.
They hold that to have credence, the law of contempt would have to be well-defined,
as in the absence of any clear guidelines it would be unmerited to imprison anyone for
contempt.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND STATEMENTS OF 
THE PROBLEM 
 
The Malaysian contempt of court is primarily a common law phenomenon as over 
the years of evolution and development in the legal system, the Malaysian courts 
have had the opportunity to establish and define the ambit of the law relating to 
contempt of court, hence provide judicial illumination and interpretation. Being 
the common law courts, the Malaysian courts are vested with inherent power to 
punish the contempt of themselves.
1
 The inherent power to punish for contempt 
has received its endorsement via Article 126
2
 of the Constitution and Section 13
3
 
of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA). These provisions confer the superior 
courts with jurisdiction to punish any person who is guilty of contempt,
4
 but fail to 
spell out what contempt is and how to deal with it. The substance and content of 
the law are still in the common law as the formulation of the law of contempt is 
left to the courts.
5
  
 
The jurisdiction to punish for contempt touches upon important fundamental 
rights of the citizen; that is, the right to freedom of speech and expression, which 
is of vital importance in any democratic system. In Malaysia, every citizen is 
guaranteed this right.
6
 But it is not an absolute right, because the Constitution 
provides limitations on the exercise of this freedom in considering other interests 
such as reputation, security and public order.
7
 As provided in Article 10 (2) of the 
                                                 
1
 In Re HE Kingdon v SC Goho [1948] MLJ 17, p. 18; Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v Faber Merlin 
Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193, p.195; MBF Holdings Bhd & Anor v Houng Hai Kong & 
Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 516, p. 526.  
2
 It states: 
The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any 
contempt of itself. 
3
 This provision is a mere repetition of Article 126 of the Constitution.  
4
 Paragraph 26 of the Third Schedule under Section 99A of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 
bestows the subordinate courts with contempt power. 
5
 Arthur Lee Meng Kwang (n. 1) p.196. 
6
 Article 10 (1) states: 
Subject to clauses (2) , (3) and (4) – 
(a)  every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression; 
7
 Article 10 (2) Parliament may by law impose- 
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it 
deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or 
 2 
Constitution, Parliament is allowed to pass law on contempt of court. Thus far 
Parliament has not passed any specific law governing the contempt of court, as it 
is left to be developed by common law. It is now the duty of the courts to create a 
balance between these two conflicting public interests, namely, the right to free 
speech and the right to protect the administration of justice. Nevertheless, in 
practice, the courts give higher protection to the administration of justice at the 
expense of freedom of speech and expression.
8
 
 
The approaches taken by the courts to the issue of contempt of court received a lot 
of concerns, especially from the Malaysian Bar. The Bar is particularly concerned 
about the patterns of citing lawyers for contempt which have been more rampantly 
used by the judges. The use of power by the judges is alarmingly higher in 
comparison to the past decades.
9
  In some cases the order for contempt issued is 
justified due to the unbecoming conduct of some lawyers that prevent the court 
from administering justice. But in other cases the validity of such order is doubtful 
and questionable. The effect is quite significant as the improper issuance of the 
order could actually derail the integrity of the judges.  
 
The Bar perceives the power to punish for contempt as arbitrary, unlimited and 
uncontrolled due to the unrestricted jurisdiction of the courts in treating contempt. 
Judges enjoyed unfettered discretion and to a certain extent, varied perceptions 
result in the uncertainties of the law. The inconsistencies can be seen through the 
definition of contempt. What constitutes contempt of court has to be ascertained 
                                                                                                                                      
any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality 
and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or of any 
Legislative assembly or to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or 
incitement to any offence; 
8
 Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167. 
9
 See Dato' Mahadev Shankar, 'Memorial Note: The Late Tan Sri Ismail Khan' (2000) 3 Malayan 
Law Journal i. He said: 
Tan Sri (Ismail Khan) kept in touch with the administration of justice in Malaysia. In the 
last few years Tan Sri was perplexed as to what was happening to the judiciary in recent 
years. He could not understand why some magistrates and even some judges were 
apparently resorting to abusing counsel and further having to rely on the frequent 
invocation of their powers of holding counsel in contempt of court in order to control 
their courts. 
 
Tan Sri took the view, which I respectfully share, that if a judge has to resort to abuse or 
to threats of holding counsel in contempt (other than in respect of technical contempt, that 
is where there has been a breach of undertaking and the like) it amounted to an admission 
that he accepts that counsel has been contemptuous of him and Tan Sri used to say that if 
that happens more than once, the possibilities are that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with the judge! 
 3 
from case law which is voluminous and not always consistent. Moreover, though a 
charge of contempt is as serious as a criminal charge, the trial is not in accordance 
with the required procedure that safeguards the trial of a criminal offence; it is by 
way of summary proceedings. There is no limit to the imprisonment that may be 
inflicted on the person or the fine that may be imposed. It is left to the courts 
unfettered discretion. Furthermore, the practices of purging the contempt after the 
contemnor tenders his or her apologies do not allow him or her to escape from the 
sentence. It also does not in any way clarify the law.  
 
Therefore, in the circumstances, would it be sufficient or proper to leave the 
whole matter to be regulated by the courts themselves? Is it necessary to fetter 
their discretion since they have invariably stated that this power should be used 
sparingly and only in extreme cases and always with reference to the interests of 
the administration of justice?
10
 Besides that, the jurisdiction to punish for 
contempt touches upon important fundamental rights of the citizen that is the right 
to freedom of speech and expression. This right is also a vital importance in any 
democratic society. Thus, the contempt law should harmonise well with the needs 
of a modern democratic system.   
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 
The objectives of this study are: 
 
1) to examine the law relating to contempt of court and the procedure for 
the punishment thereof; 
2) to examine the practice and the judicial approaches in the law of 
contempt of court; 
3) to evaluate whether there is a need for amendments therein with a view 
to clarify and reform the law whenever necessary; and 
4) to propose recommendations for the codification of the law in light of 
the examination made.  
 
                                                 
10
  Jaginder Singh & Ors v The Attorney General [1983] 1 MLJ 71, p. 180. 
 4 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The practice of leaving the formulation of the law of contempt to the courts has 
given them unfettered discretion in deciding what amounts to ‗contempt‘, how to 
deal with it and what the punishments are to be imposed. The law of contempt and 
its application is much too vague and needs to be crystallised. Therefore, the 
question to be addressed is, ‗Does Malaysia need to have its contempt laws in a 
statutory form?‘ as to overcome the uncertainties in the said area of law. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is done by library research followed by empirical research and it covers 
the theoretical and applied aspects of contempt of court. It is conducted by 
examining and analysing laws as found in statutes and case law. As contempt of 
court is a common law offence, it requires references to a voluminous case law. 
References are also made to secondary sources in the forms of books, journals, 
reports, newspapers‘ articles and reports, conference proceedings and other 
periodicals. 
 
Amongst the objectives of this research is to evaluate the sufficiency of the 
current law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia and to suggest 
amendments with the view to clarify and reform the law. Thus, this research 
suggests to examine the development in the approaches and practices taken by 
some selected jurisdictions, namely England, India, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and the United States of America (USA), in dealing with contempt of 
court in their jurisdictions. England and India have their contempt law codified 
but as to the former, only part of contempt laws are placed in statutory form. The 
other jurisdictions are mainly based on common law. Moreover, this research 
proposes to look at the international practice while referring to the international 
tribunals focusing on International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).  
 
 5 
Apart from the theoretical analysis, this thesis requires empirical research that 
concerns the practical considerations. The empirical research will provide primary 
data. The methods for this research are questionnaires and semi-structured 
personal interviews with judges, advocates and solicitors, and prosecutors.  The 
role of interviews in legal research is both to find out about the practical 
application of certain rules of law and to obtain the views of the experts on the 
subject under study.  
 
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
Although contempt of court has attracted many discussions among the legal 
practitioners and academicians especially after the incidence of citation of 
contempt of court against Zainur Zakaria during Anwar Ibrahim‘s trial, little 
literature is written on this area under discussion. In Malaysia thus far, almost no 
research has been done on the subject matter. Some writers have included only 
small portions of the discussion in their available literatures.  
 
In Malaysia, there is only one book that discusses contempt of court in general. 
The book by Mohd Nadzri Hj. Abdul Rahman Penghinaan Mahkamah Undang-
Undang. Sivil & Undang-Undang Islam [Contempt of Court. Civil and Islamic 
Laws]
11
 provides an overview relating to contempt of court. This book gives the 
general idea and basic understanding of contempt of court but it does not discuss 
in depth every offence of contempt, the procedure and the punishment of 
contempt. It is merely a descriptive work and not analytical. 
The valuable article written by Jerald Gomez,
12
 a joint article by Abdul Majid bin 
Nabi Baksh and Margaret Liddle,
13
 and a conference paper presented by Chew 
Swee Yoke
14
 are the literatures that directly discuss the subject under study. 
Gomez has outlined a brief introduction on the law of contempt of court. His work 
                                                 
11
 Mohd Nadzri Hj. Abdul Rahman, Penghinaan Mahkamah. Undang-Undang Sivil & Undang-
Undang Islam [Contempt of Court. Civil and Islamic Laws] (Mahzum Book Services, Selangor 
2008).  
12
 Jerald Gomez, 'Contempt of Court-Freedom of Expression and the Rights of the Accused' (2002) 
3 Malayan Law Journal xxxli.  
13
 Abdul Majid Bin Nabi Baksh and Margaret Liddle, 'Reforming the Law of Contempt of Court' 
(2006) XXXV No. 1 INSAF 119. 
14
 Chew Swee Yoke, 'Contempt of Court: Freedom of Expression and Rights of the Accused' 
(Paper presented at the 11th Malaysian Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur,2001) . 
 6 
discusses how the law of contempt of court has limited the right to freedom of 
speech and expression. The uncertainty of the law and the inconsistency in the 
application as well as the process of the law of contempt of court are also 
highlighted.  
 
The article by Abdul Majid and Liddle also highlights reforming the law of 
contempt of court. It emphasises that having governed by common law with the 
major influence of English common law, the Malaysian contempt law is flexible 
as judges‘ perceptions may vary. The article discusses the predicaments in three 
species of criminal contempt, i.e. contempt in the face of court, scandalising the 
court and sub judice comment. It provides a suggestion that judges should be 
using summary procedure sparingly and in most urgent cases only. It also argues 
that lodging a complaint about a judge should cease to be contempt of court if the 
complaint is channelled to a proper authority. The article also suggests that a 
public comment upon a case that has been concluded at a court of first instance 
should no longer be contempt of court.  
 
The work by Chew covers controversial incidents or cases relating to contempt of 
court. The writer points out the need for balancing the lawyer‘s right to freedom 
of speech and expression and the contempt of court. The problems relating to 
uncertainty and inconsistency, especially the practice of summary process by the 
judge in dealing with the law of contempt of court, in Malaysia are discussed. The 
writer also highlights the conduct of judges in court and the issues relating to 
criticism of judges. 
 
Another type of literature is the one that discusses the role of lawyers and judges 
in the administration of justice. Karpal Singh, a prominent Malaysian lawyer, 
wrote on the role of the lawyers in upholding the rule of law and preserving the 
independence of the profession.
15
 He highlights the importance of having an 
independent judiciary as well as the independence of the Bar. His work is 
significant to the subject as he queries the proper action to be taken against a 
judge who makes a derogatory remark in an open court against a lawyer in his 
                                                 
15
 Karpal Singh, 'The Role of Barrister in Upholding the Rule of Law: An International 
Perspective' (2003) XXXII No. 4 INSAF 72. 
 7 
own court. This raises an issue whether the particular judge should be cited for 
contempt of court or addressed to the Judges‘ Code of Ethics. This unresolved 
issue shall be discussed in the proposed study.  
 
The judge‘s conduct has been questioned in some of the Malaysian cases as seen 
in the articles written above. In Malaysia, there is little research relating to judge‘s 
conduct or misconduct in court. The discussion forms only a small part of some of 
the literature.
16
  The study proposes to examine the problem relating to the 
conduct of judges as this issue has been discussed on various occasions.
17
  
 
The scarcity of literature discussing this issue in Malaysia necessitates exploration 
into literature outside of the country. The major references are Lowe and Suffrin,
18
 
Arlidge, Eady and Smith,
19
 and C.J Miller
20
 which provide a good explanation of 
the law and process for contempt of court under common law jurisdictions, in 
particular, the development of contempt of court in England. Apart from these, 
Jeffrey Miller
21
 explains the law of contempt in Canada. As for a basic 
understanding of the law of contempt in the USA, reference is made to Goldfarb.
22
 
                                                 
16
 Chandra Muzaffar, 'Assault on Judiciary:Public Perception' (Paper presented at the 
Independence of the Judiciary,Kuala Lumpur,1988); Chang Min Tat, 'Judging the Judge' (Paper 
presented at the Independence of the Judiciary Kuala Lumpur,1988); Hariram Jayaram, 'Security 
of Tenure of Judge' (Paper presented at the Independence of the Judiciary,Kuala Lumpur,1988); 
Krishna Iyer, 'No Free Judiciary, No True Democracy' (Paper presented at the Independence of the 
Judiciary Kuala Lumpur,1988); Salleh Abas, The Role of Independence Judiciary (Percetakan A-Z 
Sdn. Bhd., Kuala Lumpur 1989); Raja Aziz Addruse, Conduct Unbecoming. In Defence of Tun 
Mohd Salleh Abas (the Former Lord President of the Supreme Court of Malaysia) (Walrus, Kuala 
Lumpur 1990); Anuar Zainal Abidin, 'Appointment and Code of Ethics of Judge' (Paper presented 
at the Independence of the Judiciary In the Islamic and Non-Islamic Judicial Systems Perak,2004) ; 
K.C Vohrah, 'The Independence of Judiciary:Its Principles Within The Ambit of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights' (Paper presented at the Independence of the Judiciary In the Islamic 
and Non-Islamic Judicial Systems,Perak,2004); R.H. Hickling, 'Separation of Powers and 
Independence of Judiciary: Relations Between Judiciary and Executive in United Kingdom' (Paper 
presented at the Independence of the Judiciary In the Islamic and Non-Islamic Judicial Systems 
Perak, 2004) . 
17
 For example, Malaysian Bar v Tan Sri Dato Abdul Hamid bin Omar [1989] 2 MLJ 281; 
Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n.8); Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim [2002] 2 MLJ 730 and recently in Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd v Metramac Corp. Sdn 
[2006] 1 MLJ 435, the conduct of judges has been criticised openly.  
18
 Gordon Borrie, N. V. Lowe and Brenda Sufrin, The Law of Contempt (3rd edn Butterworths, 
London 1996). 
19
 Anthony Arlidge, David Eady and A. T. H. Smith, Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt (3rd 
edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005). 
20
 C. J. Miller, Contempt of Court (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000). 
21
 Jeffrey Miller, The Law of Contempt in Canada (Carswell, Ontario 1997). 
22
 Ronald L. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power (Columbia University Press, New York, London 
1963). 
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In India, much is written on the subject and at least three main references discuss 
principally the Contempt of Court Act 1971.
23
  
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
The present research is comprised of five chapters. The first is the introductory 
chapter which contains the background of the research. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the Malaysian legal system. The focus of this chapter is on 
the sources of laws and the administration of justice in Malaysia. The last part of 
this chapter discusses briefly the fundamental liberties and human rights in 
Malaysia, in particular the freedom of speech and expression and contempt of 
court. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia. The 
formulation of what contempt is and the procedures with which to deal are left 
with the courts with the objective of ensuring a credible and efficient 
administration of justice. This chapter evaluates the judges‘ approach to contempt 
of court and highlights the anomalies in the matter.  
 
Chapter 4 is the central focus of this thesis where the main concerns or anomalies 
found in the current law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia are 
analysed. There are three parts to this chapter. The first part studies the main 
areas of concerns and the response taken by the Malaysian Bar in addressing the 
problems. The Bar proposed for the law to be placed in statutory form. The Bar 
took a stance that codification would bring greater certainty to the identification of 
the basis of liability and clearer guidance to participants in judicial proceedings. 
The Proposed Contempt of Court Act 1999 which was submitted by the Bar 
Council to the Government is examined in this part. 
 
                                                 
23
 K.J Aiyar, Law of Contempt of Courts, Legislatures and Public Servants (9th edn The Law Book 
Company (P) Ltd, Allahabad 1997); Justice V.K. Mehrotra, V.G. Ramachandran's Contempt of 
Court (6th edn Eastern Book Company, Lucknow 2002); Samaraditya Pal, The Law of Contempt 
(4th edn Wadhwa and Company, New Delhi 2006). 
 9 
The second part examines potential foundations for reform by reference to 
various levels. Judges play an important role in the final analysis of the law of 
contempt and are often invited to refer to foreign law as guidance. Nevertheless, 
the courts are reluctant to adopt foreign laws and to follow the development of 
contempt law in other jurisdictions. The reason given is the ‗suitability of local 
condition‘. However, the courts offer no explanation as to how the conditions are 
different and why such differences are relevant. This part proposes that the 
Malaysian courts should take initiative to widen the horizon by referring to 
foreign materials not as a total transplant but as an inspiration for development in 
the domestic law.  
 
The first potential foundation for reform is by examining the protection of human 
rights in Malaysia, taking into consideration the rejection by the Malaysian courts 
of international human rights law and foreign laws in interpreting the Malaysian 
human rights provision. The courts confined themselves to the ‗four walls‘ 
doctrine as governing a principle of interpretation,
24
 despite the right to freedom 
of expression being safeguarded internationally. It is enshrined in most of the 
international human rights law such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR). Most of the countries are inspired by the UDHR and transformed the 
ICCPR in their domestic human rights law and constitutions. As far as it is 
concerned, the UDHR had not been referred to by the Reid Commission while 
preparing the Malaysian Constitution and the ICCPR has no legal binding effect 
unless and until Malaysia ratify and transform it into the domestic law. This is the 
justification given by the courts in rejecting international human rights law in 
interpreting domestic human rights provisions.
25
  
 
Therefore, under this part, the attitude of the Malaysian courts towards 
international and foreign laws as sources of reference will be evaluated. It will be 
argued that the ‗four-wall doctrine‘ adopted by the courts does not require an 
exclusive reliance upon domestic legal sources, as the courts should refer to 
                                                 
24
 Government of State of Kelantan v Government of Federation of Malaya & Tunku Abdul 
Rahman [1963] 1 MLJ 355. 
25
 Mohammad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Ors [2002] 4 CLJ 309, p. 384. 
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foreign materials, which can give some insights to the national judiciary in 
addressing the matter. Moreover, Section 4 (4) of the Human Rights Commission 
Act 1999 (HRCA) acknowledges the UDHR as a source, as long as it is consistent 
with the Constitution. Therefore, it will be suggested that the Malaysian courts 
should not be too rigid in interpreting their provisions for human rights and should 
widen their horizon, looking at international and foreign materials in order to take 
some lessons and to learn from their experiences. In the era of globalisation, 
Malaysia should not stay aloof and should strive to be at par with the international 
standard.  
 
The second potential incentive for the national judiciary in exercising their 
judicial creativity is by reference to the approaches adopted by the selected 
jurisdictions, namely England, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the USA 
and also the international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY, in the issue of 
contempt of court. In some jurisdictions, particularly countries that base their legal 
system in common law, dissatisfaction with the law of contempt is not new. There 
had been movements for reform in the UK and India. In the UK, part of its 
contempt law has been placed in statute and the rest is still left to be dealt with by 
common law whereas India‘s contempt law can now be found in Contempt of 
Court Act 1971. Countries like Australia and Canada have once come out with the 
reform proposals but have not proceeded.  
 
The third incentive is the results from an empirical study carried out among the 
judicial personnel, advocates and solicitors as well as prosecutors in Malaysia. 
The empirical study intends to elicit the opinions of the experts on the issues in 
the law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia and also to gauge their 
attitudes towards the use of contempt power over lawyers. It offers in-depth 
discussions of the various issues pertaining to the hypothetical reasons for 
contempt sanctions being warranted, the anomalies in this area of law to the idea 
of codification.  
 
The third part of Chapter 4 is an overview of the main issues and options to 
reform based on law and empirical research.  
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Lastly in Chapter 5 some concluding remarks in which the findings of the 
research are highlighted and suggestions are proposed to improve the existing law 
and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia.  
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Chapter 2 
The Malaysian Legal System 
 
2.1 THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 
EXISTING MALAYSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM. 
 
Malaysian law encompasses laws emanating from Malaysia as well as from 
jurisdictions outside Malaysia. The present legal system emerged as the outcome 
of the various impositions and adaptations. The traditional, British and 
independence periods have contributed towards the shaping of the existing 
system. The British were not the only power that came to the land but they left 
behind a lasting legacy.
26
  
  
The British came onto the Malayan scene during the late eighteenth century to the 
early nineteenth century. When the country was occupied by Japan from 1942 to 
1945, the British were out of Malaya. After the World War II, the British came 
back to Malaya and formed the Federation of Malaya in 1948. Malaya became 
independent in 1957 and later was formed into Malaysia in 1963.  
 
The British brought their legal system with them, although at that time a legal 
order was already in place in Malaya.
27
 Therefore, in order to implement their law 
and legal system especially when the state of law in Malaya was in chaos 
regarding the issue of lex loci, the British judges asserted that there was no law or 
legal system applicable in the states, thus resolving the matter by introducing and 
imposing English common law, rule of equity as well as the English statutes.
28
 
Formal importation of the English common law and the rules of equity into the 
national legal system were done through a legislation called the ‗Civil Law 
                                                 
26
 Apart from Britain, the Portuguese, Dutch and Japanese had come onto the Malayan scene. 
27
 The British footing began with the cession of Penang in 1786. Later, in 1819 and 1824, they 
occupied Singapore and Malacca respectively. These three territories were the British colonies and 
in 1826 were organised into one administrative unit called the Straits Settlements. 
28
 Regarding the issue of lex loci, the Privy Council in Ong Cheng Neo v Yeap Cheah Neo [1872] 1 
Ky. 326, pp. 343-344, decided that: 
[i]t is really immaterial to consider whether Prince of Wales Island, or as it is called 
Penang, should be regarded as ceded or newly settled territory, for there is no trace of any 
laws having been established there before it was acquired by the East India Company. In 
either view the law of England must be taken to be the governing law so far as it is 
applicable to the circumstances of the place, and modified in its application by these 
circumstances.  
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Ordinance‘.29 In 1956, a year before Malaya achieved its independence, the 
British introduced the final version of the Civil Law Ordinance (CLO), which was 
first introduced in the Straits Settlements in 1878. The CLO 1956 that remains 
until today was revised in 1972 and renamed as the Civil Law Act 1956 (CLA).
30
  
 
Shamrahayu A. Aziz
31
 observes that it is a general understanding that the CLO 
was meant to impose on judges the obligation to bring in the common law of 
England and the rules of equity into the local cases as the provision
32
 states, inter 
alia that: 
 
[t]he common law and the rules of equity shall be applied in so far as the 
circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective local 
inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local 
circumstances render necessary. 
 
This qualification is similar to that in the treaties entered between the British and 
the Malay rulers which designated British reservation to the application of their 
laws into the local system. The application of the proviso was very much 
dependant on the court‘s attitude and interpretation. Terrel Ag CJ. stated in Yong 
Joo Lin Yong Shook Lin and Yong Yoo Lin v Fung Poi Fong
33
 that the principles 
of English law had been accepted even before the formal introduction of English 
law in order to fill the lacuna where there was no provision on the matter in 
dispute. The legislation essentially sought to formalise what had been done by the 
judges earlier. The judges‘ inclination was towards finding solutions in English 
law as most of the judges at that time were English or English-trained. This 
continues even after Malaya won its independence from Britain as the judge 
                                                 
29 Prior to the enactment of the CLO, English law was introduced into Malaya via the Charters of 
Justice and the Residential system. Under the Residential system, English officers were placed in 
the Malay states to assist the rulers in the states‘ administration. Based on their advice, a number of 
English statutes were imported to the Malay states. The English law was also applied through the 
judges who were British or British-trained as they would turn to English law when deciding cases 
before them. They had caused a great mass of rules of common law and equity to be adopted. For 
more, see Roland St. John Braddell, The Law of the Straits Settlemen: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, Kuala Lumpur 1982). 
30
 The CLA 1956 (Revised 1972) is in fact a consolidation of the CLO 1956, Sabah‘s Application 
of Laws Ordinance 1951 and Sarawak‘s Application of Laws Ordinance 1949.   
31
 Shamrahayu A. Aziz, 'The Malaysian Legal System: The Roots, The Influence and The Future' 
(2009) 3 Malayan Law Journal xcii. 
32
 Section 3 CLO. 
33
 [1941] MLJ 63, p. 72. 
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further stated that the English courts‘ decision would have a ‗salutary effect‘ in 
the Malaysian courts.
34
 
 
Apart from the CLO, the British had adopted statutory laws from India such as the 
Penal Code, the Evidence Act, the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and the 
Contract Act. These laws were actually English common law that was codified. In 
1919, the Court‘s Enactment was introduced, which created a hierarchy of court. 
This Enactment had abolished the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales‘ Island, 
Singapore and Malacca which was introduced via the Charters of Justice. With 
that, the judiciary had evolved into a modern form.
35
  
 
2.1.1 The Legal System in  the Post-Independence Period 
 
After independence, the Federal Constitution became the primary source of law 
and was also regarded as the supreme law of the country. According to Abdul 
Aziz Bari the Constitution is the bedrock of the system. It gives birth to other 
laws,
36
 thus making it the main source of Malaysian law and its legal system.  The 
Malaysian Constitution is a written constitution that is broadly and essentially 
based on the Westminster Parliamentary
37
 model but modelled on the Indian 
Constitution.  
 
The legal system in Malaysia is part of the constitutional structure. The 
Constitution created a federal type of government, the legislature and judiciary. 
As a federation, Malaysia has two levels of government, the federal and the state 
governments where the jurisdiction is separate.
38
 The Parliament, which is 
                                                 
34
 Re Tanjung Puteri Johore State Election Petition [1988] 2 MLJ 111, p. 112. 
35
 James Foong, Malaysian Judiciary- A Record (2nd. edn Sweet & Maxwell, Selangor 2002) p. 6. 
See also Braddell (n.29) p.121. 
36
 Abdul Aziz Bari, Malaysian Constitution: A Critical Introduction (The Other Press, Kuala 
Lumpur 2003) p. 18. 
37
Abdul Aziz Bari by reference to S.A De Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitution 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 1964) p. 77, has listed down four of the major characteristics of the 
Westminster democracy, which include: (1) the head of the state is not the effective head of 
government; (2) the effective head of government is the prime minister who actually appoints and 
dismisses ministers; (3) the executive is appointed from members of the legislature, namely 
Parliament; and that (4) the executive is responsible to legislature. Abdul Aziz Bari, 'British 
Westminster System in Asia-The Malaysian Variation' (2007) 4, No.1 (Serial No. 26) US-China 
Law Review 1, p. 2. 
38
 Article 74 and 9
th
 Schedule of the Constitution. 
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bicameral,
39
 is a principal law-making body which is responsible to legislate law 
for the whole country, while the State legislature legislates on matters under state 
jurisdiction and the law shall be operative in the respective state only. The 
Executive plays a role in the law-making process as they are the members of 
Parliament that sit in the House of Representatives. The Constitution creates the 
superior courts of the country, namely the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and 
the High Courts.
40
  
 
Although the Constitution has become the primary source of law, there are other 
laws and values left or imposed by the foreign power on this country that can be 
seen until today. The obvious legacies are the CLO, the statutory laws from India 
and the judicial system. Section 3 CLA 1956 allows for the application of English 
common law and equity on certain conditions as provided by the proviso of that 
section. The courts can refer to the common law of England and the rules of 
equity in so far as the people in the country permit and the circumstances render it 
as necessary. Although the application of English common law and equity is 
restricted to the situation when there is no written law in the country, there is no 
clear stated reason for the retention. The courts also incline to find solutions from 
English common law even though the proviso in Section 3 CLA implies that the 
courts can develop their own common law and may find solutions from the 
indigenous or local sources.  
 
Before the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1985, the Privy Council 
was the last avenue for appeal and served at the peak of the hierarchy of the 
Malaysian court system. The Privy Council remained as the last resort for appeals 
for thirty years after independence. The abolition of appeals to the Privy Council 
may indicate that Malaysia is ready to build up its own legal system and develop 
its autonomy. However, the decisions of the Privy Council remain highly 
                                                 
39
 It has two houses: (a) the appointed Senate, the upper or the Dewan Negara, and (b) the 
popularly elected House of Representatives, the lower house or the Dewan Rakyat. Article 44 of 
the Constitution. For further reading on Parliament, see Andrew Harding, Law, Government and 
the Constitution in Malaysia (Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur 1996); Bari, Malaysian 
Constitution A Critical Introduction (n. 36); Abdul Aziz Bari and Farid Sufian Shuaib, 
Constitution of Malaysia. Text and Commentary (2nd edn Prentice Hall, Selangor 2006).  
40
 The subordinate courts are created by the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Revised 1972) (SCA). 
Section 3 SCA lists down the subordinate courts into the Sessions Court, the Magistrate‘s Courts 
and the Penghulu’s Courts.  
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persuasive and its application depends so much on the judges‘ attitude. Thus, the 
abolition of the appeal to the Privy Council does not mean a total rejection of 
English law.
41
  
 
The administration of justice in Malaysia since independence has undergone three 
significant changes. At the time of independence in 1957, there existed a three-tier 
structure of the superior courts with the Privy Council at the apex. With the 
abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1985, the tree-tier structure was 
reduced to two tiers, i.e. the two High Courts and the Supreme Court, which 
became the final court of appeal. In the most recent reorganisation in 1994, the 
three-tier structure was reinstated, with the Court of Appeal standing between the 
two High Courts and the apex court, renamed the Federal Court. This system 
gives more appeal opportunities to the aggrieved party in the legal proceedings.  
 
The British had divided the court system into two; the civil courts and the Shariah 
courts. This segregation is retained by the Constitution. Malaysia has two parallel 
court systems. The civil courts have the general jurisdiction, having powers and 
jurisdiction to hear all types of cases except concerning Islamic matters. The 
Shariah courts, which are the state courts created by the state laws (with exception 
to Federal Territories),
42
 have jurisdiction over Muslims only and decide on 
Islamic civil and criminal matters.  
 
2.2 THE JUDICIARY AND THE PRESENT MALAYSIAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM  
  
In Malaysia, the administration of justice is in the hands of judges since the trial 
by jury has been abolished throughout Malaysia from 1 January 1975. According 
to M.P. Jain, the role of the judiciary in a democracy is ‗that of multi-faceted 
                                                 
41
 Michael F. Rutter, The Applicable Law in Singapore and Malaysia (Malayan Law Journal Sdn. 
Bhd., Kuala Lumpur 1989) pp. 430-437.  
42
 The Shariah courts in the Federal Territories are created by Parliament. See Sections 40-57 of 
the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993. See also Farid Suffian Shuaib, 
Powers and Jurisdiction of Syariah Courts in Malaysia (Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur 
2003) p.106. 
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activism and creativeness‘.43 However in Malaysia, as propounded by Andrew 
Harding, the judges are restrained and only act within the constraint of the 
doctrine of precedent.
44
  
 
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary should be independent 
and free of any pressure from the government or anyone else as to how to decide 
any particular case. Hence, judicial independence of the judges refers to their 
ability to decide cases on merit, free from any pressure.
45
 In Malaysia, the 
Constitution ‗protects‘ the independence of the judiciary by providing express 
provisions relating to the procedure for the removal of superior judges, guarantees 
on the judges‘ remuneration and terms of office, prohibition on public discussion 
on judges‘ conducts and power of the judges to punish for contempt.46 
 
Article 125 (3) of the Constitution provides for the removal of the judge by the 
King on the grounds of inability or in breach of Judges‘ Code of Ethics. The 
Constitution protects judges by prohibiting discussion on their conduct but it is not 
entirely prohibited as according to Article 127 the judges‘ conduct can be 
discussed in Parliament provided a motion supported by at least a quarter of the 
number of the house has been passed. Apart from this, Article 126 has given the 
judges power to punish for contempt in order to protect the independence.  
 
Abdul Aziz Bari argues that the protections provided for by the Constitution may 
not be sufficient. Whether the protection is implemented is actually depending on 
the judges themselves. If they were lacking integrity and courage to defend the 
Constitution, thus it would be difficult to protect the reputation. Power to punish 
for contempt and prohibition on discussion about judges‘ conduct will be of no 
                                                 
43
 M.P. Jain, 'The Role of the Judiciary in Democracy' (1979) 6 Journal of Malaysian and 
Comparative Law 240. For more on judicial activism, see Brice Dickson (ed), Judicial Activism in 
Common Law Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007). 
44
 Harding (n. 39) p. 148. See also Bari, Malaysian Constitution: A Critical Introduction (n. 36) p. 
98; Mohd Ariff Yusof, 'Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review in Malaysia' (1982) 9 Journal of 
Malaysian and Comparative Law 19, p. 38. 
45
 Bari, Malaysian Constitutio: A Critical Introduction (n. 36) p. 102. 
46
 Ibid. 
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use if the judges show no commitment towards democracy and 
constitutionalism.
47
  
 
2.2.1 The Judiciary and the Sources Of Law 
 
The courts have to interpret and apply the law by using the authorities within their 
legal bounds. Law in Malaysia is a mosaic of written and unwritten law. Article 
160 (1) of the Federal Constitution says: 
 
Law includes written law, the common law, insofar as it is in operation in 
the Federation or any part thereof, and any custom or usage having the 
force of law in the Federation or any part thereof. 
 
The relevant sources relating to contempt of court are: 
 
(i) Constitution48 
 
As discussed earlier, the Constitution was established in 1957 when Malaya 
gained independence from the UK. It contains basic structures consisting of 
supremacy of the Constitution, constitutional monarchy, separation of the powers 
of the three branches of Government. The Constitution contains provisions 
relating to institutions to citizens and their rights.
49
 Articles 5 to 13 under Part II 
of the Constitution provide for the fundamental liberties to the citizens.  
 
The Constitution is not static but evolving as it has to be developed and explained 
in accordance with the needs and changing circumstances.
50
 It is also the 
fundamental law from which the validity of all other laws derive. It is superior to 
all other forms of law. Therefore, the judiciary has the power to declare a law as 
ultra vires as being contrary to the Constitution.
51
  
 
                                                 
47
 Ibid. pp. 103-104. 
48
 As a Federation of thirteen states, Malaysia has altogether fourteen constitutions: the Federal 
Constitution and thirteen States Constitutions. 
49
 Phang Chin Hock v Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 70, p. 71.  
50
 Bari, Malaysian Constitution: A Critical Introduction (n. 36) p. 16.  
51
 This power is granted to the judiciary by Articles 4 (3), 4 (4) and 128 of the Constitution. 
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Another important feature of the Constitution is that it provides a group of 
provisions involving fundamental liberties. This is provided for under Part II of 
the Constitution. These are the provisions that are generally known as human 
rights or civil liberties – the rights that are considered important and basic for the 
development of a human being, spiritually and physically. This discussion will be 
deliberated below.  
 
(ii) Judicial Decisions 
 
In Malaysia, as in other common law countries, the law is to be found not only in 
legislation but also in cases decided by the courts. The law derived from decisions 
of the courts is known as the ‗common law‘. This is the concept originated from 
England wherein the bulk of English law has not been enacted by Parliament but 
developed by judges. The judges derived the ratio decidendi
52
 that is the legal 
principle from the cases before them. The ratio decidendi is a source of law. This 
existing legal principle will be applied to new situations as they arise. It will 
become a precedent that is the decision made by judges previously in similar 
circumstance and will bind future courts in other cases with similar facts. The 
doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of judicial precedent dictates that it is 
necessary for each lower tier to accept loyally the decision of the higher tiers. 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis in Malaysia has a two-way operation. The first is a 
vertical operation by which a court is bound by the prior decision of a higher 
court, and the other operation is horizontal. Under the horizontal operation, some 
courts are bound by their own prior decisions and prior decisions of a court of the 
same level, whether past or present.
53
  
As for the predecessor courts of the present Federal Court, the decisions are 
binding and continue to be binding until overruled by the present Federal Court.
54
  
                                                 
52
 It means to stand by the decision and not to disturb the settled matters, i.e. to stick with what has 
been decided, or like cases should be decided alike. Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, 'Recent Decisions 
Offending Stare Decisis in Malaysia' (2008 ) 3 Malayan Law Journal xcvii. 
53
 Wan Arfah Hamzah and Ramy Bulan, An Introduction to the Malaysian Legal System (Penerbit 
Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., Selangor 2003) p. 69.  
54
 This was acknowledged in Anchorage Mall v Irama Team (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2001] 2 MLJ 
520. The Court had to consider the submission advanced by the defendant urging the court not to 
follow Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 
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Decisions from courts outside the Malaysian judicial hierarchy are not binding but 
only persuasive. Even decisions of English courts are only persuasive, (subject to 
the express reception of English law under the specific provisions of Section 3 
CLA 1956). The courts also made reference to the other countries, especially 
those in the Commonwealth, for guidance on many civil, commercial and criminal 
matters. In Raja Mokhtar bin Raja Yaacob v Public Trustee, Malaysia
55
 the Court 
followed Australian decisions in a case involving the question considering a 
pension in damages for personal injury.  Raja Azlan Shah J said: 
 
Although decisions of Commonwealth courts are not binding, they are 
entitled to the highest respect. In my view it is important that I should 
apply the principles formulated in Parry v Cleaver [1970] AC 1 and 
James v Gleeson (1965) 39 ALJR 258, so that the common law and its 
development should be homogenous in various sections of the 
Commonwealth: per Lord Parker CJ in Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd 
[1962] 2 QB 415.  
 
Almost the same words have been reiterated by Chang Min Tat FJ. in Director-
General of Inland Revenue v Kulim Rubber Plantations
56
 wherein he referred to 
decisions of courts in Australia, England and New Zealand, in saying:  
 
In so far as the decisions of other courts … are concerned, we have 
always treated these judgments as of only persuasive authority, but we 
have never lightly treated them or refused to follow them, unless we can 
successfully distinguish them or hold them as per incuriam. Other than 
for these reasons, we should as a matter of judicial comity and for the 
orderly development of the law, pay due and proper attention to them. 
 
It appears that in general the Malaysian judiciary is willing to consider decisions 
of other countries, especially those in the Commonwealth, which then allow 
                                                                                                                                      
241 and the Court held that it could not disregard or refuse to follow the decision in Alor Janggus 
unless and until it is reversed by the Federal Court. Since its judicial pronouncement emanated 
from the highest court, it deserved the utmost respect and should be followed as a guide. However, 
a final decision of the Final Court is binding; its correctness may be questioned in a subsequent 
case where the identical point of law arises for decision. Tai Chai Yu v The Chief Registrar of the 
Federal Court [1998] 2 MLJ 474, p. 476 per Gopal Sri Ram JCA. For more details on the 
application of the doctrine of stare decisis in Malaysia, see Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, 'Recent 
Decisions Offending Stare Decisis in Malaysia' (n. 52); Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed, 'Rationale for 
Departing from Stare Decisis: A Review of Re Hj Khalid Abdullah; Ex p. Danaharta Urus Sdn 
Bhd [2008] 2 CLJ 326' (2008) 6 Malayan Law Journal cxxv. 
55
 [1970] 2 MLJ 151. 
56
 [1981] 1 MLJ 214. 
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Malaysian law to progress with the development of common law in England and 
its counterparts.
57
   
 
(iii) English law 
 
English common law and equity are part of Malaysian law and its reception is 
embodied in Section 3 (1) CLA 1956.
58
 Section 3 (1) (a) CLA 1956 states that 
courts in Peninsular Malaysia should apply English common law and equity as 
administered in England on 7 April 1956. In Sabah and Sarawak, Section 3 (1) (b) 
and (c) CLA 1956 states that the courts in both states should apply English 
common law, rules of equity together with statutes of general application as 
administered in England on 1 December 1951 and 12 December 1949 
accordingly. 
 
Although English common law and rules of equity may be referred to in the court, 
this does not mean that the court has to import English law wholesale and without 
thought. English common law can be applied in the absence of local legislation. 
The Act of Parliament is regarded as highly as that of English common law. This 
means that where the common law on a given topic has been superseded by the 
legislation, the court‘s duty is to interpret the statute without recourse to the 
common law existing before the statute was enacted.
59
 The English common law 
is only meant to fill in the lacuna, in which a local legislation is not present. Be 
that as it may, the fact that there is local legislation on the given topic does not 
                                                 
57
 Harding (n. 39) p. 78. 
58
 Section 3 (1) provides for general application of English law. It states: 
Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written 
law in force in Malaysia, the Court shall: 
(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the 
rules of equity as administered in England on the 7th day of April, 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with 
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 1st day 
of December, 1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with 
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 12th 
day of December, 1949, subject however to sub-section 3 (ii): 
 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general 
application shall be applied so far only as the circumstances of the States of Malaysia and 
their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local 
circumstances render necessary.  
59
 Song Bok Yoong v Ho Kim Poui [1968] 1 MLJ 56; Jagathesan v Linggi Plantations Ltd [1969] 2 
MLJ 253. 
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necessarily mean that the common law in the area is always irrelevant. There will 
be occasions where the statute does not cover a point, and then, reference to case 
law or English common law may be necessary.
60
  
 
In applying English common law, at first the court has to determine whether there 
is any written law in force in Malaysia. If there is none, then the court should 
determine the relevant common law, and the rules of equity as administered in 
England on 7 April 1956.
61
 The ‗cut-off‘ date signifies that the court should 
ascertain what was the English common law at the date of reception and in what 
way it has been modified and developed locally since that date. Having done that, 
the court should consider whether ‗local circumstances‘ and ‗local inhabitants‘ 
permit its application as such. If it is ‗permissible‘, then the court should apply it. 
Thus, that English common law principle will be a binding authority. 
 
However, if the court finds that such English common law principle is not 
‗permissible‘, the court is free to reject it totally or adopt any part which is 
‗permissible‘, with or without qualification. Where the court rejects it totally or in 
part, the court is free to formulate Malaysia‘s own common law. In so doing, the 
court is at liberty to look at any source of law, local or otherwise, be it England 
after 7 April 1956, principles of common law in other countries, Islamic law of 
common application or common customs of the people of Malaysia.
62
 Any 
English law referred to after the date specified, and current decisions of the 
English courts will only be treated as persuasive authority and can at best be 
merely useful comparative analogies in a given situation.
63
 
 
Rutter
64
 questions whether the reference to colonialism implies that the UK has an 
active interest in perpetuating the local application of English law. He, however, 
holds that this seems unlikely. He quoted Lord Scarman in Jamil bin Harun v 
Yang Kamsiah
65
 as His Lordship said: 
 
                                                 
60
 Rutter (n. 41) pp. 517-518.  
61
 The cut-off date for Peninsular Malaysia. 
62
 Nepline Sdn Bhd v Jones Lang Wootton [1995] 1 CLJ 865, p. 871 per Abdul Hamid Mohamed J. 
63
 Rutter (n. 41) p. 512. 
64
 Ibid. p. 565. 
65
 [1984] 2 WLR 668, p. 671. 
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… it is for the courts of Malaysia to decide, subject always to the statute 
law of the Federation, whether to follow English case law. 
 
According to him, this reflects that it is up to the locals to choose the application 
of English law, and it is not the desire on the part of English courts to subject 
Malaysia to the laws of England. This is supported by Sharifah Suhana
66
 as she 
claims that the strong influence which the ‗mother country‘ continues to have over 
its former colony is a reason why Malaysian judges as a matter of judicial practice 
and policy, tend to voluntarily choose and give priority to adopting a rule of 
English law over the laws of other commonwealth jurisdictions.
67
  
 
There were calls, as early as in 1971, to repeal or amend Section 3 CLA 1956 in 
order to allow a Malaysian common law to develop.
68
 This idea received a 
negative feedback from some factions, especially from the Bar. The Bar refuted 
the view that the common law is exclusively English. The common law is a body 
of centuries of experience dealing with human affairs which are the same 
everywhere although it had its origin in England. The common law is a common 
heritage shared by most of the countries of the Commonwealth and the USA. 
Under Section 3 CLA 1956, the Malaysian courts examine the common law as 
practised in different jurisdictions to find a solution best suited to Malaysia.
69
 The 
Bar is also of the opinion that Section 3 gives judges a wide discretion to accept 
any English common law principle or rule of equity. Once it is accepted, it will 
                                                 
66
 Sharifah Suhana Ahmad, Malaysian Legal System (Malayan Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur 1999) 
pp. 10-15. 
67
 A.L.R Joseph, 'Flouting Stare Decisis and the Potential Impact of European Laws on Malaysian 
Common Law: Two Reasons for Vigilance' 2007 <http://www. 
malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/3278/27/>; Mohammed Imam, 'Malaysian Common Law: 
Reality and Feasibility' (1997) 1 Current Law Journal cv. 
68
 Ahmad Ibrahim had advocated the repeal of Section 3 CLO 1956. See Ahmad Ibrahim, 'The 
Civil Law Ordinance in Malaysia' (1971) 2 MLJ lxi. In 1989, the then Lord President of the 
Supreme Court, Tan Sri Abdul Hamid Omar proposed the same. His idea was backed up by the 
then Chief Justice of Malaya, Tan Sri Hashim Yeop Sani Abdullah. The idea for repeal or amend 
was proposed in order to reject anything foreign and to incorporate Islamic values in the judicial 
making. See Hamzah and Bulan (n. 53) p. 121. The call to replace common law again arose in 
2007 when Tun Ahmad Fairuz, the then Chief Justice of the Federal Court, questioned the need to 
use English common law. He strongly supported Ahmad Ibrahim‘s views to abolish the use of 
English common law and instead refer to Islamic law and the decisions of Malaysian courts, giving 
priority to local circumstances. See 'Is Common Law Still Needed?' The Star (22 August 2007) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/is_common_law_still_needed_.html>. 
December 2007. 
69
 Hamzah and Bulan (n. 53) p. 122. 
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become part of the Malaysian common law and Malaysian law will be developed 
in this manner.
70
    
 
Hence, the judges are free to develop the Malaysian law. They may refer to 
English common law before the cut-off date, English law after the cut-off date, 
laws of other commonwealth jurisdictions or even Islamic law in making their 
decisions, so long as it suits the local conditions and circumstances.  
 
2.2.2 The Courts and the Legal Actors 
 
2.2.2.1 The Structure and the Jurisdiction of the Courts  
 
Malaysia has two parallel court systems. The federal courts, which are often called 
the civil courts, are the principal court that administers the general law of the land 
based on the common law tradition. Alongside the civil courts there also exist 
state courts which include Shariah and Native courts. The Shariah courts exist to 
administer Islamic law, mainly in Muslims‘ personal matters. The Shariah courts 
that exist in every state have jurisdiction over Muslims. For indigenous people in 
Sabah and Sarawak, they have to refer to the Native courts to deal with their 
customary matters. The Native courts have jurisdiction over Non-Muslims in 
these states.
71
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 
Shaila Koshy, 'Call to Replace Common Law "Baseless"' The Star (23 August 2007)  
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/bar_news/berita_badan_peguam/call_to_replace_common_law
_baseless.html> accessed December 2007. The similar view was expressed by two former Lords 
President of the Malaysian judiciary. Tun Mohamad Suffian and Sultan Azlan Shah of Perak 
viewed that English common law was not applied in toto but with modification. Once received, it 
will be part of the Malaysian common law. Moreover, the Malaysian courts do not exclusively rely 
on English law as they refer to other countries where the common law applies. Furthermore, Tun 
Mohamad Suffian pointed out that it was not the job of the judiciary to propose a wide ranging law 
reform, but the executive‘s. Hamzah and Bulan (n. 53) p. 122.   
71
 The Native Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes among natives in relation to 
native customary laws. The courts may hear cases arising from breach of native law or custom in 
respect of religion, matrimonial or sexual offence to family matters from betrothal, marriage, 
divorce, and custody to succession. Section 6 of the Native Courts Ordinance 1992. 
 25 
(i) The Civil Courts 
Diagram 2.1 
Hierarchy of the Courts 
 
 
(a) Federal Court 
The Federal Court, as the highest judicial authority and the final court of appeal in 
Malaysia was established pursuant to Article 121 (2) of the Constitution and came 
into being with the enactment of the CJA 1964. By the powers conferred by 
Section 17 CJA 1964, the Rules of Federal Court 1995 have come into being to 
deal with the rules and procedures of the Federal Court. 
With regard to the jurisdiction, the Federal Court derives its jurisdiction from the 
Constitution Act of Parliament namely the CJA 1964, and from the common law 
jurisdiction with respect to inherent jurisdiction.  
The Federal Court is principally an appellate court, but in addition, it has three 
other kinds of jurisdiction, namely original, referral and advisory jurisdiction.
72
 
                                                 
72
 Article 121(2) reads: 
There shall be a court which shall be known as the Federal Court and shall have its 
principal registry in Kuala Lumpur, and the Federal Court shall have the following 
jurisdiction, that is to say: 
(a) jurisdiction to determine appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal, of the High 
Court or a judge thereof; 
(b) such original or consultative jurisdiction as is specified in Articles 128 and 130; and 
(c )  such other jurisdiction as may be conferred by or under federal law. 
Federal Court 
 
Court of Appeal 
 
High Court of Malaya 
High Court of Sabah and 
Sarawak 
Sessions Courts 
Sessions Courts 
Magistrates‘ Courts 
 
Penghulu’s Courts 
 
Magistrates‘ Courts 
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With respect to its appellate jurisdiction, Article 128 (3) of the Constitution 
provides that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine appeals from the 
Court of Appeal, a High Court or a judge thereof.  
Article 128 (2) of the Constitution bestows a referral jurisdiction to the Federal 
Court. The Federal Court will exercise its referral jurisdiction when it is referred 
to for a decision by way of a special case. The Federal Court may determine the 
meaning of constitutional provisions as referred to that have arisen in proceedings 
in the High Court or in any of the subordinate courts. When the Federal Court has 
decided, it remits the case to the trial court to be disposed of in accordance with 
that decision.  
The Federal Court may also exercise its inherent powers derived from common 
law jurisdiction as being placed under Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 
1995, which states: 
 
For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in these 
Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court 
to hear any application or to make any order as may be necessary to 
prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court.  
 
In Megat Najmuddin Bin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) 
Bhd,
73
 the Federal Court considered Article 121 (2) of the Constitution in relation 
to inherent powers of the Federal Court. The Court observed that where there is a 
clear case of injustice being committed, the Court under its inherent powers must 
deal with it, i.e. to hear any application or make any order as may be necessary to 
prevent injustice.
74
  
 
(b) Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal is established by Article 121 (1B) of the Constitution.
75
 It 
was created in 1994 by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994
76
 and the Courts 
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 [2002] 1 MLJ 385. 
74
 MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Vincent Tan Chee Youn [2002] 2 MLJ 573; Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v 
PP [2004] 4 CLJ 157; Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v Public Prosecutor (No. 1) [2007] 2 MLJ 101; 
Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2008] 6 CLJ 1; 
Badan Peguam Negara v Kerajaan Malaysia [2009] 2 MLJ 161. 
75
 Article 121(1B) reads: 
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of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1994, to provide an additional level of appeal in 
Malaysia. 
Under the CJA 1964 and the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, the Court of 
Appeal has jurisdiction to determine appeals from the courts below it.  
 
(c) High Court 
 
Article 121 (1) of the Constitution creates two High Courts of co-ordinate 
jurisdiction and status situated in the Peninsular Malaysia or West Malaysia and in 
the states of Sabah and Sarawak. These two High Courts are the High Court of 
Malaya and High Court of Sabah and Sarawak. These courts have such 
jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by the CJA and the RHC 1980, 
which deals with the rules and procedures in the High Court.  
The powers and jurisdiction of the High Court are rather extensive. The High 
Court is bestowed with the original, appellate, as well as revisionary and 
supervisory jurisdictions. Its original jurisdiction with respect to both civil and 
criminal cases is unlimited as cases outside the jurisdiction of the subordinate 
courts are brought before it.  
In exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the High Court hears appeals from 
subordinate courts in both civil and criminal matters.
77
  
In addition to its appellate jurisdiction, the High Court also exercises powers of 
revision in respect of criminal proceedings in the subordinate courts,
78
 and may 
call for records of civil proceedings so as to satisfy itself the correctness, legality 
                                                                                                                                      
There shall be a court which shall be known as the Court of Appeal and shall have its 
principal registry in Kuala Lumpur, and the Court of Appeal shall have the following 
jurisdiction, that is to say: 
(a) jurisdiction to determine appeals from decisions of a High Court or a judge thereof 
(except decisions of a High Court given by a registrar or other officer of the Court 
and appealable under federal law to a judge of the Court); and  
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred by or under federal law. 
76
 Section 13 of the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1994. 
77
 Sections 26 and 27 CJA 1964. As provided by Section 28 CJA 1964, there is no appeal to the 
High Court from a decision of a subordinate court in any civil matter where the amount in dispute 
or the value of the subject matter is less than RM 10, 000, except on a question of law.  
78
 Section 31 CJA 1964. 
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or propriety of any decision recorded or passed by the subordinate courts.
79
  The 
High Court has general supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction over all 
subordinate courts.
80
  
 
(d) Subordinate Courts: Sessions, Magistrates‟ and Penghulu‟s 
Courts 
 
Under Article 121 (1) of the Constitution, two inferior courts, namely, the 
Sessions
81
 and Magistrates‘ Courts have been created with jurisdictions and 
powers as may be conferred by or under the federal law. The Subordinate Courts 
Act 1948 (SCA) deals with the power and jurisdiction of the courts while the 
Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 (SCR) governs their rules and procedures.  
 
Both the Sessions and Magistrates Courts have wide criminal and civil 
jurisdiction. The Sessions Courts have jurisdiction to hear all criminal matters 
involving offences other than those punishable with death and may pass any 
sentence allowed by the law except the sentence of death.
82
 In addition to its 
original jurisdiction, the Sessions Court is vested with a limited supervisory 
jurisdiction over the Magistrates‘ and Penghulu’s Courts.83  
 
Magistrates‘ Courts84 deal with the greatest volume of work as they deal with a 
host of minor offences and civil cases. It has jurisdiction to hear and determine 
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 Section 32 CJA 1964. 
80
 Section 35 CJA 1964. 
81
 Sessions Courts are established under Section 59 SCA 1948. Each Sessions Court is presided 
over by a Sessions court judge appointed by the King, on the recommendation of the Chief Judge. 
The Sessions Court judge is appointed from a member of the Judicial and Legal Service of the 
Federation.  
82
 Section 63 SCA 1948. 
83
 A Sessions Court‘s judge may call for and examine the record of any civil proceedings before 
the two courts below to satisfy him or herself of the correctness or propriety of any decision 
recorded or passed in any proceedings of that court. If there is any impropriety or irregularity 
found, the judge must forward the record with to the High Court for an order. Section 54 SCA 
1948. 
84
 Magistrates‘ courts are established under Section 76 SCA 1948. It consists of a magistrate sitting 
alone either by first or second class magistrates. Both classes of magistrates are appointed by the 
King in the federal territories and by the Ruler of the State in the states. The first class magistrates 
are legally qualified and must be members of Judicial and Legal Service of the Federation. They 
are appointed on the recommendation of the Chief Judge. Second class magistrates are not legally 
qualified as they are civil servants and court officials who do magisterial work in addition to their 
administrative duties. However, in practice at present, Second Class Magistrates are no longer 
appointed. See Sections 78 and 79 SCA 1948 respectively. 
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any civil or criminal matter arising within the local limits of its assigned 
jurisdiction. The Magistrates‘ Courts have the jurisdiction to hear criminal cases 
where the maximum sentence does not exceed ten years imprisonment.
85
  
 
The Penghulu’s Courts exist only in Peninsular Malaysia but nowadays this court 
hardly ever tries cases owing to its minimal jurisdiction. This court has the power 
to hear civil matters in which claim does not exceed RM 50, where the parties are 
of an Asian race, speaking and understanding the Malay language.
86
 The 
Penghulu‘s Court‘s criminal jurisdiction is limited to offences of a minor nature 
charged against a person of Asian race which is specially enumerated in his 
warrant, which can be punished with a fine not exceeding RM 25.
87
  
 
(ii) The Shariah Courts 
 
The Shariah courts, being the state courts, are created and regulated by state laws 
and under the responsibility of the state authorities. The Shariah courts are 
established in all the states through the Administration of Islamic Law 
Enactment,
88
 and in the federal territories, through federal law.
89
 The courts are 
concerned with matters on which states are empowered to pass laws as 
enumerated in Item I List II of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.
90
 Hence, 
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 The Second Class Magistrate can try offences for which the maximum term of imprisonment 
does not exceed twelve months‘ imprisonment. Section 88 SCA 1948. 
86
 Section 94 SCA 1948 reads: 
A Penghulu's Court may hear and determine original proceedings of a civil nature in 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money, with or without 
interest, not exceeding fifty ringgit and in which all the parties to the proceedings are 
persons of an Asian race speaking and understanding the Malay language. 
87
 Section 95 SCA 1948. 
88
 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1978 (Johore) (No. 14 of 1978); Administration of 
Shariah Courts Enactment 1982 (Kelantan) (no. 3 of 1982); Administration of the Shariah Courts 
Enactment 1985 (Melaka) (No. 6 of 1985); Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1989 
(Selangor) (No. 2 of 1989); Administration of Islamic Law (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 1991 
(No.1 of 1991); Administration of Islamic Law 1991 (Pahang) (No. 3 of 1991); Administration of 
Muslim Law Enactment 1992 (Perak) (No.2 of 1992); Shariah Courts Enactment 1992 (Perlis) 
(No. 5 of 1992); Shariah Courts Enactment 1992 (Sabah) (No. 14 of 1992); Administration of 
Islamic Religious Affairs Enactment 1993 (Penang) (No. 7 of 1993); Shariah Courts Enactment 
1993 (Kedah) (No.4 of 1994); Shariah Courts (Terengganu) Enactment 2001 (No.3 of 2001); 
Shariah Courts Ordinance 2001 (Sarawak) (Ord. 4/2001). 
89
 Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (AIL (FT) Act 1993) (Act 505). 
90
 Item 1 of List II states: 
Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, 
Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam, 
including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, 
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the Shariah courts have jurisdiction over Muslims only and decide on Islamic civil 
and criminal matters. In its civil jurisdiction, the courts shall hear cases on family 
and some personal Muslim matters as indicated by state legislation such as 
betrothal and marriage, divorce, nullification or separation, marital property 
claims, maintenance of dependants, legitimacy, guardianship and custody, testate 
and intestate and gifts inter vivos and charitable trust.
91
 In its criminal jurisdiction, 
the Shariah courts shall have jurisdiction over criminal matters of religious nature 
including offences relating to sexual relationship, incest, prostitution and other 
offences like consumption of liquor, non-payment of zakat (tithing) and failure to 
fast during Ramadhan. Although the Shariah courts have jurisdiction over 
criminal matters, their penal jurisdiction is very limited, with restricted 
jurisdiction not only regarding the types of triable crimes but also regarding 
punishment.
92
   
 
At present, the Shariah courts apply a three-tier system, namely, the Shariah 
Subordinate Courts, the Shariah High Courts and the Shariah Appeal Courts. The 
lower Shariah Courts remain in the hands of the states but the Shariah Appeal 
Court has been ‗federalised‘ through the Department of Shariah Judiciary 
Malaysia. According to Shamrahayu A. Aziz, ‗federalised‘ here does not involve 
the transfer of state power to the federal government, it is a mere administrative 
federalisation, whereby there is only one and the same panel of judges to form the 
                                                                                                                                      
divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-
charitable trusts; Wakafs and the definition and regulation of charitable and religious trusts, 
the appointment of trustees and the incorporation of persons in respect of Islamic religious 
and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions 
operating wholly within the State; Malay customs; Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar 
Islamic religious revenue; mosques or any Islamic public places of worship, creation and 
punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that 
religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List; the constitution, 
organization and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over 
persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included 
in this paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as 
conferred by federal law; the control of propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons 
professing the religion of Islam; the determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine 
and Malay custom. 
91
 See for example Section 46 (b) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 
1993. 
92
 The Shariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 was passed by the Parliament conferring 
jurisdiction on Shariah courts. The Act was revised in 1984 and the punishment was increased 
from 6 months imprisonment, or RM 1,000 fine, or a combination of both to the maximum penalty 
of three years imprisonment or a fine not exceeding RM 5,000 or whipping not exceeding six 
strokes or any combination thereof. Aziz (n. 31).  
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bench of this Shariah appellate court throughout the country instead of having 
different panels for different states.
93
  
 
2.2.2.2 The Legal Actors 
 
(i) The Judges 
 
In December 2008, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act 2009 (JACA) was 
passed and the Judicial Appointment Commission (JAC) was established in order 
to appoint and promote judges of the superior courts.
94
  
 
The JAC is composed of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court as the Chairman, 
the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judges of the High Courts, a 
Federal Court judge and four other eminent persons who are not members of the 
executive or public service appointed by the Prime Minister after consulting the 
Bar Council, Sabah Law Association, the Advocates Association of Sarawak, 
Attorney General and other relevant bodies.
95
 The functions and powers of the 
JAC are listed under Section 21 JACA and amongst the JAC‘s functions and 
powers is to select a suitable qualified person to merit the appointment as a judge 
of the superior court before tendering a recommendation to the Prime Minister for 
his consideration.
96
 The Act has laid down the criteria against which potential 
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 Ibid. (n. 31). 
94 'Government Proposes to Set Up Judicial Appointment Commission' Bernama (17 April 2008) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/bar_news/berita_badan_peguam/government_proposes_to_set_
up_judicial_appointment_commission.html. >  accessed September 2008.  
In fact, on 1 April 2006, the UK ended seven hundred years of legal tradition when a new Judicial 
Appointments Commission came into existence and was charged with the task of judicial 
appointments. The establishment of the Judicial Appointment Commission in Malaysian scenario 
will ensure that the judiciary will be responsible for the selection of the judges. This will be good 
for public confidence in the judiciary. The change in the appointment of the judges is perhaps in 
response to the chaos in the judiciary especially after a series of scandals including a secretly taped 
video showing a lawyer allegedly brokering the appointment of senior judge (with the help of 
deputy minister who had direct influence in the appointment of judges) in a telephone conversation 
with someone who was later appointed the Chief Justice. 
95
 Section 25 JACA 2009. 
96
 In the subordinate courts, the appointment of the Sessions Courts‘ judges and Magistrates come 
almost entirely from the Judicial and Legal Service of the Federation. Their conditions of service, 
as members of the judicial and legal service, are governed by the rules that apply generally to 
public service. A Judicial and Legal Commission, created pursuant to Article 138 of the 
Constitution, is responsible for appointment, placement, promotion, transfer and the exercising of 
disciplinary control.  
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appointees can be assessed. Certainly, the candidates should fulfil the 
requirements as provided for under Article 123 of the Constitution, i.e. a citizen of 
Malaysia who has been an advocate or a member of the judicial and legal service 
for ten years preceding his appointment. As far as the criteria relating to personal 
attributes are concerned, the Act provides that the candidates should have the 
following qualities: integrity, competency and experience; objective, impartial, 
fair and of good moral character; decisiveness, ability to make timely judgments 
and have good legal writing skills; industriousness and the ability to manage cases 
well and also have excellent physical and mental health. The JAC in selecting 
candidates must also take into account the need to encourage diversity in the range 
of legal expertise and knowledge in the judiciary.
97
 After making the selection, the 
JAC will submit a report of its recommendation to the Prime Minister who will 
tender his advice to the King for the appointment of the selected candidate in 
accordance to Article 122B.
98
 
 
The Constitution secures the independence of judges as individuals via Article 
125 which provides after the appointment that the judges cannot be removed from 
office until their tenure expires or with the exception of misbehaviour or inability 
to discharge official duties. Any attempt to remove a judge from his office during 
his term requires a tribunal established under Article 125 of the Constitution to 
enquire into the allegation against him.
99
 The King may then act upon the 
recommendation of the tribunal as to whether the judge in question ought to be 
removed.
100
 Apart from that, the remuneration of the judges is set by Parliament
101
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 Section 23 JACA 2009. 
98
 Sections 26 and 28 JACA 2009. With regard to the selection and appointment of the superior 
judges, the Prime Minister is still having the authority or final say. The JAC only helps in 
recommending the suitable candidates but not in appointing a judge. Although the Act is welcome, 
this new act is triggered with criticisms as it still gives the Prime Minister the final say in 
appointing senior judges including the Chief Justice. Ambiga Sreenevasan, 'Bar Council's 
Comments on the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill 2008' (17 December 2008) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/members_opinions_and_comments/bar_councils_comments_o
n_the_judicial_appointments_commission_bill_2008.html> accessed February 2009.  
99
 If the Prime Minister or the Chief Justice, after consulting the Prime Minister, believes that a 
judge ought to be removed from office, such officials may represent this opinion to the King who 
will constitute a tribunal to consider the matter. 
100
 A tribunal was appointed to enquire into allegations of misbehaviour by the then Lord 
President, Tun Salleh Abas, and the insubordination of five Supreme Court judges in 1988. The 
1988 judicial crisis started when the High Court declared UMNO (one of the fractions of Barisan 
Nasional, a ruling party in the government) an illegal society. The Prime Minister began to attack 
the judiciary by making heated statements and later tabled a bill in Parliament to amend Articles 
121 and 145 of the Constitution. These amendments divested the courts of the ‗judicial power of 
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and there is also a mandatory retirement age of 65 years or for an extended period 
as provided by the Constitution. The Constitution also protects the judges against 
the reduction of their remuneration and the alteration of other terms of office that 
could be detrimental to them during their term of service.
102
 The independence of 
judges is also furthered by a rule that they are immune from personal liability for 
anything done in the course of their judicial office unless it can be shown that they 
acted outside the jurisdiction and mala fide
103
 as provided for in Section 14 CJA 
1964.
104
 Furthermore, judges are ensured with privileges. The reputation of the 
judiciary is protected by the Constitution. Article 127 prohibits discussion of the 
conduct of every judge of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or High Court in 
either the House of Parliament or the State Legislative Assembly, except by way 
of a substantive motion that is one quarter of the Members of Parliament 
supporting the motion to discuss the matter in the House.
105
 In exchange for this 
                                                                                                                                      
the Federation‘, giving them only such power as Parliament might grant them. The Attorney 
General was also empowered to determine the venues in which cases would be heard. At this 
point, the Lord President of the Supreme Court began making strong statements about defending 
the autonomy of the judiciary. With the agreement of the other federal judges, he wrote a letter to 
the King with the hope that all the unfounded accusations against the judiciary would be stopped. 
Tun Salleh, Lord President, who was suspended from his post, was summoned by the Prime 
Minister who demanded his resignation. At first he agreed but upon finding that his suspension 
would be backdated so as to nullify some of his earlier actions in then pending cases such as the 
UMNO case, he withdrew his resignation. The government then initiated impeachment 
proceedings against him and was officially charged with writing ‗a letter to the King without 
approval of all judges in the country‘, displaying ‗bias and prejudice‘ against the government, and 
seeking ‗to undermine public confidence in the government's administration.‘ The tribunal 
eventually found him guilty, and he was officially relieved of his position. Of the five judges who 
had supported him, two were convicted, and the other three were acquitted. For more detail, see 
A.J. Harding, 'The 1988 Constitutional Crisis in Malaysia' (1990) 39 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 57. 
101
 Article 125 (6) of the Constitution; Judges‘ Remuneration Act 1971.  
102
 Article 125 (7) of the Constitution. 
103
 Judges do not enjoy total immunity and one could proceed against a judge on grounds of mala 
fides. See 'Imuniti Hakim Tidak Mutlak (Judicial Immunity is not Absolute)' Utusan Malaysia (9 
Februari 2006). 
104
 Section 14 (1) CJA 1964 states: 
[n]o Judge or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for 
any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether 
or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, nor shall any order for costs be made against 
him, provided that he at the time in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do 
or order the act complained of. 
 See also Thiruchelvasegaram Manickavasegar v Mahadevi Nadchatiram [2003] 2 CLJ 752; Tai 
Choi Yu v Ian Chin Hon Chong [2002] 2 CLJ 259; Takang Timber Sdn Bhd v The Government of 
Sarawak & Anor [1998] 3 CLJ SUPP 413.  
105
 In Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1, the defendant 
intended to convene an EGM of the Bar for the purpose of discussing certain allegations relating to 
the judiciary that they considered matters of public interest. The plaintiff brought an action in the 
High Court to stop the EGM on the grounds that the EGM and the proposed resolution constitute 
contempt of court and amounted to offences under the Sedition Act 1948. The High Court granted 
an interlocutory injunction and held that the conduct of judges cannot be discussed even by the 
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protection from criticism, the judiciary is expected to observe the judicial code of 
ethics. 
 
In 1994, the Constitution was amended to include a new clause 3A to Article 125. 
The clause enables the King, on the recommendation of the Chief Justice, 
President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the two High Courts, 
after consulting with the Prime Minister, to prescribe a written code of ethics to be 
applicable to every judge of the Superior Court. The Judges‘ Code of Ethics 1994 
was introduced to govern judicial conduct of superior courts judges.
106
 In July 
2009, the new Code has come into force. The Judges‘ Code of Ethics 2009 (JCE) 
states the basic standards to govern the conduct of all judges.  
 
The Code provides guidance and imposition on judges, to ensure that their 
conduct, both in and out of court, is maintained at a high standard; both in their 
personal and judicial conduct. They must not conduct themselves in such a 
manner as to bring the judiciary into disrepute. They must also maintain and 
enhance the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the 
impartiality of the judges and of the judiciary.
107
 The judges have the duty to 
comply with the Code; as non-compliance would render them to disciplinary 
                                                                                                                                      
Parliament unless a substantive motion under Article 127 applies. The High Court observed that 
there is a need to protect and uphold the independence of judiciary. However, the Court of Appeal 
in Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Ors v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 155 emphasised 
on the consideration of freedom of speech in considering restriction on discussing conduct of 
judges.  
106
 The Code of Ethics was referred to in Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and 
Another Appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 481, p.527, where the Court of Appeal considered the requirement 
to write judgment in the Malaysian courts. Gopal Sri Ram JCA observed that the judicial policy 
whereby a judge is duty-bound to give reasons for his decisions has received constitutional 
sanction via Article 125 (3A) of the Constitution. The Code of Ethics to which clause 3A of the 
article refers, proscribes a judge ‗inordinately and without reasonable explanation of delay in the 
disposal of cases, the delivery of decisions and the writing of grounds of judgment.‘ The effect of 
the breach of any provision in the Code could lead to removal of a judge from office as provided 
by Article 125 (3) on the ground of ‗any breach of any provision of the Code of Ethics…‘ 
107
 Sections 5 to 11 of the Code lay down the code of ethics to be observed by the judges. The 
judges are expected, among others, to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They 
must be free from any extraneous influence, inducement, threat or interference from any quarter or 
for any reason. The judges must not permit others to convey the impression that they are in a 
position to influence the judges. The judges are also expected to conduct themselves in a manner 
which is befitting of a judge. Judges must avoid a close relationship with lawyers. They must 
behave in a way that might not bring their private interests into conflict with their judicial duties. 
The judges are not allowed to give comment about pending or impending proceedings that might 
be heard before their courts. 
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proceedings.
108
 Hence, the Constitution and the Code are empowered to deal with 
unbecoming and injudicious conduct of the judges. Any complaints against a 
judge can be forwarded to the Chief Justice in writing.
109
 The Chief Justice after 
receiving a complaint against a judge for any breach of the provision of the Code 
will determine the degree of the alleged breach in order to either refer the matter 
to the tribunal under Article 125 (4) of the Constitution, if the breach warrants the 
judge to be referred to the tribunal,
110
 or to the Committee.
111
  
 
Even though the judges‘ ethical conduct is governed by the Code of Ethics, there 
was an ‗attempt‘ to subject the judges to contempt of court. The issue relating to 
contempt by judges in their own courts was discussed briefly in Public Prosecutor 
v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim.112 In this case, the counsel for the defendant had 
filed a motion to commit a High Court judge for contempt for words uttered to the 
counsel in a proceeding in his own court. The Attorney General‘s application to 
represent the judge in the proceedings was rejected on the grounds of conflict in 
the doctrine of separation of power.  This is because the Attorney General is the 
legal advisor to the Government under Article 145 (e) of the Constitution. The 
Court in this case did not discuss in depth the motion of contempt of court against 
the judge but only replied to the rejection of the Attorney General‘s application.113  
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109
 Section 12 JCE 2009. 
110
 The tribunal set up under Article 125 (4) of the Constitution deals with cases involving the 
removal of a judge for offence under Article 125 (3) of the Constitution.  
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 A Judge Ethics Committee is set up to deal with judges who breached the Judges‘ Code of 
Ethics. The Judges‘ Ethic Committee Act 2010 (JECA) came into force on 4 March 2010 to deal 
with matters relating to the conduct and discipline of all judges. Section 4 of the Judges‘ Ethic 
Committee Act 2010; 'Who Judges the Chief Judge?' New Straits Times Online (23 October 2009) 
<http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/articles/12eye/Article/> accessed December 2009; 
<http://www.parlimen.gov.my/eng-index.php> accessed 3 November 2009. 
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 [2002] 2 MLJ 730. 
113
 Hashim Yusoff J observes at pp. 734-735: 
The words being the subject matter of the instant notice of motion were uttered by 
Augustine Paul J in the course of the proceedings of Wilayah Persekutuan Criminal Trial 
No 45-49-98 (PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim [1998] 4 MLJ 481). It is therefore, done in 
the course of his duties as a judge of the High Court. Whether the words are 
contemptuous and if so, then whether Augustine Paul J can be cited for contempt in his 
own court are issues to be determined later in these proceedings. For the immediate 
matter at hand, I cannot agree with the argument that the AG cannot represent Augustine 
Paul in these contempt proceedings. It cannot be said that Augustine Paul has 
compromised the judiciary by accepting the services of the AG to appear and defend him 
in these proceedings … If I may add, proper for the AG as the officer established under 
the Constitution and under the Act to step in and defend the judge not as a private 
individual but in the protection of such office and the institution of the judiciary and in the 
interest of the administration of justice in this country. I cannot see how it would affect 
the doctrine of separation of powers by the AG doing so. The AG has exercised his 
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(ii) The Lawyers 
 
(a)  The Advocates and Solicitors 
 
In Malaysia, advocates and solicitors are the private practitioners and members of 
the Malaysian Bar.
114
 They are governed by the Legal Profession Act 1976 
(LPA).
115
 The LPA establishes the Bar, of which all advocates and solicitors are 
members, and the Bar Council,
116
 which manages the dealings of the lawyers from 
their admission
117
 to their conducts.
118
 
                                                                                                                                      
discretion and acted in the public interest by his application to represent Augustine Paul J 
in order to prevent interference with the administration of justice. 
114
 The Malaysian Bar is an independent Bar the aim of which is to uphold the cause of justice and 
oversee the interest of the legal profession. It is established under the Advocates and Solicitors‘ 
Ordinance 1947 which was subsequently repealed by the LPA 1976.  
115
 The advocates and solicitors in Sabah and Sarawak are professionally organised by the 
Advocate Ordinance of Sabah and Advocate Ordinance of Sarawak respectively. Since, the 
empirical study of this research is mainly conducted in the Central Region of the Peninsular 
Malaysia, the major reference will only be made to the LPA 1976. The Central Region is 
Malaysia‘s populous region whereby the number of lawyers and legal firms are bigger in this 
region as compared to other regions. It is reported that the number of lawyers in this region has 
reached to 8,100. See <http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal_directory_statistics.html.>. 
116
 Under Section 47 LPA 1976, the Bar Council was established with the main function to manage 
the affairs of the Malaysian Bar and the proper administration of the functions of the Bar. The Bar 
Council is an autonomous body as it is a creation of statute. Its primary purpose is to uphold the 
cause of justice without regards to its own interests or that of its members, uninfluenced by fear or 
favour. The Bar Council consists of the President, the Vice President, the immediate past 
President, the Chairman of each of 11 State Bar Committees, one member elected by each of the 
11 State Bars to be its representative to the Bar Council and 12 members elected from throughout 
Peninsular Malaysia by way of total ballot. See Section 42 LPA 1976.For more details, see 'The 
Role of Malaysian Bar - Its Struggles & Achievements' (11 October 2003) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal_profession/the_role_of_the_malaysian_bar_its_struggles_
achievements.html> accessed July 2007. 
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 In order to be admitted as an advocate and solicitor, he or she must be a qualified person. The 
definition of the qualified person is a measure of the formal academic prerequisites whereby in 
Malaysia he or she must possess a degree of Bachelor of Laws from the recognised universities. 
Besides that, as mentioned in Section 11 LPA 1976, he or she must attain the age of eighteen 
years, be of good character, a citizen or permanent resident of Malaysia and have satisfactorily 
served the period of pupilage of nine months under the supervision of a pupil-master who has been 
in active practice not less than seven years. Another stage that he or she must undergo is the 
admission to the Bar. After the completion of the pupilage, he or she must file a petition for 
admission to the High Court. On the hearing day of the petition and where there is no objection 
from the Attorney General, the Bar Council and the State Bar Committee of the State in which the 
pupil has served any part of his period of pupilage, against the petition, the High Court judge will 
order his or admission to the Role. Therefore, he or she becomes entitled to practice provided with 
an issuance of a practicing certificate from the Bar.  
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 In relation to advocates‘ conducts in courts, apart from the LPA, the practice standards are also 
laid down in the Legal Profession (Practice & Etiquette) Rules 1978, the Bar Council Rulings 1997 
and the Conveyancing Practice Rulings. Advocates, being members of the Bar are also officers of 
the court. Their duties are twofold: to their client and to the court. Rules 15 and 16 of the Legal 
Profession (Practice & Etiquette) Rules 1978 requires lawyers to act with candour, courtesy and 
fairness, and to fearlessly uphold the interest of their client. 
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The Malaysian Bar being an association of lawyers, pursues the objectives of the 
legal profession. They are independent, self-regulating and practise self-
discipline.
119
 They speak up for the legal profession, they look after the interest of 
the profession and they also have the duty to protect public interest against 
delinquent lawyers. The recalcitrant lawyers are subjected to disciplinary 
procedures handled by the Disciplinary Board; separate and independent of the 
Bar Council to deal with complaints and matters of discipline.
120
 The Disciplinary 
Committees appointed by the Board will investigate and hear complaints against 
advocates and solicitors.
121
 If the advocate is found guilty of any misconduct he 
will be liable to be struck off the Roll or suspended from practice for any period 
not exceeding five years or ordered to pay a fine or be reprimanded or censured, 
as the case may be.
122
 
 
The Bar, in order to realise its objectives, is often committed to upholding the rule 
of law, promoting a strong and independent judiciary and an independent Bar; 
ever vigilant to act in all matters without fear or favour and without regards to its 
own interests. The Bar speaks loud and clear in these matters, often at the peril of 
its own members. The active participation of the Bar in matters involving their 
members is often in conflict with the government. The executive views that the 
Bar‘s stand on several issues seemed to be politicised.123 There has been 
continuous tension between the Bar, the government and the judiciary, especially 
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 Section 77 LPA 1976 that empowers the Bar Council, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, to make rules regulating professional practice, etiquette, conduct and discipline of 
advocates and solicitors. Any advocate who fails to comply with any rules will be liable to 
disciplinary proceedings. Although the Bar is independent and self-regulated, the provision of 
Section 77 in requiring the approval of the Attorney General in making the rule, shows that the 
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 Section 93 LPA 1976.  
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 Sections 95, 96, 99, 100, 103A, 103B and 103C LPA 1976. 
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 Section 94 (2) LPA 1976.  
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 The Bar protested against the use of Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA), i.e. a preventive 
detention law which allows for detention without trial or criminal charges under limited, legally 
defined circumstances. Due to the alleged draconian nature of the Act, the Bar strongly criticised it 
and called for its repeal, as it seemed against the human rights, especially rights to be heard and to 
a full and fair trial. Noor Arianti Osman, 'ISA Rally-Utter Violations of Human Rights by the 
Police and FRU' (2 August 2009) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/human_rights/isa_rally_utter_violations_of_human_rights_by_t
he_police_and_fru.html> accessed 15 November 2009.   
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after the judicial crisis in 1988.
124
 The government used legislative power to have 
a control over the Bar. For instance, Section 46 LPA was amended to prohibit any 
politician or Member of Parliament from holding office in the Bar Council or 
State Bar Committees. The Bar perceives the executive power‘s amendment of the 
LPA as to clip the wing and nip the power of independence and freedom of the 
Bar. Thus, the amendments of the LPA over the years have been the source of 
some controversy.
125
  
 
Tension between the Bar and judges remains after the Bar‘s vote of no confidence 
during the events of 1988.
126
 The tension continues and has been aggravated by a 
series of high-profile political trials especially that of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. 
Further, in 2000, the High Court granted an injunction to restrain the Bar Council 
from convening an EGM to discuss improprieties in the Malaysian judiciary.
127
 It 
held that the conduct of judges cannot be discussed except in Parliament.
128
 From 
the said scenarios, it is noted that the Bar doubts the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary, which, due to the political influence, has used the judicial power 
against lawyers. At the same time, the Bench feels that there is a decline in 
                                                 
124
 The removal of Salleh Abbas is regarded as one of the greatest blows to judicial independence 
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 There were serious allegations of impropriety leveled against certain members of the judiciary 
that urged the Bar to call for an EGM. The EGM was intended to discuss these allegations, i.e. the 
conduct and propriety of the then Chief Justice who went on vacation with a lawyer with the view 
of urging the government to appoint a Royal Commission of Inquiry to make such inquiries and 
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granted an injunction applied by one of the members of the Bar to prevent the EGM from 
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 Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (n. 105).  
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standards in the Bar and the members of the Bar are ready to lower the prestige of 
the judiciary through unwarranted publicity in the media.
129
 The relationship 
between the Bar and the Bench becomes more strained by the increased use, or 
threat to use, the contempt law against advocates.
130
 
 
(b) The Prosecutors 
 
In Malaysia, the prosecution power is bestowed upon the Attorney General who is 
the Public Prosecutor.
131
 The Attorney General is a key officer in the legal system 
as he is the guardian of public interest. He is appointed by the King on the advice 
of the Prime Minister
132
 and his duty is to advise the King and the government on 
legal issues referred to him. He also has complete discretion to institute, conduct 
or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a 
Shariah Court.  
 
In regard to his prosecutorial discretion, the Attorney General functions via the 
Prosecution Division of his Chambers. The Division is headed by a Senior Deputy 
Public Prosecutor, deputised by also a Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor and the 
other staff members are the Deputy Public Prosecutors. These officers are civil 
servants and governed by the Judicial and Legal Service of the Federation. There 
is a lack of clarity in cases of unbecoming conduct, in terms of the prosecutors‘ 
disciplinary procedures.  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
129
Brendan Pereira, 'Bar Council vs. the Judiciary' (10 January 1999) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.gov.my/bar_news/berita_badan_peguam/bar_council_vs_the_judici
ary.html.> accessed September 2007.  
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 The removal of the Lord President, Salleh Abas had resulted in the finding of contempt against 
the Bar Council‘s secretary. The same goes to the counsel for Anwar Ibrahim wherein Zainur 
Zakaria was found in contempt. There were numbers of contempt cases against lawyers cited 
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 Section 376 CPC. 
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 Article 145 of the Constitution. 
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2.3 FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND CONTEMPT OF COURT: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN MALAYSIA 
  
Part II of the Constitution provides for various fundamental liberties. Even though 
the term ‗fundamental liberties‘ is explained neither by the Reid Commission nor 
the White Paper, those are the provisions which are generally known as human 
rights.
133
 Nevertheless, the HRCA 1999 provides some provisions that may shed 
some lights on the term. Section 2 HRCA provides that ‗human rights refer to 
fundamental liberties in Part II of the Federal Constitution‘. Therefore, the human 
rights in Malaysia are guaranteed by constitutional provisions.  
 
Part II of the Constitution contains nine provisions on various aspects of 
fundamental liberties which are placed under several headings: personal liberty,
134
 
prohibition from slavery and forced labour,
135
 prohibition on double jeopardy and 
retrospective criminal laws,
136
 right to equality,
137
 freedom of movement,
138
 
freedom of expression, assembly and association,
139
 religious freedom,
140
 
educational rights,
141
 and propriety rights.
142
 Although these rights are entrenched 
in the Constitution, as in most legal documents, the Constitution makes it clear 
those rights are not absolute. There are restrictions imposed on the rights and these 
limitations are either passed by the law in Parliament, or the policy laid down by 
the executive or the ways the courts interpreted them.  
 
Freedom of speech and expression is often viewed as one of the most important 
attributes to democracy, as through it, ideas are articulated and arguments are 
advanced.
143
 Be that as it may, this right is not absolute. Freedom of speech and 
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 Article 6 of the Constitution. 
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 Article 10 of the Constitution. 
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 Article 11 of the Constitution. 
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 Article 12 of the Constitution. 
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 Article 13 of the Constitution. 
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 Observer and Guardian v UK A 216 (1992) 14 EHRR 153, para 63. For more details, see Helen 
Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4 edn Routledge-Cavendish Oxon 2007) pp. 300-309. 
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expression as enshrined in Article 10 (1) is expressly qualified from the outset. Its 
opening straight away mentions the restrictions. Article 10 (1) reads: 
 
Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4): 
 
(a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) all citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms; 
(c) all citizens have the right to form associations. 
 
 
The right conferred by Article 10 (1) (a) is made expressly subject to various 
limiting constitutional provisions that can be imposed by Parliament.
144
 
Parliament may under Article 10 (2), by law impose on these rights such 
restrictions as it: 
 
deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the 
federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, 
public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges 
of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence. 
 
Therefore, the Constitution leaves the matter for Parliament to decide and that the 
Constitution allows important and basic rights to be curtailed or even to be taken 
away. This is what Harding says as Article 10 is remarkable for what it takes 
rather than what it gives.
145
 This is due to the fact that many laws imposing 
restrictions on free speech have been passed by Parliament.
146
  
 
The law of contempt seeks to protect the interest in the administration of justice. It 
is used, among others, to curb pre-trial discussion or sub judice comments which 
might influence those involved in forthcoming and/or ongoing proceedings. 
Furthermore, contempt law seeks to protect the impartiality and independence of 
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 This is endorsed by the Court in Lau Dak Kee v Public Prosecutor [1976] 2 MLJ 229 as 
Mohamed Azmi J said: 
Article 10 (1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees the rights to every citizen to freedom 
of speech, assembly and association. Those rights are, however, subject to any law passed 
by Parliament. 
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 Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (n. 39) p. 189. 
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 For instance, on the grounds of ‗security of the Federation or any part thereof‘, ISA 1960, 
Official Security Act 1972, Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, Protected Areas and 
Protected Places Act 1959, Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958, Sedition Act 1948 and the 
Telecommunications Act 1950 were enacted. Shad Saleem Faruqi, 'Free Speech and the 
Constitution' (1992) 4 Current Law Journal lxiv.   
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the judiciary. The judiciary is protected from any comments or publications which 
might scandalise the court.  
 
However, there is a significant tension between these rights and restraints as 
contempt law comes into conflict with free speech and expression. Contempt of 
court is a restriction or interference with the guarantee, i.e. freedom of speech. 
Whether the interference with the guarantee can be justified or not, the court has 
to strike a balance between these two fundamental principles of public interests. In 
striking a balance the Malaysian courts take rather a strict approach as in Trustees 
of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v SM Idris & Anor 
and Another Application.
147
 In this case, the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether the respondents‘ press statements commenting on the judgment of the 
Supreme Court amounted to contempt of court. The two respondents were 
advocates. In deciding whether  contemptuous or not, the Court had to strike a 
balance between the rights of freedom of speech under Article 10 and the need to 
protect the dignity and integrity of the Supreme Court in the interest of 
maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. The Court had to decide whether 
the criticism was within the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith by 
looking at the facts of each particular case. If the criticism is beyond the limits set 
it is likely to prejudice the confidence of the public in the role of the courts in the 
administration of justice. Apart from that, the Supreme Court pointed out that it 
should not lose sight of local conditions. The first and second respondents were 
found in contempt as the Court heard their speeches as blatant insinuations
148
 that 
scandalised the Supreme Court and brought it into disrepute as they were outside 
the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith. The Supreme Court has justified 
this strict approach by saying that Malaysia is unique as far as local conditions and 
peculiarities are concerned and thus should not follow the liberal approach 
adopted by the courts in the UK.
149
 According to the Court, Malaysia is unique 
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 The speeches were delivered in Malay language and the inferences are that the court had acted 
recklessly and irresponsibly and that it was an abuse of the process of the court. There was also a 
suggestion that the Supreme Court judges were prejudiced, not gainfully employed and had not 
discharged or was in dereliction of their judicial duties and irresponsible. There was also 
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 Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n. 8). 
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because the local condition is different and the sensitivity of the local courts need 
not be the same as courts in England.  
 
Furthermore, in Manjeet Singh Dhillon,
150
 the Supreme Court was invited to refer 
to foreign laws to cases in which these jurisdictions were useful in determining the 
law of contempt in Malaysia. The Court held that the English cases from 1981 
onwards were of no assistance in determining the law of contempt in Malaysia, 
which was derived from the common law of England, as the common law was 
modified by statute and by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The recent Canadian decisions also did not apply as they were based on 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom which had no parallel in Malaysia. 
The Malaysian courts were also resistant to the UDHR
151
 and no reference was 
made to international human rights bills even though freedom of speech and 
expression is specially promoted in international instruments on human rights. 
Interestingly, the courts offer no explanation in holding as to how the conditions 
are different and why such differences are relevant.  
 
2.3.1 Malaysia and Human Rights 
In the globalised era today, international law is increasingly becoming a tool for 
justice to ensure that governments live up to their legal obligations to their citizens 
under international laws, treaties and instruments. International laws and treaties 
are a form of supranational governance over the laws of member states ensuring 
legal integration with internationally recognised standards and rights. Under the 
international law, States assume obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil 
human rights. The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from 
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to 
protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights 
abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take positive action to 
facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. Therefore, for the enjoyment of 
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 Ibid. p. 172. 
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 Mohamad Ezam (n. 25). It is interesting to note that there was no reference to any international 
documents in the Reid Commission Report even though the UDHR was adopted by the UN 
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Constitution: A Critical Introduction (n. 36) p. 141. 
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human rights, the States have to bring their laws in line with the international 
human rights laws.  
In order to have the international human rights laws applicable to domestic law, 
the Member States have to ratify the relevant convention or covenant and translate 
the rights and freedom in the covenant into their domestic legal systems.
152
 The 
ratification has the effect of bringing in line the national law with the international 
human rights laws ratified. In numbers of monist countries, the international laws 
take direct effect in law upon being signed by the government.
153
 For dualist 
countries like Malaysia, the international laws were incorporated and transformed 
into their domestic law by means of statute.
154
 According to Elizabeth Evatt,
155
 
States can be grouped into three categories, the first being those that incorporate 
the covenant rights into domestic law. This incorporation of covenant rights into 
domestic law is often with a status superior to ordinary national law.
156
 The 
second group of states is those which protect the rights through the constitution or 
other entrenched law. In States which do not incorporate treaties or covenant into 
domestic law, the rights may be guaranteed by constitutional provisions or by 
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155
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 In these States, national courts can enforce the covenant rights directly and the effect can be to 
invalidate or render inapplicable national laws which are incompatible with covenant rights. 
Sometimes, however, the incorporation of the covenant into domestic laws gives its provisions 
only the status of ordinary laws which can be overridden by later domestic legislation.  
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entrenched legislation that overrides laws incompatible with their protection. If 
the rights protected are expressed in  similar terms to the covenant, the courts may 
draw on the jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies. But in some 
cases the domestic provisions differ materially from the covenant. Canada is in 
this group. Thirdly are the states that rely on legislative or other solutions. This is 
by legislation which is modelled to a greater or lesser extent on the covenant or 
other international instrument. In these mainly common law countries, some rights 
may be protected under common law. The courts may try to ensure that as far as 
possible statutory interpretation, the development of the common law and 
administrative decisions are in line with the international obligations undertaken 
by the State. The UK, Australia and New Zealand are within this group.  
 
In Malaysia, the human rights are entrenched in the Constitution but neither 
reference was made to the UDHR or any international bills of rights such as the 
ICCPR. Nonetheless, it is noted that international law affects Malaysians through 
the Constitution and the CLA 1956. Malaysia as a member of international 
organisations is being affected by the ratification of treaties and convention and 
the later incorporation through legislation into domestic law, Act of Parliament 
and judicial decisions.
157
 It is also noted that international law, in particular 
international human rights law, can be incorporated into the domestic law through 
the judiciary.
158
 This is due to the fact that the final analysis of the provision 
depends on the courts as their decisions form part of the law.  
 
Hence, the court should be ready to take a broad liberal attitude and not be 
restrictive i.e. literal and pedantic approach in interpreting constitutional 
provisions relating to fundamental liberties.
159
 This suggests that the judiciary 
should consider the use of comparative law or foreign materials as a tool of 
interpretation. Aharon Barak points out that comparative law or foreign materials 
enrich the options available to the judges. He suggests that examining a foreign 
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solution may help a judge choose the best local solution.
160
 This point is 
elaborated in Chapter 4. 
 
However, as described by Amanda Whiting, Malaysia‘s involvement in the 
international human rights regime is very ‗limited‘.161  Malaysia has not yet 
ratified the two Covenants, i.e. the ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), which are collectively termed as 
the International Bill of Human Rights.
162
 The refusal on the part of the Malaysian 
Government to ratify the two international covenants was justified by a rather 
limp reason offered by a senior cabinet member when he said that the fundamental 
guarantees were entrenched in the Constitution. Thus it obviated the need to ratify 
these international instruments.
163
 However, this was dismissed by Dato‘ Param 
Cumaraswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, as fallacious. He said: 
 
Firstly, not all human rights which are provided in the Covenants are 
entrenched in the Malaysian Constitution. Secondly, how could 
something be described as being guaranteed when it can be removed or 
abrogated by two thirds majority in Parliament? As two thirds majority is 
required to amend any article of the Constitution, it cannot possibly be 
argued that fundamental rights are singled out for guarantee.
164
 
 
H.P. Lee observes that ratification of these instruments would lead to a greater 
degree of accountability to the international community in the face of complaints 
of infringement of the rights provided by the covenants.
165
  
 
Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs of Malaysia‘s willingness to 
participate in the international protection of human rights. In 1995, the 
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 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2006) p. 
197. 
161
 Amanda Whiting, 'Situating SUHAKAM: Human Rights Debates and Malaysia's National 
Human Rights Commission' (2003) 39 Stanford Journal of International Law 59, p.71. 
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 Malaysia has also not signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and their Families. Ibid. 
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 Param Cumaraswamy,'"Foreword" in SUARAM'S Malaysian Human Rights Report' (2002) p. 
i. 
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 Ibid. 
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 H.P. Lee, 'Human Rights in Malaysia' in Carole J. Peterson and Albert H.Y. Chen Randall 
Peerenboom (ed) Human Rights in Asia. A Comparative Legal Study of Twelve Asian 
Jurisdictions, France and the USA (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York 
2006) 191, p. 192. 
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Government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) albeit with many reservations.
166
 As regards CEDAW, 
reservations were made to Articles 5(a), 7(b), 9(2), 16(1)(a), (c), (f), (g) and 16 
(2). A declaration was made on Article 11. CEDAW sets out a definition of 
discrimination against women, outlines the obligation of the State and the 
measures to be taken by the State to eliminate discrimination. This far, the 
Malaysian Government has not passed an Act through Parliament to make 
CEDAW wholly applicable to Malaysian. Instead, CEDAW is given effect in a 
piecemeal fashion, i.e. by incorporating its principles in some of the domestic 
legislation
167
 and Article 8 (2) of the Constitution.
168
 For the ratification of the 
CRC and to make the rules applicable in Malaysia, the Child Act 2001 was 
enacted. The aim of the Child Act 2001 is to safeguard the welfare and interest of 
children which was promulgated based on the principles enumerated in the CRC.  
This Act provides for care, protection and rehabilitation of a child without 
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin or physical, 
mental or emotional disabilities or any other status. Apart from this, Malaysia is a 
member state of United Nations and a signatory to the UDHR. Due to Malaysia‘s 
involvement in the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) which has 
enlightened the need to safeguard human rights, the Parliament passed the HRCA 
1999 in 2000.  
 
The Act established the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, known as 
SUHAKAM.
169
 The establishment of SUHAKAM is influenced by the growing 
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 Cumaraswamy (n. 163) p. 215. 
167
 The Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 was amended to accord mothers and fathers equal 
guardianship rights over their children. The Domestic Violence Act 1994 was enacted to deal with 
domestic violence, the victims of which are mostly women and children. The Distribution Act 
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the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property 
or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or 
employment. [Italic added]. 
169
 SUHAKAM is the acronym for ‗Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia‘ (the Human Rights 
Commission). 
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international emphasis on human rights and the recognition that the human rights 
issues transcend national boundaries, the changing political climate in Malaysia 
and the growing and dynamic civil society. Thus, SUHAKAM, which is a national 
human rights institution has been set up to protect and promote human rights in 
Malaysia.
170
 Amongst its functions are to promote public awareness in relation to 
human rights, to advise and assist the government in formulating legislation and 
recommend necessary measure to be taken as well as regarding the subscription or 
accession of treaties and other international instruments in the field of human 
rights, and to conduct inquiries into complaints regarding infringement of human 
rights.
171
 Furthermore, Section 4 (4) HRCA provides: 
 
For the purpose of this Act, regard shall be had to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 to the extent that it is not inconsistent 
with the Federal Constitution. 
 
B. Lobo
172
 on this point argues that international human rights laws as in the 
UDHR are applicable into our domestic law. Section 2 HRCA defines human 
rights as enshrined in Part II of the Constitution and Section 4 (4) HRCA has 
imported the UDHR into Malaysian law to the extent that it is not inconsistent 
with the Constitution. By looking at these provisions he suggests that, Section 4 
(4) in particular has made the provisions of the UDHR as supplemental, i.e. an 
extension or an appendage to Part II of the Constitution thus having constitutional 
status. The provisions of the Act, by specific reference to Part II of the 
Constitution, have been put on the same pedestal as Part II of the Constitution. 
Thus, this includes the provisions of the UDHR. He argues that the UDHR had 
been incorporated into domestic law, on a par with the supreme law and is the 
fundamental right of Malaysians.  
 
Malaysia has still some way to go before it can be said that human rights are fully 
and effectively protected. However, there are a lot of initiatives taken by NGOs to 
                                                 
170
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have human rights discourse and to highlight abuses of human rights. The national 
human rights Commission, SUHAKAM, is playing a role in promoting human 
rights although it has been attacked for being a ‗toothless‘ watchdog.173  
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Chapter 3 
Contempt of Court in Malaysia 
 
3.1 THE MALAYSIAN LAW OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 
 
The law of contempt migrated to Malaysia with the British colonists and the 
common law judicial system.
174
 According to Malaysian law, the contempt power 
is necessary to ensure that the due administration of justice is not impeded and to 
provide the courts with power to enforce their judgment. The Malaysian courts 
have the opportunity to establish and define the ambit of the law of contempt. The 
wide discretionary powers exercised by the judges render the contempt law 
substantially flexible in its application. Due to this, from time to time criticisms 
have arisen, especially from the Bar. The Bar perceives that contempt power is 
fraught with possible abuse.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to consider whether the law of contempt of court in 
Malaysia is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to operate effectively in this 
jurisdiction. What this chapter seeks to do is identify some problems that exist 
with the law as it is currently applied in the Malaysian courts.  
 
3.1.1 Jurisdiction 
 
The Malaysian law of contempt in its present form is derived from two sources: 
first, from provisions contained in the Constitution, statutes and Rules of Court, 
and second, from common law – in particular English common law rules – which 
are still in force.  
 
Article 126 of the Constitution and Section 13 CJA (which is a mere repetition of 
Article 126) provides: 
 
                                                 
174
 The contempt power migrated to Malaysia with the establishment of the Court of Judicature 
which exercised all the jurisdiction of the English Court of Laws and Chancery in 1807 through 
the First Charter of Justice. Supra. (n. 35). 
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The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court shall have the 
power to punish any contempt of itself. 
 
These provisions are the basis of the power of contempt for superior courts. The 
powers of the superior courts to commit for all forms of contempt are regulated by 
Order 52 RHC 1980. Order 52 r.1 RHC provides for the procedural vehicle to 
exercise the courts‘ power to order committal. The procedure under Order 52 
RHC may be invoked to produce the sanction of imprisonment or a fine. 
 
The subordinate courts are also empowered to punish anyone for contempt and the 
relevant provision is that of paragraph 26 of the Third Schedule under Section 
99A SCA 1948.
175
 Paragraph 26 of the Third Schedule provides that the 
subordinate courts have: 
 
Power to take cognisance of any contempt of court and to award 
punishment for the same, not exceeding, in the case of a Sessions Court, 
a fine of three hundred ringgit or imprisonment for six weeks, in the case 
of a Magistrates' Court presided over by a First Class Magistrate, a fine 
of one hundred and fifty ringgit or imprisonment for three weeks, and in 
the case of a Magistrates' Court presided over by a Second Class 
Magistrate, a fine of fifty ringgit or imprisonment for one week, to such 
extent and in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of court. If the 
contempt of court is punishable as an offence under the Penal Code, the 
court may, in lieu of taking cognisance thereof, authorise a prosecution. 
  
Order 34 r.1 of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 (SCR) provides for the 
procedural vehicle to exercise the courts‘ power to order committal.  
 
In addition to Paragraph 26 of the Third Schedule of the SCA, a Magistrate is 
vested with a power to deal with any person who intentionally offers any insult or 
causes interruption while he is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding. This is 
provided for under Section 353 CPC
176
 and read together with Section 228 Penal 
Code.
177
  
                                                 
175
 It states: 
In amplification and not in derogation of the powers conferred by this Act or inherent in 
any court, and without prejudice to the generality of any such powers, every Sessions 
Court and Magistrates' Court shall have the further powers and jurisdiction set out in the 
Third Schedule.  
176
The section reads: 
When any such offence as is described in sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 of the Penal 
Code is committed in the view or presence of any Magistrate‘s Court, whether civil or 
criminal, the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time 
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Article 126 of the Constitution and Section 13 CJA are, however, only conferring 
general powers to the courts. The content of the law is still very much developed 
in the common law.
178
 Contempt of court has developed through case by case 
basis within the Malaysian courts; since there is no written law of the subject 
despite the authorisation given to the Parliament via Article 10 (2)
179
 of the 
Constitution; to make laws against contempt of court. The courts continue to refer 
to English common law for guidance.
180
 Thus, in the absence of any restriction 
imposed by Article 10 (2) of the Constitution, the path is well paved for the 
growth and development of the common law, in relation to contempt of court. In 
fact, the common law provision has been expressly preserved under Section 3 
CLA.
181
  
 
3.1.2 Definition of Contempt 
 
Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia182 states inter alia that since the term ‗contempt of 
court‘ has neither been defined in the Constitution nor any other statutes, it is for 
the courts to define it. Contempt is manifold in its aspect. However, over the 
years, the Malaysian courts have had the opportunity to establish and define the 
ambit of the law relating to contempt of court. The Supreme Court in Manjeet 
Singh Dhillon quoted a succinct definition of contempt as found in R v Gray,
183
 
where Lord Russell of Killoween CJ offered the following: 
 
Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge 
of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of 
                                                                                                                                      
before the rising of the Court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cognisance of the 
offence and sentence the offender to a fine not exceeding fifty ringgit and, in default of 
payment, to imprisonment for  a term which may extend to two months. 
177
 The section reads: 
Whoever intentionally offers any insult or causes any interruption to any public servant, 
while such public servant is sitting in any state of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term that may extend to six months, or with a fine that may 
extend to two thousand ringgit, or with both.  
178
 Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241, p. 247. 
179
 Article 10 (2) of the Constitution (n. 7). 
180
 In Dato’ Seri S Samy Vellu v Penerbitan Sahabat (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 440, p. 478, 
the Court stated that since there is no specific statute in Malaysia covering the definition of 
contempt, in the meantime the courts have to follow common law approving the principle 
established in Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n. 8). 
181
 Section 3 CLA (n. 58). 
182
 Vol. 2, p. 75.  
183
 [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, p. 40. 
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court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done, or writing 
published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice 
or the lawful process of the Court is a contempt of court.  
 
The Federal Court in Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd
184
 adopted 
the general definition of contempt of court as provided by Oswald, who defines 
contempt as follows: 
 
… To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted 
by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and the administration of 
the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice 
parties, litigants, their witnesses during the litigation.
185
  
 
The Courts took the view that contempt of court is ‗interference with the 
administration of justice‘ and added further that the generality of that phrase 
renders the categories of contempt open wide.
186
  
 
The definition adopted in Monatech is an endorsement of the statement made by 
Low Hop Bing J in Chandra Sri Ram v Murray Hiebert,
187
 which inter alia states 
that the circumstances and categories of facts that may arise and that may 
constitute contempt of court are never closed.
188
 In Dato’ Seri S Samy Vellu v 
Penerbitan Sahabat (M) Sdn Bhd (No. 1)
189
 the Court classifies the broad 
categories of contempt of court into matters like: 
 
(i) disrupting the proceedings of the court and this is described as 
contempt in the face of the court,  
 (ii) publications of court proceedings which would tend to interfere 
with the court proceedings itself,  
 (iii) publications of court proceedings that would scandalise the 
courts,  
 (iv) disobeying court orders, and  
 (v) failure to fulfil undertakings given to the court.  
 
                                                 
184
 Monatech (n. 178). 
185
 J.F. Oswald, Contempt of Court (3rd edn 1910) p. 6. 
186
 See Zainur bin Zakaria v Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 604 (FC), pp. 608-609 where the 
reference was made to Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest‘s statements in Attorney General v Times 
Newspaper Ltd [1974] AC 273.  
187
 [1997] 3 MLJ 240 (HC), p. 270. 
188
 This is because the generality of the phrase ‗administration of justice‘ renders that the 
categories of contempt are never closed.  
189
 Samy Vellu (n. 180) p. 525. 
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The first three fall under criminal contempt whilst the last two are civil contempt. 
As can be seen, contempt of court is that broad offence that incorporates all 
branches of the rules that must be followed to ensure that the mechanisms of 
administration of justice are not in any way interfered with or jeopardised. 
  
In general, contempt may be divided into civil and criminal contempt. Civil 
contempt usually arises where there is a disobedience to the courts‘ orders, 
decrees or undertakings by a party to a proceedings in which the court has 
generally no interest to interfere unless moved by the party for whose benefit the 
order was made. It is also known as ‗contempt by disobedience‘ or ‗contempt in 
procedure‘ where its sanction is remedial, coercive190 and for the benefit of the 
complainant.
191
  
 
Criminal contempt is committed when there is an interference with the 
administration of justice in the nature of a public wrong that requires punishment 
from the public point of view, which is punitive in nature.
192
  
 
3.1.2.1 Civil Contempt versus Criminal Contempt 
 
In broad terms it is easy to differentiate criminal contempt from civil contempt 
since the basis of the distinction is similar to that between crimes and torts 
generally, that is, in its character and purpose. In practice, the distinction between 
the two has become blurred and the two do on occasions overlap. For example, if 
the person against whom the order was made had broken it, he would be liable for 
civil contempt but the damage is also done to the administration of justice.  
 
The standard of proof applicable in both type of contempt is beyond reasonable 
doubt as contempt carries penal punishment.
193
 The penal element in enforcing 
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 It consists of imprisonment until such time as the order is complied with or waived. 
191
 Dr. Leela Ratos & Ors v Anthony Ratos s/o Domingos Ratos & Ors [1997] 1 MLJ 704; T.O. 
Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151.   
192
 Gomez (n. 12).  
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 In Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch. 128 it is stated that the burden of proof in civil contempt is as 
similar as in criminal trial because contempt of court is an offence of criminal character since a 
contemnor may be sent to prison. This case has been referred to in Wee Choo Keong v MBF 
Holdings Bhd & Anor and Another Appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 549; Murray Hiebert (HC) (n. 187).  
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court order was emphasised by Cross J in Phonograpic Performances Ltd v 
Amusement Cateres (Peckham) Ltd,
194
 which was referred to in Majlis 
Perbandaran Melaka v Yau Jiok Hua.
195
 Cross J in the former states: 
 
… Where there has been wilful disobedience to an order of the court and 
a measure of contumacy on the part of the defendants, then civil 
contempt … ‗bears a twofold character, implying as between the parties 
to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a 
form of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the state, 
a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the court in the 
public interest‘. Civil contempt bears much the same character as 
criminal contempt.
196
 
 
Further, in the context of the procedural arrangement, in civil contempt not only 
the party aggrieved has locus standi, it is possible for the Attorney General to 
intervene or the court may proceed on its own motion.
197
 This is no different to 
criminal contempt except to exclude the party aggrieved. There are also cases 
arising out of disobedience of an injunction; the application will be brought in the 
civil proceedings but the court may nevertheless make a finding of criminal 
contempt.
198
 
 
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is important because it is only 
criminal contempt which may be dealt with instantly and possibly without further 
evidence if it occurs in the face of the court.
199
 Where contempt occurs not in the 
face of the court, proceedings will commence on motion. Civil contempt should 
not be dealt with instantly but in accordance with the usual Rules of Court.
200
 In 
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 [1964] Ch. 195. 
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 [2006] 5 MLJ 389. 
196
 [1964] Ch. 195, pp. 198-199. 
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 Tommy Thomas v Peguam Negara Malaysia & Others [2001] 3 CLJ 457. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Proceedings for criminal contempt could be commenced by the court of its own motion or by 
the Attorney General, and also by an interested party. For criminal especially contempt in the face 
of the court, it is usually dealt with summarily by the court, which causes the immediate arrest of 
the contemnor and sentences him to a fine or imprisonment as a punishment for his wrongdoing. 
Imprisonment for a criminal contempt is for a fixed term or alternatively until the court orders the 
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between Civil and Criminal Contempt' (1981) 50 University of Cincinnati Law Review 677. 
200
 Proceedings for civil contempt would normally be commenced by the party aggrieved. For civil 
contempt, i.e. disobedience contempt, a motion issues on affidavits, the alleged contemnor is 
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Malaysia, contempt of court has been regarded sui generis. The Court in Re Abdul 
Aziz’s Application201 perceives contempt as an offence sui generis which has been 
treated as a criminal matter and falls on the criminal side of the jurisdiction.
202
  
 
Although the distinction between civil and criminal contempt continues to be 
made, Arlidge et al. consider that the two categories have rather more in common 
than their traditional separation implies.
203
 Anuar J in Houng Hai Kong
204
 opines 
that the distinction between civil and criminal law is irrelevant. According to His 
Lordship, whether the act is scandalising the court or the wilful disobedience of 
the orders makes no difference because in both circumstances the administration 
of justice is at stake. The same view was upheld by the High Court in Asia Pacific 
Parcel Tankers Pte. Ltd. v The Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Normar 
Splendour’.205 The Court took a view that it is meaningless to have two categories 
of contempt since the standard of proof of the alleged contemptuous act is to the 
same exacting standards as in criminal cases. The Court supports the views 
ventilated by Salmon J in Jennison & Ors v Baker
206
 and Lord Oliver in Attorney 
General v Times Newspapers Ltd,
207
 that the classification is an unhelpful and 
almost meaningless one. Nevertheless, as observed by Paul Anthony 
McDermott,
208
 the modern view appears to be that behaviour may amount to civil 
or criminal contempt depending on the circumstances surrounding the contempt.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
brought before the court and has an opportunity to disprove the facts alleged against him. If the 
disobedience is proved, the contemnor can be committed to prison to remain until he purges 
himself of contempt by doing the right or undoing the wrong. Generally, the imprisonment is for 
an unspecified period, i.e. until he purged his contempt or until the order of the court was obeyed. 
The imprisonment is not punitive but coercive.  Arlidge, Eady and Smith (n. 19) p. 151; Beale, (n. 
199) pp. 169-174. For more on this, see Fisher (n. 199); Martineau (n. 199). 
201
 [1962] 1 MLJ 64. See also Arthur Lee Meng Kwang (n. 1). 
202
 These were the observations by Lindley LJ and Lopes LJ in O'Shea v O'Shea and Parnell 
(1890) 15 PD 64, pp. 64-65 and also by Wills J in the King v Parke [1903] 2 KB 441, p. 441. See 
also Messrs Hisham, Sobri & Kadir v Kedah Utara Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1988] 2 MLJ 
239; Achieva Technology Sdn Bhd v Lam Yen Ling & Ors [2009] 8 MLJ 625. 
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204
 Houng Hai Kong (n. 1). 
205
 [1999] 6 MLJ 652, p. 670. 
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 [1972] 1 All ER 997, pp. 1001-1002. 
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 [1992] 1 AC 191, pp. 217-218. 
208
 Paul Anthony McDermott, 'Contempt of Court and the Need for Legislation' (2004) 4 Judicial 
Studies Institute Journal 185. 
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Although the two types of contempt overlap, the classification retains some 
importance. There is no clear rule or principle in Malaysia that provides the 
distinction between civil and criminal contempt as obsolete. 
 
3.1.2.2 Classification of Contempt 
 
(i) Civil Contempt 
 
Civil contempt is known as procedure contempt or contempt by disobedience. A 
typical case of civil contempt of court is when a party refuses or neglects to do an 
act required by a judgment or order of court within the time specified in the 
judgment or order, or to disobey a judgment or order requiring a person to abstain 
from doing a specific act.
209
 In Malaysia, civil contempt may be committed by 
breach of injunction,
210
 aiding or abetting a breach of injunction or court order,
211
 
breach of an undertaking
212
 or by disobeying an order of the court.
213
 
 
These conducts give rise to a private injury or wrong at the suit of another party to 
the litigation. Thus, causing such private injury is not likely to be a criminal 
contempt unless it is deliberately repeated or otherwise indicates an intention to 
defy the court‘s authority. This is when a person‘s actions are designed to obstruct 
the course of justice by thwarting or attempting to thwart a court order.
214
 Hence, 
civil contempt is also described as quasi-criminal as it partakes of a nature of a 
criminal charge
215
 because in order to sustain a conviction for civil contempt of 
court, the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt.
216
 A ‗penal‘ 
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 Societe Jas Henessy & Co & Anor v Nguang Chan (M) Sdn Bhd [2005] 5 CLJ 515, p.531. The 
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 Edmund Ming Kwan @ Kwaun Yee Ming, Edmund v Extra Excel (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Ors 
(Part 1) [2007] 7 MLJ 250, p. 272.  
216
 It is an accepted principle that contempt is an offence of criminal character because of its penal 
sanction. This is the test stated by Lord Denning MR in Re Bramblevale Ltd (n. 193) and has been 
referred to by the Malaysian Federal Court in Monatech (n.178) p. 416, when the Court took the 
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sanction may also be imposed to compel compliance and/or to punish the non-
compliance.
217
 
 
The High Court in Tiu Shi Kian & Anor v Red Rose Restaurant Sdn Bhd
218
 has 
listed ingredients to be satisfied before a person could be cited for civil contempt. 
Firstly, there must be a court order, undertaking or injunction which specifically 
and unambiguously requires the relevant act to be done or omitted by the other 
party. The terms of the order etc. must be clear and unambiguous otherwise it is 
difficult to identify any particular act of contempt.
219
    
 
Secondly, the alleged contemnor must be shown to have had proper notice of the 
terms of the order as he cannot be held in contempt of what he does not know.
220
  
 
Thirdly, there must be clear proof that the terms have been broken and the breach 
must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
221
 There must have been an element 
of wilful disobedience of the order as mentioned by the Federal Court in T.O. 
Thomas.
222
 The Courts accepted the principle in Fairclough & Sons v Manchester 
Ship Canal Co. (No.2)
223
 that contempt must be wilful and the order of court must 
have been contumaciously disregarded. It is no good if it is casual, accidental or 
unintentional.  
 
As regards the requirement of mens rea, the Federal Court in T.O. Thomas took a 
view that an actual intention to prejudice or to interfere with the proper 
administration of justice is immaterial and there is only need to prove that the 
                                                                                                                                      
stance that the standard of proof is the criminal standard of proof, be it classified as ‗civil 
contempt‘ or ‗criminal contempt.‘  See also Tay Seng Keng v Tay Ek Seng Co. Sdn Bhd [1978] 1 
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alleged contemnor deliberately, wilfully or intentionally disobeys the order of the 
court. The Court approved the English principle as laid down in AG v 
Walthamstow Urban District Council,
224
 Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban District 
Council,
225
Regina v Odhams Press Ltd
226
 and AG v Butterworth.
227
 Hence, the 
intention to disobey the order can be deduced from the circumstances arising out 
of a breach of undertaking, order or even injunction.
228
   
 
(ii) Criminal Contempt 
 
Criminal contempt can be committed in the face of the court (in facie) or outside 
the court (ex facie). The basis for this classification is, inter alia, the procedures 
that to be applied are dependent upon the classification. Contempt in the face of 
court may be punished instantly and summarily. 
 
The act or conduct could fall under criminal contempt if there is a tendency of 
interference with the administration of justice. Lord Diplock in Attorney General v 
Times Newspapers Ltd
229
 explains what due administration of justice means: 
 
… The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens should 
have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of 
criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their 
legal rights and liabilities; secondly, that they should be able to rely on 
obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of tribunal which is free from bias 
against any party and whose decision will be based on those facts only 
that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with 
the procedure adopted in courts of law; and thirdly that, once the dispute 
has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely on there 
being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to 
decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any 
of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that 
they will be observed is contempt of court. 
 
Thus, it is possible for any conduct that tends to prejudice any of the requirements 
of the due administration of justice to be punished as contempt of court.  
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In Malaysia, criminal contempt is not as straightforward as civil contempt, 
especially in terms of the procedures and the sentences to be imposed. Criminal 
contempt in Malaysia currently corresponds roughly with the common law 
offences of contempt in the face of court, contempt by scandalising the court and 
the common law rule of sub judice. Scandalising and sub judice contempt are 
often known as publication contempt. 
 
(a) Contempt in the Face of the Court (in facie) 
 
Contempt in the face of the court occurs in court or within the cognisance of the 
court. This was described by Lord Denning MR in Balogh v St. Albans Crown 
Court:
230
 
 
Blackstone in his Commentaries, 16
th
 ed. (1825), Book IV, p. 286, said: 
‗If the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the offender may 
be instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges.‘ 
In Oswald on Contempt, 3
rd
 ed. (1910), p.23 it is said: ‗Upon contempt in 
the face of the court an order for committal was made ‗instanter‘ and not 
on motion. But I find nothing to tell us what is meant by ‗committed in 
the face of the court.‘ It has never been defined. Its meaning is, I think, to 
be ascertained from the practice of the judges over the centuries. It was 
never confined to conduct which a judge saw with his own eyes. It 
covered all contempts for which a judge of his own motion could punish 
a man on the spot. So ‗contempt in the face of the court‘ is the same thing 
as ‗contempt which the court can punish of its own motion.‘ It really 
means ‗contempt in the cognizance of the court. 
 
 
In Malaysia, the Court in Re Kumaraendran, an Advocate and Solicitor,
231
 with 
reference to McKeown v The King
232
  and Balogh
233
 established that contempt in 
the face of the court refers to an act or conduct in open court which immediately 
disrupts judicial proceedings. It is contempt in the cognisance of the court where 
all the circumstances are in the personal knowledge of the judge. Re Zainur 
Zakaria
234
 extends this definition to include misconducts in the course of 
proceedings either within the court itself or at least, directly connected with what 
is happening in court.  
                                                 
230
 [1975] 1 Q.B. 73. 
231
 [1975] 2 MLJ 45. 
232
 (1971) 16 DLR 3rd 390. 
233
 Balogh (n. 230). 
234
 [1999] 2 MLJ 577. 
 61 
Hence, contempt in the face of the court in Malaysia may be committed inside the 
courtroom within the sight and hearing of the presiding judge, which is within the 
personal knowledge of the court. It may also extend to misconduct committed 
outside the courtroom i.e. within the courtroom but outside the sight of the judge 
or when it happens at some distance from the court
235
 or which connected with 
what is happening in the court.  
 
Judges can deal with contempt in the face of court summarily. This means that 
when the court encounters an unexpected situation of gross misconduct, the court 
may deal with it immediately without other evidence than the facts known 
personally to the judge to cite the contemnor. This immediate remedy is necessary 
for the purpose of ensuring that a trial in progress or about to start can be brought 
to a proper and dignified end without disturbance.
236
 The greater the power to deal 
with contempt in the face of the court, the more caution is to be exercised by the 
courts, so that this power is invoked by the courts as a last resort.
237
  
 
The Malaysian courts take contempt in the face of court seriously when they 
exercise summary punishment. However, the judges are always reminded to 
exercise this power sparingly and when in real need. The approaches taken by the 
courts in 1970s were less pragmatic wherein the courts seemed very cautious in 
applying summary power in in facie contempt.  This is evident in the case of 
Karam Singh v Public Prosecutor
238
 and Re Kumaraendran.
239
 In these two cases, 
upon appeal and revision by the higher court, the orders of committal were 
unsustainable in law and invalid on the basis of procedural irregularities despite 
maintaining the act as gross contempt in the face of court.  
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In Karam Singh, an advocate appealed against the summary conviction and 
sentence of two weeks imprisonment on the grounds of contempt in the face of the 
court. The facts disclosed in the appeal record were that there was heated 
argument between the Magistrate and the appellant who was appearing on behalf 
of the accused in the case. The Magistrate adjourned to Chambers for fifteen 
minutes and after considering the matter returned to the Bench and decided to deal 
with the appellant summarily. It was held by the High Court that a Magistrate‘s 
summary power to proceed of his own motion must never be invoked unless the 
ends of justice really require such drastic measures. The High Court commented 
that the Magistrate should not be both the prosecutor and the judge. It was further 
held that in this case the Magistrate should have adjourned the matter and reported 
it to the local Bar Committee. This decision was later followed in Re 
Kumaraendran. 
 
In Re Kumaraendran, a defence counsel was recorded to have shouted and 
behaved in a manner which was most unexpected in the courtroom whilst the 
proceedings were in session in the Sessions Court before the President of the 
Sessions Court. He later made an application for the case to be heard before 
another judge or otherwise he would discharge himself from further acting for the 
accused. The judge allowed his application to discharge himself. After the ruling 
was recorded, the advocate said to the judge:  
 
If you say this (referring to the ruling), outside the court, I will take on 
you certainly. 
 
He was found to be guilty of contempt in the face of court and the judge exercised 
the summary power to commit him to two days‘ imprisonment. On revision, the 
High Court found that the remark as recorded by the President constituted 
insulting and contumacious behaviour in outrageous and provocative language 
tantamount to a deliberate challenge to the President‘s authority. It was clearly a 
gross contempt in the face of court as the insulting statement was made in the 
President‘s presence, in his hearing and indeed directed at and to him. However, 
the High Court ordered the order of committal as unsustainable because the charge 
was not distinctly stating the specific offence charged, thus depriving the advocate 
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from an opportunity of answering the charge. The High Court regarded this as a 
breach of the rules of natural justice, in particular, the right to a fair hearing.
240
 
 
These two cases show that the Courts had adopted an originally protective attitude 
towards members of the Bar whose contumacious conduct no doubt constituted 
contempt. The Courts were more concerned with the rule of natural justice and the 
Courts will only resort to summary procedure when it is in real need and when 
there are no other options available. 
 
However, starting from the 1980s, the approaches adopted by the courts were 
more pragmatic. The advocates‘ misbehaviour or contumacious conduct has been 
given a stricter treatment than that handed down in the above two cases. In PP v 
Seeralan,
241
 a respondent, an advocate who was in court holding a watching 
brief
242
 became emotional and made several allegations of bias against the 
Magistrate. He was ordered by the Magistrate to leave the courtroom, which he 
refused to do, saying that he had every right to be in the Court. He continued to 
make allegations of bias against the Magistrate saying that the Magistrate was 
unfair and prejudiced. The Magistrate eventually, after adjournment, took 
cognisance of the contempt committed and required the respondent to show cause 
why he should not be punished. The respondent denied and he was then cited for 
contempt with the imposition of a fine of RM 1,500 or, in default, one week‘s 
imprisonment.  
 
The High Court, however, on the following day reversed and set aside the 
Magistrate‘s Order. This had moved the Public Prosecutor to refer the matter to 
the Supreme Court to consider whether the respondent‘s conduct amounted to 
contempt in the face of the court. The Supreme Court found that the respondent‘s 
uncompromising attitude, his unabashed arrogance and insolence towards the 
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Magistrate, constituted contempt of a serious kind. The Supreme Court also found 
that the Magistrate had exercised the power effectively as the contemnor was 
given the opportunity of being heard. Salleh Abbas LP observed that many cases 
of contempt of court have been reversed because of the failure of the court to give 
the contemnor an opportunity of being heard before he is punished.
243
 
 
Re Zainur Zakaria
244
 is one of the notable and controversial cases of contempt of 
court. Zainur Zakaria was one of the lawyers for Anwar Ibrahim and was found in 
contempt during Anwar‘s trial. His act of filing an application supported with an 
affidavit to disqualify the prosecutors from further prosecuting the case (on the 
basis of fabrication of evidence on the part of the prosecuting team) was found 
contemptuous. When the motion came up for hearing, the judge informed the 
parties that he intended to commence proceedings for contempt against Zainur for 
having filed the motion. According to the judge it was scandalous and frivolous 
thus undermining the integrity of the trial. Zainur was given the opportunity to 
tender an unconditional apology to the court, the Attorney General and the two 
prosecutors, which he refused. He was asked to show cause and in doing so he 
explained that he filed the motion upon the instruction of his client.  
 
Zainur applied for an adjournment to call for evidence but it was rejected by the 
judge. The court summarily cited him for contempt as his act had the tendency to 
deflect the court from determining the issues exclusively by reference to the 
evidence. He was sentenced to three months‘ imprisonment. This case went on 
appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court‘s decision but at the Federal 
Court level, it was overruled. The Federal Court decided that the High Court judge 
had incorrectly applied the summary procedure, resulting in injustice to Zainur. 
The refusal to grant an adjournment as requested by Zainur had deprived him 
from the opportunity to answer the charge against him thus offending the principle 
of natural justice.
245
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In the aftermath of Re Zainur Zakaria, there were ‗unusual‘ and extreme 
approaches in cases of contempt, especially the use of summary power by the 
judges. Writing letters to Chief Registrars about a matter pending before the court 
could be the subject for contempt in the face of court as decided in Koperasi 
Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd v Lim Joo Thong.
246
 
 
In a recent case of contempt in the face of court, a lawyer Matthias Chang was 
fined RM 20,000, in default a month‘s jail by the High Court for contempt of 
court.
247
 He was called as the first witness in his defamation suit against American 
Express (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd
248
 and during the cross examination, there was an 
argument between him and the judge in which he tried to address the court on 
points of law. He then expressed his lack of confidence in the judge and walked 
out of the witness stand while being cross-examined.  
 
Chang accused the judge of making snide remarks, belittling his counsel, 
denigrating their integrity and being rude and offensive to litigants and lawyers. 
He further claimed that the judge did so knowing that she was immune from any 
legal action and had the weapon of contempt of court to put down any opposition 
to her conduct as being disrespectful to the court.
249
 The judge ordered him to 
apologise but upon his refusal the judge cited him for contempt.  
 
In this case, the contemnor claimed an abuse of contempt power by the judge. He 
alleged that he was cited for contempt after he had told the judge that he would 
file a complaint against her after she refused to retract some derogatory remarks 
against the contemnor‘s counsel in the civil suit when they attempted to draw the 
judge‘s attention to certain relevant laws. He walked out from the witness box as 
an act of dissatisfaction with the judge‘s response.250 Chang attracted the attention 
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by refusing to pay the fine and ‗surrendered‘ himself to the order of contempt by 
which he was sent to a prison.
251
 At a news conference, he said that he was 
prepared to be imprisoned in order to prove that judges should not get away with 
their unethical behaviour and lack of decorum. He claimed that the law of 
contempt is being exploited and used as a weapon to silence those who fight for 
their rights. ‗Unjust, has been abused and will be abused in the future‘252 renders 
this draconian law of contempt in Malaysia a need to be reviewed and revised.
253
  
 
The citation of contempt against Chang was justified weighing his conduct of 
walking out of the courtroom during the proceedings. According to Ragunath 
Kesavan, the Bar Council Chairman, a witness is only allowed to step out of the 
witness box when judges release him from oath. Thus, Chang‘s act of leaving the 
courtroom in the middle of the proceedings was found by the judge as disruptive 
to judicial process thus meriting the contempt citation.
254
 Nonetheless, this case 
sparks the discussion on reforming the law of contempt in Malaysia. The 1999 
reform proposal by the Bar has been raised again by some lawyers and 
academicians.
255
  
 
Most of the cases of contempt in facie in Malaysia were committed by the 
advocates and solicitors. Misbehaviour in court such as threatening or attempting 
violence in court, using abusive or provocative language, may place the advocates 
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for contempt. Apart from this, accusing judge of judicial misconduct, 
incompetence or mishandling the case may also land the advocates in contempt.
256
 
Furthermore, in Leela Ratos
257
 an advocate was found guilty of contempt in the 
face of the court for failing to give a satisfactory explanation for his client‘s 
absence on the hearing date. The High Court found that the advocate‘s conduct 
showed a deliberate attempt to mislead the court or to disrupt the proceeding by 
manoeuvring an adjournment.   
    
The advocates are usually in a position where there is a conflict between his 
obligation to the court and his duty to his client. The advocates have the right of 
audience in court to argue their clients‘ cases fearlessly and resolutely, but as an 
officer of the court his obligation to the court prevails over his duty to the client. 
His duty to the court remains paramount in the administration of justice.
258
  
 
Therefore, the advocates have to carry the duty and their clients‘ case 
professionally and give due courtesy to the court.
259
 Every advocate who handles 
a case for his client in court must know that decency is to be observed and due 
respect is to be paid to the judge. In endeavouring to defend his client in respect of 
any particular charge, he must not commit a new offence. At the same time, the 
judge should not use the power to cite an advocate for contempt as a method to 
suppress advocacy. It has to be borne in mind that not every act of discourtesy or 
breach of professional duty would attract contempt liability.
260
 Whilst not 
amounting to contempt an act might render an advocate liable to disciplinary 
procedures.
261
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Section 99 (2) LPA allows any court to write a complaint against any misconduct 
of the advocates or pupils to the Disciplinary Board, a body that has power to take 
action against a lawyer for misconduct.262 After receiving the complaint, the 
Board will review it and form an Investigating Tribunal to look into the complaint. 
The Tribunal will report to the Board whether a formal investigation is 
necessary.
263
 If the Board thinks that a formal investigation is necessary, it will 
then form a Disciplinary Committee to hear and investigate the matter. The 
Disciplinary Committee will hold a hearing. After hearing and investigating the 
matter, the Disciplinary Committee may recommend to the Disciplinary Board 
whether disciplinary action should be taken against the lawyer concerned.
264
 The 
Committee may recommend that the lawyer be reprimanded, fined, suspended 
from practice for a period of time or struck off the Roll.
265
 The complainant or the 
advocate concerned, if dissatisfied with the decision of the Board, may appeal to 
the High Court.
266
 
 
(b) Contempt Out of the Court (ex facie) 
 
Most conduct committed out of the face of the court that is ‗calculated‘ to 
interfere with the proper administration of justice is contempt. This includes an 
attack on the integrity or impartiality of a judge if it interferes with or prejudices 
those proceedings and a publication sub judice.  These two types of contempt are 
also known as publication contempt as it involves publication of material that 
tends to interfere with the proper administration of justice. Publication contempt 
always comes in conflict with freedom of speech and expression in which free 
speech is always ‗sacrificed‘ for the greater protection of the administration of 
justice.
267
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(i) Scandalising a Court or a Judge 
 
Contempt by scandalising prohibits verbal or written attacks upon judges or 
courts. It is a principle of common law of contempt as stated in R v Gray
268
 which 
Lord Russell of Killoween CJ defined as: 
 
… Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a 
judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt 
of court. That is one case of contempt. Further, any act done or writing 
published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice 
or the lawful process of the courts is a contempt of court. The former 
class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke L.C. characterised 
as ‗scandalising a court or a judge‘.269  
 
R v Gray was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Manjeet Singh 
Dhillon
270
 and still applies in Malaysia.  
 
Contempt by scandalising involves publications interfering with the due course of 
justice as a continuing process. The offence of scandalising can be committed 
regardless of whether the words said or acts done occur before, during or after a 
trial or without reference to a particular trial at all. If the publication occurs before 
or during proceedings there is additional risk of committing sub judice contempt 
that is contempt by interfering with the course of justice in the particular case.  
Therefore, under the existing law contempt may be committed through publication 
of material such as an accusation of bias, prejudice or corruption which 
scurrilously attacks or abuses a judge, which is calculated to bring a judge or a 
court into contempt or to lower his authority. It is not confined to a particular 
medium. However, it is commonly committed by publication of written comment 
in a newspaper. It also extends to broadcasting on television and radio, or the 
words displayed on a poster and even by means of a cartoon.  In Malaysia, signing 
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of prolix, frivolous and scandalous pleading amounts to contempt by 
scandalising.
271
  
 
The law of contempt by scandalising is aimed at prohibiting scurrilous attack or 
abuse of a judge or of a court and attacks upon the integrity and impartiality of a 
judge or a court
272
 in order to prevent the undermining of public confidence in the 
administration of justice. If the judges should be scandalously abused, people will 
lose confidence in them and the whole administration of justice would suffer.
273
 
Apart from this aim, the courts and judges are given powers of punishing under 
this kind of contempt because they are said not to be in a position to reply to 
criticism against them.
274
  
 
However, in Malaysia, some of the judges have gone against the norm where they 
talk to the press to defend allegations made against them. In the case of the former 
Chief Justice Eusoff Chin, when he was alleged of corruption by ‗tagging‘ 
alongside the lawyer V.K. Lingam on a family vacation in New Zealand in 1994, 
he replied that it was just a mere coincidence of holidaying with a lawyer in New 
Zealand.
275
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over-react' News Straits Times (9 June 2000) 6; Steven Gan, 'Eusoff, Lingam Face New 
Allegations' (9 May 2000) <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/2760> accessed 17 December 
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The judges also take an opportunity to defend themselves in their judgment. R.K. 
Nathan J in Yusri Mohamad & Anor v Aznan Mohamad,
276
 defended himself 
against ‗personal vilification‘ by a Court of Appeal Judge in an unrelated case.277 
With that, it is now questionable as whether it is justifiable for judges to exercise 
contempt power and at the same time have access to the media to reply to the 
criticisms.  
 
Nevertheless, if people freely and openly criticise the judiciary, it may produce 
‗unwarranted public misgiving‘278 that could lead to anarchy.279 That is why their 
judgments are allowed to be criticised provided it is done with reasonable 
courtesy.
280
 The judiciary needs to be accountable and answerable to society and 
moreover, the scrutiny might enhance their judicial performance.
281
 Therefore, in 
determining whether the criticism does not amount to contempt of court, the court 
needs to strike a balance between the right to freedom of speech and the interest in 
protecting the administration of justice. The balance is that the conduct or the 
criticism must be within the limit of reasonable courtesy.    
 
In Arthur Lee Meng Kwang,
282
 the Court took a firm approach. This case dealt 
with the criticism of the court and was decided when the Malaysian courts system 
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was two-tiered due to the abolition of appeal to the Privy Council. The contemnor, 
a lawyer, represented parties in an action for declaratory orders and other relief 
concerning certain properties. He was successful at the High Court but the 
decision was reversed in the Supreme Court. He had no forum for further appeal. 
This led him to write various letters to the three Supreme Court judges that 
reversed the decision, to the advocates for the respondents in the original case and 
to the President of the Bar Council. The letters were perceived by the Court as a 
tool to persuade and influence the panel that allowed the appeal to review the case 
by reversing its own decision which had been delivered earlier on. According to 
the Supreme Court, the advocate not only criticised the judgment of the Court but 
also alleged the decision of the Supreme Court to be unjust and biased.
283
 The 
letter inferred that there would be no justice if the Supreme Court failed to review 
its own decision in the original case.  
 
The Supreme Court recognised that there must be a balance between the right to 
protect the integrity of the superior courts in the interest of maintaining public 
confidence in the judiciary and the right of free speech which is recognised in 
Article 10 of the Constitution. The balance adopted by the Court was that the 
conduct must be within the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith. The 
Supreme Court accepted the common law principle of contempt of court as found 
in R v Gray
284
  and as referred to a test of ‗reasonable courtesy and good faith‘ 
laid down in R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Blackburn (No. 
2).
285
 The Court in Ex parte Blackburn held: 
 
Criticism, however vigorous of a judgment or a decision of a court will 
not constitute contempt if it is made in good faith and is reasonable, even 
though it contains error; but it is desirable that criticism should be 
accurate and fair, bearing in mind that the judiciary cannot enter into 
public controversy thus cannot reply to criticism.
286
  
 
Although the Supreme Court referred to Ex parte Blackburn as a persuasive 
authority, the Court added the qualification that in determining the limit of 
reasonable courtesy it should not lose sight of local conditions. This is a 
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proposition laid down in Public Prosecutor v The Straits Times Press Ltd
287
 and 
Public Prosecutor v SRN Palaniappan & Ors
288
 where Spenser Wilkinson J. 
hesitated to follow too closely the decisions of English Courts on the subject of 
contempt without first considering whether the relevant conditions in England and 
this country are similar.  
 
In the present case, sensitivity of the Malaysian courts is the reason given by the 
Supreme Court in deviating from the decision in Ex parte Blackburn.
289
 The 
Supreme Court was established on 1 January 1985, and its sensitivity need not be 
the same as courts of similar jurisdiction in England or other countries. Apart from 
this, after due consideration to local conditions, the Court held that criticisms that 
are considered as within the limit of reasonable courtesy in England and other 
jurisdictions are not necessarily so in Malaysia. Hence, the Court held that any 
allegation of injustice or bias however couched in respectful words and even if 
expressed in temperate language, cannot be tolerated, particularly when such 
allegation is made for the purpose of influencing or exerting pressure upon the 
court in the exercise of its judicial functions. It is also irrelevant whether the 
criticism was well founded or not as it could not be tolerated if merely intended to 
exert pressure upon the court.
290
 The advocate was found to be in contempt as he 
had exceeded the limit of fair criticism and fair comment. His letter scandalised 
the Court by accusing the court of being biased, thus intending to bring the Court 
into disrepute.  
 
On the other hand, in the same year the courts took a different approach in Lim Kit 
Siang v Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.291 In this case, the applicant applied 
for a leave to commit the respondent, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia, for 
contempt of court with regard to the respondent‘s statement in Time magazine. In 
an interview with Time magazine the respondent had said that the judiciary could 
take away the legislative power of Parliament by interpreting law passed by 
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Parliament contrary to the intention of Parliament.
292
 The applicant argued that the 
statement by the respondent showed disrespect, disrepute and offended the 
integrity of the court as it threatened and intimidated the judiciary. It was also 
argued that the statement challenged the authority of the judiciary and the doctrine 
of separation of powers.  
 
At the High Court, it was concluded that the statement merely expressed the Prime 
Minister‘s dilemma and confusion on the doctrine of the separation of powers.293 
The High Court held further that in administering the law of contempt of court, a 
balance between the right to freedom of speech and the need to protect the 
integrity and authority of the courts has to be struck. The Court found that the 
statement was a statement in the desperation of a Prime Minister on the 
shortcoming of the lawmakers in translating policies into law. This finding was 
upheld by the Supreme Court, which viewed the statement as coming from a 
misunderstanding of the concept of separation of powers and that the courts 
should not be overly sensitive and overact impetuously. This is a liberal approach 
taken by the Supreme Court comparing to the earlier case of Arthur Lee Meng 
Kwang.
294
 
 
However, in 1990, in Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi
295
 the Supreme 
Court applied the similar test as in Arthur Lee Meng Kwang
296
 in citing contempt 
against the two defendants.  
 
Manjeet Singh Dhillon
297
 is one of the notable cases in the series of contempt 
cases, dealing with contempt by causing unwarranted aspersions upon the Acting 
Lord President‘s character as a judge who was performing the duties as the Acting 
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Lord President. This case arose out of the events in relation to the dismissal of the 
Lord President and around the contempt proceedings initiated by the Malaysian 
Bar against the Acting Lord President who was later appointed Lord President, 
with regards to the suspension of the five Supreme Court judges. The Bar applied 
for an order to commit to prison the Acting Lord President and this application 
was supported by an affidavit affirmed by the Secretary of the Bar Council, which 
became the subject matter of this case. The application was due to the allegation 
that the Acting Lord President abused his official powers by prohibiting a sitting 
of the Supreme Court to hear an application by Salleh Abas to prevent the 
submission of the report of the Tribunal regarding his removal to the King. The 
Acting Lord President was also claimed to have ordered the court to be locked for 
the purpose of impeding access to the court by the previous Lord President and he 
also ordered the court seal to be kept under lock.  
   
The application of the Bar Council for leave for an order of committal against the 
Acting Lord President was rejected because what he tried to do was only to 
prevent an unlawful sitting. However, the Attorney General later made an 
application to commit the respondent, the secretary of the Bar Council, to prison 
for alleged contempt of court. This was in relation to the statement in the affidavit 
that was claimed to amount to scandalising a judge. The statement in paragraph 9 
in the affidavit, in particular, was contended by the Attorney General as the 
grossest criticism alleged against the highest ranking judge in Malaysia, in these 
words: 
 
… contempt apart, the aforesaid conduct of the respondent (i.e., the Lord 
President) also constitutes misbehaviour within the meaning of art. 125 of 
the Constitution deserving his removal from office. 
 
The Supreme Court stated that there is a limit to what a person may say or write of 
a judge or a court. If it is beyond the limit permitted, it may be treated as contempt 
of court. In this case, the Supreme Court had to ascertain whether the above 
statement as contained in the affidavit were beyond the limit of reasonable 
criticism thus amounting to contempt by scandalising a judge. In determining this 
issue the Court had to turn to English common law as it stood on 7 April 1956 for 
guidance, bearing in mind the qualification of the local condition permits. The 
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Supreme Court accepted the common law principle as stated in R v Gray
298
 and 
further stated that this type of contempt is not obsolete as it survives in other 
common law jurisdictions.
299
  
  
The Court decided that to find contempt requires strict proof in which an intention 
to disrepute the court or the judge is not necessary. It is enough to prove that the 
alleged contemnor intended to file the said application and affidavit in question. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court took a view that it is not necessary to prove there 
was a real risk that the administration of justice is prejudiced, it is enough that it is 
likely to do so. A list of foreign cases such as R v Kopyto
300
 was tendered before 
the Court in order to persuade the Court to look at the development of this law in 
other jurisdictions. However, the Court rejected to accept this foreign reasoning 
on the basis of local condition.
301
  
 
Therefore, in cases of scandalising the court, the Malaysian courts took a stricter 
view as the sensitivity of the local court may not be the same as in England, the 
USA or Canada.
302
 The Supreme Court affirmed the principle established in 
Arthur Lee Meng Kwang
303
 and Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi.
304
  
 
However, Harun Hashim SCJ dissented. He took the view that in upholding the 
contention that the statements made by the respondent amounted to scandalising 
the Acting Lord President in his judicial capacity, it must be shown that the 
Acting Lord President was exercising some judicial power. It is not enough if the 
statements are made against the person of the Acting Lord President only. The 
judge opined that the publication was not likely to have an injurious effect on the 
minds of the public or of the judiciary which could lead to interference with the 
administration of justice. This is because the extent of the publication of the 
affidavit is very limited. He further said that mere abuse of a judge, however 
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defamatory, is not a contempt of court. The abuse must relate to the performance 
of a judicial duty by the judge for it to be a criminal contempt of court.  
 
The majority decided that the respondent was guilty of contempt of court for the 
criticism made against the Lord President in his judicial capacity. He was fined 
with RM 5,000.  
 
This case is significant as it highlights the right to free speech and expression in 
the sense of to what extent the conduct of the judges can be criticised. In principle, 
criticisms of a judge‘s conduct, so long as no aspersions are cast on a judge‘s 
personal character, do not amount to scurrilous abuse. It will not be contempt if 
the attack is only upon the personal reputation of the individual judge as such. 
Any personal attack is dealt with under the ordinary rules of slander and libel. 
However, what needs to be noted is that although the majority mentioned Lim Kit 
Siang,
305
 there is neither elaboration nor explanation in the present case on the 
liberal approach taken in Lim Kit Siang.  
 
Manjeet Singh Dhillon represents a new kind of relationship between the Bar and 
the Bench. The Bar had not only shown the dissatisfaction and disagreement with 
the conduct of the judiciary in general but also had singled out the Acting Lord 
President as a person not fit to continue office. The case also showcases the use of 
contempt power by the judiciary against a member of the Bar for criticism made 
by the Bar against judges or judiciary. The citations of contempt of court against 
the members of the Bar have increased since then.
306
   
 
In 1999, another notable case of publication contempt arose. In Murray Hiebert,
307
 
the appellant, a Canadian, was a journalist and a correspondent for the magazine 
Far Eastern Economic Review. He wrote and published an article relating to the 
respondent‘s case against her son‘s school which was still pending. The 
respondent was the next friend of the plaintiff in the main suit and a wife to a 
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judge of the Court of Appeal at that time. The appellant wrote an article that 
contained amongst other claims that the respondent‘s son was the son of a 
prominent judge of the Court of Appeal and that the trial of his case began in less 
than seven months, insinuating that since the father is a prominent judge, he was 
able to influence the court. The High Court found that the article imputed that by 
hearing the case earlier than an ordinary one the High Court in hearing the case 
had been manipulated or influenced by the Court of Appeal judge. The article also 
imputed that by continuing to hear the case, the High Court was unable to 
dispense justice with fairness and impartiality. The High Court found the article 
contemptuous as it sought to influence the court to dismiss the civil suit or to 
prejudice its mind by the adverse criticism stated in the article in a case that was 
pending.  
 
This case is important as it sets the current test for establishing contempt ex facie. 
On appeal, it was argued by the defence counsel that the High Court applied the 
wrong test of liability by referring to an Indian case of Brig ET Sen (Retd) v 
Edatata Narayanan & Ors.
308
 He submitted that the correct test is that there must 
be a ‗real risk of prejudice as opposed to a remote possibility‘ as established in 
Reg v Duffy & Ors; ex p. Nash
309
 that was adopted in AG v Times Newspaper 
Ltd.
310
 The Court rejected this argument and decided that Brig ET Sen (Retd) was 
a good authority even though India has a Contempt of Court Act. It is interesting 
to note that the Court of Appeal justified that since Brig ET Sen (Retd) referred to 
Thakur Jugak Kishore Sinha v The Sitmarlin Central Co-operative Bank Ltd
311
 
and Re PC Sen
312
 in which reference was made to R v Gray,  the Court of Appeal 
opined that Brig ET Sen (Retd) also echoed the principle of English common law. 
Apart from this, the test of tendency or likelihood to interfere with the 
administration of justice was consistently applied in the local cases of PP v The 
Straits Times Press Ltd
313
 and Re Sin Poh Amalgamated Ltd & Ors.
314
 Hence, the 
Court said that there was no reason to depart from this principle. It states: 
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[W]hether there are local decisions in point on an issue namely, the test 
to apply as in Straits Times Press Ltd, Palaniappan and Sin Poh 
Amalgamated, that is the test for the High Court to apply until overruled 
by the Federal Court.
315
  
 
Therefore, it was not necessary to prove affirmatively that there had been an 
actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of the offending 
statement. It is enough if it is likely or tends to interfere in any way with the 
proper administration of justice, whether or not the alleged contemnor intended 
that result. 
 
As regards mens rea or intention, the defence counsel argued that it was not his 
intention in any way either to prejudice the fair trial of the said suit or to prejudge 
its outcome. He did not intend to do more than report on a case of considerable 
public interest in the region. He also argued that he had no knowledge that the fact 
he stated or impression he gave was false. Besides that, he claimed that he had no 
intention to excite prejudice or exert pressure on the High Court. The defence 
counsel, therefore, submitted that the common law offence of contempt of court 
requires proof of mens rea that is an intention on the part of the alleged contemnor 
to impede or prejudice the administration of justice in order to constitute contempt 
of court.
316
  
 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and upheld the decision of the High 
Court. The Court of Appeal quoted a Singapore case of AG v Wain & Ors (No. 
1)
317
 where Sinnathuray J. held: 
 
… However, from the reported cases in the Commonwealth jurisdictions 
and the opinions of textbook writers, the balance of authority is that is 
that it is not necessary to have an actual intention to commit the contempt 
of scandalising the court. The intention of the writer of the article 
complained of is irrelevant in contempt proceedings. I support this view 
because in English common law, mens rea is not an element that has to 
be proved to establish contempt and s. 8 (1) of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act, has incorporated that. So, when a person alleges bias 
against a judge, it is not necessary to prove that he intended to interfere 
with the administration of justice. What the court must do is to consider 
the effect the article complained of has, or is calculated to have, on the 
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mind of the reader. The intention, however, is relevant to the penalty to 
be imposed. 
 
 
The Court of Appeal however, held that in order to establish contempt of court as 
the result of a publication scandalising the court or interfering with the course of 
justice, intention or mens rea on the part of the alleged contemnor was not an 
essential ingredient and having no knowledge that the alleged conduct or 
publication amounted to contempt of court was not a defence for the alleged 
contemnor. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal agreed with the view of the High 
Court that intention on the part of the contemnor is irrelevant so long as he 
published an article that has tendency to sully the administration of justice.   
 
The test and principle in Murray Hiebert is applied until it is overruled by the 
Federal Court.  As to date, it was referred to in Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat 
Bhd,
318
 Monatech,
319
 Raja Segaran [2005],
320
 Yau Jiok Hua,
321
 Achieva 
Technology
322
 and Foo Khoon Long v Foo Khoon Wong.
323
  
 
(ii) Sub Judice Rule 
 
The media have an important role in publicising certain matters that they believe 
are issues of public interests and concerns. With regard to the court proceedings, 
the basic principle of ‗open justice‘ is applicable whereby the court proceedings 
must be held in open court, and press and public have the right to attend, evidence 
is communicated publicly and nothing is done to discourage the publication to the 
wider public of fair and accurate reporting of those proceedings.
324
 However, 
there are some restrictions placed on the media‘s role in disseminating 
information, particularly when the subject matter concerned is relating to an 
ongoing trial in a courtroom.  
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The law on what may be published about current legal proceedings is known as 
the sub judice rule. The law of contempt operates to restrict what may be 
published about particular litigation only during the time the trial is ongoing. It is 
in fact, operated to postpone what may be said. Once the legal proceedings are 
over, the restrictions imposed under the contempt laws are, in general, lifted.
325
  
 
The object of limiting what can be said during the currency of legal proceedings is 
to protect the fairness of that trial. This is to avoid ‗trial by the media‘ which 
could influence the participants in the proceeding. ‗Trials by media‘ put at risk the 
due administration of justice in the particular proceedings.
326
 They could also 
undermine confidence in the judicial system generally.
327
 Another concern when 
dealing with this kind of contempt of court is freedom of speech. The courts are 
well aware of the dilemma of reconciling these two important public interests, i.e. 
protection of fair trials and preservation of freedom of speech. The courts need to 
strike a balance between the two, but most of the time courts tend to favour the 
protection of a fair trial at the expense of freedom of speech.
328
  
 
In Malaysia, to establish liability under sub judice rule, Murray Hiebert
329
 rules 
that ‗it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there had been an actual 
interference with the administration of justice by reason of offending statements. 
It is enough if it is likely or it tends in any way to interfere with the proper 
administration of justice‘ which denotes the ‗inherent tendency‘ test.330 This is the 
lower threshold for determining liability for publication contempt that interferes 
with particular proceedings. The Court of Appeal in Murray Hiebert disagreed 
with the test of liability established in R v Duffy
331
 that there must be ‗a real risk of 
prejudice to the administration of justice as opposed to a remote possibility‘, even 
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though this test proposed that a minimal or small risk of interference as opposed to 
remote possibility should be satisfied.   
 
In Malaysia, there is an imprecise time frame concerning when the case remains 
sub judice. In R v Davies, ex parte Delbert-Evans,
332
 which was cited in PP v 
Abdul Samad b. Ahmad & Anor,
333
 it was found that contempt can be committed 
at any time until the case is ended, i.e. the case is finally over when the Appeal 
Court has heard and determined the appeal. The question is, how do we determine 
when does the case start?   
 
In Abdul Samad, the Court held that the sub judice period starts in criminal 
process when summons or warrants have been issued or arrest has been made, or 
in civil case, when a writ has been issued or a plaint filed. In The Straits Times 
Press,
334
 it has been decided that a criminal case remains sub judice until the 
expiration of the time allowed for appealing or in the event of appeal until the 
conclusion of an appeal. From these cases, the sub judice period starts in criminal 
cases from the issuance of warrant or arrest made until the conclusion of appeal. 
In civil cases, it is from the issuance of the writ until the conclusion of appeal.  
 
However, in Abdul Samad, the Court had to deal with the publication of an article 
while police investigation was going on. The Court decided that contempt would 
be committed if it was known at the time of the publication that police 
investigation was proceeding and that the prosecution was at the very least, under 
consideration, even though no one has been officially accused of the offence.       
 
3.1.3 Mens Rea or Intent 
 
In general criminal law, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt not only the actus reus of an accused person, i.e. that the 
accused had committed the wrongful act, but also his mens rea, i.e. his guilty 
mind, in that the accused intended the consequences of his act or was reckless as 
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to such consequences. To this general rule, there are exceptions in which a person 
may be guilty of an offence although he had no guilty mind. It is only required to 
prove that the accused committed the act. Contempt of court is one of those.  
 
Lord Denning MR in AG v Butterworth
335
 observed that: 
 
In considering whether a man has been guilty of contempt of court, you 
do not look at his knowledge or intention, but only look at what he did. If 
his action was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, that is 
enough, irrespective of his state of mind at that time. 
 
AG v Butterworth has been referred to by the Malaysian courts and in Malaysia it 
has been established that the state of the accused mind i.e. whether it must be 
proved that the accused has intended to interfere with the course of justice, is 
irrelevant and all that is required to be proved is that the accused committed the 
requisite act.
336
   
 
However, in England, after the coming into force the CCA 1981, Section 6 (c) of 
the Act, which deals with publication contempt, preserves the liability for 
contempt at common law if intention to prejudice the administration of justice can 
be shown. The requirement to prove specific intent has been reaffirmed in 
Attorney General v Punch Ltd and Another.
337
 The House of Lords held that to 
constitute contempt, the Attorney General had to prove that the alleged contemnor 
did the relevant act with the necessary intent. This is by showing that the alleged 
contemnor knew that the publication would interfere with the course of justice by 
defeating the purpose underlying the injunction. In order words, it must be shown 
that the alleged contemnor intended to publish with the intention to do what the 
order or injunction prevents him to do.  
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was established in AG v Times Newspaper [1992] 7 AC 191 and AG v News Group Newspapers 
plc [1989] QB 110.  
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3.1.4 Mode of Trial or Procedures 
 
In contempt cases, the court can commence the proceedings of its own motion. 
The prosecutor and persons interested in the litigation may also initiate the 
proceedings. The court can request that the Attorney General assumes conduct of 
the proceedings even if the parties do not wish to pursue a contempt motion.
338
 
Therefore, in general there are two ways of commencing contempt proceedings: 
by way of instanster i.e. summary power,
339
 or by summary process i.e. by way of 
motion. The former is when a judge is allowed to deal with the matter 
immediately. It is normally when the contempt committed before him is in the 
face of the court. The latter procedure is adopted when the motion is brought 
before a judge before whom the accused must appear and show cause why he 
should not be cited for contempt of court.
340
  Therefore, for in facie curiae, the 
court may initiate contempt proceeding suo motu whereas for contempt ex facie, 
summary process will be initiated either by the court, Attorney General or by the 
affected party.  
 
The court can deal with an alleged contemnor ‗on the spot‘ only in cases of 
flagrant and disruptive contempt that create risk to the immediate administration 
of justice. It should be used sparingly due to reasons explained in R v Griffin
341
 
which was referred to in Jaginder Singh
342
 and Zainur Zakaria:
343
  
 
We are here concerned with the exercise of a jurisdiction which is sui 
generis so far as the English Law is concerned. In proceedings for 
criminal contempt, there is no prosecutor, or even a requirement that a 
representative of the Crown or of the injured party should initiate the 
proceedings. The judge is entitled to proceed of his own motion. There is 
no summons or indictment, nor is it mandatory for any written account of 
the accusation made against him to be furnished to the contemnor. There 
is no preliminary inquiry or filtering procedure such as a committal. 
                                                 
338
 Arthur Lee Meng Kwang (n. 1); Tommy Thomas (n. 197). See also Miller, The Law of Contempt 
in Canada (n. 21) p. 48.  
339
 The summary power was highlighted in Balogh (n. 230). Summary power is characterised as 
the court‘s inherent ability of its own motion to cite for contempt those who disrupt proceedings or 
who threaten people involved in the proceedings. In the summary power is the court‘s ability to 
punish immediately, without charge or trial as in ordinary trial. 
340
 See R v Vallieres (1973), 47 DLR (3d) 378. 
341
 (1988) 88 Cr App R 63. 
342
 Jaginder Singh (n. 10). 
343
 Zainur Zakaria (FC) (n. 186) pp. 617-618. 
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Depositions are not taken. There is no jury. Nor is the system adversarial 
in character. The judge himself enquires into the circumstances so far as 
they are not within his personal knowledge. He identifies the grounds of 
compliant, selects the witnesses and investigates what they have to say 
(subject to right of cross-examination), decides on guilt and pronounces 
sentence. This summary procedure, which by its nature is to be used 
quickly if it is to be used at all, omits many of safeguards to which an 
accused is ordinarily entitles, and for this reason it has been repeatedly 
stated that the judge should choose to adopt only in cases of real need.  
 
In Malaysia, the procedure to deal with contempt of court can be found under 
Order 52 RHC and Order 34 SCR, for superior
344
 and subordinate courts 
respectively. For subordinate courts, apart from Order 34 SCR, Section 353 CPC 
provides for Magistrates‘ Court a procedure as to offences committed in court 
such as intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in a judicial 
proceeding.
345
  
 
3.1.4.1 Procedures in the Superior Courts 
 
Order 52 r. 1 RHC provides for the procedural vehicle to exercise the High 
Court‘s power to order committal.346 The procedure under Order 52 may be 
invoked to produce the sanction of imprisonment or a fine independently of the 
Penal Code or the CPC.
347
 The High Court may punish for contempt committed in 
connection with proceedings set out in Order 52 r.1 (2): 
 
                                                 
344
 The application of this provision is extended to the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. Rule 
3 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995 and Rule 4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994, 
inter alia, state that where there is no other provision made by any written law or by these Rules, 
the procedure and practice in the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 and the Rules of the High 
Court 1980 shall mutatis mutandis apply. 
345
 Section 353 CPC is read together with Section 228 Penal Code. Section 353 CPC reads: 
When any such offence as is described in section 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 of the Penal 
Code is committed in the view or presence of any Magistrate‘s Court, whether civil or 
criminal, the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time 
before the rising of the Court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cognisance of the 
offence and sentence the offender to a fine not exceeding fifty ringgit and, in default of 
payment, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months.  
 
Section 228 reads: 
Whoever intentionally offers any insult or causes any interruption to any public servant, 
while such public servant is sitting in any stage of judicial proceedings, shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may 
extend to two thousand ringgit, or with both. 
346
 Power to make committal order for subordinate courts is contained in Order 34 r. 1 SCR. 
347
 Arthur Lee Meng Kwang (n. 1); Chung Onn v Wee Tian Peng [1996] 5 MLJ 521; Murray 
Hiebert (HC) (n. 187). 
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(1) any proceedings before the High Court; 
(2) criminal proceedings, except where the contempt is committed in 
the face of the court or consists of disobedience to an order of the 
court or a breach of an undertaking to the court, which means to 
say that where these exceptional situations arise in any criminal 
proceeding, the High Court is empowered to deal with the matter 
summarily and instantly without going through the notice of 
motion; 
(3) proceedings in a Subordinate Court; or 
(4) contempt committed otherwise than in connection with any 
proceedings.  
 
Order 52 r.4 further provides: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Order shall be taken as 
affecting the power of the High Court to make an order of committal of 
its own motion against a person guilty of contempt of court. 
 
Therefore contempt proceeding may be initiated either by the court suo motu or by 
way of motion moved by Attorney General or any interested parties.  
 
(i) Contempt in the Face Of the Court (in facie) 
 
Order 52 r. 1A allows the court to act on its own motion for contempt committed 
in the face of the court. It allows the court to deal with such contempt instantly 
instead of serving a formal notice to show cause to the alleged contemnor. The 
court, however, must ensure that the alleged contemnor understands the nature of 
the offence alleged against him and has the opportunity to be heard in his own 
defence. The court must also keep a proper record of proceedings.
348
  
 
When the court is satisfied that contempt is clear, the alleged contemnor is ordered 
to appear before the court on the same day at the fixed hour for the purpose of 
purging his contempt.
349
 Where the alleged contemnor has purged his contempt by 
                                                 
348 In Butler v Butler (1993) Fam 167, p. 174, it states that the procedure is intended that: 
(1)  no alleged contemnor shall be in any doubt as to the charges which are made against 
him;  
(2)  he shall be given a proper opportunity of showing cause why he should not be held in 
contempt of court;  
(3)   if an order of committal is made, the accused  
       (a)   knows precisely in what respects he has been found to have offended, and 
       (b)   is given a written record of those findings and of the sentence passed upon him.      
349
 Order 52 r 1A (2) RHC reads: 
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tendering his unreserved apology to the court, and it is considered such contempt 
is not of a serious nature, he will be excused and no further action is to be taken 
against him.
350
 If the alleged contemnor refuses to purge his contempt, the court 
will pass a sentence on him.
351
  
 
(ii) Contempt Out of the Court (ex facie) 
 
Order 52 r 1B RHC provides that in other cases of contempt of court, the alleged 
contemnor will be served personally with a formal notice to show cause why he 
should not be committed to the prison or fined. This is the procedure to be applied 
in any other branches of out-of-court contempt. 
In order to bring contempt to the notice of the court, the party aggrieved or the 
Attorney General will move the court by applying leave for an order of committal, 
to commit the alleged contemnor to prison.
352
 However, in practice, the courts 
also act on their own motions in these branches of contempt in light of the saving 
provisions of Order 52 r. 4 RHC.
353
  
 
Order 52 r.2 (1) RHC stipulates that no application for an order of committal may 
be made unless leave to make such an application has been granted. This leave 
must be applied for ex parte in open court supported with a statement and an 
affidavit verifying the facts relied on.
354
 If the applicant fails to apply for leave, it 
may nullify the proceedings.
355
 The person against whom an ex parte leave is 
granted may apply to set it aside. In the absence of an application by an alleged 
contemnor to set aside an ex parte leave for committal proceedings, the post-leave 
                                                                                                                                      
Where a Judge is satisfied that contempt has been committed in the face of the Court, the 
Judge may order the contemnor to appear before him on the same day at the time fixed by 
the Court for the purpose of purging his contempt. 
350
 Order 52 r 1A (3) RHC. 
351
 Order 52 r 1A (4) RHC. 
352
 Order 52 r. 1 (1) RHC. 
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 In Tommy Thomas (n. 197) the Court of Appeal took a view that although the contempt 
committed was not in the face of the court during the proceedings, the matter had the effect of 
undermining public confidence in the dignity and integrity of the judiciary and should be promptly 
remedied. The Court held that the High Court had taken the right steps in issuing the notice to 
show cause even after nine days the alleged offence was committed since neither the Attorney 
General nor the parties took any step to bring committal proceedings against the appellant.  
354
 Order 52 r. 2 RHC. 
355
 Tan Gin Seng v Chua Kian Hong [1999] 1 MLJ 29. 
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procedure would follow. After obtaining the leave, the application for an order of 
committal must be made to the court by way of motion.  
 
The court will fix the hearing date for the said motion.
356
 Order 52 r. 3 (3) RHC 
provides that the notice of motion applying for the order of committal, 
accompanied by a copy of the statement and affidavit in support of the application 
for leave under Order 52 r. 2 (3) RHC, must be served personally on the person 
sought to be committed, so that he will be informed of the facts upon which leave 
has been obtained so as to allow him to answer the claim against him.
357
  
 
The hearing of the motion is held in open court except in cases stated in Order 52 
r 5 (1) RHC.
358
 During the hearing the parties shall rely only on the grounds set 
out from the statement and affidavit filed in under Order 52 r. 2 RHC unless the 
parties have obtained the leave to rely on new grounds.
359
 Since the proceedings 
are started by motion, a civil form of process, interlocutory order relating to the 
filing of evidence, cross examination and discovery are made available. After the 
hearing and if the court finds the alleged contemnor guilty of contempt, the court 
                                                 
356
 Order 52 r. 3 (1) RHC reads: 
When leave has been granted under rule 2 to apply for an order of committal, the 
application for the order must be made by motion to the Court and, unless the Court or 
Judge granting leave has otherwise directed, there must be at least 8 clear days between 
the service of the notice of motion and the day named therein for the hearing. 
357
 In Folin & Brothers Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) v Wong Boon Sun & Ors and Another Appeal 
[2009] 5 MLJ 362, p. 380, the Court held that the notice must state with sufficient particularity the 
alleged breaches to enable the alleged contemnor to defend himself.  
358
 It states: 
Subject to paragraph (2) , the Court hearing an application for an order of committal may 
sit in private in the following cases, that is to say- 
(a) where the application arises out of proceedings relating to the wardship or adoption 
of an infant or wholly or mainly to the guardianship, custody, maintenance or 
upbringing of an infant, or rights of access to an infant; 
(b) where the application arises out of proceedings relating to a person suffering or 
appearing to be suffering from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental 
Disorders Ordinance, 1952 (31/52); 
(c) where the application arises out of proceedings in which a secret process, discovery 
or invention was in issue; 
(d) where it appears to the Court that in the interests of the administration of justice or 
for reasons of national security the application should be heard in private, 
but except as aforesaid, the application shall be heard in open Court. 
359
 UMBC Bhd v Chuah Sim Guan @ Chai Chong Chin [1999] 3 AMR Supp. Rep. 803 rules that 
the parties are bound by their respective affidavits which constitute pleadings in committal 
proceedings and so a party may only raise questions of facts in the affidavits. Moreover, in Wong 
Soo Teong [Trading as Chop Yeok Lan] v Long Foo Kang & Anor [1996] 2 BLJ 47, the Court 
refused to accept the fresh affidavit filed by the party in support of the application for leave. The 
reason for this is that as the application for leave is made ex parte the person sought to be 
committed should be informed of the facts upon which leave was obtained so as to allow him to 
prepare for his defence. Besides, the fresh affidavit could prejudice the committal as the grounds 
upon which leave was granted may be substituted with other grounds.  
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will sentence him to prison or fine him or both. However, during the hearing, the 
alleged contemnor may tender his unreserved apology in order to purge his 
contempt.
360
  
 
3.1.4.2 Procedures in the Subordinate Courts 
 
In the subordinate courts, the procedure for committal proceedings is provided for 
under Order 34 SCR. There is nothing in the provisions mentioned in the 
subordinate courts‘ jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings on their own 
motion. Order 34 r. 2 SCR provides that no application to a court for committal 
order may be made unless leave has been granted by the court in which an 
application for such leave be made ex parte supported by an affidavit. Thus, the 
leave to move the court for contempt proceedings is applied either by the party 
aggrieved or by the Attorney General.  
 
After the leave has been granted, the application for an order of committal must be 
made to the court by filing a notice in Form 94. The court will fix the hearing of 
the said notice by allowing at least seven clear days between the service of the 
notice and the hearing date.
361
 The notice of motion in Form 94 together with the 
affidavit filed in accordance to Order 34 r. 2 SCR, must be served personally on 
the person sought to be committed so that he will be well informed of the alleged 
contempt.
362
  
 
The hearing of the notice is held in open court but the court may sit in chambers if 
for reasons of the interest of administration of justice or of national security. If the 
court decides to make an order of committal against the person sought, the court 
will in open court state the person‘s name, the nature of the act or omission in 
respect of which the order of committal is being made and the length of the period 
for which he is being committed.
363
  
 
                                                 
360
 In Chung Onn (n. 347), apology can operate as mitigating factor in contempt proceedings. 
361
 Order 34 r. 3 (1) SCR. 
362
 Order 34 r. 3 (3) SCR. 
363
 Order 34 r. 4 SCR. 
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The provisions in the SCR do not provide specifically the procedures for contempt 
in the view or presence of the court, i.e. in facie contempt.  However, in Public 
Prosecutor v Lee Ah Keh & Ors
364
 and Seeralan,
365
 the subordinate courts 
initiated contempt proceedings on their own motion by virtue of Section 228 Penal 
Code
366
 read together with Section 353 CPC,
367
 for its procedure. Magistrates may 
invoke their power under Section 228 if an alleged contemptuous act is an offence 
of intentional insult or interruption occurs before him during a judicial proceeding. 
Therefore, in Lee Ah Keh
368
 Ali J said: 
 
When contempt is committed in the view or presence of the court, the 
first thing to do is to order the offender to be detained by the police and at 
the same time to record the act or statement constituting the contempt. 
The court then proceeds with its other business for the day. After 
completing other business but before rising, offender shall be produced 
again to deal with. If the magistrate decides to take cognisance of the 
contempt, the act or statement constituting the contempt shall be read out 
to the offender who is then asked to show cause why he should not be 
punished. 
 
As there is no standard parameter in procedure to deal with contempt in facie in 
the subordinate courts, the High Court in Bok Chek Thou & Anor v Low Swee 
Boon & Anor
369
 has set out guidelines for Magistrates and Sessions Courts judges 
to follow. Suriyadi J lists down these guidelines, as follows: 
 
(i) to have cognisance of, or to be personally conscious and aware  
of the conduct, remarks, act of refusal to answer to questions 
and/or evidence of the contemnor; 
(ii) to record that witnessed conduct, remarks, act of refusal to 
answer and/or evidence of that intended contemnor. These 
notations will be a point of reference subsequently when the 
intended contemnor is required to explain the above 
‗contemptuous‘ acts or statements. It must be borne in mind that 
these are mere guidelines as it is not possible to particularise all 
the acts or statements which can or cannot constitute contempt in 
the face of the court;  
(iii) in the event of any comparative evidence being made available, 
to show that perjury had occurred, such comparative evidence are 
to be recorded;  
                                                 
364
 [1968] 1 MLJ 22. 
365
 Seeralan (n. 241). 
366
 Section 228 Penal Code (n. 357). 
367
 Section 353 CPC (n. 357). 
368
 Lee Ah Keh (n. 364) p. 24. 
369
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(iv) any apparent evinced intentions to obstruct and frustrate the 
administration of justice connected to that perjury are to be 
minuted; 
(v) having concluded that a probable offence of contempt had been 
committed, the contemnor is to be informed of the court‘s desire 
to pursue a contempt proceedings; 
(vi) when the contempt is committed in the view and presence of the 
judge, he is to order the offender to be detained by the police, 
pending the commencement of the contempt proceedings; 
(vii) that the proceedings be adjourned for a short while, if necessary, 
for a ‗cooling-off period‘ or for purposes of permitting the judge 
to prepare the charge; 
(viii) when the proceeding commences, the charge is read out to the 
intended contemnor, with it having sufficient particularities, 
especially the perjured testimony, together with the evinced 
intention to frustrate or obstruct the administration of justice. If 
the charge is based on conduct, remarks or refusal to answer 
questions witnessed by the judge or which he has cognisance of, 
then those appropriate particulars are to be specified; 
(ix) as this is a criminal proceeding, the contemnor must be given the 
opportunity to answer the charge. This conferment of such an 
opportunity is essential, especially when the committal may be a 
sentence. This is of opportunity to reply invariably brings forth 
the consideration of the concept of the necessity of representation 
for the contemnor...[a] summary proceedings requires instant 
action…courts should not rigidly follow the time honoured ‗right 
of legal representation‘; 
(x) having given that opportunity to reply, and if admission is 
elicited, the court may proceed with the sentencing. If he has 
adequately explained his perjury/remarks/conduct, and/or reason 
for refusing to answer to questions, then he may be dealt with 
appropriately or even entitled to an outright acquittal. Otherwise 
the sentencing procedure follows.
370
 
  
3.1.5 Sanctions and Remedies 
 
Sentencing is another unique feature in the law of contempt of court. In general, 
the purpose of sanction or punishment in criminal contempt is punitive. However, 
for civil contempt, if disobedience is proved, the contemnor can be committed to 
prison to remain until he purges himself by doing the right or undoing the wrong.  
 
In Malaysia, the courts have wide discretionary powers in sentencing for 
contempt. In contrast to statutory offences that have a definite range of sentencing, 
                                                 
370
 Bok Chek Thou (n. 369) pp. 349-350. 
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there is no limit to punishment for contempt of court. Sentences as provided under 
Order 52 r. 8 RHC include mere admonition,
371
 a fine
372
 or imprisonment.
373
  
 
As for civil contempt, the High Court in Chung Onn
374
 stated that the courts have 
theoretically unlimited jurisdiction to mete out any sentence for contempt of court. 
Custodial sentence by way of imprisonment may be imposed only in the most 
serious cases. Seriousness is judged by reference to the unrelenting interference 
with the administration of justice and the unmitigated culpability of the offender. 
In the less serious case, the imposition of a fine is appropriate. However, there is 
also no limit to the imposition of a fine. The court assessing a proper fine, will 
take into account participation of the offender in the interference with the course 
of justice, the damage done to the public interest in addition to the seriousness of 
contempt. Besides that, the decision of the courts is made on previous cases that 
may be referred to as guidance. 
 
In addition, tendering unreserved apology is significant in contempt proceedings 
as it may purge the contempt or may operate as a mitigating factor. Low Hop Bing 
J. in Yau Jiok Hua
375
 says: 
 
As the contempt is of a continuous nature, and so long as the contempt 
has not been purged by the contemnor, it continues unabated every day. 
For that, I impose a daily fine of RM750, to be paid from day to day, 
until the contemnor purges the contempt, i.e. by paying the money to the 
applicant pursuant to the 2003 order. For the daily fine, I impose a day‘s 
imprisonment in default thereof. 
 
For contempt in facie as in Re Zainur Zakaria,
376
  the contemnor was given an 
opportunity to tender an unconditional apology but refused to do so. The High 
Court considered the attitude of the contemnor in refusing to apologise and 
                                                 
371
 In Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd (n. 246), a contemnor was discharged after due 
admonition. 
372
 In Arthur Lee Meng Kwang (n. 1) the respondent was imposed a fine of RM 5,000. The 
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sentence him to three months‘ imprisonment. The imprisonment imposed reflects 
the punitive nature of punishment.  
 
3.2 MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF CONTEMPT OF COURT IN MALAYSIA 
 
3.2.1 What is Contempt and Its Classification: Actus Reus and its 
Test of Liability 
 
In Malaysia, given that contempt is a growth of the common law, there is no 
authoritative definition or limitation on contempt and the categories are not 
closed. The courts perceive that an interference with the administration of justice 
is contempt of court and since there are no clear guidelines as to what amounts to 
contempt, there is always a possibility and a risk for the alleged contemnor to fall 
victim to variable and unpredictable judicial ‗creation‘ of categories or scope of 
contempt of court.  
 
With regard to contempt in the face of the court, even though the boundaries of in 
facie contempt have not been precisely defined, it is contempt of court if the 
misconduct occurs in the course of the proceedings, either within the court itself
377
 
or directly connected with what is happening in court.
378
 The actus reus, or the 
ways by which contempt in the face of the court may be committed, are as many 
and varied as permutations of human conduct may permit. Different views also 
have been taken as to whether a particular set of circumstances did or did not 
constitute contempt. That being the case, the view of the presiding judge would 
hold the balance. Nevertheless, there is always a propensity for perception and 
approaches to vary from judge to judge as to how they view the alleged 
misconduct occurring before them. One judge might see the alleged act as 
contempt in the face of court justifying the exercise of summary power but 
another judge might not.  
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378
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In Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd
379
 the High Court instituted 
proceedings for contempt in the face of court on its own motion against a legal 
firm and its client for writing letters to Chief Registrars of the High Court, the 
Federal Court and to the Chief Justice of the Federal Court on a matter pending 
before the court. The letters, according to the Court, had not only prejudged the 
issues to be tried by the Court, but had suggested defiance of the order of stay 
made by the court. This was due to the content of the letters whereby the 
defendant‘s solicitor was seen as directing the registrar to fix a new auction date 
as soon as possible. However, the counsel for the contemnors contended that this 
case was not a case of in facie contempt as the letters were not written with regard 
to something occurring in the face of court. 
 
The Court, nevertheless, found that the acts and conduct of the alleged contemnors 
based on the letters written by them in respect of matters arising from the case 
constituted in facie contempt. It was contempt in the cognisance of the court, as 
such acts and conduct took place during pending proceedings and when the case 
has not been finally disposed of by the court. The justification given by the Court 
was that the circumstances and categories of facts which may arise and may 
constitute contempt in the face of the court in a particular case are never closed. It 
may arise from any act, any slander, any contemptuous utterance and any act of 
disobedience to an order of the court. Any of these acts in varying degrees that 
affect the administration of justice or may impede the fair trial of sub judice 
matter can be deemed to be contempt in the face of the court. The Court also 
viewed that any comment or views expressed on a pending proceeding which 
purports to prejudge the issues to be tried by the court is a usurpation of the proper 
function of the court. This may be punished as contempt irrespective of the effect 
or likely effect on the particular proceeding in question.  
 
To rebut the contemnors‘ contention that this case was not contempt in facie since 
the letters were not written with regard to something occurring in the face of the 
court, the High Court held that to constitute contempt in the face of the court the 
acts or words must interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of justice. 
                                                 
379
 Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd (n. 246). 
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It is unnecessary that all the circumstances of the act of contempt should take 
place in either a courtroom or within the personal knowledge of the presiding 
judge. Instead of approaching the matter by way of sub judice contempt, the High 
Court decided this was a case of in facie contempt. Thus, it allowed the Court to 
invoke its suo motu jurisdiction and dealt with the matter summarily.  
 
As regards publication contempt, especially sub judice comment, there have been 
growing signs of concern particularly in newspaper circles that the law of 
contempt unduly inhibits the freedom of speech and expression, and freedom of 
the press. However, the press, media and public are concerned that at many key 
points the law is uncertain, particularly as to whether comment on matters that 
might become the subject of criminal proceedings is inhibited by the law of 
contempt only while the proceedings are ‗pending‘ or from the time they are 
‗imminent‘. It is yet to be defined clearly what publications are held to ‗prejudice‘ 
a criminal case as well as in connection with civil proceedings. Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier, the problem of when the law of contempt begins to operate in 
relation to criminal proceedings is perhaps one of the most troublesome areas of 
contempt. A publication that is likely to prejudice a fair trial will amount to 
contempt proceedings if the trial may be said to be ‗pending‘ or ‗imminent‘. Any 
attempt to give meaning to ‗pending‘ and ‗imminent‘ must necessarily be 
speculative.
380
  
 
Another issue is regarding the test of liability. Under sub judice contempt, general 
proposition of the actus reus is that any publication that has a tendency to 
‗prejudice‘ a fair trial or the due course of justice will amount to contempt. The 
test of liability in Murray Hiebert
381
 has been accepted as the test to be applied in 
determining sub judice contempt in Malaysia; it is not necessary to prove 
affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of 
justice by reason of the offending statement. It is enough if it is likely or tends in 
any way to interfere with the proper administration of justice. This means that 
even if the possibility of interference of the proceedings is remote, the publication 
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 Borrie, Lowe and Sufrin (n. 18) p. 142. 
381
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may amount to contempt. The Court rejected the test established in R v Duffy
382
 
that is ‗real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice as opposed to remote 
possibility.‘  
 
In contempt by scandalising a court or a judge, the same test applied. In Manjeet 
Singh Dhillon,
383
 it has been ascertained that there can be contempt if there is a 
reflection upon the administration of justice. The Court found that the criticism 
made by the alleged contemnor if repeated would indisputably undermine the 
authority of the Lord President and lower the dignity of the court in the eye of the 
public.
384
  Therefore, as to the test of liability, the Malaysian courts emphasise on 
the tendency of a publication to interfere with the administration of justice and not 
whether there is any practical reality that the publication would indeed interfere 
with the administration of justice. In these two cases, the contemnors were 
punished for the tendency of the perceived evil of their conducts even though the 
perceived evil could not and would not materialise.
385
 
 
Another area of concern regarding contempt of court is the dichotomy between 
civil and criminal contempt. In broad terms it is easy to differentiate criminal 
contempt from civil contempt. However, this is not a principled distinction. In 
practice, the distinction between the two has become blurred. This is due to the 
concept of ‗interference with the administration of justice‘. For instance, if the 
court has made a peremptory order, its breach is necessarily an interference with 
the way in which the court has expressly determined to administer the course of 
justice. Therefore, if the person against whom the order was made had broken it, 
he would be guilty of civil contempt but the damage is also done to the 
administration of justice. This is evident in Tommy Thomas
386
 as discussed earlier. 
The Court exercised its suo motu jurisdiction ordering the appellant to show cause 
as to why he should not be cited for contempt for breaching his undertaking of the 
pledge not to repeat his remarks or statements published in the magazine.  
 
                                                 
382
 R v Duffy (n. 309). 
383
 Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n. 8). 
384
 Ibid. p. 180. 
385
 Shuaib (n. 279) pp. 238-239. 
386
 Tommy Thomas (n. 197). 
 97 
3.2.2 Mens Rea and Defences  
 
In Malaysia, mens rea is not an essential ingredient to constitute contempt. On the 
existing state of the authorities, i.e. Murray Hiebert
387
 and Koperasi Serbaguna 
Taiping Barat Bhd
388
 it is reasonably clear that in proceedings for criminal 
contempt, lack of intention or knowledge for the contemptuous conduct is not a 
defence. It means that any person acting contemptuously could not argue that he 
does not intend to or does not know that the behaviour or act in question 
constitutes contempt of court.
389
 The Courts in both cases further stated that since 
intention on the part of the contemnor is irrelevant, contempt of court is a strict 
liability offence.  
 
In Leela Ratos,
390
 the alleged contemnor was held in contempt as his conduct was 
calculated to disrupt court proceedings by manoeuvring an adjournment and he 
was found to have intention to do so. The Court inferred the alleged contemnor‘s 
intention by evaluating his acts of giving contradictory statements to the court 
regarding his client‘s failures to attend the court.391 From this, the court inferred 
that he knew about his client‘s absence beforehand and had come to court 
prepared with intention to apply for another postponement, i.e. for the third time. 
  
From this authority, it can be said that if the contemnor has ‗knowledge‘ that the 
alleged act will produce a contumacious act, it would fasten him with liability. 
Such knowledge will be inferred by applying the test as to whether objectively 
‗the effect‘ of the publication would result in interfering with the administration of 
justice.
392
 
 
                                                 
387
 Murray Hiebert (HC) (n. 187) pp. 272-273.  
388
 Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd (n. 246) p. 63. 
389
 Murray Hiebert (HC) (n. 187) p. 272. 
390
 Leela Ratos (n. 191). 
391
 Ibid. p. 733. 
392
 Wain (n. 317) p. 532. 
 98 
The confusion as to mens rea as a requirement in establishing contempt is due to 
the fact that the definition of contempt contains no reference to mens rea.
393
 
Contempt is simply ‗any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or 
interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court‘. This has 
led to an assumption that the offence is an absolute or strict liability offence 
whereby there is no need to have intention; completely and utterly disrespectful 
action in itself is sufficient to constitute contempt.   
 
In Malaysia, therefore, intent as established in contempt cases does not relate to 
obstructing or interfering with the due course of justice. It relates to the 
commission of the particular act which in turn obstructs or interferes with the due 
course of justice. As intent to disrupt or hinder the course of justice is not required 
to warrant a finding of contempt, what must be found is only intent to commit an 
act which tends to undermine public confidence in the courts or tends to interfere 
with the course of justice. If it needs to prove intent beyond the act, that is, intent 
to undermine public confidence in the courts or to interfere with the course of 
justice, the courts would have no remedy against contempt committed against it. It 
would not be able to stop those who employ vulgar and abusive language in court 
or those who defy court orders.    
 
Currently, intent is not an ingredient to constitute contempt. Any argument or 
defence saying that an alleged contemnor who engages in angry and abusive 
language in court does not intend to undermine public confidence in the court is 
not acceptable defence. Therefore, in relation to publication and media contempt, 
the author, publisher, printers and distributors may be found in contempt if the 
alleged contemptuous article is published and distributed to public at large. There 
might be only a very slim chance to avoid citation of contempt, even though the 
printers and distributors argue that they have no knowledge of the contemptuous 
article.    
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Defences may offer a counterbalancing measure but when treated as strict 
offences, some defences are ‗deprived‘ from the contemnor. In publication 
contempt, defences such as innocent dissemination, public interest and fair 
criticism have not been considered by the Malaysian courts. In Murray Hiebert, 
the Court by reference to R v Griffiths, ex p. AG,
394
 held that the defence of 
innocent dissemination was not available to those who in practising their trade 
were responsible for putting the offending writing into circulation. This was 
extended to the printers and distributors. The Singaporean courts in Wain
395
 and 
Attorney General v Pang Cheng Lian & Ors
396
 also held that despite no 
knowledge of the existence of the offending articles by the printers and 
distributors, neither lack of intention nor the defence of innocent dissemination 
was available to them since what was printed was in fact contemptuous.  
 
In determining whether a discussion may amount to contempt or a factor to be 
considered as a defence in sub judice rule, public interest in the nature of 
discussion or comments should be taken into consideration. AG v Times 
Newspapers Ltd
397
 and Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd: Re Truth & Sportmans 
Ltd
398
 provide that the interest of the due administration of justice should give way 
to the interest in discussing matters of public interest. However, the Malaysian 
courts have never considered a defence of public interest.  
 
It is in the interest of the due administration of justice that the judiciary should be 
accountable and transparent. It is not acceptable that there should be a complete 
ban for discussing the judiciary since it is an organ of government under the 
democratic framework. On the right of criticism, Lord Atkin said:
399
 
  
The path of criticism is a public way: the wrong-headed are permitted to 
err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing 
improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and 
are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or 
attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. 
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Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the 
scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary 
men. 
 
Therefore, there is no reason, apart from the phrase ‗maintaining the confidence of 
the public‘ to deny the defence of fair comment in the law of contempt. The 
Malaysian judiciary should withstand fair criticism as the comments made in good 
faith may ensure that the judges and the courts provide their best service possible 
as arbiters of dispute and defenders of constitution.         
 
3.2.3 Mode of Trial or Procedures 
 
The procedures for trial of contempt cases are various, sometimes obscure and 
highly unusual. The summary power is also criticised because it offends the basic 
principle of natural justice, i.e. the rule against bias – the judge acts as a 
complainant, a prosecutor, a chief prosecution‘s witness as well as a judge with 
the task of imposing the sentences. The combination of several responsibilities in 
one person will cause at least two main difficulties. The first relates to bias – how 
can a judge be the judge of his own case? Secondly, there is a problem of 
presumption of innocence. By ordering the alleged contemnor to show cause as to 
why he should not be cited for contempt, it shows that the judge has already 
formed his opinion that the alleged contemnor is at guilt. 
 
The summary power is fraught with possible abuse because it can deprive the 
alleged contemnor of a clear and distinct charge and also his best possible 
defence. More importantly, punishment being meted out on the spot usually 
precludes the alleged contemnor from seeking legal advice or representation.
400
 
 
In invoking summary contempt power, the courts have to evaluate the situation in 
each particular case. The judges will apply their perception and exercise their 
discretion in deciding what circumstances and facts of the case might allow them 
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to punish contempt suo motu. This is supported by Lee Hun Hoe CJ. in Cheah 
Cheng Hoc
401
 when His Lordship said: 
 
The power must be used sparingly but fearlessly when necessary to prevent 
obstruction of justice. We feel that we must leave the exercise of this 
awesome power to the good sense of our judges. We will interfere when 
this power is misused. 
 
In general, summary power is used in cases of flagrant and disruptive contempt 
that create risk to the immediate administration of justice. It is used in contempt in 
facie. However, in Malaysia, there are cases where the courts exercise their 
summary power even in cases arguably serious and urgent to act immediately.
402
  
 
In some earlier cases, such as Karam Singh
403
 and Re Kumaraendran
404
  the courts 
had adopted protective attitude towards the advocates who had engaged in 
contemptuous conducts by referring them to the Bar for disciplinary action. The 
courts seemed reluctant to exercise this great power except when in real need and 
only resorted to this power as the last option. The nemo judex in sau causa rule 
that says a complainant cannot be a judge in his own cause received higher 
consideration by the courts. 
 
Many cases of contempt of court have been reversed due to procedural 
irregularities particularly because of the failure of the court to give the contemnor 
an opportunity of being heard before he is punished. In Re Zainur Zakaria
405
 the 
higher court had reversed the lower court‘s decision when the Federal Court406 
found that the High Court judge was too quick to use summary power to cite the 
alleged contemnor for contempt, which deprived him of the opportunity to answer 
the charge against him. The procedure employed by the High Court did not ensure 
sufficient fairness and had not been correctly applied resulting in injustice to 
Zainur.
407
 Zainur should have been given a reasonable opportunity to prepare for 
his case and to call for witnesses. The refusal of his application for an 
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adjournment by the High Court judge had deprived his right to a full and fair trial. 
N. H. Chan
408
 observes that the application filed by the alleged contemnor to 
discharge the prosecutors from further prosecuting the case was an absurd 
application which had no merit. According to him, the High Court judge in this 
case should have dismissed the application and carried on with the case before 
him as it was not for the judge to investigate into the complaint. Recourse should 
have been sought elsewhere such as reporting it to the police or to complain to the 
Attorney General. He views that the judge was wrong to resort to summary 
procedure since no contempt was disclosed at all.
409
 Furthermore, the Federal 
Court took a view that in this particular case the judges had not exercised their 
discretion judicially.
410
 
 
In the aftermath of Re Zainur Zakaria there were ‗unusual‘ and extreme 
approaches in contempt cases as evident in Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat 
Bhd.
411
 The crucial issue in this case is whether the alleged contempt was so gross 
as to merit immediate punishment. Two of the three letters alleged to constitute 
contempt were written sometime in the middle of December 1997 and the third 
was undated. By 17
 
February 1998, the court hearing an application in a pending 
case had all three letters before it. The hearing of the application was adjourned to 
6 April 1998. During the adjournment the court formed the view that the three 
letters constituted a prima facie case of contempt. Accordingly, the court ordered 
letters to be issued to the alleged contemnors to show cause why they should not 
be cited for contempt. The show cause hearing was fixed for 17 March 1998 but 
seems to have commenced on 6 April 1998. The fact that a show cause letter 
could be issued and that the hearing thereof was fixed at a future date indicates 
that the alleged contempt was not one that justified the use of summary power.  
  
The frequent use of summary contempt power by judges after the 1988 judicial 
fiasco is not acceptable to the litigants and the lawyers; to a certain extent it has 
                                                 
408
 N.H. Chan, Judging the Judges (Alpha Sigma Sdn Bhd, Petaling Jaya 2007) pp. 59-60. 
409
 Ibid. p. 60. 
410
 Zainur Zakaria (FC) (n. 186) p. 619. 
411
 Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd. (n. 246). 
 103 
been perceived as being misused by some judges.
412
 The summary contempt 
power is a necessary power but it must be exercised with caution.  
 
Albeit the caution, they are still cases of contempt that are ‗unusual‘ such as 
Koperasi Serbaguna Taiping Barat Bhd. contrary to what had been practised 
previously. The courts were reluctant to exercise this power except in most serious 
cases when they are urgent to act immediately.
413
 The Bench entrusted the Bar to 
handle the disciplinary matters of their members.   
 
The current procedure and practice relating to contempt cases reserved to the 
courts an undefined degree of discretion, which to some extent may be justified. 
However, the discretion may sometimes lead to variable approaches thus leaving 
uncertainties in the area. In the matter of contempt outside court, it is unclear as to 
whether the court is justified to exercise its suo motu jurisdiction. Should the 
matter be initiated only on a motion by the Attorney General instead of the court 
taking the matter in its own hand? Besides that, the current procedure does not 
explain at what juncture the Attorney General should initiate a contempt action.  
 
3.2.4 Sanctions and Remedies 
 
There is no structure of maximum sentences provided for the courts. 
Consequently, while exercising their judicial discretion the judges can impose 
whatever term of imprisonment or fine they consider appropriate, but must have a 
stipulated limit. The imposition of sanction or punishment that is not fixed may be 
excessive in one case to another depending on the discretion of the judge. Hence, 
the absence of a clear guideline on the limit of sentences appears to leave a 
contemnor entirely at the court‘s mercy.  
 
In Chung Onn,
414
 it was decided that the unmitigated culpability of the offender as 
one of the factors to be considered in weighing the seriousness of the offence. 
Tendering unreserved apology is significant in contempt proceedings as it may 
                                                 
412
 Chan (n. 413) p. 61. 
413
 Cheah Cheng Hoc (n. 258) p. 300. 
414
 Chung Onn (n. 347). 
 104 
purge the contempt
415
 or may operate as a mitigating factor.
416
 This is an ‗unusual‘ 
feature in contempt proceeding as an apology rather than a publicised retraction 
that would give the grounds for mitigation of penalty. In Arthur Lee Meng 
Kwang,
417
 the Supreme Court, after imposing a fine on the contemnor, said that 
they wished the contemnor had tendered his apology before the hearing of his 
contempt case and he would plead for leniency after he is found guilty in order for 
the court to consider these as additional mitigating factors.  
 
Hence, the entire criminal justice system rests on the assumption that a person 
accused of a crime is considered innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt. Therefore, for the alleged contemnor to tender his unreserved apology 
before he is proven guilty of the alleged contempt would in fact be self-
incriminating. It has to be borne in mind that every accused person enjoys the 
rights to silence and to be presumed innocent.  
 
3.2.5 Judges and Judicial Approach 
 
3.2.5.1 Inconsistencies in the Application of English Common 
Law and Attitudes towards Foreign Law 
 
Another concern in the law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia is the 
application of English common law of contempt and other foreign sources in the 
law of contempt in Malaysia. Although reference is made to English common law 
of contempt by virtue of Section 3 CLA, the judges have repeatedly justified 
taking a different approach from their counterparts in other jurisdictions on the 
basis of ‗local conditions‘.  
 
The refusal to follow the English principle of the test of liability in publication 
contempt is witnessed in Murray Hiebert
418
 and Manjeet Singh Dhillon
419
 cases. 
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Abdul Aziz Bari
420
 observes the reluctance of the Malaysian courts to follow their 
English counterparts in areas where development has taken place. According to 
him, the reluctance is evident in the area of contempt of court, the impact of which 
on the scope of freedom of speech is very significant. The reasons given were that 
Malaysian social conditions are very different from those in England and that the 
sensitivity of the local courts need not be the same as courts of similar jurisdiction 
in England. Nonetheless, there is often no explanation provided in the holdings as 
to exactly how the conditions are different or why such differences are relevant.  
 
The courts have also been inconsistent in applying the cut-off period.
421
 In 
Monatech,
422
 in determining whether the defendant‘s act in disposing the assets 
pending an application of Mareva injunction by the applicant would amount to 
contempt, the Federal Court referred to post-1956 English cases.
423
 However, as 
noticed in Murray Hiebert
424
 the Court of Appeal refused to follow the decisions 
of English courts
425
 but instead applied local cases decided in 1949.
426
 The Court 
in Murray Hiebert preferred to follow the local cases, which referred to the 
English cases that were decided before 1956
427
 which provide that the test is 
whether the statement is ‗likely or it tends in any way to interfere with the proper 
administration of justice.‘  
 
Farid Suffian Shuaib argues that there is no valid reason for the courts to exclude 
post-1956 development of English law and adhere to pre-1956 local case law but 
the Court justified its approach on the basis of the different ‗local conditions‘.428 
The local conditions in this respect have to take into account the time, space and 
place. The local condition changes and does not mean that time should stand still. 
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The principle of law develops with the development of time. The contempt law in 
England develops and it is argued that the English cases, particularly the post-
1981
429
 are adequate to free speech and democratic framework. 
 
Another reason given for the refusal in not following English cases, for example 
Attorney General v English,
430
 is the existence of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981.
431
 The Act provides that contempt against sub judice would only be 
committed by publication ‗which creates a substantial risk that the course of 
justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.‘432 
This means that the prejudice need not have materialised but the degree of its risk 
must be substantial, as distinct from merely possible or remote.
433
 It may be said 
that the case law after the enactment of this Act cannot be considered as 
constituting common law of England. It is argued that the post-Act decisions are 
persuasive
434
 even though they were influenced by the ECHR. Shuaib views that 
although the details of the provisions for freedom of expression in the ECHR are 
dissimilar, the basic guarantee of free speech exists in the ECHR as in the 
Malaysian constitution.
435
 Therefore, the Malaysian courts should take initiative to 
refer to parts of the developed English contempt law where substantial risk to the 
administration of justice is required before the publication is considered 
contemptuous.  
 
Freedom of speech and expression that often comes in conflict with contempt of 
court is not only protected in the Constitution but is also specially promoted and 
protected under the international legal system. There are numerous instruments 
known as international human rights laws that guarantee this right, amongst others 
are the UDHR and the ICCPR. Nonetheless, Malaysian courts are reluctant to 
refer to these instruments on the basis that the UDHR is not a binding instrument 
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and the ICCPR has no legal impact since Malaysia has not ratified it.
436
 Although 
the judges are frequently invited to determine the current practice of contempt law 
with regards to international standard and practices in other foreign jurisdictions, 
they have always backed down on the basis of non-legal binding and also 
differing social conditions in Malaysia and foreign countries. Harun Hashim SCJ. 
in Manjeet Singh Dhillon
437
 viewed: 
 
In view of Article 10 of the Constitution, it was suggested that the 
American decisions should apply. I think not. The First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States guarantees freedom of speech to the 
extent that it cannot even be restricted by legislation. The American 
Courts are quite clear that the free speech guarantee permits far greater 
criticism of Judges as Judges than would be allowed in England. 
 
In Canada, R v Gray applied until the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms came into force by the Constitution Act of 1982 which 
guaranteed freedom of expression. In R v Kopyto 47 DLR 213, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the conviction of a lawyer by a trial 
Court for contempt of court by scandalising the court on the ground that 
the statements were now protected by the guarantee to freedom of 
expression. This reasoning will not apply here in view of Article 10 (2) of 
the Constitution and s. 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956.  
 
Hence, the Court in Manjeet Singh Dhillon was not willing to interpret Article 10 
of the Constitution in light of analogies drawn from other countries such as the 
USA and Canada. The Malaysian courts prefer that the provision be interpreted 
within its own four walls.
438
 
 
3.2.5.2 Judges and Judicial Misconduct 
  
The power to summarily punish a person for contempt is a useful and valuable 
weapon in the judicial armoury. When properly used, it upholds the course of 
justice by instilling confidence in the judiciary. However, this power is open to 
misuse. Once it is misused or is being perceived to be misused and abused, it will 
erode the confidence of the public in the justice system. The confidence in the 
judiciary started to be eroded after the 1988 judicial fiasco mentioned above. It 
was the starting point of the strain relationship between the Bar and the Bench. It 
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resulted that in recent years, there appears to have been a tendency to launch 
contempt proceedings against judges in Malaysia. 
 
The Malaysian Bar applied to commit Abdul Hamid Omar when he was an Acting 
Lord President for contempt for preventing a sitting of the Supreme Court.
439
 The 
motion, however, was denied due to the lack of locus standi or alternatively, he 
had acted within his power.
440
 In Anthony Ratos s/o Domingos v City Specialist 
Centre Sdn Bhd (Berniaga sebagai City Medical Centre),
441
 an advocate was held 
in contempt of court for initiating contempt proceedings against a High Court 
judge who had given an order to strike out his client‘s petition in the High Court.  
 
The issue of judges being in contempt was raised again in the motion to cite 
Augustine Paul J for contempt by Christopher Fernando, one of the counsels for 
Anwar Ibrahim‘s corruption trial.442 The alleged contempt was committed in the 
said corruption trial when Augustine Paul J, as the presiding judge, remarked 
against a counsel that: 
 
[I]f the way of speaking is like an animal, we can‘t tolerate him. We 
should shoot him.
443
  
 
This case has not been reported but it was mentioned in Anwar Ibrahim [2002].
444
 
It is rather unfortunate because the Court did not proceed to decide on the issue of 
contempt against a judge as the Court said that it would determine the issues later. 
The Court however proceeded to grant an application by the Attorney General to 
represent His Lordship in these contempt proceedings set to hear the application 
of the Attorney General to dismiss the motion.
445
 However, a stay of the 
proceeding was granted by the Court of Appeal until the disposal of an appeal
446
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against allowing the Attorney General to represent Augustine Paul J.
447
 The case 
is still pending until today and will probably be closed as both parties to the 
proceedings are deceased.  
 
The attempt to cite judges for contempt shows symptoms of the strained 
relationship between the Bar and the Bench. The Bar claimed that the judiciary 
‗was widely seen to be complicit in political prosecution by the government‘.448 
This strained relationship affected the application of the law of contempt by 
increasing the sensitivity of judges to any statement or conduct that may be 
interpreted as being disrespectful or scandalising them. 
 
The position on contempt of court by judges is not clear in Malaysia as compared 
to India where law clearly provides that judges may be held in contempt of their 
own court.
449
 In general, any party, whoever he may be, who interferes with the 
administration of justice commits contempt. However, as mentioned, there seems 
to be uncertainty as to whether a judge can be subject to contempt of court. 
Section 14 CJA bestows judicial immunity on judges and any person acting 
judicially. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the integrity, independence and 
resolve of the judiciary. It is also to ensure that justice may be administered by the 
judges independently without any apprehension of personal consequences.
450
 
Thus, if an action were to lie, the judge would lose their independence which is 
necessary for the administration of justice.
451
 Furthermore, the ethical conducts of 
judges are governed by the Judges‘ Code of Ethics 2009 and there is a proper 
forum to decide on judges‘ misconduct. 
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The administration of justice is not merely in the hands of judges. The Bar is a 
partner for that purpose. The Bar and the Bench work together. Thus to have an 
erring judge and erring contemnor are both a danger to the ‗pristine purity of the 
seat of justice‘.452 It is worth noting the words of Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Lee Chan 
Leong
453
 when he said: 
 
The Bar is a critical partner in the function which the court carries out, 
which is to ensure that members of the public and litigants receive justice 
in an untainted form. Proceedings for contempt are there to protect and 
defend integrity of justice itself. It is not there to protect the self-
righteousness of individual judges or their personal pride. Taking offence 
on small points and becoming enraged on trivia to the extent of 
subjecting an advocate and solicitor to contempt proceedings is neither in 
the best traditions of the Bench nor enhances the dignity of the court. 
Members of the Bar are already under considerable pressure to canvass 
their clients‘ case to the best of their ability. Judges should not make that 
burden even greater by instituting oppressive contempt proceedings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
452
 Mehrotra (n. 23) p. 3. 
453
 Lee Chan Leong (n. 415) p. 727. 
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Chapter 4 
A Proposal for Reform  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Parliament, thus far, has not enacted laws covering contempt of court in Malaysia 
even though competent to do so under Article 10 of the Constitution.
454
 As seen in 
the preceding chapter, the formulation of the law of contempt is left to the courts. 
Due to the absence of written law on the subject matter, the courts may refer to 
English common law and also the law and practice of some selected common law 
jurisdictions for persuasive reasoning and guidance.
455
 Nevertheless, the courts are 
inconsistent in accepting and rejecting foreign law and generally the courts will 
put a disclaimer as to ‗suitability of local condition‘ when persuaded to accept 
foreign legal reasoning on the matter. Unfortunately, the courts often offer no 
detailed explanation as to why and how Malaysia is unique in this context. The 
effect of wide discretionary power exercised by the judges in determining 
contempt, and accepting or rejecting foreign law, led to uncertainties in the law 
and practice of contempt.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the main concerns in the law and practice of contempt of court 
in Malaysia as highlighted in Chapter 3 in light of a proposed reform by the 
Malaysian Bar and also will examine other potential incentives for improvement 
by reference to various levels. There are three parts of this chapter. The first part 
studies the main areas of concern and the response taken by the Malaysian Bar in 
addressing the problems. The second part examines the potential foundations for 
reform by reference to human rights protection in Malaysia taking into 
consideration the rejection by the Malaysian courts of international human rights 
law and foreign laws in interpreting the Malaysian human rights provision. 
Secondly, to the approaches adopted by some common law jurisdictions such as 
England, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA. The practice of the 
                                                 
454
 Parliament in exercising the power bestowed under Article 10 (2) of the Constitution has in fact 
enacted legislation such as the Official Secrets Act 1972, the Internal Security Act 1960, the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 and the Sedition Act 1948 on the basis of security of 
the Federation. 
455
 Section 3 CLA 1956 (n. 58). 
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ICTY will be examined too. Lastly, the results from the empirical study which 
was carried out among the legal actors in Malaysia will be evaluated in order to 
provide another option or incentive for reform. The last part is the overview of the 
main issues and options for reform based on law and empirical research. 
 
4.2 THE MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN AND THE BAR‟S 
MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 
 
The following are the main areas of concern in the Malaysian law of contempt of 
court as highlighted in the preceding chapter: 
 
(i) Contempt and its classifications of contempt: Actus reus and its test 
of liability. 
(ii) Mens rea and defences. 
(iii) Mode of trial and procedures. 
(iv) Sanctions and remedies. 
(v) Judges and their judicial creativity. 
 
The Malaysian Bar highlights the significant tension created by the law of 
contempt as a tool to protect the interest of the administration of justice at the 
expense of the freedom of expression. The Bar views ‗the sub judice rule‘ and 
‗scandalising the judiciary‘ as an encroachment on freedom of speech and thus 
called for a review. In response to these anomalies and to seek for clarity in this 
area of law, the Bar proposed to place the law in a statute. The Bar took into 
account the movement in other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as England and 
India, which had recognised this unsatisfactory legal position and codified 
substantially their law of contempt.
456
  
 
In 1999, the Bar, through the Bar Council, sent a memorandum together with a 
Proposed Contempt of Court Act 1999 (the Proposed Act) to the Prime Minister, 
his deputy and the Attorney General. The proposal seeks to address the ambiguity 
of the law of contempt of court in common law and to provide statutory 
safeguards in the exercise of contempt powers by the courts.  
                                                 
456
 In India, a law reform committee, known as Sanyal Committee recommended a draft bill and 
the bill was enacted as the CCA 1971. In the UK, the CCA 1981 was enacted governing media 
publication.  
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The Bar highlighted several governing factors in drafting the proposed law. They 
are: 
 
(i) To clearly define what is and what is not ‗contempt‘.  
(ii) To specify a maximum limit to the punishment that can be 
imposed. 
(iii) To clearly specify that the standard of proof for any charge of 
contempt, whether civil or criminal, is ‗beyond reasonable doubt‘ 
and to set out the defences available. 
(iv) To lay out a proper, fair and comprehensive procedure for dealing 
with contempt in line with the UDHR, to which Malaysia is a 
signatory, in particular Articles 10
457
 and 11.
458
 
(v) To strive for uniformity and consistency with other common law 
jurisdictions, primarily the English and Indian positions.
459
 
 
4.2.1 The Proposed Contempt of Court Act 1999460 
 
The preamble of the Proposed Act declares its object as ‗an Act to define 
Contempt and limit the powers of Court to punish for Contempt and to regulate 
the procedure in relation thereto‘.  The Proposed Act is to be applied throughout 
Malaysia and is divided into nine parts. 
 
                                                 
457
 It states: 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. 
458
 It states: 
(1)  Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the 
guarantees necessary for his defence. 
(2)  No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed. 
459
 The references relied primarily on England and India because as known England is the ‗mother 
country‘ for this common law doctrine of contempt of court, whilst India and Malaysia share quite 
similar legal history as both are heavily influenced by English ideas. The Bar in preparing the 
Proposed Act has duly considered the reports of the Phillimore Committee in Britain and the 
Sanyal Committee in India, the English Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the Indian Contempt of 
Courts Act 1971.   
460
 The Proposed Act is attached as Appendix A. 
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(i) Part 1- Preliminary 
(ii) Part II- Criminal Contempt  
(iii) Part III-Civil Contempt 
(iv) Part IV-Other Forms of Contempt 
(v) Part V- Procedure for Dealing with Criminal Contempt 
(vi) Part VI- Appeal in All Cases of Contempt of Court 
(vii) Part VII- Limitation and Punishment for Contempt 
(viii) Part VIII- Execution 
(ix) Part IX- General 
  
At present, only the courts are invested with the power to maintain its authority 
and to prevent its process from being abused. The position of the Industrial Court 
and other Tribunals are unclear. The Proposed Act, however, does not define the 
word ‗court‘ in the strict sense of the term, it defines ‗court‘ as the Federal Court, 
Court of Appeal, High Court, Sessions Court, Magistrate Court and Industrial 
Court. With that, the authority to decide on contempt of court is extended to the 
Industrial Court. 
 
4.2.1.1 The Proposed Act and the Responses to the Main Areas 
of Concern 
 
(A) Contempt and its Classification: Actus Reus and the Test of 
Liability 
 
In Malaysia, since the expression ‗contempt of court‘ does not appear either in the 
Constitution or in any statute, what is contempt can be found in the judicial 
interpretation. It is indeed difficult and almost impossible to frame a 
comprehensive and complete definition of contempt of court.
461
 This is due to the 
fact that the law in this area is evolving, thus rendering contempt protean in its 
character. Moreover, it has never been subjected to legislative scrutiny. As pointed 
out by the Sanyal Committee in India, the categories of contempt are not closed. 
                                                 
461
 In Telhara Cotton Ginning Co. Ltd v Kashinath, ILR 1940 Nag. 69, the Indian Court admits 
that it is difficult to attempt comprehensive definition as well as neat and clear-cut classifications 
of contempt as highlighted by the Sanyal Committee.   
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Nevertheless, the Committee attempted to define contempt in the most general 
terms.
462
  
 
Contempt of court is not a single offence. It describes several different types of 
offence from misbehaving in court, obstructing justice, disobeying court order, 
breaching the sub judice rule and scandalising the court.
463
 In general, contempt is 
stated broadly to fall into two groups: civil and criminal contempt.   
 
Section 2 of the Proposed Act also defines ‗contempt of court‘ as civil and 
criminal contempt. This definition merely makes a characteristic classification of 
the expression ‗contempt of court‘. However, the Proposed Act goes further by 
defining civil and criminal contempt.  
 
Under Section 3 (2) of the Proposed Act, civil contempt means: 
 
wilful disobedience of any judgment or any order requiring a person to 
do or abstain from doing a specified act or any writ of habeas corpus or 
wilful breach of an express undertaking given to Court on the faith of 
which the Court has given its sanction. 
 
Criminal contempt is defined under Section 3 (3) of the Proposed Act as: 
 
publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by 
visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any 
act whatsoever which: 
(a) is a falsehood and is intended to bring a Court into disrepute; 
(b) interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings or 
obstructs the administration of justice in any other manner. 
 
Therefore, the definition of ‗contempt of court‘ illustrates that contempt is not a 
single offence and may not be exhaustive. The categories of contempt are not 
closed by the definition as the Proposed Act suggests ‗publication or act done 
which obstructs the administration of justice in any other manner‘. Again, what is 
contumacious is for the court to decide since the discretion cannot be confined 
within the four walls of a definition. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that 
this does mean that the court should not be guided by the definitions given in the 
                                                 
462
 Sanyal Committee Report, p. 19.   
463
 Pal (n. 23) p. 35. 
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Proposed Act. It is only the categories of contempt that may not be closed by the 
definitions.
464
  
 
(i) Distinction between Civil and Criminal Contempt 
 
Albeit dividing contempt into civil and criminal, the clause further provides for 
the standard of proof for establishing contempt of either type, which is beyond 
reasonable doubt. The same standard of proof applies to civil contempt since the 
penalty imposed ranges from fine to imprisonment. Due to this, some confusion in 
distinction between the two types of contempt is caused. In Home Office v 
Harman,
465
 while explaining the difference between civil and criminal contempt, 
Lord Scarman pointed out that civil contempt constitutes an injury to private 
rights of a litigant. It is left to the litigant to bring to the notice of the court. He 
may either decide not to act in which he may waive, or consent to the non-
compliance. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, involves defiance of the court, 
revealed in conduct which amounts to obstruction or interference with the 
administration of justice.  
 
The Proposed Act does not explain further the distinction between civil and 
criminal contempt but the courts may consider the test for distinction suggested by 
the Sanyal Committee as follows: 
 
…the question whether a contempt is civil or criminal is not to be judged 
with reference to the penalty which may be inflicted but with reference to 
the cause for which penalty has been inflicted.
466
[Emphasis added] 
 
For instance, where a person commits a breach of an order, he is guilty of civil 
contempt but a third party aiding and abetting the breach commits criminal 
contempt because he interferes with the administration of justice.  
 
  
                                                 
464
 See Ahmed Ali v Superintendent, District Jail, Tejpur 1987 Cri LJ 1845, p. 1849.  
465
 (1983) 1 AC 280. 
466
 Sanyal Committee Report, Ch. IV, p.22. 
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(ii) Types of Contempt of Court 
 
(a) Civil Contempt 
 
Civil contempt as observed in the Proposed Act is initiated for effective 
implementation of an order. Its aim is primarily coercive, that is, to bend the will 
of the person to comply with the court order.  
 
As defined in Section 3 (2) of the Proposed Act,
467
 civil contempt involves the 
existence and proof of the following: 
 
(i) there must be a judgment or order or writ of habeas corpus or 
undertaking of a court;
468
 
(ii) the judgment, order, writ of habeas corpus or undertaking must be 
given to a court; 
(iii) there must be a disobedience to such judgment, order or writ of 
habeas corpus or breach of such undertaking; 
(iv) the disobedience or breach must be wilful. 
 
The important element injected by the Proposed Act to the definition of ‗civil 
contempt‘ is the qualification of ‗wilful‘ disobedience as an essential ingredient of 
the offence of civil contempt. The requirement of ‗wilful‘ connotes that there is a 
need to prove that the alleged contemnor wilfully or deliberately disobeys the 
order. This is basically to ‗formalise‘ the ingredients laid down in T.O. Thomas.469  
 
Thus, to constitute civil contempt, it must be shown that there is an order, 
injunction or undertaking which the terms of this order etc. are known to the 
alleged contemnor. There must also be clear proof that the terms have been broken 
and breach must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The disobedience must be 
wilful and the order of court must have been contumaciously disregarded. It is not 
enough if it is casual, accidental or unintentional but must be wilful or deliberately 
disregard the order. 
                                                 
467
 See Chapter 4, 4.2.1.1 (A), p. 118. 
468
 The words or expressions of the judgment, order, writ of habeas corpus, undertaking given to a 
court, are not defined by the Proposed Act.  But they are well understood legal terms.  
469
 In T.O. Thomas (n. 191) the Court accepted the principle in Fairclough & Sons (n. 223) that 
contempt must be wilful and the order of court must have been contumaciously disregarded. 
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With this new law, mere disobedience without a wilful element is not sufficient to 
constitute contempt. It is noted that before a contemnor is punished for non-
compliance of the order of the court, the court must not only be satisfied about the 
disobedience of the order but should also be satisfied that such disobedience is 
wilful and intentional. Therefore, an alleged contemnor will be liable if he 
intentionally breaks a court order in the sense that he is aware of the order and acts 
with the intention of breaking it. Intent in this sense is in relation to the act but not 
intent to obstruct the due course of justice. 
 
(b) Criminal Contempt 
 
Part II of the Proposed Act covers criminal contempt. Section 3 (3) of the 
Proposed Act defines the class of criminal contempt under which it has the 
essential element of ‗publication‘. The word ‗publication‘ has not been defined 
technically but Section 4 (1) provides that publication includes any speech, 
writing or other communication in whatever form which is addressed to the public 
at large. Section 3 (3) of the Proposed Act classifies criminal contempt as: 
the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by 
visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any 
act whatsoever which: 
(a) is a falsehood and is intended to bring a Court into disrepute; 
(b) interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings or 
obstructs the administration of justice in any other manner. 
 
With regard to the definition in the Proposed Act, the first precondition to be 
satisfied is that there is a publication or doing of any act, and secondly, such 
publication or doing of the act has resulted in any or all of the consequences 
specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 3 (3).  
 
The publication may be made by written words, spoken words, signs, and visible 
representations or otherwise. The scope of publication is wide. However, it is 
difficult to understand what publication would come and be covered by 
‗otherwise‘. Apart from the publication, criminal contempt could be committed by 
‗doing of any act‘.  
 119 
Analysis of the definition of criminal contempt shows that, it covers ex facie 
contempt, in particular, publication contempt. Therefore, at least, three classes of 
action have been classified as criminal contempt committed out of courts. They 
are: 
 
(i) any publication or act done which is falsehood and is 
intended to bring a Court into disrepute; 
(ii) publication or act done which interfere with the due course 
of any judicial proceedings;  
(iii) publication or act done which obstructs the administration 
of justice in any other manner.  
 
The third class of criminal contempt is far wider in scope than the phrase ‗course 
of any judicial proceedings‘. Furthermore, the last words ‗in any other manner‘ 
further extend its ambit and give it a residuary character and it indicates that the 
species of criminal contempt are not always mutually exclusive. Part II,
470
 Chapter 
I of the Proposed Act further deals with publication amounting to criminal 
contempt. 
 
In facie contempt is placed under Section 9 of Chapter 3 of the Proposed Act. The 
provision states: 
 
It is contemptuous if any person in the presence of the court engages in 
any conduct that substantially interferes with or obstructs the continuance 
of the proceedings. 
 
Hence, the element of ‗presence‘ differentiates between in facie and ex facie 
contempt under this Proposed Act.   
 
(i) Publication or Act Done which is Falsehood and is Intended 
to Bring a Court into Disrepute 
 
This new stipulation is a response to the current practice of the offence of 
contempt by scandalising the court or the judge. Contempt by scandalising in 
common law connotes ‗any act done or writing published calculated to bring a 
                                                 
470
 Sections 4 to 9 of the Proposed Act.  
 120 
court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority‘.471 This is the 
definition of contempt by scandalising applied in Malaysia at present.
472
  
 
Currently, to convict a person for contempt by scandalising, the court has to 
determine whether or not the alleged contemptuous criticism or statement is 
within the limit of reasonable courtesy and good faith, and has an inherent 
tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice.  
 
This new law, however, proposes to deviate from the current test applied in 
scandalising contempt because the current test limits freedom of expression to an 
unjustifiable degree. This is because the criminal liability is imposed without it 
being necessary to establish that the person or the institution has been harmed or 
being prejudiced in a significant way. Furthermore, the criminal liability is 
imposed without the offence being defined in sufficiently precise terms to give 
fair warning to the alleged contemnor as to what type of statement or publication 
gives rise to criminal liability. Therefore, the Bar proposes to replace the word 
‗scandalising‘ to ‗publication or act done to disrepute the court‘ thus diverging 
from the current test to determine liability in this kind of criminal contempt. 
 
Under this new law, it is required to prove that the content of the publication is 
false and the alleged contemnor intends to publish and also have intention to 
disrepute the administration of justice by his false publication. Therefore, it is 
noted that the test of liability or the degree of danger to the administration of 
justice is higher than the one at present. As it has to prove the element of 
falsehood, the risk must be serious, real and present danger,
473
 so that the 
administration of justice, the judiciary or judges, will be brought into serious 
disrepute.  
 
                                                 
471
 See R v Gray (n. 183) p. 40. 
472
 This is a type of scandalising contempt as established in R v Gray (n. 183). The principle 
applied affirmatively in Malaysia as can be seen in Arthur Lee Meng Kwang (n. 1) and Manjeet 
Singh Dhillon (n. 8).  
473
 In the USA, it has been established in In re Little 1972 404 U.S. 553 that for a statement or 
publication to be contemptuous it must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely threat to the 
administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or probable, it must be immediately 
imperil. See also Bridges v California 1941 314.S. 252.   
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This new rule would protect any court from statements of falsehood which intend 
to bring down the court‘s reputation. The ‗falsehood‘ requirement connotes 
statements that are true cannot be punished. Therefore, the statements or criticisms 
made against the court or judiciary as a whole must be in the form of reasonable 
argument, made in good faith, free from imputation of improper motives and true. 
With that, a person may express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any 
act of a judge done in his judicial capacity or any decision given by him as ‗justice 
is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer scrutiny and respectful, 
even though outspoken comments of ordinary men‘.474 Although the preference is 
given to freedom of expression, it must be borne in mind that the right to criticise 
the judiciary must be exercised in such a manner that people‘s faith in the 
judiciary is not shaken.  
 
(ii) Publication or Act Done which Interferes with the Due 
Course of Any Judicial Proceedings 
 
This new branch of criminal contempt responds to the common law of sub judice 
rule. One of the concerns in sub judice contempt is trial by media. ‗Media trials‘ 
are objected because they put at risk the due administration of justice in the 
particular case. It might influence the judge in his decision making. In the long 
run, such trials could undermine confidence in the judicial system in general.
475
  
 
On the other hand, putting a restriction on the media in reporting the matter, to a 
certain extent may be in conflict with the right to free expression and media 
freedom. This is the issue in sub judice which involves the confrontation of what 
are essentially competing values. The norms of freedom of expression are not 
always comfortably harmonised with those relating to the right to a fair trial and 
preservation of public confidence in the administration of justice. Hence, the law 
as it stood currently contains uncertainties which restrict and impede free speech, 
freedom of the press to inform the public and the right of the public to be properly 
informed.  
 
                                                 
474
 Ambard (n. 399). 
475
 Borrie, Lowe and Sufrin (n. 18) p. 69.  
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Under the common law rule of sub judice, writers, publishers and distributors are 
prevented from discussing or publishing material which is related to the trial 
which is still under the court‘s deliberation. However, there is doubt over the 
precise start of the sub judice period, deriving from the interpretation of the words 
pending
476
 and imminent
477
 laid down by the courts.
478
 Borrie and Lowe suggest 
that once proceedings have begun the law is right to insist that the media should 
have no role to play in the administration of justice.
479
 Thus, this uncertainty leads 
to another issue: are the media free to publish material without fear of contempt 
proceedings during the gap between the conclusion of proceedings at first instance 
and the initiation of an appeal?  
 
The Proposed Act overcomes this uncertainty by specifying the trial is ‗sub 
judice’ when the proceedings in question have commenced and active at the time 
of the publication.
480
 Section 4 (4) (a) of the Proposed Act provides that a criminal 
proceeding is commenced and active from the time the accused is charged or 
summons is issued until the final determination of the substantive issues in the 
proceedings at first instance. In the case of civil proceedings, as provided by 
Section 4 (4) (b), when it is instituted by the filing of an action or other originating 
process. The Act precludes the appeals as Section 4 (5) provides that ‗active 
means all proceedings at first instance where there has yet to be a final 
determination of the substantive issues in the proceedings‘. If the prejudicial 
material published is in relation to an ongoing appeal proceeding, the chance of 
being found in contempt is very slim.
481
 
 
                                                 
476
 The criminal trial, for example, is pending from the time a person has been arrested and it 
remains pending until he has been acquitted, the time for an appeal has expired or all possible 
appeals have been completed. The Straits Times Press Ltd (n. 287) p. 83 following R v Davies (n. 
332). 
477
 Under the common law as applied by English courts, proceedings are taken to be sub judice 
from an earlier time, that is, from the time they are imminent. Thus, criminal proceedings are 
imminent if it is obvious that a suspect is about to be arrested. See Sally Walker, 'Freedom of 
speech and Contempt of Court: The English and Australian Approaches Compared' (1991) 40 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 583. 
478
 SRN Palaniappan (n. 288); The Straits Times Press Ltd (n. 287). 
479
 Borrie, Lowe and Sufrin (n. 18) pp. 5-6.  
480
 Section 4 (3) of the Proposed Act states: 
This Part applies to a publication only if the proceedings in question have commenced 
and are active within the meaning of this section at the time of the publication. 
481
 Sections 4 (3), (4) and (5) of the Proposed Act.  
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In addition, the Proposed Act diverges from the current test practice in 
determining whether the alleged material amounts to contempt. The requirement 
of ‗substantial risk‘ makes significant changes to the current law which is based 
on the test of a ‗inherent tendency‘.482 This Act proposes that in order to be 
contemptuous, the publication must present a substantial risk so that the prejudice 
to the litigation is serious. Section 4 (2) of the Proposed Act reads: 
 
This Part applies only to a publication which creates a substantial risk 
that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously 
impeded. 
  
This in fact limits liability for contempt under the ‗strict liability rule‘. Therefore, 
the liability is strict under Section 4 (2) of the Proposed Act when the publication 
create a substantial risk so that the course of justice in the particular trial will be 
seriously impeded or prejudiced and the proceedings in question must be ‗active‘ 
at the time of the publication.  This new provision requires ‗double test‘ which 
means that first, there must be a substantial risk of prejudice i.e. the risk must be a 
practical risk but not a theoretical risk
483
 and secondly, the risk will seriously 
impede the proceedings. The court has to test whether or not the publication will 
bring an impact on the judge at the time of the trial. The law should now aim at 
preventing serious prejudice as such; trivial cases ought not to be brought before 
the court.  
 
This new law bears a strong resemblance to Section 2 (2) CCA 1981 under which 
England has recognised the rule of strict liability where a publication carries a 
substantial risk of serious prejudice to an ongoing trial i.e. active proceedings. 
Under the strict liability rule, mens rea is not an ingredient, provided the 
publication is the one that causes a substantial risk of serious prejudice and it falls 
within the ‗active‘ period of that ongoing proceeding.  
 
The Proposed Act introduces a ‗protection for good faith discussion of public 
affairs and public interest‘ under Section 8 (2) which is an equivalent of Section 5 
                                                 
482
 Murray Hiebert (HC) (n. 187); Murray Hiebert (CA) (n. 267). 
483
 AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (1992) 3 All ER 38. 
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CCA 1981.
484
 The provision provides, inter alia, that even a serious interference 
to a trial has been created, there will be no liability arises so long the publication 
in question is part of a discussion in good faith of public affairs or matters of 
public interest. Section 8 (2) is treated as a measure intended to protect media 
freedom when the publication in question concerns a general issue of public 
interest. Section 8 (2) reads: 
 
A publication made as or as part of a legitimate discussion in good faith 
of public affairs or other matters of general interest held in public is not 
to be treated as contempt if it only incidentally and unintentionally 
resulted in a serious interference to particular legal proceedings.  
 
(iii) Publication or Act Done Obstructs the Administration of 
Justice in any Other Manner 
 
This is a catch-all provision. The use of the expression ‗in any other manner‘ 
indicates that sub-clause (b) is intended to cover the residuary cases of contempt 
not expressly covered by Section 3 (3) of the Proposed Act. ‗Administration of 
justice‘ itself is an expression which is obviously wide enough to include the 
specific situations covered by sub-clause (a) and first part of sub-clause (b).  Thus, 
anything said, done or published which does have the effect of obstruction of the 
administration of justice in a manner otherwise than publication or act done which 
is falsehood and intended to disrepute the court or by interfering with the due 
course of judicial proceedings would amount to criminal contempt within this sub-
clause. 
 
This provision seems to provide a ‗solution‘ for any special circumstances where 
contempt of court may not be covered. It is a nature of contempt of court that the 
conducts amounting to contempt are not exhaustive. Therefore, by having this 
new branch of contempt of court, it will give the judiciary a chance to ‗create‘ a 
new type of contempt of court. 
  
 
                                                 
484
 For more see Chapter 4, 4.3.2.2 (d) (i), pp. 206-211. 
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(iv) Filing of Pleadings and Complaint against any Presiding 
Judge 
 
The Act proposes that a person should not be found guilty for the sake of filing an 
action, pleading, application or affidavit in court,
485
 unless it carries a substantial 
risk of prejudice to the administration of justice.
486
 Under this new law, an 
application to seek disqualification of the Presiding Officer on any ground or 
statement made by him
487
 cannot be immediately ruled as contempt of court. This 
recusal application can be made to the court where the Presiding Officer presides 
or to any co-ordinate court, a superior court or to a Presiding officer who has 
supervisory jurisdiction over the co-ordinate or superior court.
488
  
 
(v) Contempt in the Face of the Court  
 
Section 9 of Part II of the Proposed Act
489
 provides that contempt in the face of 
court is committed when a person in the presence of the court engages in any 
conduct that substantially interferes with or obstructs the continuance of the 
proceedings. The Bar proposes retention of the common law offence of contempt 
in the face of court but with some modifications. It is limited in its physical scope 
when it only confines to the misconducts in the presence of the court. 
 
‗In the presence of the court‘ in this context connotes that the act must have been 
committed in the courtroom during the ongoing trial. However, it does not clearly 
explain whether there should be a requirement that the judge actually witnesses 
                                                 
485
 Section 5 (1) of the Proposed Act. 
486 This proposal seems to respond to the case of Re Zainur Zakaria (n. 234) where a lawyer was 
cited for contempt for filing an application which the Court found to be frivolous and 
contemptuous. 
487
 One of the grounds for recusal applications is reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the 
judge. However, the judges are very sensitive to this allegation as it would question not only the 
integrity of the judge but also the administration of justice entirely. In Che Minah bt Remeli v 
Pentadbir Tanah, Pejabat Tanah Besut, Terengganu & Ors [2008] MLJU 182, p. 221, Abdul 
Malik Ishak JCA said: 
It is advisable that any counsel who proposes to embark on this perilous course of action 
must be certain lest he runs foul of the law and be cited for contempt. 
See also In Re Tai Choi Yu (n. 256). 
488
 Section 5 (2) of the Proposed Act. 
489
 It reads: 
It shall be contempt in the face of the court if any person in the presence of the Court shall 
engage in any conduct that substantially interferes with or obstructs the continuance of the 
proceedings. 
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the conduct in question. If the judge actually witnesses what has happened, one of 
the important rationales for summary procedure is established. This is due to the 
fact that the act committed in his presence and all the facts are within his personal 
knowledge. However, if he does not actually witness the alleged misconduct, it 
will not make the offence lose the character of in facie contempt. Accordingly, 
this new provision appears to restrict misbehaviour to the one occurs in the 
presence of the court, not necessarily witnessed by the judge, but must 
substantially interfere or obstruct the continuance of the proceedings. This means 
that the actus reus must be of a serious nature to deserve a citation of contempt of 
court.  
 
(B) Mens Rea and Defences 
 
(i) Mens Rea and Strict Liability 
 
The Proposed Act introduces strict liability rule to ‗publication or act done which 
interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings‘. This is when the 
publication creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings 
in question will be seriously impeded and the proceedings are active. Therefore 
mens rea is not an element to constitute this kind of criminal contempt. This 
means that the publisher cannot escape liability by arguing that he had no 
intention of prejudicing on-going legal proceedings. 
 
Intention is necessary to commit any publication or act done which is a falsehood 
and bring a court into disrepute. The requirement to prove intention also extends 
to the publication of prejudicial material outside the scope of strict liability. For 
contempt in the face of the court, mens rea is not a necessary ingredient. 
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(ii) Defences 
 
(a) Defences to Civil Contempt 
 
Section 17 provides a defence for civil contempt. Under Section 17 (1) defence of 
unintentional disobedience can be raised by the alleged contemnor.
490
 It is to be 
noted that the statutory definitions of ‗civil contempt‘ refer to ‗wilful‘ 
disobedience to any judgment, order etc. Thus, mere disobedience is not sufficient 
to commit a person as it must be proven that the disobedience was wilful and with 
intention. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that non-compliance with an order for 
interrogatories, discovery or production of documents must be dealt with in 
accordance with the relevant rules relating to civil procedure and not by the law 
relating to contempt.  
 
As regards breach of undertaking by an officer of the court, Section 17 (4) states 
that it will be contempt if the undertaking is expressly given to the court by the 
officer of the court in the discharge of his professional duties and he continues to 
be in breach without reasonable excuse despite a mandatory order requiring the 
performance of the undertaking has been obtained.  
 
Furthermore, Section 17 (5) states that failure to attend court at the appointed time 
for hearing by an advocate should not be subject to contempt of court provided 
reasonable explanation is tendered for the said non-attendance. The provision also 
provides that the court can refer the said advocate to the appropriate authority for 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings. 
 
(b) Innocent Publication or Distribution 
 
The Proposed Act provides a number of defences available to publishers and 
distributors. Under Section 7 (1)
491
 the publisher can raise a defence of innocent 
                                                 
490
 Section 17 (1) of the Proposed Act reads: 
An unintentional disobedience will not warrant an order for committal or fine although in 
such an instance the contemnor may be ordered to pay the cost of the application. 
491
 It reads: 
 128 
publication by showing that at the time of the publication, he has no knowledge 
and no reason to believe that the relevant proceedings are active. As regards 
distributor, Section 7 (2)
492
 provides that he can raise a defence that at the time of 
the publication after taking all reasonable care he has no knowledge that the 
publication contains the prejudicial material. 
 
(c) Fair and Accurate Report of Proceedings 
 
In general, all cases brought before the courts are heard in open court. Public trial 
in open court is essential for fair administration of justice. Reporters are generally 
present in the courtroom exercising their rights to inform the public of matters of 
public interest. Therefore, the right to publish fair and accurate reports of 
proceedings cannot be deprived from the press especially when those proceedings 
are conducted publicly.  
 
The ‗open justice‘ principle is based on public interest consideration. However, it 
must give way when public interest indicates a degree of privacy. For instance, the 
names of rape victims, juvenile and children of the disrupted marriage cannot be 
identified. In addition, Section 6 of the Proposed Act deals with publication of 
judicial proceedings before a court sitting in chambers or in camera. In general, 
the publication of information relating to proceedings in private will be 
contemptuous if it relates to wardship or adoption of an infant and matters relating 
him, proceedings brought under the Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952, where the 
information relates to trade secret, and where the court having power under statute 
to prohibit the publication of the information in relation to the proceedings.  
 
Other than those situations, reporters, publishers and distributors who publish fair 
and accurate reports of the proceedings may argue that they are not to be held 
                                                                                                                                      
A person is not guilty under this Part as the publisher of any matter to which this part 
applies if at the time of the publication having taken all reasonable care, he has no 
knowledge and has no reason to believe that the relevant proceedings are active. 
492
 It states: 
A person is not guilty under this Part as the distributor of a publication containing any 
such matter if at the time of distribution, having taken all reasonable care, he has no 
knowledge that it contains such matter and has no reason to believe that it is likely to do 
so. 
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liable for contempt of court. Section 8 of the Proposed Act
493
 provides a defence 
of the fair and accurate report of proceedings. Hence, the report must be a fair 
representation of what has taken place in court and not necessarily word-perfect. 
While reporting the proceedings, care should be taken that what is reported 
reflects what had actually taken place in court.  
 
(C) Mode of Trial or Procedures 
 
(i) Civil Contempt 
 
As for civil contempt, the Proposed Act adopts the procedure as laid down in the 
RHC 1980 and SCR 1980 under Order 52 and Order 34, respectively. Therefore, it 
retains the current procedures in dealing with civil contempt as discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
 
(ii) Contempt in the Face of the Court 
 
Section 20 of Part V of the Proposed Act is a procedural provision relating to the 
hearing of contempt committed in the face of the court. The Bar proposes to 
replace summary power of punishment that is by way of instanter with a new 
procedure. Under the new procedure, an alleged contemnor is tried by some court 
other than the one which accuses him of contempt unless he chooses to be tried 
before the same judge before whom the alleged contemptuous conduct occurred.  
 
Section 20 (1)
494
 of the Proposed Act provides that the party who can initiate the 
proceeding is the judge before whom the alleged act occurred. Apart from the 
                                                 
493
 It provides: 
(1) No liability or offence arises under this Part in respect of a fair and accurate report of 
legal proceedings held in public and published in good faith. 
(2) A publication made as or as part of legitimate discussion in good faith of public 
affairs or other matters of general public interest held in public is not to be treated as 
contempt if it only incidentally and unintentionally resulted in a serious interference 
to particular proceedings. 
(3) No liability or offence arises under this Part if the report, publication or distribution 
is innocent and is undertaken in good faith.  
494
 Section 20 (1) reads: 
When it is alleged, or appears to any court that a person has been guilty of criminal 
contempt committed in its presence, the court shall immediately: 
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judge, by virtue of the expression ‗when it is alleged‘ under this provision, other 
parties such as the Attorney General or any aggrieved party who are in the court 
and witnessed the alleged act committed in the presence of the court can move the 
court to initiate contempt proceedings.  
 
Therefore, when it appears to the court that the alleged contemnor has been guilty 
of contempt committed in its presence, the court will immediately inform the 
alleged contemnor, in writing the alleged contemptuous conduct with which he is 
going to be charged. This notice must contain the actual words or the particulars 
of the conduct alleged and also the interpretation given to it by the said judge. The 
judge will then place the charge together with the statement of facts of the case 
with the Chief Justice for further action. However, at this stage, the alleged 
contemnor is given a chance to tender an apology. If he apologises to the court 
and this is accepted, thereby it concludes the complaint. If not, the court will 
proceed with the trial. A proviso (iii) to Section 20 (1) further provides that the 
contempt action or hearing taken against the alleged contemnor should not affect 
the continuance of the main trial or the proceedings.  
 
The Chief Justice upon receiving the charge and statement of facts will 
immediately appoint another judge to hear and determine the charge.
495
 However, 
at this juncture, the alleged contemnor may elect to be tried before the same 
presiding judge before whom the alleged contemptuous act has been committed.  
 
Once the judge has been appointed, a formal notice containing the charge, the 
date, place and time of hearing should be served to the alleged contemnor 
personally. The formal notice should also have a clause that informs the alleged 
                                                                                                                                      
(a) cause such person to be informed in writing of the conduct with which he is to 
be charged which shall include the actual words or the particulars of the 
conduct alleged to be contemptuous and the interpretation given to it by the 
Presiding Officer; and 
(b) place the charge of contempt to be preferred on the person, together with a 
statement of facts of the case, with the Chief Justice. 
Provided that nothing herein shall preclude: 
(i) the person charged with contempt from electing to be tried before the same 
Presiding Officer; 
(ii) the person charged with contempt from tendering an apology acceptable to the 
court and thereby concluding the compliant; 
(iii) the continuance of the trial or the proceedings. 
495
  Section 20 (2) of the Proposed Act. 
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contemnor of his right to file a defence and right to legal representation. After the 
service of the notice, the appointed judge should immediately convene a hearing.   
 
The hearing is like normal criminal proceedings whereby the alleged contemnor is 
given every opportunity to make his defence and to tender evidences to support 
his case.
496
 The court then will determine the charge and make such order for 
punishment or discharge him. If there is an adjournment pending the 
pronouncement of the decision, the alleged contemnor should be allowed to be on 
bail or bond.
497
 
 
This new procedures depart from the summary powers of courts to deal with 
contempt committed in their presence. The courts can no longer punish in facie 
contempt instantly, no matter how serious the alleged contemptuous act is. Under 
this the new provision, the alleged contemnor is afforded an opportunity to consult 
an advocate before he is dealt with.  
 
(iii) Criminal Contempt in General  
 
Section 21
498
 of the Proposed Act provides for criminal contempt proceedings 
which are not committed in the face of the court. It allows the court and other 
parties, namely the Attorney General and the aggrieved party, to initiate the 
proceedings on the matter as the provision uses the expression of ‗when it is 
alleged‘ and ‗upon its own view‘.  
 
                                                 
496
 The judge before whom the alleged contemptuous act has been committed is not necessarily to 
be called as a witness as the statement of facts under subsection (1) (b) may be treated as evidence 
in the case. Section 20 (5) of the Proposed Act.  
497
 See Section 20 (6) of the Proposed Act.  
498
 Section 21 (1) reads: 
When it is alleged, or appears to any Court upon its own view, that a person has been 
guilty of criminal contempt, the court shall immediately: 
(a) cause such person to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is 
charged and this shall include the actual words or particulars of the actual conduct 
alleged to be contemptuous and the interpretation given to it by the Presiding Officer 
and afford him every opportunity to make his defence to the charge; 
(b) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person 
and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine 
the matter of the charge and make such order for the punishment or discharge of 
such person as may be just. 
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If it is found that a person has committed an alleged contemptuous act, the court 
has to serve on the alleged contemnor a charge in writing containing the actual 
words and particulars of the actual conduct of the alleged contemptuous act. Once 
the charge is served on him, he is allowed every opportunity to make his defence 
to the charge. The court will fix for the hearing of the matter. After taking all the 
evidence, the court may either proceed with the hearing or may adjourn the matter 
to some other date.
499
  
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), Section 21 (2) clearly 
enables the alleged contemnor to apply to be tried by another judge. The court 
then has to place a charge with a statement of facts of the case before the Chief 
Justice for his direction.  
 
(D) Sanctions and Remedies 
 
The Proposed Act tackles the issue of the maximum punishment that can be 
imposed. By having the maximum punishment set out in a legislation, it is a 
controlled power and restrictive in nature in contrast to the present scenario in 
which the power of court in imposing punishment for contempt of court is 
arbitrary and unlimited power.  
 
Section 25 states that when a person is found guilty of contempt, the court will 
impose a punishment of imprisonment for a term, not exceeding fourteen days or 
with fine not exceeding RM 2,000 or with both. Section 25 (2) prevents the court 
from imposing a sentence in excess of that specified in the Act. Nevertheless, the 
sentencing will still ultimately depend on the court‘s assessment of the gravity of 
the contumacious conduct on a case by case basis. If the court is satisfied that 
imposition of a fine will not be sufficient punishment to meet the ends of justice 
and that the contemnor should be imprisoned, the court may order the contemnor 
to be detained in a Civil Prison
500
 for a period not exceeding fourteen days.  
                                                 
499
 If it is adjourned and upon preferring the charge, the court may grant the alleged contemnor a 
right to bail or bond. Section 21 (3) of the Proposed Act. 
500
 Section 3 of the Proposed Act defines civil prison to mean a place for custody of persons 
segregated at all times from other convicted criminals.  
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A proviso to Section 25 (1) states that the contemnor may be discharged or the 
punishment awarded may be remitted if he tenders his apology to the court. It is 
further stated in this clause that an apology should not be rejected merely on the 
ground that it is qualified or conditional if the contemnor makes it bona fide. The 
acceptance of apology is a matter of discretion judging from the word ‗may‘ in the 
provision. The acceptance or rejection of the apology tendered is judged from the 
conduct of the contemnor. If the apology tendered appeared to be sincere and not 
just to ward off the punishment, it could be accepted by the court. Thus the clause 
states that apology should be accepted if it is a sincere apology and the contemnor 
makes it bona fide even if it is qualified or conditional. How the court will decide 
on the sincerity and bona fide depends on the facts of the case. For instance, a 
belated apology may be evidence of lack of bona fide as it should be tendered at 
the earliest possible stage and it should be tendered unreservedly and 
unconditionally.
501
 However, the clause puts a contrary requirement; even if the 
apology is with condition or qualified, the court should not reject it once it is 
tendered bona fide.  
 
It has to be borne in mind that the acceptance of apology is a matter of discretion. 
Apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of the offence, as ‗apology 
is intended to be real evidence of contriteness‘.502  
 
Section 16 (1) of the Proposed Act expresses that committal order or fine can only 
be ordered when contempt is of a degree of fault or misconduct and as a last resort 
i.e. when other remedy that is equally effective in law is not available.  
 
(E) Judges  
 
Among the general issues which go to the heart of the law and practice of 
contempt of court is the respective role of judges. Contempt is the judge‘s 
strongest power to impose sanctions for acts which disrupt the court‘s proceeding 
and acts which interfere with the administration of justice. However, the concern 
                                                 
501
 Chung Onn (n. 347). 
502
 M.Y. Shareef v Honourable Judges of the High Court of Nagpur, AIR 1955 SC 19, p. 23.  
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raised by the Bar in relation to this point is the questionable conduct of the judge 
during the trial, such as his poor behaviour and any of his actions which gives the 
impression of misusing the contempt power vested in him. The Proposed Act 
under Part IV, under the heading of ‗Other Forms of Contempt‘ suggests that a 
Presiding Judge is to be subject to contempt law. Under Section 18 (1), a 
Presiding Officer may be liable for contempt of his own court or of any other 
court in the same manner as any other individual is liable. Presiding Officers in 
this context means Judges, Judicial Commissioners, Judicial Officers, Magistrates, 
Industrial Court President and Industrial Court Chairman.
503
  
 
Nevertheless the mode of trial provided under Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) are not 
clear. Under these provisions, a complainant will file a formal statement of 
complaint identifying the matter complained of as constituting contempt with the 
Chief Justice. The Chief Justice, after receiving the complaint needs to 
immediately constitute a committee of three Judges, who are at least superior in 
service to the Presiding Judge complained about. The Committee will inquire into, 
hear and decide the matter. The proceedings suggested under this provision are 
more like the proceedings laid down in the Code of Ethics. It appears that the 
courts are not allowed to initiate suo motu proceedings for criminal contempt 
against any judges complained of misbehaved. Instead it is handled by the ‗Ethics 
Committee‘. This position is slightly different from India even though the idea of 
introducing this provision was inspired by them. In India, courts initiate suo motu 
proceedings for contempt against any judicial officers alleged of contempt.
504
  
 
(F) Others – Limitation Period and Appeal 
 
Section 23 of the Proposed Act sets the limitation within which proceedings for 
contempt have to be initiated. This provision introduces a period of limitation. The 
contempt proceedings by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as 
early as possible. It is necessary and desirable that the period of limitation should 
be specified in respect of actions for contempt. Therefore, it has been laid down in 
                                                 
503
 Section 3 of the Proposed Act.  
504
 Sikander Khan v Ashok Kumar Mathur, 1991 (3) SLR 236; Sub-Committee on Judicial 
Accountability v Justice V. Ramaswami, 1995 (1) SCC 5 as discussed in Pal (n. 23) pp. 450-451.  
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Section 23 that the proceedings have to be initiated within six weeks from the date 
on which the contempt is alleged. If not, it will be barred. For the purpose of 
computation of the period of six weeks in Section 23, it is suggested that time 
begins to run from the point at which the contempt is alleged to have been 
committed, for instance, from the date of the act which is alleged to defeat the 
order of the court.  
 
Another important feature created under Part VI of the Proposed Act is the right of 
appeal in all contempt cases. Section 22 (1) provides that an appeal shall lie from 
any order or decision of a court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for 
contempt whilst subsection (2) states the courts to which appeals lie as well as the 
courts from which such appeals lie. Therefore, an appeal will lie: 
 
(i) to the High Court from an order or decision of any Industrial Court, 
Magistrates Court or Sessions Courts. 
(ii) to the Court of Appeal from an order or decision of the High Court 
whether pursuant to subsection (2) (a) or otherwise. 
(iii) to the Federal Court from an order or decision of the Court of Appeal 
whether pursuant to sub-section (2) (b) or otherwise.  
 
An application for appeal is to be filed within thirty days from the date of the 
order appealed against.
505
 
 
An appeal shall lie in any case as of right at the instance of the contemnor or in the 
case of an application for committal or fine, at the instance of the applicant.
506
 
This means that Section 22 (2) deals with the question of locus standi i.e. the 
person at whose instance an appeal will lie. Therefore, the person who has been 
proceeded against for contempt as well as who causes the initiation of the 
proceedings for contempt can file an appeal under Section 22 (1) of the Proposed 
Act.  
 
Section 22 (4) lays down the power of the appellate court during the matter is 
pending appeal. Sub-clause (a) confers power to the appellate court to suspend the 
execution of the punishment or order appealed from. Sub-clause (b) confers power 
                                                 
505
 Section 22 (6) of the Proposed Act.  
506
 Section 22 (2) of the Proposed Act. 
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on the court to release the appellant on bail if he is in custody. As laid down under 
sub-clause (c) the court has been conferred a discretion to hear the appeal despite 
the fact that the alleged contemnor has not purged the contempt that is the 
contumacious act or conduct is still continuing.  
 
Hence, on appeal, the court to which the appeal is brought may reverse or vary the 
order or decisions made by the court below and make such other order that may be 
just.
507
  
 
4.2.2 The Response to the Bar Council‟s Proposal 
  
In the heat of the Anwar Ibrahim‘s trial that led to the finding of contempt against 
Zainur and other contempt cases where courts seem very keen in exercising the 
contempt power, pressure had been exerted towards placing the law of contempt 
of court on a statutory footing by the Malaysian Bar in particular.
508
 The proposal 
by the Bar received mixed responses from the authorities. 
 
The judiciary also responded to the Bar Council‘s proposal. The then Chief 
Justice, Tun Eusoff Chin, conveyed the message that it is needless to codify 
contempt laws.
509
 He said that the current position was satisfactory.  
 
As reported in Malaysian newspapers,
510
 Datuk Seri Rais Yatim, the then Minister 
handling the portfolios of law and justice, expressed that he was in favour of 
enacting a Contempt of Court Act as the current position is far from satisfactory 
due to uncertainties. In addition, far too many issues had arisen over the use of 
such powers which are based on the common law. His Deputy commented that the 
Government and the Attorney General will take the necessary action on the 
proposal submitted by the Bar Council. Although he was positive about the idea of 
                                                 
507
 Section 22 (3) of the Proposed Act. 
508
 'The 53rd AGM of the Malaysian Bar held at the Crown Princess Hotel, Kuala Lumpur' (1999) 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/malaysian_bars_resolutions/the_53rd_AGM_of_the_malaysian
_bar_held_at_the_crown_princess_hotel_kuala_lumpur_saturday_20_march_1999.html> accessed 
July 2007. 
509
 'Eusoff: No Need to Codify Contempt Law' The Star (25 September 2000). 
510
 'Rais is for Enacting Contempt Law' New Sunday Times (24 September 2000); 'Akta Khusus 
Hina Mahkamah Dikaji (The Specific Act for Contempt of Court is under Deliberation)' Utusan 
Malaysia (10 October 1999). 
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legislating the law of contempt, he had reservations on the proposal of citation of 
contempt against the presiding officers. He views that judges enjoy immunity and 
they are bound by the Code of Ethics when ethical matters are concerned.  
 
The then Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, when asked about 
the update on the matter said that the proposal by the Bar was under 
deliberation.
511
 However, to date there is no Bill tabled in Parliament and the 
government kept silent on this as no explanation was tendered whatsoever.  
 
In 2005, Abdul Malik Ishak J. raised the same concern as the Bar‘s. He pointed 
out that there are many areas of contempt of court still unchartered, thus a specific 
statute which spells out the details of the law is needed.
512
  
 
Ten years have lapsed since the Memorandum was served on the government and 
there is no positive action on the part of the government. At the same time, it also 
raises a grave concern on the part of the Bar for not taking pro-active moves in 
pressing their case.  
 
There are two main arguments for the Bar‘ inactivity. Firstly, the Bar‘s approach 
to contempt matter is rather reactive than pro-active. Much discussion on 
contempt of court began after the incidence of the removal of Salleh Abbas that 
led to the citation of contempt against the Secretary to the Bar Council, Manjeet 
Singh Dhillon. Subsequently, the Malaysian Bar reacted to this by passing a 
motion of no confidence on the Acting Lord President and a resolution in the 
EGM to commit him to prison for contempt of court, where it is alleged that the 
respondent attempted to prevent, frustrate and interfere with the sitting of the 
Supreme Court of Malaysia.
513
 At that juncture, the Bar had not come out with the 
idea and reform proposal. Only after Zainur Zakaria was sentenced to three 
months imprisonment for contempt of court in 1999 during Anwar Ibrahim‘s trial, 
the Bar proposed to legislate the law of contempt of court.  
 
                                                 
511
 'Contempt Act: Government Considering a Law based on Bar Council Proposal' The Star 
Online (10 October 1999). 
512
 Samy Vellu (n. 189). 
513
 Abdul Hamid bin Omar (n. 17).   
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From this scenario, it is noted that the Bar took action when there were high 
profile cases involving the VVIPs and the cases received a lot of coverage from 
the main stream media.
514
 This is supported with the recent case of Matthias 
Chang, the ex-political secretary to former Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad, who was cited for contempt in the face of the court.
515
 This case has 
‗reopened‘ the discussion on the need for a written law of contempt of court.516  
 
Furthermore, the number of reported cases of contempt from 1980 to 2009 in 
Table 4.1 below shows no significant increase in the number of contempt cases. 
They are relatively stable except from the year 1998 to 2003. Looking at this, it is 
noted that the Bar perceives contempt matters as less urgent after 2001.  
 
In 2001, it has been reported that the Office Bearers and the Executive Director on 
behalf of the Bar Council, paid a courtesy call to the Chief Justice, the Chief 
Judge of Malaya and the Chief Registrar on 16 January 2001. Amongst the 
matters raised was the possibility of expediting the enforcement of the proposed 
Contempt of Court Act to define contempt so that judges do not exercise their 
discretion liberally.
517
 Consequently, on 27 June 2001, the Federal Court allowed 
the appeal of Zainur against contempt of court and quashed his three-month jail 
sentence. The Federal Court was of the opinion that the High Court had not 
followed the proper procedure in finding Zainur guilty of contempt and imposing 
the subsequent custodial sentence. The conduct of the hearing and the use of 
summary procedures had deprived Zainur of the opportunity of answering the 
charge against him. The Bar welcomed the finding in this case.
518
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
514
 Salleh Abbas was a Lord President and Anwar Ibrahim was a Deputy Prime Minister before 
they were removed from their office.  
515
 See Chapter 3, 3.1.2.2 (ii) (a), pp. 65-66. 
516
 Anis Ibrahim, 'Chang Case Highlights Need for Contempt Law' New Straits Times (19 April 
2010); Faruqi, 'Justice not a Cloistered Virtue' (n. 255); Sen and Lee, (n. 247). 
517
 See under the heading of Follow-up Action for Motion 2 in , 'The 53rd AGM of the Malaysian 
Bar held at the Crown Princess Hotel, Kuala Lumpur' >accessed July 2007. 
518
 <http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/malaysian_bars_news/ > accessed March 2007. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Contempt Cases Reported in the Malayan Law Journal 
(From 1980 to 2009) 
 
Year No. of Cases 
2009 10 
2008 6 
2007 8 
2006 9 
2005 7 
2004 7 
2003 12 
2002 12 
2001 18 
2000 9 
1999 15 
1998 12 
1997 8 
1996 8 
1995 10 
1994 5 
1993 10 
1992 3 
1991 9 
1990 8 
1989 9 
1988 6 
1987 6 
1986 7 
1985 5 
1984 1 
1983 4 
1982 3 
1981 4 
1980 2 
 
 
Secondly, the Bar Council holds office for one year subject to the right of re-
election. Thus, the change of the President and the Office Bearers could relate to 
the first point discussed above. It is argued that there could be no continuation in 
the agenda, as different Presidents have different ideas, interests and priorities.  
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4.3 POTENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR REFORM 
 
4.3.1 Contempt of Court and a Chilling-Effect on Freedom of 
Speech under the Malaysian Domestic Human Rights 
Context 
 
The freedom of speech and expression bestowed under the Constitution and the 
independence of the judiciary are the two essential and important constitutes of 
democracy in Malaysia. Reconciling these two competing public interests and 
maintaining a balance, presents a challenge to any democratic set-up. The 
Malaysian Court affirmed that reconciliation of these two principles involves the 
difficulty in deciding cases of contempt of court.
519
 In fact, the Bar pointed out 
that there is a significant tension between freedom of speech and expression and 
the administration of justice because of the high public interest in maintaining and 
protecting both principles. The Malaysian law of contempt of court has resulted in 
a ‗chilling‘ of the freedom of speech and expression on matters of public 
interest.
520
 
 
The chilling-effect on the freedom of speech is evident by the approaches taken by 
the courts in justifying contempt sanctions on the ground of protection of greater 
interests, namely the due administration of justice. For instance, in determining 
whether comment or criticism amounts to contempt, the court needs to test 
whether the comment or criticism is within the limit of free speech i.e. within the 
limit of reasonable courtesy and good faith. The courts were often invited to refer 
to foreign law as well as international human rights law in interpreting Article 10 
of the Constitution in order to determine whether the comment or criticism is 
within the limit of free speech.  However, the courts were reluctant on the basis 
that the courts should not ‗lose sight of local conditions‘.521 Hence, in this context, 
the court opts for the ‗four walls‘ doctrine as a governing principle of 
constitutional interpretation.
522
 This approach limits the courts in citing, 
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evaluating and applying foreign decisions and international human rights law in 
adjudicating civil liberties.   
 
Nevertheless the doctrine does not require an exclusive reliance on domestic legal 
sources. Rather, it should be permissible for the Malaysian courts to widen the 
horizon by looking at other constitutions or foreign materials in order to learn 
from their experiences and to refer to them as inspiration for development in 
domestic law.  
 
The status of human rights law in Malaysia has been discussed briefly in Chapter 
2. The discussion in this part undertakes to examine the status of international law 
within the Malaysian domestic legal order, given the rejection of the Malaysian 
courts in applying international human rights law in interpreting its human rights 
provision. It will be argued that in being confined to the ‗four walls‘ doctrine, 
Malaysian human rights law, particularly the right to freedom of speech, is far 
below the standard set internationally. One of the reasons is due to Malaysia‘s 
limited involvement in human rights regimes.
523
 Malaysia has not incorporated the 
UDHR in its law nor ratified the ICCPR. Although sources of human rights law 
such as the UDHR and the ICCPR are not part of Malaysian law, resort may 
legitimately be had to such law to help the courts to resolve the uncertainty in 
domestic law. As discussed in Chapter 2, international law, in particular 
international human rights law, can be incorporated into the domestic law through 
the judiciary.
524
 
 
4.3.1.1 Malaysian Courts‟ Attitude towards International Case 
Law and International Human Rights Instruments   
 
The Malaysian constitution, which was based on the Indian model, contained a 
formulated statement of fundamental rights placed under Part II under the heading 
of ‗Fundamental Liberties‘. The right to freedom of speech is guaranteed under 
Article 10 of the Constitution. It is interesting to note that the Reid Commission, 
while preparing the Constitution in 1956, had not made any reference to the 
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international documents such as the UDHR, given the fact the UDHR was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 1948. This justifies the reluctance of the courts in 
citing international human rights law principle when interpreting Article 10 of the 
Constitution.  
 
The balancing of free speech against competing interests such as protecting the 
independence of judiciary is an area in which comparative analysis is very much 
helpful. However, in Malaysia foreign decisions have thus far not been persuasive 
in the area of free speech and contempt of court.  Although the courts do engage 
with foreign decisions as seen in Manjeet Singh Dhillon,
525
 instead of adopting 
their reasoning the courts reject them based on the ‗local condition‘ argument.  
 
The Supreme Court in Manjeet Singh Dhillon considered case law from the USA, 
Canada, Pakistan and India. The Court, while noting the Indian Constitution, 
noted that the preservation of common law under Article 19 of the Indian 
Constitution made Indian decisions ‗persuasive authority‘ in Malaysia. However, 
the American decisions were rejected because the First Amendment of the USA 
Constitution was couched absolutely and ‗guarantees freedom of speech to the 
extent that it cannot be even restricted by legislation‘. The American test of 
liability permits more extensive criticism of judges but this test was rejected by 
the Malaysian court.  
 
Furthermore, whereas R v Gray,
526
 an English decision decided in 1900 was 
considered useful, the Supreme Court did not treat as authority a Canadian case of 
R v Kopyto
527
 because it was decided after the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms came into force in 1982. In Kopyto, free speech was accorded greater 
weight in recognition of their constitutionalised status. The Supreme Court 
rejected Kopyto because ‗[T]his reasoning will not apply here in view of Article 
10 (2) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956‘. Thio Li-Ann 
commented that the approach taken by the court was somewhat ‗disconcerting as 
Kopyto represents an attempt to calibrate upwards the value of constitutional 
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guarantees of free speech and to recognise the important role free speech plays in 
promoting democratic debate‘.528 Thio further adds that the Malaysian courts 
assume that the common law offence of scandalising is consistent with free speech 
guarantee, ignoring the fact that this offence was formulated for immature and 
uneducated societies, which were phased out in England. Thio quotes McLeod v St 
Aubyn
529
 where the Privy Council observed that this offence should be retained in 
‗small colonies, consisting principally of coloured populations‘ as it may be 
‗absolutely necessary to preserve in such a community the dignity of and respect 
for the Court‘.530  
 
The Supreme Court in Manjeet Singh Dhillon, nevertheless took a view that 
scandalising the court was still an offence punishable in New Zealand, a country 
with a common law background. The Court perceived that there was no need to 
constitutionalise the Malaysian law of contempt because Malaysian ‗social 
conditions‘ were ‗very different from those in England and more alike those in 
Asian countries within the Commonwealth such as India.‘531 
 
However, the Court did not elaborate further and concluded that the offence 
should be continuing until the legislature ‗make such power obsolete‘.532 The 
rejection of the American and Canadian approaches which are more protective of 
free speech and display judicial confidence in being able to withstand criticism 
suggests that Malaysians were undiscerning and that judicial reputation rests on 
fragile foundations.  
 
The standard protection of freedom of speech in Malaysia is below the standard 
guaranteed under the international human rights law i.e. the UDHR and the 
ICCPR, although HRCA 1999 was passed with a view of promoting human rights 
in Malaysia. Section 4 (4) HRCA which states inter alia that the UDHR should be 
regarded in matters of human rights as long as it is consistent with the 
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Constitution. By reading this provision on face value, it can be said that HRCA 
introduces into domestic law the provisions of the UDHR while redefining 
fundamental liberties under Part II of the Federal Constitution as ‗human rights‘. 
The UDHR at its inception was not meant to be legally binding. Nevertheless its 
non-binding statement of aspirations with moral authority was designed to provide 
a ‗common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations‘.533 Even 
though it is a non-binding international human rights bill, the UDHR is 
acknowledged today as the legitimate aid to the interpretation of the expression 
‗human rights and fundamental freedom‘ in the Charter of the United Nations as 
well as in most of other countries‘ Constitutions.534  
 
In Malaysia, the introduction of Section 4 (4) HRCA leaves questions of the 
application and the status of UDHR in Malaysia- what if a provision of the UDHR 
is in conflict with the Constitution, and will the UDHR to be ignored? Where 
some particular matter covered by the UDHR was not specifically dealt with in 
the Constitution, should the provisions of the UDHR be given its full scope?
535
 In 
Mohamad Ezam
536
 the Federal Court was invited to determine the extent and 
scope of Article 5 (3)
537
 of the Constitution with regard to the international 
standard under the UDHR.
538
 The appellant argued that the international standards 
would be of persuasive value and assistance when defining the scope of Article 5 
(3) of the Constitution. He also argued that the approach taken by the international 
communities and reliance on UN documents on the subject of legal representation 
has already received statutory recognition in Malaysia by the passing of the 
Internal Security Act (ISA).
539
 This argument was rebutted by the respondent‘s 
counsel by stating that reference to international standards set by the UDHR and 
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several other UN documents on the said issue cannot be accepted as such 
documents are not legally binding on the Malaysian courts.
540
 
 
The Federal Court in this context had to determine the impact of the UDHR by 
virtue of Section 4 (4) HRCA on the domestic law. The Court ruled that the 
position of the UDHR is not changed. It is a non-legally binding instrument which 
is only declaratory in nature and does not have the force of law or binding on 
member states. The Court further said that the UDHR is a resolution of the 
General Assembly of the UN and not a convention subject to the usual ratification 
and accession requirements for treaties. In the opinion of the Court, if the UDHR 
was intended to be more than declaratory principles, the UN could have embodied 
them in a convention or a treaty which Member States can ratify and accede to. 
Only then will those principles have the force of law. In the case at point, the 
Federal Court ruled that since the written law
541
 provides the rules for the subject 
matter, there is no necessity to resort to the international rules.  
 
Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ construed the words ‗regard shall be had‘ to the 
international standards contained in the UDHR in Section 4 (4) HRCA as merely 
being ‗an invitation to look at the 1948 Declaration if one was disposed to do so 
and to consider the principles stated therein and be persuaded by them if need be. 
Beyond that, one was not obliged or compelled to adhere to the 1948 
Declaration‘.542 This restrictive reading was supported further by the qualifying 
statutory provision that the UDHR should be considered ‗subject to the extent it 
was not inconsistent with the Constitution‘.543 
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The Malaysian courts have demonstrated a dismissive attitude towards 
transnational sources on the basis of sufficiency of domestic law and sources to 
resolve the problem at hand without examining foreign sources in any significant 
detail. This is evident in Mohamad Ezam as well as Merdeka University
544
 
whereby the Court in ignoring the UDHR declared ‗…in any event the pertinent 
provisions for consideration are those contained in our municipal legislation‘.545 
The judges considered international standards superfluous because in their view, 
such international standards were of limited persuasive value and assistance as 
Malaysian laws are sufficient to deal with the matter.
546
  
 
Adherence to the ‗four walls‘ of the constitutional text suggests a lack of 
receptivity towards foreign law or international law. Indeed, arguments based on 
the UDHR have been hastily dismissed. This is also observed by Shamrahayu A. 
Aziz in her examination of the application of International Human Rights 
Instruments i.e. the UDHR in the context of freedom of religion.
547
 According to 
her, the objectives of the UDHR do not create ‗hard law‘ obligations on the 
Malaysian judiciary to adopt the International Instruments in interpreting the 
provisions on fundamental liberties. The status of the UDHR is a mere 
declaration. She argues that to apply international instruments such as the UDHR 
in defining the right to freedom of religion in Malaysia has no strong basis, as the 
documents are not binding on Malaysia. She explains that for the International 
Human Rights Instruments to be legally enforced in Malaysia it is depending upon 
legislative implementation. The Constitution does not impose a duty on the 
national court to take cognisance of the International Human Rights Instruments 
in any of its provisions.
548
 She highlights that the international laws on human 
rights are not law of the country and the Malaysian judiciary should not assume 
the parliament‘s power to make law.549 For the international law and instruments 
to have legal force in Malaysia, they have to be ratified, transformed or 
incorporated in a statute or an Act of Parliament.  
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The point highlighted by Shamrahayu A. Aziz is that for the international human 
rights instruments to have a legal force in Malaysia, they have to be ratified and 
the Parliament have to transformed them in a statute, is taken. Article 74(1) of the 
Constitution allows Parliament to make laws with respect to any matters 
enumerated in the ‗Federal List‘ or the ‗Concurrent List‘. The Federal List in the 
Ninth Schedule includes: 
 
1. External Affairs, including- 
(a) Treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries 
and all matters which bring the Federation into relations with 
other countries; 
(b) Implementation of treaties, agreements and convention with 
other countries… 
 
From the wording of Article 74, read together with the Federal List, it is 
concluded that Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws relating to 
external affairs and that it has power to implement international treaties and make 
them operative domestically. Furthermore, Article 39 of the Constitution, in 
respect of the power of the executive, provides that the executive authority is 
vested in the King and exercisable by him or by the Cabinet or any Minister 
authorised by the Cabinet. Article 80 (1) of the Constitution extends the executive 
authority to all matters with respect to which Parliament may make law.
550
 
Therefore, in terms of external affairs, the executive authority extends to the 
making or conclusion of the treaty, agreement and convention. It can be concluded 
that the ratification, the making of the conclusion of treaties or conventions and 
treaty-making are vested in the executive authority of the Federation.
551
 
 
Freedom of speech and expression are specially promoted in international 
instruments on human rights. Its application in the context of free speech, 
however, as pointed out by Shamrahayu A. Aziz, lies at the core of the country‘s 
own social and moral values. She refers to Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria
552
 
where the ECtHR decided that it was up to the individual states to adopt and to 
apply any limitations to freedom of expression on the grounds legitimately 
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prescribed by the ECHR. She concludes that the decision implies that the 
individual states may interpret the rights under the international documents 
according to the strategies to achieve basic human rights in their communities. 
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that Shamrahayu A. Aziz‘s argument lingers around the 
area of freedom of speech and freedom of religion, and also the issue of moral 
considerations as one of the variables affecting the margin of appreciation.
553
 The 
ECtHR in Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria allowed national authorities a wider 
margin of appreciation in matters involving the assessment of morals. This is due 
to the fact that there is no uniform notion of morality as the standard requirements 
of morals vary from one country to another.  The national authorities should have 
a wide margin of appreciation in assessing what was necessary to protect religious 
feeling. However, the ECtHR has taken a different stance in relatively recent case 
of Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler v Austria,
554
 disfavouring a broad margin of 
appreciation. The close scrutiny of the merits of the case led to the conclusion that 
the injunction prohibiting the applicant from exhibiting and publishing the 
painting was disproportionate to the aim pursued i.e. ‗protection of the rights of 
others‘ and therefore not necessary in a democratic society.555 Furthermore, in the 
context of freedom of speech and contempt of court, the ECtHR has to draw a 
reasonable balance between the interests of freedom of expression and the 
protection of judicial authority. In doing so, the ECtHR considers that, in contrast 
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to morals, the notion of judicial authority is more objective and capable of 
uniform standard, thus disfavouring a broad margin of appreciation. The scope of 
the margin is further circumscribed by freedom of press. The interference with the 
freedom of expression by curbing media freedom to comment and publish on a 
matter of public concern, must answer to a pressing social need. It is established 
that if the interference strongly affected a particular trial, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine may not have an important role, and the interference may be 
found justified.
556
 Therefore, it is noted that, in the area of freedom of speech and 
contempt of court, in the context of the ECHR, the national authorities are not 
given a wider margin of appreciation to determine this right according to the 
strategies to achieve basic human rights in their communities.  
 
In Malaysia the protection of freedom of speech and expression remains bleak in 
reality.
557
 There is a need to strive to be on par with the other countries especially 
in the age of globalisation. The international law on human rights is becoming 
increasingly relevant, especially in avoiding the recurring violation of 
fundamental liberties. 
 
In general, for an international treaty or covenant to have its effect in Malaysia, it 
needs ratification, as treaties and conventions do not automatically become part of 
the law of Malaysia. To implement a treaty or convention in Malaysia, Parliament 
has to pass legislation implementing that treaty or convention. For example, 
Malaysia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and it is implemented 
in Malaysia by the enactment of Child Act 2001.
558
 Therefore, any person who 
claims that his rights under the Convention have been violated may invoke the 
Malaysian courts the relevant provision in the Child Act 2001. That shows the 
application of a treaty-based norm which is based on a dualist approach whereby 
the reception of international treaty is not automatic but by a passing on an Act of 
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Parliament. That is also the argument forwarded by Shamrahayu A. Aziz on the 
application of international human rights law in Malaysia. However, this raises a 
question relating to the Malaysian courts‘ duty in interpretation of law. Can the 
free speech provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR be enforced through the 
courts taking into consideration that these two international instruments have no 
binding effect in Malaysia? The courts should shift in their judicial approach of 
relying on ‗four walls‘ doctrine to a pragmatic approach and the sophisticated 
handling of international law in the domestic courts. The argument is that 
international norms which are customary norms and non-binding standards may 
serve the Malaysian courts as one of the analogies in interpreting the Constitution 
and relevant provision of free speech.  
 
4.3.1.2 International Free Speech Norms: the UDHR and the 
ICCPR 
 
The aim of international human rights is to afford legal protection to every human 
being. This is to affirm that all individuals have rights which should not be denied 
by society or State. Pursuant to a mandate in the UN Charter, the UN Economic 
and Social Council created the Commission on Human Rights in 1946 which then 
proceeded to introduce the UDHR two years later. As mentioned earlier, the 
UDHR is a document containing principles that many scholars now consider as 
customary international law.
559
 It contains thirty articles and the right to freedom 
of expression is enshrined in Article 19 as follows:  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.  
 
The UDHR, while not a treaty itself, is not formally legally binding.
560
 As the 
UDHR does not contain any enforcement or interpretive mechanisms and it is not 
sufficiently specific to bind nations, the UN Human Rights Commission created 
the ICCPR. The ICCPR is a comprehensive accord embodying in more detail 
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many rights enumerated in the UDHR. The ICCPR took effect in 1976, ten years 
following its adoption in 1966.
561
  
 
Under Article 19 ICCPR, individuals have the right to hold and express opinions 
of all kind. The provision states: 
 
(1)  Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. 
(2)  Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in 
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media 
of his choice.  
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute as it may be restricted. 
However, any limitation must remain within strictly defined parameters. The 
permissible restrictions on freedom of speech are expressed in Article 19 (3) 
ICCPR: 
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary:  
(a)  For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b)  For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.  
 
Under the ICCPR, restrictions must meet a strict three-part test as laid down in 
Mukong v Cameroon.
562
 First, the interference must be provided for by law. This 
requirement will be fulfilled only when the law is accessible and formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. Second, the 
interference must pursue one of the legitimate aims listed in Article 19 (3). Third, 
the restrictions must be necessary for the restriction, to secure one of those aims.  
Thus, the crux of the issue is whether the restrictions are ‗necessary in a 
democratic society‘.  
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Mukong was a journalist and also a long-time opponent of the one-party system in 
Cameroon. He had publicly advocated the introduction of multi-party democracy 
and worked towards establishing a new political party in Cameroon. He wrote 
several books but unfortunately, as he contended, these never reached the public 
as they were either banned or prohibited from circulation.
563
 He brought his case 
to the Human Rights Committee
564
 as he claimed to be a victim of violations by 
Cameroon of, among others, Article 19 ICCPR. 
 
As to the issue of freedom of expression, Mukong claimed a violation of his right 
to freedom of expression and opinion as he was persecuted for his advocacy of 
multi-party democracy and the expression of opinions inimical to the State party‘s 
government. The State contended that the restrictions imposed were justified 
under Article 19 (3) ICCPR on grounds of national security and/or public order. 
The State argued that Mukong‘s right to this freedom was exercised without 
regard to the country‘s political scenario which was in the midst of struggling for 
unity. In considering this issue, the Committee laid down the three-part test. The 
Committee was satisfied with the State‘s justifications, which had fulfilled the 
first two conditions. However, the Committee had to consider whether the 
measures taken against Mukong were necessary for the safeguarding of national 
security and/or public order. The Committee found that it was not necessary for 
the State to arrest and detain him in order to safeguard an alleged vulnerable state 
of national unity. Safeguarding and strengthening national unity under difficult 
political situations cannot be achieved by attempting to muzzle advocacy of multi-
party democracy, democracy tenets and human rights.
565
 The Committee 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 19 ICCPR.  
 
Although many nations have ratified the ICCPR, some have not enforced it. Many 
countries have also failed to sign the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which 
provides an international complaint process for individuals who have exhausted 
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domestic remedies.
566
 When a state ratifies or accedes to the ICCPR, it undertakes 
three domestic obligations and at least one international obligation
567
 – to respect 
and to ensure the recognised rights,
568
 to give effect to the recognised rights,
569
 to 
provide an effective remedy
570
 and to report periodically to the Human Rights 
Committee.
571
  
 
Parallel to international development, there also developed a body of regional 
human rights law,
572
 for example the ECHR, a regional treaty to protect human 
rights and fundamental liberties in Europe. It was drafted in 1950 and entered into 
force on 3 September 1953. All Council of Europe Member States are party to the 
Convention and new members are expected to ratify the convention at the earliest 
opportunity.
573
 The ECHR established the ECtHR. This allows any victim of the 
violation of human rights under the ECHR by a Member State to bring his case to 
the ECtHR.  
 
The ECHR protects the right to freedom of expression as provided under Article 
10: 
  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
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Secretary General of the UN periodic reports on the measures adopted to give effects to the 
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examined by the Human Rights Committee. 
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  The ECHR, American Convention on Human Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ 
Rights. 
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 Article 64 ECHR provides that the State, when signing the Convention or when depositing its 
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(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
The right to freedom of expression is however subject to certain restrictions as 
provided for under Article 10 (2).  Contempt of court was one of the restrictions of 
freedom of expression. However in Kyprianou v Cyprus,
574
 the Grand Chamber 
has to determine whether the citation of contempt of court against the appellant 
had deprived him from his right to freedom of expression.  
The Court applied the three-part test in determining whether Mr. Kyprianou‘s 
right to freedom of speech under Article 10 ECHR had been violated after he was 
cited for contempt of court and a five-day imprisonment term was imposed on 
him.
575
 The Court has to determine whether the conviction by the national court 
amounts to interference and whether the interference was justified. First, the Court 
has to determine whether the conviction and sentence were ‗prescribed by law‘. 
Secondly, whether the interference pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the 
‗authority of the judiciary‘. Thirdly, the Court has to determine whether the 
interference with the applicant‘s freedom of expression was ‗necessary in a 
democratic society‘. 
The Court agreed that the conviction and sentence were prescribed by law under 
Sections 44 (1) and (2) of the Courts of Justice Law 1960 and Article 162 of the 
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 15 December 2005, (Application No. 72797/01). Cyprus became a member of the Council of 
Europe on 24 May 1961 and ratified the ECHR on 6 October 1962. See 
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Cyprus Constitution. In determining the second and third ingredients, the Court 
basically has to strike a balance between the need to protect the authority of the 
judiciary and the need to protect the applicant‘s freedom of expression. In doing 
so, the Court looked at the ‗authority and impartiality of the judiciary‘ as stated in 
Article 10 (2) ECHR.  
The ‗authority of the judiciary‘ includes courts as the proper forum for the 
settlement of legal dispute and for the determination of one‘s guilt or innocence. 
At this point, what is at stake is the confidence which the court must inspire in the 
accused and also the public at large. Lawyers are at the central position in the 
administration of justice, being intermediaries between public and court. Thus, as 
a lawyer, the applicant‘s conduct must contribute to the proper administration of 
justice and maintain public confidence therein. There are restrictions to his 
conduct and Article 10 provides that lawyers‘ comments should not overstep the 
boundary. One of the restrictions to the lawyers‘ right to freedom of expression is 
the authority of the judiciary. However, on the lawyers‘ part, while defending 
their client in court, particularly in the context of adversarial criminal trials, they 
can find themselves in a delicate situation - whether to object or complain about 
the conduct of the court while keeping in mind their clients‘ best interest. The 
Court when considering the issue of the custodial sentence perceived that it gave 
chilling effect to the applicant‘s freedom of expression. He would feel constrained 
in conducting his case and this would cause possible detriment to the clients‘ case.  
 
Therefore, the Court found that the sentence imposed by the national court was a 
harsh punishment, considering that it was enforced immediately while the client‘s 
case i.e. a charge of murder was ongoing. The penalty was disproportionately 
severe on the applicant and was capable of having a ‗chilling effect‘ on his 
performance of his duties as a defence counsel. The procedural unfairness in the 
summary proceedings for contempt was also lack of proportionality. The Court 
considered that the national court failed to strike the right balance between the 
need to protect the authority of the judiciary and the need to protect the applicant‘s 
right to freedom of expression and held that Article 10 of the Convention has been 
breached by reason of the disproportionate sentence imposed on the applicant. 
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Although ECHR is a regional human rights law, there are attempts by non-
European lawyers to argue cases decided by the ECtHR before their own national 
court.
576
 This is due to the reason that the ECHR is perceived as ‗the most 
sophisticated of all contemporary instruments for the international protection of 
human rights‘.577 
 
4.3.1.3 Rethinking the Malaysian Courts‟ Attitude towards 
International Human Rights Law and Foreign Law in an 
Age of Globalisation 
 
Freedom of speech and expression under Article 10 (1) (a) of the Constitution is 
not an absolute right, as Article 10 (2) provides for its restriction i.e. ‗such 
restrictions as it [Parliament] deems necessary or expedient in the interests of the 
security of the Federation or any other part thereof, friendly relations with other 
countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the 
privileges of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against 
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence‘. The Malaysian 
Parliament is, therefore, the sole judge of the question whether it was necessary to 
impose restrictions to protect or promote any of the specified interests. The ISA 
1960, for instance, was passed when the Parliament deemed it was necessary or 
expedient in the interest of security of the Federation. Nevertheless, as to 
contempt of court, Parliament left the matter for the courts to decide. 
 
The courts adopt the ‗four walls‘ doctrine in interpreting Article 10 of the 
Constitution. The court interprets the provision based on the texts and ‗not within 
light of the analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the United 
States of America or Australia‘.578 As seen in Manjeet Singh Dhillon579 as 
discussed above, the tendency to dismiss foreign cases as irrelevant under the 
                                                 
576
 In Murray Hiebert (CA) (n. 267); AG v Times Newspapers Ltd (n. 186) or Thalidomide case 
was cited before the Court. In Kok Wah Kuan v Pengarah Penjara Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan 
[2004] 5 MLJ 193, the Court declined to apply Director of Public Prosecutors of Jamaica v 
Mollison (2003) 2 W.L.R. 1160, a Privy Council decision, on the ground that Mollision was 
heavily influenced by the ECHR.  
577
 John P. Humphrey, 'The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century' 
in Maarten Bos (ed) The Present State of International Law and Other Essays (Kluwer, Deventer 
1973). 
578
 Government of State of Kelantan (n. 24). 
579
 Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n. 8). 
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‗four walls‘ doctrine is on the basis of differences in wording between the foreign 
bill of rights and the domestic constitution. The dismissal is often supported by a 
declaration that foreign law is inapplicable locally because conditions in these 
jurisdictions differ.  
 
Often the provision or the bill of rights embodies broad statement of principle: 
foreign law can shed some light on the texts. As observed in Malaysia, the courts 
have referred foreign case law, especially Indian cases, due to the fact that 
Malaysian Constitution is modelled on Indian. Victor Ramraj terms this as 
‗genealogical interpretation‘ because the interpretation is based on the notion that 
there exists a relationship of genealogy and history which ties these two 
Constitutions together.
580
 Choudhry suggests ‗dialogical interpretation‘ in 
interpreting the bill of rights.
581
 Under this mode, a court engages in a kind of 
dialogue with foreign jurisprudence in order to better understand its legal system 
and jurisprudence. The court examines foreign case law and doctrine, not so much 
to gain an accurate picture of the state of the law in other jurisdictions, but to 
understand the underlying principle adopted by such foreign law. Here, the 
domestic court, in analysing the foreign laws, must ask why those foreign courts 
have reasoned in a certain way. Then the national court will certainly ask itself 
why it reasons the way it does. Therefore, to accept or reject the foreign laws 
referred to the court, it must be supported by certain reasons. It is suggested that 
the ‗four walls‘ doctrine does not reject foreign material in toto because 
genealogical and dialogical interpretations allow judges to use foreign materials as 
source of inspiration when considering how bill of rights jurisprudence should be 
developed. 
 
We have seen that the Malaysian courts have declined to consider foreign legal 
materials on the basis of differing local conditions in Malaysia and the foreign 
countries without explaining how the conditions are different and why such 
differences are relevant.
582
 Thio Li-Ann has pointed that ‗[T]his perfunctory 
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 Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n. 8); Arthur Lee Meng Kuang (n. 1). 
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waving away of foreign cases on the basis of ‗we‘re different‘ is undesirable. A 
focused elaboration of the different social conditions of these countries would aid 
in assessing their relevance to the matter at hand‘.583 A key reason for referring to 
foreign jurisprudence is a perception that there may be a doctrine or mode of 
analysis originating in a foreign jurisdiction that is suitable for domestic 
application. However, the foreign jurisprudence may not be suitable if conditions 
between the foreign and domestic jurisdictions differ to such an extent that the 
foreign doctrine might operate detrimentally.
584
  
 
Ramraj however, argues that whatever the peculiarities of local conditions, the 
courts are free to look elsewhere for inspirational principles to apply in a case at 
hand. In doing so, he says that the courts might well realise that not all local 
conditions are as special and distinct as they may initially seem.
585
 Jack Tsen-Ta 
Lee elaborates that the existence of differing social and other conditions in the 
domestic and foreign jurisdictions does not impair the use of foreign materials. 
Once a norm is identified, if the local condition is so peculiar as to warrant 
departure from a common normative standard, then the court is duty-bound to 
‗show clearly what these conditions are and why they justify departure‘. If it is 
justifiable to refer to foreign materials, then the court may use it as a ‗catalyst for 
evolution within the domestic legal system‘.586 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that referring to foreign material in interpreting 
domestic law gives some benefits. Valuable insights into how other jurisdictions 
have framed the issue at hand and developed solutions can be gained. 
Furthermore, a comparative approach ensures that a judgment concerning the 
fundamental liberties of individuals is made with an eye to evolving national and 
international standard.
587
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From the discussion above, there is a need to call for judicial activism in 
interpreting fundamental rights in the Constitution so as to expand its scope by 
incorporating human rights and foreign law. Gopal Sri Ram, a Court of Appeal 
Judge rejected a ‗pedantic‘ approach towards reading the Constitution. Instead he 
advocates referring the Constitution as a ‗living piece of legislation‘ which is 
capable of adapting to changing circumstances. He suggests reading Part II of the 
Constitution ‗prismatically‘588 to discern implied rights from the text in order to 
ensure citizens obtain the full benefit and value of those rights. He highlights that 
fundamental liberties provisions should be interpreted as human rights. He pointed 
out that Section 4 (4) HRCA gives scope for the application of international law as 
it states that regard shall be had to the UDHR to the extent that it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. When viewed as human rights, he noted that 
judges are free to interpret the constitutional freedoms using international human 
rights instruments as external aids of interpretation.
589
  
 
Previously, when the Privy Council was the final appellate court in Malaysia, it 
was open to foreign law as it dealt with appeals from jurisdictions throughout the 
Commonwealth. The Privy Council decisions had precedential weights in this 
context. Empirically, there has been a pool of foreign cases in the Malaysian 
courts and the courts have some idea in dealing with international and foreign 
laws as a basis of interpretation. The departure from the Privy Council in fact 
gives opportunity for the courts to develop the national law with the exposure of 
the foreign law in expanding the scope in interpretation. In fact, the courts should 
be more critical and evaluative rather than confining themselves to the ‗four 
walls‘. 
 
Even though in the area of free speech the courts seem reluctant to follow 
rationales from foreign decisions, in the area concerning the rights of indigenous 
peoples the courts resort to foreign decisions and international law. The concept of 
native title was established in the Malaysian law in the case of Adong bin Kuwau v 
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Kerajaan Negeri Johor.
590
 This concept was followed in Nor anak Nyawai v 
Borneo Pulp Plantation.
591
 Sagong bin Tasi v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor
592
 is a 
case involving the taking of lands occupied by Temuans, an aboriginal tribe, in 
conjunction with the building of the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. These 
decisions relied heavily on the reasoning in foreign decisions from the USA, 
Canada and Australia with respect to the issue of native title and property rights, 
and certain international law instruments. In Adong bin Kuwau,
593
 the Court stated 
that since this case dealt with a relatively novel issue in Malaysia, the court had to 
turn to various sources including cases, articles and writing both in and outside 
Malaysia.
594
 The Court took judicial notice of the worldwide trend towards the 
recognition of native peoples‘ rights in the aftermath of the Second World War in 
countries which practice the Torrens land law system. Under the Torrens system, 
titles are issued pursuant to statutory powers. Specifically, in Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia, the courts had greatly expounded on native rights over 
their lands.
595
  
 
By looking at this scenario, it is therefore suggested that in the area of free speech 
and contempt of court, the Malaysian courts should give consideration to the 
relevance of the UDHR to domestic law.
596
 This is because Malaysia, as a 
member state of the UN, is bound by the UN Charter to respect the standards laid 
down in the UDHR. Apart from this, Malaysia has declared its support of the 
UDHR as seen in Section 4 (4) HRCA, this may be taken as evidence of 
government policy such that courts are presumptively to act in compliance with 
international obligation or foreign policy principles. The UDHR has attained the 
status of customary international law (CIL)
597
 and the rights which carry the status 
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of CIL may form part of the background against which the interpretation takes 
place.
598
 In Malaysia, an established rule of CIL should be part and parcel of the 
Malaysian law to the extent that they are not contrary to the statutes and public 
policy. The CIL is applicable as long as Malaysia has not persistently objected to 
it. In Malaysia, the courts appear to have applied CIL through the medium of 
English common law by virtue of Section 3 CLA 1956. The courts applied CIL as 
part and parcel of common law.  
 
In a globalising world where international human rights law is an instrument of 
transnational judicial conversations between judges across borders, the invocation 
of international instruments in domestic courts is instructive to show that domestic 
courts take initiative to enforce international law. The judges have to be more 
open and receptive to use international and foreign law as tool of interpretation. 
They should not confine themselves within the ‗four walls‘. It is noticed that the 
legal culture of resistance towards international law is slowly eroding in some 
areas of civil liberties. The Malaysian courts in novel cases referred and applied 
foreign decisions into Malaysian case as seen in Adong bin Kawau. This shows 
that the courts can apply foreign materials if they wish to. When the courts refer to 
comparative materials to interpret the bill of rights, it actually helps the courts to 
better understand, recognise and shape the national identity of the country. The 
courts use the material as a source of inspiration. 
 
It is worth sharing an analogy put forward by Jack Tsen-Ta Lee in his article. He 
wrote ‗imagine the judge as a herbalist who seeks a cure for a constitutional 
ailment. To increase the chances of finding the right treatment for the patient, the 
sensible herbalist will gather a selection of herbs from a variety of locations. It is 
only prudent to scrutinise all the plants to determine whether or not there are any 
noxious weeds among them. However, once he has ascertained that a plant can 
                                                                                                                                      
develop into binding norms over time if they become accepted customary law. In fact, the UDHR 
has received the status of CIL and the principles are applicable without the need for ratification or 
accession by states in contrast to the legally binding treaties such as the ICCPR. See Javaid 
Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2
nd
 edn Pearson Education Ltd, Essex 2010) pp. 22-23; 
Hurst Hannum, 'The UDHR in National and International Law' (1999) 3 Health and Human Rights 
144, pp. 147-149. 
598
 Jayawickrama (n. 533); Abdul Ghafur Hamid, Public International Law. A Practical Approach. 
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indeed provide efficacious cure, he would be foolish to reject it to his patient‘s 
detriment merely because it was not found in his own garden‘.599  
 
4.3.2 Contempt in Some Selected Common Law Jurisdictions and 
International Criminal Tribunals 
 
The common law concept of contempt of court has also been ‗imported‘ by other 
jurisdictions such as the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India. 
Although these countries share the same origin of contempt law as it originated in 
England, later on, throughout their legal journey, some changes and developments 
have been made to some of these jurisdictions. In fact, there have been 
movements for reform in these countries. India chose to place its contempt law in 
a statute which now is found in CCA 1971. In the UK, part of its contempt law 
has been placed in a statute while the rest is still left to be dealt with by common 
law. The UK CCA 1981 covers publication under the regime of strict liability. 
Countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand had once come out with the 
reform proposals but they have not been carried out. Hence, in these countries, 
their contempt law is mainly based on common law.  
 
The study of the law of contempt in Malaysia has shown among others that the 
judges play an important role in the final analysis of the law of contempt. Since 
the Malaysian law of contempt is based on common law principle, the counsels 
often invited the courts to look at cases and developments in contempt law in its 
counterparts. However, as discussed in the preceding part, the reluctance is due to 
the ‗suitability of local conditions‘. 
 
Under this part, the development of contempt law in the abovementioned 
jurisdictions will be evaluated in responding to the main areas of concern in 
Malaysian law of contempt of court. In addition to the practice of contempt law in 
these sovereign states, it will also examine how an international criminal tribunal, 
in particular the ICTY, which possesses international legal personality, deals with 
contempt cases. The case study is made only to the ICTY considering quite 
significant contempt cases delivered by this tribunal.  
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The discussion on the main areas of concern of the law of contempt is Malaysia is 
discussed by looking at these selected jurisdictions separately. However, where 
there is common ground, such jurisdictions are discussed concurrently. 
4.3.2.1 The Background 
 
(i) England 
 
The law of contempt of court has established its roots in England since time 
immemorial.
600
 From its ancient origins, contempt of court has developed over the 
years as a creation of courts. The power is inherent in superior courts.
601
 However, 
in 1971, the Phillimore Committee was established under the chairmanship of 
Lord Justice Phillimore to consider whether any changes were required in the law 
relating to contempt of court. The Phillimore Report
602
 was reported in December 
1974 but only in 1980 was the Contempt of Court Bill tabled in Parliament. This 
took place in the aftermath of the adverse decision of the ECtHR in the Sunday 
Times case.
603
  The Bill was tabled with an intention to bring the UK law into line 
with the decision of the ECtHR, and so as to repair the breach of the Convention. 
As a result, the CCA 1981 was passed at least partly in response to the decision of 
the ECtHR in Sunday Times case. In England at present, the law of contempt of 
court relating to publications interfering with the due course of justice, in 
particular legal proceedings, is covered by the Act which attracts the strict liability 
notion.
604
 The rest of contempt laws are still under the common law regime.
605
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Hence, the sources of contempt law in England are the CCA 1981 and the 
common law in those areas where the Act does not operate. Apart from these, the 
exercise of contempt power is to some extent affected by the ECHR.  
 
Section 3 (1) HRA requires that the UK legislation ‗so far as it is possible‘ is to be 
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.
606
 
However, it has been accepted by the domestic courts that all statutes should be 
interpreted compatibly with Convention rights, regardless of whether they regulate 
behaviour of public authorities or private persons.
607
 If the higher court i.e. High 
Court upwards, is satisfied that a provision of primary legislation is incompatible 
with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.
608
 The 
legislation may, later on, be amended to remove the incompatibility.
609
   
 
Section 2 (1) HRA further requires the English courts and tribunals ‗to take into 
account‘ amongst others ‗any judgments, decision declaration, or advisory opinion 
of the ECtHR‘ where it is relevant ‗in determining a question which has arisen in 
connection with a Convention right‘. Section 2 (1) HRA literally means that the 
ECtHR judgments, decisions and advisory opinion are not formally binding as 
precedent upon the English courts, indeed they are to be considered alongside 
relevant decisions from other jurisdictions. On its face, the English courts are not 
bound to apply the ECtHR‘s case law in domestic law at all. Nevertheless, in 
Regina (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator,
610
 the House of Lords held that ‗the English 
court was obliged to take into account of the case law of the ECtHR and should, 
save in special circumstances, follow its clear and constant jurisprudence; and that 
further, since the correct interpretation of the Convention could only be 
authoritatively expounded by the European Court, the domestic court should not 
without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of its case law‘.611   
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As for common law contempt, the interpretative requirements of Section 3 HRA 
do not apply but Section 2 remains applicable due to Section 6 HRA
612
 which 
means that relevant decisions of the ECtHR must be taken into account.   
 
(ii) Canada 
In Canada, contempt of court is the only remaining common law offence.
613
 The 
other criminal offences are found within the Criminal Code.
614
 The common law 
and the English law still has significant impact on the development of the law of 
contempt in Canada. Clearly the historical link between the two countries played 
an important role in this matter and also the proviso to Section 9 of the Code 
which made contempt of court an exception to the rule preventing a conviction for 
an offence under the common law. As far as the law of contempt is concerned, the 
English common law is acceptable authority and English cases may be cited in 
Canadian courts. 
In 1977 and 1982, there were calls to reform the common law contempt in 
Canada. The Canadian Law Commission recommended an amendment to Section 
9 of the Criminal Code, abolishing the common law power of judges to punish for 
contempt.
615
 The Commission suggested that contempt of court would only be 
dealt with by the Criminal Code. However, the Bill was not passed into law and 
the continuance of the inherent power to deal with contempt of court is still 
guaranteed to the courts.   
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The significant event had taken place in 1982 when the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms of 1982 was implemented. The Charter guarantees the 
individual‘s right to freedom of expression616 ‗subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society‘.617 The Charter also protects a person‘s legal rights in criminal and penal 
matters.
618
 In R v Cohn,
619
 the availability of the Charter rights in contempt 
proceeding was mentioned. Goodman JA said: 
…it is a matter of the common law continuing to evolve as it has done for 
centuries but henceforth, in Canada, it must evolve within the framework 
provided by the Charter to safeguard individual rights. Each case will 
have to be decided on its own particular facts after applying the proper 
legal principles.
620
 
 
Therefore, the Charter plays a vital role in the development of the law of contempt 
in Canada. 
 
(iii) The USA 
The English law of contempt had far-reaching influence on the law of contempt in 
the USA. In the USA, the power to punish for contempt has been consistently 
viewed as a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary and 
therefore has been deemed ‗inherent‘ in all courts.621  
Historically, the American courts punished contempt in facie and out of court 
contempt summarily. This is evident in Respublica
622
  which was influenced by an 
                                                 
616
 Section 2 of the Charter provides: 
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(b)  freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other media of communication.  
617
 Section 1 of the Charter.  
618
 Section 11 of the Charter provides safeguards to individual rights. A person charged with an 
offence, has, amongst others, the right to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific 
offence, to be tried within the reasonable time, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to the law in a fair and public hearing by an in independent and impartial tribunal and 
also right to reasonable bail.   
619
 R v Cohn (1984) 13 DLR (4
th
) 680 (Ont. C.A). 
620
 Ibid. p. 706. 
621
 Ex parte Robinson, 86 US (19 Wall) 505 (1873) p. 510 where the Court stated that the moment 
the courts in the USA came into existence, they possessed the contempt power. 
622
 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (1788). 
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English case of Almon
623
 in which bookseller John Almon was held in contempt 
for publishing a ‗libel‘ on the Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield. The judgment in 
Almon which was referred by Blackstone in his Commentaries in the year 1765 
was responsible for the initial introduction of summary contempt process into the 
USA.
624
 In 1789, the contempt power inherent under common law received 
statutory recognition. Judiciary Act 1789
625
 recognised such inherent power by 
noting that ‗all the said courts of the United States shall have power to…punish by 
fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempt of authority in 
any cause or hearing before the same…‘ This Act conferred power on all courts to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the courts‘ discretion without stating the 
manner or the procedure to be adopted before punishment could be imposed.
626
 
The impeachment trial of Judge James Peck (1826-1831) had a remarkable and 
far-reaching effect on the law of contempt in the USA. Judge Peck was survived 
impeachment for summarily imprisoning
627
 lawyer Lawless for the indirect 
contempt of writing an article that criticised Judge Peck‘s decision while the case 
was still pending.
628
  
  
A day after Judge Peck‘s acquittal, Congress set in motion the process to change 
the law. In 1831, Congress enacted legislation to limit the scope of the federal 
summary contempt power to acts committed ‗in the presence of the court or so 
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice‘.629 The aim of the Act was 
to prevent misbehaviour in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice. Secondly, it aimed to preserve the discipline 
amongst the officers of the courts, to enforce obedience to the process and orders 
                                                 
623
 Wilmot’s Notes (1765) 243, 97 ER 94 in Arlidge, Eady and Smith (n. 19) p. 17. 
624
 William F Chinnock and Mark P Painter, 'The Law of Contempt of Court in Ohio' (2002-2003) 
34 University of Toledo Law Review 309, p.313. 
625
 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
626
 Joel M. Androphy and Keith A. Byers, 'Federal Contempt of Court' (1998) 61 Texas Bar 
Journal , p. 18. 
627
 In addition to the imprisonment, Lawless was ordered to be suspended from practicing as an 
attorney in the judge‘s court for 18 months.  
628
 At the impeachment proceeding, it was argued on behalf of Judge Peck that the power to punish 
contempt summarily is inherent in the courts as a necessary part of their institution and existence, 
and it was claimed that he had, in good faith, punished Lawless for his contempt and in doing so, 
followed common law precedents. He survived impeachment by only a single vote of Congress. 
Chinnock and Painter (n. 624) p. 313. For more, see Walter Nelles and Carol Weiss King, 
'Contempt by Publication in the United States' (1928) 28 Columbia Law Review 401; Goldfarb (n. 
22).  
629
 Nelles and King (n. 628) p. 430. 
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of the courts, and to state that the power of the courts to exercise a summary 
jurisdiction in contempt extended to the matters specified therein and no other.
630
  
The effect was that summary procedure was no longer available for contempt out 
of court. It was only available in certain contempt in the face of court. It set 
specific limits on the exercise of the contempt power by the federal courts. This 
explicit authority to cite an individual for contempt as in the Act of 1831, is now 
placed in Section 401, Title 18, U.S. Code (18 U.S.C.).  
 
By virtue of Section 401, 18 U.S.C., the federal courts
631
 have broad powers to 
punish acts of criminal contempt which have been restricted to three types of 
misbehaviour. Section 401, 18 U.S.C. states: 
 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or 
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its 
authority, and none other, as  
(1) Misbehaviour of any person in its presence or so near thereto as 
to obstruct the administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehaviour of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writs, process, order, 
rule, decree or command. 
 
In addition, Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures provides for 
procedural guideline for criminal contempt. Rule 42 (a)
632
 deals with indirect 
                                                 
630
 Section 1 of the Act of 1831 states: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America, in Congress assembled, that the power of the several courts of the United States 
to issue attachments for contempt of court, shall not be construed to extend to any cases 
except the misbehaviour of any person or persons in the presence of the said court, or so 
near thereto to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehaviour of any of the 
officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance 
of any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person or persons, to 
any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said court. 
631
 For the discussion of contempt in the USA, major reference is made to the federal law. In the 
USA, there is no single ‗court system‘ as every state has its own court system to handle cases that 
involves disputes or crimes within the state. Federal Government also has a court system to handle 
cases that involve disputes governing the federal law and the Constitution. The Federal Courts 
consist of Supreme Court as the highest court in the federal system, followed by Courts of Appeal 
as intermediate level in the federal system. The lowest level in the federal system is District 
Courts. See http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts.aspx.  
632
 Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures states: 
Any person who commits criminal contempt may be punished for that contempt after 
prosecution on notice. 
(1) Notice.  
The court must give the person notice in open court, in an order to show cause, 
or in an arrest order. The notice must:  
(A) state the time and place of the trial;  
(B) allow the defendant a reasonable time to prepare a defense; and  
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contempt by way of ‗Disposition After Notice‘ and Rule 42 (b)633 confers the 
courts summary contempt power to ‗punish a person who commits criminal 
contempt in its presence if the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and 
so certifies‘. 
 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Chambers v Nasco, Inc.,634 shows that 
the court relied on its inherent power in imposing sanctions. In this case, the 
District Court imposed sanctions against Chambers in the form of attorney‘s fees 
and expenses totaling almost $ 1 million. The District Court declined to impose 
sanction under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. 1927 because 
both statutes only apply to attorneys who unreasonably and intentionally delay 
proceedings and would not reach Chambers as the statutes were not broad enough 
to reach ‗act which degrade the judicial system‘.635 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
held that the District Court had properly invoked its inherent power in assessing a 
sanction.  
 
The Supreme Court viewed that even though there are provisions for a range of 
sanctions in punishing contempt of its authority, among others, as in Section 40, 
18 U.S.C.,
636
 the federal courts may ignore these provisions and exercise inherent 
                                                                                                                                      
(C) state the essential facts constituting the charged criminal contempt and 
describe it as such. 
(2) Appointing a Prosecutor.  
The court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney for the 
government, unless the interest of justice requires the appointment of another 
attorney. If the government declines the request, the court must appoint another 
attorney to prosecute the contempt. 
(3) Trial and Disposition.  
A person being prosecuted for criminal contempt is entitled to a jury trial in any 
case in which federal law so provides and must be released or detained as Rule 
46 provides. If the criminal contempt involves disrespect toward or criticism of 
a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the contempt trial or hearing 
unless the defendant consents. Upon a finding or verdict of guilty, the court 
must impose the punishment. 
633
 Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules, the court (other than a magistrate judge) may 
summarily punish a person who commits criminal contempt in its presence if the judge saw or heard 
the contemptuous conduct and so certifies; a magistrate judge may summarily punish a person as 
provided in 28 U.S.C. S. 636(e). The contempt order must recite the facts, be signed by the judge, 
and be filed with the clerk.  
634
 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
635
 Chambers were alleged with attempting to deprive the court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud 
performed outside the confines of the court, these were: filing false and frivolous pleadings and 
attempting by other tactics to delay, oppress and harass in order to reduce Nasco to exhausted 
compliance.  
636
 Chambers v Nasco (n. 634) p. 62. 
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power to sanction bad faith misconduct even if procedural rules exist which 
sanction the same conduct. The Court reasoned the shifting from using the 
expressing provisions to the exercising inherent power on two points. Firstly, if 
there is no statute or rules to cover the sanctionable conduct, courts may rely on 
inherent power. At another, courts may invoke inherent authority whenever 
conducts sanctionable under rules was intertwined within conduct that only 
inherent power could address. By allowing courts to ignore express rules and 
statutes, the Court treated inherent powers as the norm and textual bases of 
authority as the exception.
637
  
 
Thus, as noted in Chambers v Nasco, inherent powers may be limited by statutes 
or rules but with respect to contempt, the Court asserts both the power to act in 
areas not covered by statutes and rules, and the power to act when Congress has 
not shown its intention to limit the court, then the court could utilise its inherent 
powers. 
 
Furthermore, the Bill of Rights protects certain rights and freedoms and can be 
applied by the court to strike down incompatible laws. It does not cover all rights 
and freedoms as set out in the ICCPR which the USA ratified with a number of 
reservations in 1992.
638
 The freedom of expression is protected under the First 
Amendment. 
 
(iv) Australia 
The historical connection between England and Australia has meant that a good 
deal of the laws of these countries have emanated from England. The law of 
contempt is no exception. In Australia, from the moment the British took 
possession for the British Crown, she became the subject to the laws of England. 
Thus, in Australia, the Court Act 1828 provided that all laws and Statutes in force 
in England on 25
th
 July 1828 should be applied to the administration of justice in 
the New South Wales, the first British colony established in Australia. The legal 
system at that time was based on the English legal system. Even though some 
                                                 
637
 Ibid. pp.62-67. 
638
 Evatt (n. 155) p.289. 
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states
639
 in Australia codified their law and departed from the common law as a 
source of reference, exceptions were made to the rule that they preserved the 
common law offence of contempt of court.
640
 
In 1987, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that the law of 
contempt should be in statutory form.
641
 The proposed Australian legislation 
would abolish the common law of contempt.
642
 However, until today Australia has 
non-statutory contempt powers. The law of contempt of court in Australia is 
mainly common law and the source of contempt powers of the Australian courts 
resides in the common law. The Australian courts of record have an inherent 
jurisdiction to punish contempt of court.   
In Australia, there is no provision in its Constitution that explicitly guarantees 
freedom of speech and of the press. Australia inherited the traditional English 
view that freedom of speech was best protected by the common law. There have 
been unsuccessful attempts to incorporate a guarantee of free speech, along with 
other human rights into the Australian Constitution. There is also no bill of rights 
legislated despite Australian ratification to the ICCPR and acceded to its First 
Optional Protocol in 1991.
643
 
(v) New Zealand 
The position in New Zealand is quite similar to Australia. New Zealand became a 
British colony upon British settlement. The courts and concepts of English law 
were adopted thus to include the judge-made concept of contempt of court and the 
procedures to be adopted for committal for contempt. Hence, the law of contempt 
in New Zealand has been built up from the English common law, which remains 
the main source of the summary jurisdiction in the New Zealand courts. In New 
                                                 
639
 Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania. 
640
 Section 10 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tasmania) states: 
Nothing in this Act shall affect the authority of courts of record to punish a person 
summarily for the offence commonly known as ‗contempt of court‘; but no person shall 
be punished and also punished under the provisions of the Code for the same act or 
omission. 
641
 Walker (n. 477). 
642
 Law Reform Commission, Contempt Report No. 35, at paras. 44 and 267. 
643
 Most of Covenant rights and freedoms have no guarantee against legislative encroachment by 
either State or Federal Parliaments. Evatt (n. 155) p.293. 
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Zealand the common law is still relied on. Contempt is the only non-statutory 
offence that remains punishable by the courts in New Zealand.
644
 
In New Zealand, freedom of expression is guaranteed under Article 14 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. This Act is based on the ICCPR but not all 
Covenant rights were incorporated into this Bill of Rights Act. 
 
(vi) India 
 
The Indian legal system was heavily influenced by English idea, but the influence 
of religious personal law
645
 is not ignored. English law would only be applied in 
so far as applicable to Indian conditions and inhabitants. English law was applied 
to fill in the lacuna in the Indian law. Consequently, much of the English common 
law and equity found its way into Indian law. The principle of contempt of court 
was one of them. Even after independence in 1947, English law still received a 
favourable reception.  
 
However, in order to establish uniformity in the law, define the limits and powers 
of certain courts and regulate their procedures, the Contempt of Court Acts were 
passed in 1926, 1952 and 1971.
646
 It is the 1971 Act that presently regulates the 
law of contempt in India. The power to punish for contempt has been clearly 
vested in the courts of record thus barring the inherent powers to punish for 
contempt of court. All areas of contempt of court are codified into the CCA 1971. 
 
In India, the right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed under Article 
19 of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
644
 Section 9 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
645
 Hindu, Islamic and Burmese Buddhist laws. 
646
 The 1926 Act was repealed by the 1952 Act, and the 1952 Act was repealed by the 1971 Act. 
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(vii) The ICTY647  
  
The ICTY was established by the UN Security Council as an ad hoc tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia in 1993 to address atrocities committed in the former 
Yugoslavia. It has jurisdiction over four clusters of crime committed on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, namely, grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, violations of laws or customs of war, genocide and crime 
against humanity. It tries only individuals, not organisations or governments.
648
 
The ICTY, like any criminal court needs to preserve the integrity of its 
proceedings and ensure a due administration of justice. Therefore, it is important 
that the offences against the administration of justice such as contempt are 
addressed.
649
 
                                                 
647
 At present, there is an independent and permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) 
established on 17 July 1998 and is governed by the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, 
to prosecute and try persons accused for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crime and 
aggression. ICC is a permanent treaty based international criminal court established when 120 
states adopted Rome Statute to establish the same. As of 24 March 2010, there are 111 state parties 
to the Rome Statutes of International Criminal Court. The ICC functions as a jurisdiction of last 
resort, able to hear cases only if no state is able to or willing to provide a forum for a particular 
case. For more details on the ICC, see Leila Nadya Sadat, 'The Legacy of the ICTY: The 
International Criminal Court' (2002-2003) 37 New England Law Review 1073; Otto Triffterer, 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:Observer's Notes, Article by 
Article (Hart Publishing, 2008); Alexander Zahar and Goran Sluiter, International Criminal Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008); <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ > 
accessed March 2010. 
648
 The UN Security Council also established another ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda in 1994 known 
as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in order to judge people responsible for 
the Rwandan genocide and other serious violations of the international law in Rwanda or by 
Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between 1 January and 31 December 1994. Apart from ICTY 
and ICTR, there are also Special Courts set up jointly by the government of the States Members of 
the UN and the UN such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone which is mandated to try those who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996; the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Tribunal for Cambodia, Ad Hoc Court for East Timor and the 
Iraq Tribunal. Consequently, the ICC was established and considered as an international 
organisation which is governed by a treaty that is the Rome Statute of International Criminal 
Court. The idea of having a permanent international criminal court is to ensure stability and 
inconsistency in international criminal jurisdiction. For details, see Zahar and Sluiter (n. 647) pp. 
4-35; Triffterer (n. 647). As mentioned earlier, only the practice of contempt in the ICTY will be 
examined due to quite significants numbers of contempt cases decided by that Tribunal.  
649
 The ICC under Article 70 of the Rome Statute has jurisdiction to deal with offences against the 
administration of justice.  Article 70 (1) provides: 
The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration of 
justice when committed intentionally: 
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to article 69, paragraph 1, 
to tell the truth; 
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged; 
(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or 
testimony of witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or destroying, 
tampering with or interfering with the collection or evidence; 
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Article 15 of the ICTY Statute bestows its judges to create ‗rules of procedure and 
evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and 
appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and 
other appropriate matters‘.650 The ICTY has adopted provisions in their Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE) that deal with the punishment of contempt and 
false testimony. Rule 77 and 77bis of the RPE deal with contempt and Rule 91 of 
the RPE is for false testimony.  
 
Rule 77bis deals with the procedure for fines and the possibility of imprisonment 
for non-payment of such fines. Rule 77 states that penalties of up to seven years‘ 
imprisonment and/or fines not exceeding 100 000 euros may be imposed in cases 
of witnesses refusing to answer questions, unauthorised disclosure of information 
ordered to be confidential by a chamber, failure to comply an attendance order or 
to produce documents, interfering with witnesses and interfering with persons to 
prevent them from obeying court orders.  
 
The Tribunal may also exercise its inherent power to hold contempt persons who 
knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of justice as expressly 
stated in Rule 77 (A). The Tribunal asserts that it can invoke its inherent contempt 
power to punish and impose sanction on the contemnor. Goran Sluiter observes 
that the case law of the Tribunal offers examples where the statutory jurisdiction 
has been expanded.
651
 Sluiter views that the Appeal Chamber in Blaskic
652
 has 
confirmed the Trial Chamber‘s finding that an inherent power exists to hold 
                                                                                                                                      
(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the Court, for the 
purpose of forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform 
improperly, his or her duties; 
(e) Retaliating against an official of the court on account of duties performed by that or 
another official; 
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official of the Court in conjunction with his or 
her official duties.  
The ICTR can deal with contempt of the Tribunal under Rule 77 RPE which are of the 
same wordings of the ICTY‘s RPE. 
650
 ‗Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia‘, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993). Also ‗Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY)‘, Rule 24 (ii). Both documents 
can be found at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statuteindex.htm; 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev44_en.pdf 
respectively. 
651
 Goran Sluiter, 'The ICTY and Offences against the Administration of Justice' (2004) 2 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 631, p.632.  
652
 Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Blaskic (IT-95-14-AR108bis). Appeals Chamber, 29 October 1997, 
para.59. 
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individuals in contempt of the Tribunal when they fail to comply with 
subpoena.
653
 In addition, Rules 77 (C) and (D) deal with procedural aspect of 
contempt.  
 
Human rights are applicable in the legal framework of the ICTY in a number of 
ways. The direct application of human rights law constitutes the rights explicitly 
set out in the Statutes and the RPE. For example, the rights of the accused contain 
in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute derives their language almost directly from 
Article 14 of the ICCPR.
654
  The human rights law enters the ICTY as part of CIL 
or general principles of law. Nevertheless, in practice, the ICTY is inconsistent in 
taking human rights treaty law into account. The reluctance of the ICTY in 
considering human right treaty is seen in Prosecutor v Tadic.
655
 The Tribunal held 
that ‗the interpretation given by other judicial bodies to Article 14 of the ICCPR 
and Article 6 of the ECHR is only of limited relevance…the International 
Tribunal must interpret its provisions within its own legal context and not rely in 
its application on interpretations made by other judicial bodies…‘656 However, in 
some other cases the Tribunal had ample regard to the ICCPR and the case law of 
the ECtHR.
657
  
 
Although the ICTY is considered an important tool to improve the protection of 
human rights, the Tribunal may potentially violate human rights itself, in term of 
the rights to a fair trial. In the area of freedom of expression, the ICTY has 
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 Sluiter, 'The ICTY and Offences against the Administration of Justice' (n. 651) p.633. For more 
detail on inherent power of the Tribunal, see Michael Bohlander, 'International Criminal Tribunals 
and Their Power to Punish Contempt and False Testimony' (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 91; 
Louise Symons, 'The Inherent Power of the ICTY and ICTR ' (2003) 3 International Criminal Law 
Review 369. 
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 Goran Sluiter, 'International Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human Rights' (2002-
2003) 37 New England Law Review 935, p. 935. 
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 Case No. IT-94-1-T, T. Ch. II, Decision on the Prosecutor‘s Motion Requesting Protective 
Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 10 August 1995.  
656
 Tadic (n. 655) paras. 27-28. 
657
 See Prosecutor v Delalic and others, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic‘s 
Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, 2 September 1997, paras. 50-51; Prosecutor v Blaskic, Case 
No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia to review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 29 October 1997, para. 59. 
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curtailed this right when a newspaper was ordered not to publish names of 
protected witness.
658
  
 
4.3.2.2 Definition and Classification of Contempt 
 
(i) England 
In a common law jurisdiction, contempt of court is continuously evolving court-
made law and can be difficult to state with precision. Under the common law, 
contempt falls into civil and criminal. There are at least three categories of 
common law criminal contempt i.e. contempt in the face of court, contempt by 
scandalising a court or a judge and contempt by sub judice comments. 
Classifying contempt into civil and criminal has become progressively less 
important in some of the jurisdictions. The classification has been described as 
‗unhelpful and almost meaningless‘.659 According to Salmon LJ., the classification 
tends to mislead because the standard of proof is the same as criminal standard, 
and both civil and criminal have a common right of appeal.
660
 In order to remedy 
the matter, Sir John Donaldson MR suggested a reclassification as (1) conduct 
involving breach, or assisting in the breach, of a court, or (2) any other conduct 
involving an interference with the due administration of justice, either in a 
particular case or more generally as a continuing process.
661
 Nonetheless, the 
distinction is still significant to determine procedure to be applied and sanction to 
be imposed. In England, albeit the suggestions advanced on possibility to 
reclassify or to abolish distinction forwarded by the Phillimore Committee, 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 did not adopt that recommendation.
662
 As noted by 
Arlidge et al
663
 the two categories are still overlapping although the distinction 
between the two continues to be made. England maintains the categories of 
common law contempt but introduces strict liability rule to ‗publication which 
                                                 
658
 See Prosecutor v Mrksic and others, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion 
for an Order for Publication of Newspaper Advertisement and an Order for Service of Documents, 
19 December 1997.  
659
 Jennison v Baker (n. 206) p. 61. 
660
 AG v Newspapers Publishing Plc [1988] Ch 333, p. 362. 
661
 Ibid. p. 364. 
662
 Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court (1974) pp. 72-73. 
663
 Arlidge, Eady and Smith (n. 19) p. 122. 
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create a substantial risk that the course of justice in a particular proceedings will 
be seriously impeded or prejudiced regardless of intent to do so‘. In England, 
contempt of court can be broadly categorised as: 
(1) Civil contempt 
 
(2) Criminal contempt 
 
(a) Contempt in the face of the court  
 
(b) Contempt committed outside the court, such as: 
 
(i) Publication which create a substantial risk that the course of 
justice in a particular proceedings will be seriously impeded or 
prejudiced regardless of intent to do so 
(ii) Publication which are intended to interfere with or impede the 
administration of justice 
(iii) Publication in breach of restrictions on reporting of 
proceedings in court 
(iv) Acts which scandalise or otherwise lower of the authority of 
the courts 
(v) Acts which interfere with or obstruct persons having duties to 
exercise in a court of justice 
(vi) Acts in abuse of process of court. 
 
(ii)  Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
 
In Australia, New Zealand and Canada, contempt law is based on common law.  
Therefore the types of contempt generally correspond to common law contempt of 
court. As to the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, an Australian 
Court in Witham v Holloway
664
 had discussed the distinction between the two 
branches of contempt and opined that the basis for the distinction that is ‗coercive 
and punitive‘ is not a good distinction as both are still punishment. The Court was 
in opinion that the distinction is illusionary and it should be abolished.
665
 
Although the Court portrayed a strong indication to abolish the distinction, that 
was not the case. The distinction between civil and criminal contempt survives. In 
Hearne v Street,
666
 Kirby J gave the following guidance on how to distinguish the 
two: 
 
                                                 
664
 (1995) 183 CLR 525. 
665
 See also Hinch v AG [1988] LRC (Crim) 476, p. 503. 
666
 (2008) 235 CLR 125. 
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…the traditional question must be confronted: were the contempt 
proceedings here essentially punitive (in which they will be classified as 
‗criminal‘) or were they remedial or coercive (in which case they will be 
classified as ‗civil‘)? 
 
The same position is evident in New Zealand. In Siemer v Solicitor General
667
 it 
was concluded that there is still a distinction in New Zealand law between civil 
and criminal contempt.  
 
In Canada, the court in Poje v Attorney General of British Columbia
668
 decided 
that contempt through non-compliance with a court order may be criminal in 
nature where the disobedience is contumacious and openly defiant. This position 
has been confirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court in United Nurses of Alberta v 
Attorney General for Alberta
669
 in which the Courts held that civil contempt is 
converted to criminal because its constitutes a public act of defiance of the court 
in circumstances where the accused knew, intended or was reckless as to the fact 
that the act would publicly bring the court into contempt. However, the distinction 
between civil and criminal contempt still endures in Canada.
670
 
 
Australia
671
 and Canada
672
 had proposed to codify their contempt law in order to 
overcome the uncertainties but the recommendations had not been taken up by the 
governments. 
 
(iii) The USA 
 
In the USA, its Supreme Court struggled with the distinction between civil and 
criminal contempt as early as 1911 in Gompers v Buck’s Stove & Range Co.673 In 
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Gompers, in drawing a distinction between civil and criminal contempt, the court 
focused on the ‗character and purpose‘ of sanction imposed.674 The court reasoned 
that a contempt sanction is civil in nature if it is remedial and intended to benefit 
the complainant. It is remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had 
refused to do. In contrast with the purpose of a civil contempt sanction, the 
purpose of a criminal sanction is to punish the contemnor and vindicate the 
authority of the court. Criminal contempt is punitive in character.  
 
Despite the original distinction between criminal and civil contempt offered by the 
Supreme Court, distinguishing the two still poses a considerable challenge. The 
Supreme Court in International Union, United Mine Workers v Bagwell
675
 once 
again considered the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. The Court 
approved the use of fines as a method of coercing compliance with courts orders. 
With that, the lower courts used this as an opportunity to punish future acts of 
contempt with prospectively affixed sanctions but without procedural 
requirements of a criminal contempt proceeding.
676
 However, the fine line 
between coercion and punishment will always give rise to the possibility that a 
civil or coercive contempt sanction might evolve into a criminal sanction.  
 
Besides classifying a contemptuous act on the basis of the criminal and civil 
distinctions, a contemptuous act also can be classified as being either direct or 
indirect.
677
 The distinction between direct and indirect contempt revolves around 
where the contempt occurred. For instance, direct contempt occurs when a 
contemptuous act is committed in the physical presence of the judge, or within an 
integral part of the court, while the court is performing any of its judicial 
function.
678
 Indirect contempt, on the other hand is usually associated with the 
refusal of a party to comply with a lawful court order, injunction, or decree which 
imposes a duty of action or forbearance.
679
 Labelling contempt as direct and 
indirect is important as distinction controls the manner in which the court may 
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dispose of the matter. Direct contempt justifies the use of summary process. 
Additionally, Section 401, 18 U.S.C. grants the Federal Court to punish acts of 
criminal contempt and Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures 
provides for its procedural guideline. 
 
The power to punish acts of contempt in the USA is inherent in the court. The 
courts have inherent power in sanctioning a person for contempt if the courts 
perceive the person‘s conduct interferes with administration of justice and the 
courts also have inherent power in imposing any appropriate penalties.
680
  
 
(iv) India 
 
India has placed its contempt law in the CCA 1971. The Act defines contempt as 
civil or criminal contempt. The Act attempts to give clear definition by providing 
the criteria of what may amount to civil and criminal contempt. Civil is defined as 
meaning wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or 
other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. On the 
other hand, criminal contempt means the publication (whether by words, spoken 
or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or 
the doing of any other act whatsoever which: 
 
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalises, or lowers or tends to lower 
the authority of, any court; or 
(ii) prejudices, or interferes, or tends to interfere with, the due course 
o any judicial proceeding; or 
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to 
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. 
 
(v) The ICTY 
 
As mentioned above, the ICTY has provisions to deal with contempt of the 
Tribunal under their Rule 77 RPE. Rule 77 (A) RPE allows the Tribunal in 
exercising its inherent power to hold in contempt those who knowingly and 
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wilfully interfere with its administration of justice. They are including any person 
who: 
 
(i) being a witness before a Chamber, contumaciously refuses or 
fails to answer a question;  
(ii)  discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing 
violation of an order of a Chamber;  
(ii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before 
or produce documents before a Chamber;  
(iv)  threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or 
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or 
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a 
potential witness; or  
(v)  threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to 
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that 
other person from complying with an obligation under an order 
of a Judge or Chamber.  
 
Rule 77 not only provides for the ‗offence‘ of contempt, it also provides for the 
procedure and penalty as stated in Rule 77 (C) and (G) respectively. 
 
(a) Civil Contempt 
 
Civil contempt is a less ‗controversial‘ area of contempt compared to criminal 
contempt. In most of these jurisdictions, civil contempt involves disobedience to 
process. It is a civil contempt of court to refuse or neglect to do an act required by 
a judgment or order of the court within the time specified in the judgment or order 
or to disobey a judgment or order requiring a person to abstain from doing a 
specified act. It is also a civil contempt to act in breach of undertaking given to the 
court by a person. 
 
In England, in order to commit for civil contempt of disobedience as in a breach 
of injunction, the court has to satisfy that, the terms of the injunction are clear and 
ambiguous,
681
 the defendant has proper notice of the terms
682
 and that breach has 
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
683
 In order to establish contempt of court in 
breach of injunction, there is no need to establish a wilful disobedience to a breach 
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order, but merely that the contemnor understood what he must not do and the 
consequence.
684
 The same rule applies to breach of undertaking.
685
  
 
In Canada,
686
 the USA,
687
 Australia
688
 and New Zealand, apart from proving the 
criteria as in England, the requirement of wilful disobedience is sufficient to 
constitute contempt. This also applies in India. Section 2 of the CCA 1971 
defines civil contempt as ‗wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, discretion, 
order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a 
court‘. Therefore, it needs to prove that the act of disobedience is wilful and 
intention to do or not is needed to establish contempt. Mere disobedience without 
wilful element is not sufficient to constitute contempt.  
 
(b)     Contempt in the Face of the Court (in facie) 
 
(i) England 
 
According to Blackstone, 16th ed., 1825, Bk. 4, Ch. 20, p. 286, and Oswald on 
Contempt, 3rd ed., 1910, the phrase ‗in the face of the court‘ has never been 
defined and its true meaning is to be ascertained from the practice of the judges 
over the centuries.
689
 In facie contempt may be broadly described as any word 
spoken or act done in or in the precincts of the court which obstructs or interferes 
with the due administration of justice or is calculated to do so.
690
  
 
Thus, the judge usually has personal knowledge of the event leading to the 
contempt. He does not need the testimony of witnesses. This is because the 
contempt occurs in his presence. This kind of contempt usually involves a serious 
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act or misbehaviour occurred in the sight of the judge. In facie contempt justifies 
the exercise of summary punishment. The way a lawyer conducts a case in court is 
calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute such as by insulting 
the judge or jury amounts to contempt.
691
 In R v Logan,
692
 Logan made an 
outburst in court after being sentenced to two years and three months 
imprisonment. Due to his outburst, the judge immediately added another six 
months of imprisonment. Arlidge et al
693
 comment that the outbursts in the dock 
normally arise from the stress or emotion of the moment. Due to this factor, 
although the matter should not be ignored, the contemnor should at least be 
afforded an opportunity to explain and apologise. On the other hand, as explained 
by Arlidge et al, it should be recognised that the judges sometimes have to take 
quick action and the contemnor is allowed to appeal on this decision.
694
  
 
However, it is not always necessary for a contemptuous act that occurs within the 
court to have been seen by the judge. Likewise, it is not necessary that all the 
circumstances of the contempt should be within the personal knowledge of the 
judge dealing with the contempt.
695
 Nor it is necessary that the act of contempt 
take place wholly or in part of the courtroom itself, as it can happen at some 
distance from the court. This includes the intimidation or bribery of witnesses
696
 
or jurors
697
 and the harassment of a defendant.
698 
  
In contempt in the face of the court, in committing a contemnor, what matters to 
the court is that his act involves a serious interference with the administration of 
justice and the process of the court. In the relatively recent case of R v Steven 
Stanley Phelps
699
 an appellant was convicted at Crown Court of possessing an 
offensive weapon and he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. In the course 
of the hearing he attacked two female dock officers while his counsel was 
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addressing the judge in mitigating. He became disconcerted as he thought his 
counsel did not say everything on his behalf. He was told to calm down by the 
dock officers but he spat at one of them and punched her in the face. The judge 
ordered him to calm down and when he did not the judge ordered him to be 
handcuffed. While the three male officers tried to arrest and handcuff him, he 
lashed out with his fists punching the two female dock officers. He was brought to 
a local police station. The judge remained in court throughout the incident. In fact 
he rose briefly while the court was in commotion as the appellant was brought to 
custody. The judge later returned to court in the absence of the appellant and told 
the appellant‘s counsel that she proposed to deal with the contempt immediately 
after the counsel had completed his mitigation. The judge sentenced the appellant 
to two years imprisonment for contempt consecutive to the other sentences.   
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to twenty one months 
imprisonment. The Court of Appeal held that the Crown Court was not wrong in 
sentencing the appellant summarily, weighing the appellant‘s behaviour of a kind 
that could not be tolerated. However, the Court of Appeal decided that it was not 
an appropriate case for the maximum sentence of two years.  The Crown Court 
should have taken time to reflect about what was the appropriate course to take, to 
allow counsel to take instructions and to address judge in mitigation. The Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that in this situation, a cooling off period together with 
other procedural safeguards might be appropriate. In the Court of Appeal‘s 
opinion, the sentencing judge could have put the case back for a short time in 
order to allow the appellant to calm down and be brought back to the court, to 
speak to his counsel and to apologise.   
 
Contempt in the face of the court justifies the use of summary procedure to 
commit the contemnor. However, in England, concerns were often raised 
regarding a lack of clearly defined principles, especially on when and how to 
embark summary procedure.
700
  The superior courts of record have jurisdiction to 
deal summarily with contempt both in the face of the court and out of the court. 
The Crown Court is a superior court of record and has been preserved with 
                                                 
700
 See R v Griffin (n. 341); R v Tamworth JJ., ex p. Walsh [1994] C.O.D. 277; R v S [2008] 
Crim.L.R. 716. 
 185 
inherent power to make an order of committal on its own motion by virtue of 
Order 52 r. 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC). However, Order 52 r. 1 
(2) RSC restricts the circumstances in which such order can be made by the 
Crown Court to contempt in facie, disobedience of  a court order or breach of 
undertaking to the court. The Magistrates‘ Court, which is not a court of record, 
has the power to punish for contempt under Section 12 CCA 1981.  
 
On 5
 
April 2010, the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 (CPR) came into force 
superseding the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005. This amendment was in response 
to the Court of Appeal‘s observation in R v M701 in which the Crown Court‘s 
jurisdiction to punish for contempt of disobedience of restraint order was 
questioned. The Court of Appeal observed that the Crown Court has power but in 
the absence of relevant rules, the procedures are not clear. Part 62 of the CPR is a 
provision for contempt by disobedience of a court order etc. by the Magistrates‘ 
Court, Crown Court and the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. However, 
this provision does not extend to contempt in the face of the court. Therefore, in 
June 2010, the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee published a paper to consider 
a proposal to amend Part 62 CPR to make further rules about contempt of court. 
New rules proposed for inclusion in Part 62 would apply to contempt in facie and 
to be applied in Magistrates‘ Courts, Crown Court and in the Criminal Division of 
the Court of Appeal. The Committee expects to receive comments by 10 
September 2010.
702
  
 
(ii) Canada and Australia  
 
In these jurisdictions, the common law rule as to contempt in facie applies. 
Therefore, any act or conduct that interferes with the due administration of justice 
and the process of the court amounts to contempt in the face of court justifies 
summary punishment. 
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In Canada, contempt in the face of court is also known as contempt by 
interference. It deals with the conduct of the contemnors that interfere with the 
courts‘ proceedings. Accordingly, the Canadian Charter of Rights must be taken 
into consideration when dealing with contempt cases. Contempt involves 
‗expression‘ under Section 2 (b) of the Charter, thus, to commit a person for 
contempt in facie, the alleged conduct must be so serious and present a clear and 
present danger.
703
 Showing-up drunk for court so as to enable to deal with the 
issues in the case is a corruption of expression interfering with court 
proceedings.
704
 An insolent and abusive witness may be committed for in facie 
contempt and may be dealt with instantly.
705
 
 
As regards geographical limit, conduct out of the presence of a judge could be 
contempt in cognisance of the court if witnessed by an officer of the court. 
However, it was cautioned that in that situation it would prefer to treat such 
conduct as contempt out of the court.
706
 
 
In an Australian case of Ex parte Bellanto: Re Prior,
707
 the court decided that 
words or action used in the face of the court or in the course of the judicial 
proceedings can only be contempt if they are such as to interfere with the course 
of justice. 
 
Although there have been many prosecutions for acts of contempt in the face of 
court the issue of geographical limits which define the court‘s face remain unclear 
in Australia. This is highlighted in R v E Sleiman (Judgment No. 29).
708
 The 
authorities conflict on the question. This is because the scope of what occurs ‗in 
the face of the court‘ has been broadened by judicial decisions. In Registrar, 
                                                 
703
 Kopyto (n. 300). 
704
 R v Jolly [1990] 57 C.C.C. (3d) 389 (B.C.C.A). 
705
 B.K. v Her Majesty The Queen [1995] 4 S.C.R. 186. Although the conduct of the appellant was 
insolent, it was unjustified to convict him of contempt of court instanter. The instanter summary 
procedure was unjust, as there were no circumstances which made it urgent and imperative to act 
immediately.  
706
 British Columbia Government Employee Union v A.G. of British Columbia [1988] 2 S.C.R. 
214.  
707
 (1963) 63 SR (N.S.W.) 190. 
708
 [1999] NSWSC 858. 
 187 
Court of Appeal v Collins,
709
 contempt in the face of court encompasses not only 
conduct within the sense of judges but also conduct which takes place outside the 
courtroom yet with some geographic proximity such as the passageway, the 
veranda and the steps leading to it.
710
 On the other hand, in Fraser v The Queen,
711
 
the conduct should confine to which the judge could see or hear. The absence of 
such formulation of the rule introduces a degree of uncertainty as to precisely 
when the jurisdiction maybe invoked. Priestley J. in European Asian Bank AG v 
Wentworth
712
 acknowledged that:  
 
It is obviously desirable that the point should be settled one way or the 
other as soon as may be. Until the question is settled I find it difficult to 
see that any judge confronted with the question at first instance could be 
criticised for adopting either view.  
 
In the relatively recent case of In the Matter of Bauskis,
713
 Adam J. has considered 
the principles relevant to contempt in facie. In this case, John Wilson and Eric 
Jury sued a number of defendants, who were instrumentalists of the State of New 
South Wales. They claimed a right to trial by jury. The defendants filed notices of 
motion seeking to strike out the statement of claim. When the matter was called 
over the Registrar, a large number of persons were present in court, all wearing T-
shirts with the words ‗Trial by jury is democracy‘. The matter was referred to 
Adam J., the judge in duty on that day.  
 
The matter was called before Adam J. and Mr. Wilson, a lawyer who was at the 
Bar table, wearing the same T-shirt as the people in the public gallery. He 
demanded a jury trial which Adam J. refused. There was a heated argument 
between them to the extent that Mr. Wilson moved forward towards the Bench 
and asked the Sheriff to remove Adam J. At the same time, the judge also ordered 
the sheriff to remove Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson ignored this and kept saying that the 
judge should be removed and he will request for an issuance of a warrant of arrest 
against the judge. He continued to shout at the judge. The Court ordered Mr. 
Wilson to be removed from the court. 
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During that time, the court was in uproar as the people at the public gallery who 
attended to support Mr. Wilson and Mr. Jury were yelling abuse at the judge and 
at the sheriff‘s officer. The court ordered the sheriff to remove those supporters 
who refused to remove their T-shirt, from the courtroom. One of them, Mr. 
Bauskis refused to leave and to take off his T-shirt. The court ordered him to be 
placed in custody. Later in the same day, he was given an opportunity to tender 
his apology which he refused. His defiance continued when he refused to give any 
information to the judge for the purpose of granting bail. Mr. Bauskis was taken 
into custody and remained in custody until he was brought back the following day. 
The next day, he still maintained his defiance and he was then sentenced to 
fourteen days imprisonment. 
 
It can be seen in this case that the court was reluctant to cite contempt against a 
barrister and instead removed him from the courtroom. However, the court cited a 
person who defied the court order for contempt. 
 
In Australia, contempt in facie usually involves barristers. For instance, Wilson v 
The Prothonotary
714
 and Morrissey v The New South Wales Bar Association.
715
 In 
Wilson, the Plaintiff had filed a statement of claim. The defendants applied to 
strike it out. The Court acceded to the defendants‘ request and ordered the 
proceedings to be dismissed with costs. While the judge was in the process of 
delivering his reasons, Mr. Wilson threw two bags of paint, one which struck the 
judge and splashed yellow paint over him. The second bag landed between the 
Judge‘s Associate and the court reporter, splashing paint on them as well. Wilson 
was cited for contempt and sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of two 
years. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal extended leniency to Wilson and 
allowed appeal against sentence. The original sentence was quashed and he was 
released from custody on the day the judgment of the Court of Appeal was 
delivered. He had served three months and twenty days in custody.  
 
In Morrissey, Joseph Morrissey, formerly a legal practitioner in the State of 
Virgina, USA, sought an admission as a legal practitioner in New South Wales, 
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but there was a doubt as to his character. This was due to acts of contempt he had 
committed. During the proceeding regarding his admission, there ensued an 
exchange of provocative taunts and jibes, culminating in a fight in which several 
blows were exchanged. The presiding judge convicted both lawyers of contempt. 
He sentenced Morrissey to ten days imprisonment but suspended five days. In 
October 1997, Morrissey was convicted of contempt following an angry outburst 
to a judge who had passed a net sentence of fifteen years on his client for a drug-
related offence. The words used in his outburst were: 
 
That‘s outrageous, that is absolutely outrageous…I have never seen a 
more jaded, more bitter, more angry jurist in my life… 
 
He was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment.  
 
In this type of contempt, as can be seen from the above cases, the courts are at 
discretion to determine what acts may amount to contempt in the face of court, the 
way to impose punishment to the contemnor and also the variation of sanctions.  
 
(iii) New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, what constitutes contempt is defined in Section 401 of Crime 
Act 1961. The definition covers assault, threats, intimidation, wilful insults to a 
judge or judicial officer; wilful interruption or obstruction of court proceedings or 
misbehaviour in court; and wilful disobedience of court orders or directions 
during the course of proceedings. The definition is broad and all-embracing as a 
category of contempt in facie cannot be closed. 
 
In Mair v Wanganui District Court
716
 a defendant was in defiance of a court order 
when he was ordered by the court no to say a prayer before the judge during the 
proceeding. In fact, he was given a chance to say the prayer before the hearing 
began. Due to his refusal, the court remanded him in custody until the next 
morning. The Court decided that he had improperly interrupted proceedings in the 
trial with the prayer after the plainest of warnings that to do so would be construed 
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as contempt. He considered the contempt prolonged and that it was a thoroughly 
public challenge to the authority of the Court. The following day he refused to 
apologise and was sentenced to twelve days imprisonment. He appealed against 
his conviction on the grounds that the District Court had no power to adjourn or 
remand a contemnor but had to pass sentence on the day of finding that contempt 
had occurred. He relied on Section 206 of Summary Proceedings Act 1957 which 
defines contempt of court and sets out the maximum penalties without mentioning 
a power to adjourn or remand for sentence. He suggested that this set out a code 
for dealing with contempt of Court. The Court rejected this argument as the Court 
decided that the District Court had the power to remand a contemnor prior to 
passing sentence. Sections 6 and 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
were consistent with this, as powers to remand or adjourn enhanced the various 
rights of minimum standards of criminal procedure. Also, Section 14 (1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 provided a power to adjourn an offender‘s hearing, and 
an offender included a person liable to be dealt with for contempt of Court. 
Section 10 of the Act, relating to the opportunity of legal representation, also 
supported the view that a contemnor could be remanded. Fundamentally, the 
power to give a contemnor the opportunity to apologise was one of the most 
important aspects of this summary procedure.  
 
(iv) The USA 
 
In the USA, a contemptuous act is classified as being either direct or indirect. The 
distinction between the two revolves around where the contempt occurred i.e. 
within the presence of the court or outside the presence of the court. Direct 
contempt occurs when the contemptuous behaviour is committed in the physical 
presence of the judge, or within an integral part of the court while the court is 
performing any of its judicial functions. In contrast, indirect contempt occurs out 
of court.
717
  Indirect contempt is usually associated with the refusal of a party to 
comply with a lawful court order, injunction or decree which imposes a duty of 
action or forbearance. Labelling an act of contempt as direct or indirect becomes 
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important because the distinction controls the manner in which the court may 
dispose of the matter. Direct contempt is punished summarily. 
 
Section 401 (1) and (2), 18 U.S.C. deal with direct contempt. Section 401 (1) 
states ‗misbehaviour of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct 
the administration of justice‘ and Section 401 (2) involves ‗misbehaviour of any 
of its officers in their official transactions‘. As established in American Airlines, 
Inc. v Allied Pilots Association,
718
 in order to establish a criminal violation of 
Section 401 (1), the following four elements must be established beyond 
reasonable doubt: 
 
 (i) misbehaviour, 
 (ii) in or near the presence of the court, 
 (iii)  with criminal intent, 
 (iv) that resulted in an obstruction of the administration of justice.  
 
In re Williams
719
 the type of misbehaviour which falls under this kind of contempt 
is explained: 
 
[t]he contemnor‘s conduct must constitute misbehaviour which rises to 
the level of an obstruction of and an imminent threat to the administration 
of justice, and it must be accompanied with the intention on the part of 
the contemnor to obstruct, disrupt or interfere with the administration of 
justice.  
 
Therefore, there are dual elements of direct contempt to be punished summarily, 
which are: 
 
(i) a contumacious act committed in open court in the judge‘s 
presence and immediate view that results in the judge‘s personal 
knowledge. In this situation, it makes further evidence 
unnecessary for summary finding. 
(ii) a contumacious act constitutes an imminent threat to the 
administration of justice that result in demoralisation of the 
court‘s authority.720  
  
It must have a ‗judge‘s personal knowledge‘ in which the judge acquired by his 
own observation of the contemptuous conduct and ‗imminent threat‘ elements. In 
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re Davis,
721
 it further elaborates that where a judge has no personal knowledge of 
the alleged act of contempt because of its commission beyond his own actual 
physical presence, it will be treated as indirect contempt.  
 
Therefore to justify a finding of summary contempt and imposition of summary 
sanction, the act must post a threat that requires immediate sanction to preserve 
the dignity and authority of the court. As described by the Supreme Court in In re 
Little:
722
 
 
The fire which [the contumacious act] kindles must constitute an 
imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The 
danger must not be remote or probable; it must be immediate imperil.  
 
Hence, there must be a finding of ‗an actual obstruction of justice‘ in all Section 
401 (1) for the court to exercise summary contempt power. Fernos-Lopez v United 
States Dist. Court
723
 has offered some helpful guidance i.e. ‗where there is no 
physical disorder in the courtroom, no laughing, shouts or abusive language, and 
no significant delay in the proceedings, obstruction of justice is not shown‘.  
 
Section 401 (1) usually applies to the counsel appearing before the court, whereas 
Section 401 (2) refers to other officers such as court clerks and other conventional 
court officers.
724
 Therefore, Section 401 (1) typically will be the controlling 
statutory provision whenever attorney conduct is involved. In the USA, contempt 
power is used to curb overzealous attorneys.  
 
The cases of Taylor v. Hayes
725
 and State of Illinois v William Allen
726
 are the 
examples of how the courts dealt with the attorneys. In Taylor’s case, the attorney 
represented defendants in a jury trial presided over by a respondent trial judge. 
The trial judge told the attorney nine times that he was in contempt of court. After 
the jury verdict, the trial judge found the attorney guilty of criminal contempt and 
sentenced him to consecutive jail terms totalling over four years. The judge barred 
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the attorney from practicing law in part of the state court system. While the appeal 
was pending, the trial judge entered a corrected judgment. The appellate court 
affirmed the convictions for contempt and reversed the order barring the attorney 
from practice. Certiorari was granted. The Court held that petty contempt could be 
tried without a jury and denied the petitioner‘s request for a jury trial. The Court 
held that the attorney was entitled to due process rights of notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before being adjudged in contempt. Because the attorney 
was not accorded these rights, the Court reversed his conviction. The Court held 
that, if the attorney was to be retried on the contempt charges, a different judge 
should hear the trial. 
 
In William Allen, an advocate was removed from the courtroom and disbarred for 
his abusive remarks to the court. In Ex parte Adam Reposa,
727
 an attorney was 
found guilty for contempt for an obscene gesture made in the courtroom. He was 
ordered to ninety days in jail.  
 
(v) India 
 
In India, Section 2 (c) (i), (ii), (iii) CCA 1971 covers criminal contempt. Section 2 
(c) defines criminal contempt as publication (whether by words spoken or written, 
or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of which (i) 
scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tend to lower the authority of the 
court or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of 
any judicial proceedings or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or 
tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. 
 
Although the Indian definition is broad and may perhaps cover nearly all the 
situations of contempt in facie, it would appear section 2 (c) (iii) specifically 
recognises the principle that the category of contempt in facie should not be 
closed because it provides a safety net for punishment of contempt that occurs ‗in 
any other manner‘. Even so, in determining whether the act amounts to contempt 
in facie, the court must ascertain whether the act complained of was calculated to 
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obstruct or had tendency to interfere with the course of justice and the due process 
of the administration of justice. If the answer is affirmative, contempt would have 
been committed under one of the relevant heads of Section 2 (c).
728
 
 
(vi) The ICTY 
 
The offence of contempt is explicitly dealt with in Rule 77 RPE. The current 
wording is a result of the amendment on 13 December 2001.
729
 The Rule indicates 
that the Tribunal, in the exercise of its inherent power, may hold in contempt those 
who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the administration of justice, and lists 
some forms of contempt as follows: 
 
 (A) The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in 
contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its 
administration of justice, including any person who 
 
 (i) being a witness before a Chamber, contumaciously refuses or 
fails to answer a question; 
 (ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing 
violation of an order of a Chamber; 
(iii) without just excuse fails to comply with an order to attend before 
or produce document before a Chamber; 
(vi) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or 
otherwise interferes with, a witness who is giving, has given, or 
is about to give evidence in proceedings before a Chamber, or a 
potential witness; or 
(vii) threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise seeks to 
coerce any other person, with the intention of preventing that 
other person from complying with an obligation under an order 
of a Judge or Chamber.  
 
The list however is deemed to be non-exhaustive due to the wording of the 
provision ‗including‘ and it has been consistently upheld by the Tribunal 
Chamber, as in Vujin,
730
 that in contempt cases, the form of contempt listed in 
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Rule 77 does not limit the inherent powers of the Tribunal to prosecute and punish 
for contempt.
731
  
 
The Rule does not classify contempt into civil or criminal, or direct or indirect. 
However, Rule 77 (A) (i) RPE has similarity as contempt in facie and direct 
contempt. This is illustrated in Bulatovic.
732
 Bulatovic was charged under this rule 
of having knowingly and wilfully interfered with the administration of justice by 
contumaciously refusing to answer questions asked by the Prosecution during his 
testimony before Trial Chamber III of the ICTY on 19 and 20 April 2005. He was 
found guilty of serious contempt in the Tribunal and noted that his conduct would 
normally merit the immediate imposition of a custodial sentence in order to mark 
the gravity of the offence and to deter the Respondent and others who might be 
tempted to follow the same course, from defying the authority of the Trial 
Chamber.
733
  
 
Another situation where an accused may be committed for contempt of the 
Tribunal is when he knowingly and wilfully obstructed the administration of 
justice and committed contempt by interfering with a witness as decided in Beqa 
Beqaj.
734
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(c) Scandalising a Court or a Judge 
 
(i) England 
 
The offence of scandalising the court is often regarded as having fallen into 
desuetude
735
 and has been described as ‗virtually obsolescent‘736 in England. 
Nevertheless it continues to exist in other parts of the Commonwealth. In England, 
scandalising the court remains a common law offence
737
 as it falls outside the 
scope of strict liability rule under the CCA 1981 as it comprises the interference 
with the administration of justice as a continuing process.  
 
Generally, the actus reus of scandalising the court is the publication of material 
that is calculated to lower the repute of the court or judge and so undermine public 
confidence in the administration of justice.
738
 It has been established in common 
law that publications which scurrilously abuse the court or the judge,
739
 
publications imputing corruption or suggesting bias on their part may be regarded 
as contempt.
740
 Hence, to constitute scandalising contempt, in principle, it requires 
proof of real risk, as opposed to remote possibility, that the public confidence in 
the administration of justice would be undermined.
741
 The risk in undermining the 
administration of justice arising from the criticism is a real one, which means 
there is a practical reality that the publication would indeed disrepute the court or 
the judges and generally would interfere with the administration of justice.  
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However, scurrilous abuse is to be distinguished from criticism, as criticism is 
permissible.
742
 It is legitimate to criticise a judge‘s conduct in a particular case or 
the decision delivered by the court provided that aspersions are not cast on the 
motives of a judge or court. The comments must be kept within the limits of 
reasonable courtesy and good faith.
743
 This means that criticism of a judge‘s 
conduct or conduct of a court, even if strongly worded, is not contempt provided 
that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith and is not directed to 
the personal character of a judge or to the impartiality of a judge or a court.   
 
In England, there is a changing perception that the special and extra protection for 
the judiciary does not need strict enforcement in order to uphold liberal ideals.
744
 
Almost the same sentiment was expressed by Lord Hailsham in Badry v Director 
of Public Prosecution of Mauritius
745
 – the citation for contempt arising from 
critical comments about the judiciary and their work was not at all worthwhile. In 
that case Commonwealth countries were urged not to punish for contempt for 
scandalising the judiciary except for the most extreme forms of abuse.  
 
In England, the trend now has changed. According to Borrie and Lowe, what 
kinds of publication are capable of scandalising the court or the judge is subject to 
changes depending on the changes in the social and political conditions of the 
country. They also take a view that what was held to amount to scurrilous abuse in 
1900 or 1930 would not be held to amount to scurrilous abuse in the 1990s.
746
 The 
changing trend was highlighted in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. 
(No.2)
747
 or famously known as Spycatcher. In this case no action for contempt 
was taken against the Daily Mirror when it published upside-down photographs of 
all the Members of the House of Lords under the headline ‗You Fools!‘ The 
publication was in response to the Spycatcher injunction in 1987. This situation 
reflects that when courts are confident of their stability and strength, scope for 
comments of the actions of the court are quite considerable. As described by 
Michael K. Addo, the English judges are part of a mature system of democracy 
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and they have had sufficient time to earn the respect and confidence of the public. 
They have matured with considerable tolerance which enables them to withstand 
criticism.
748
  
 
At present, with the coming of the HRA 1998, the cases of scandalising the court 
must be read together with Article 10 of the ECHR: whether it is one which is 
‗necessary in a democratic society‘. The restriction to the right of freedom of 
expression must meet the three-part test that it must be ‗prescribed by law‘, for the 
maintenance of the authority …of the judiciary‘ as a legitimate aim within Article 
10 (2) of the ECHR and must be ‗necessary in a democratic society‘.749  
 
In De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium
750
 two journalists had been subjected to 
penalties for publishing an allegation of bias against a group of judges. The case 
was brought up before the ECtHR. The ECtHR after reiterating its view that 
domestic court, as the guarantors of justice, must enjoy public confidence and 
must be protected from unfounded destructive attack, was satisfied that the article 
that contained the allegation of bias contained mass detailed information about the 
circumstances. The information was based on thorough research and supported by 
opinions of several experts. The journalists published what they had learned from 
the case and they could not be said to be failed in carrying out their professional 
obligations. The ECtHR found that their conviction was not necessary in a 
democratic society and Article 10 had been breached.       
 
C.J. Miller observes that the decisions of the ECtHR hardly undermine the 
rationale for scandalising the court. It is supported as long as the requirement that 
truth or justification must be available as a defence. Miller, however, argues that 
the standard is still lower compared to Canada and the USA as these two 
jurisdictions adopt a very tight test of ‗clear and present or imminent‘ danger.751  
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(ii) Canada and the USA 
 
In Canada, before the Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there were 
number of prosecutions.
752
 Since the Charter, the English common law offence of 
scandalising the court has been challenged in Kopyto.
753
 It has been held that this 
area of the law might fall foul of Section 2 (b) of the Charter which guarantees 
‗freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of press 
and other media of communication‘. In Kopyto, an alleged contemnor was a 
lawyer whose client had brought an action against the police. After his client‘s 
case was dismissed, he gave a statement to the press, part of which said: 
 
This decision is a mockery of justice. It stinks to high hell. It says it is 
okay to break the law and you are immune so long as someone is above 
you said to do it…We‘re wondering what is the point of appealing and 
continuing this charade of the courts in this country which are warped in 
favour of protecting the police. The courts and the police are sticking so 
close together you would think they were put together with Krazy Glue. 
 
The Court ruled that the common law test was not strict enough. In order to meet 
constitutional requirement of the Charter, the Crown have to prove that the act 
was done or word was uttered with the intent to cause disrepute to the 
administration of justice and evil consequences flowing from the act were 
extremely serious as it apprehended real, substantial and immediate danger. As 
Goodman JA said that the Charter accorded higher protection to expression of 
honest and sincere opinion and prosecutions would be constitutional if the 
reasonable limit on expression is a clear, significant and imminent present danger 
to the fair and effective administration of justice. Dubin JA called the publication 
‗disgraceful‘ but did not believe it could have any effect on the public confidence 
in the administration of justice. Houlden JA took a view that scandalising 
prosecutions were inherently unconstitutional as they exercised a disproportionate 
restraint on freedom of expression. The Crown took a higher stance on freedom of 
expression and judicial activism which reflects Canada‘s modern condition as a 
newly fledged constitutional democracy.  
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In Kopyto, it demonstrates that the Canadian judiciary evolves within a modern 
and civilised system, and thus able to withstand criticism. As Cory JA said: 
 
…the courts are not fragile flowers that will wither in the hot heat of 
controversy.
754
 
In Canada, with respect to Kopyto, the common law of scandalising contempt is 
no longer supportable.  
In the USA, as observed by Borrie and Lowe,
755
 contempt by scandalising is not 
known but in contempt charges in relation to pending cases the position was 
summed up in Bridges v State of California.
756
 It must be proved that there exists 
real and present danger that the publication interferes with the administration of 
justice in order to constitute contempt of court. It means that a substantive evil 
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before 
utterances can be punished.
757
 In this jurisdiction, for attorneys who engage in 
making false, scandalous or other improper attacks upon a judge, the rule is clear 
that they are subject to discipline and potentially being disbarred.
758
  
 
(iii) Australia and New Zealand 
 
In Australia and New Zealand, scandalising contempt still has life. In Australia, 
In Re Colina and Another; Ex parte Torney
759
 the Court acknowledged that 
contempt by way of scandalising of the court still exists and can be dealt with 
summarily. However, the Court viewed that summary contempt power should be 
exercised sparingly and only when necessity demands.
760
 The vitality of this 
common law offence can be seen in Fitzgibbon v Barker
761
 a publication which 
contained the statement that a man had been ‗jailed for two years only because he 
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wanted to see his children‘ was held to be calculated to lessen or discredit the 
authority of the court in the minds of the public.
762
  
 
That scandalising contempt survives in New Zealand was confirmed in Solicitor-
General v Radio Avon
763
 and Solicitor-General v Smith.
764
 In order to establish an 
actionable contempt, as established in Radio Avon, it must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that there is a real risk as opposed to remote possibility that 
public confidence in the administration of justice will be undermined. Hence, the 
risk of harm has to be resulted. In Smith, a Member of Parliament broadcast 
several statements in which he sought to put pressure upon a judge of the Family 
Court to determine a custody dispute in favour of one of his constituents. The 
Court found that his comments were intended to lessen public acceptance and 
were apt to undermine public confidence in the Court‘s decision. The effect of his 
statements as perceived by the Court would put pressure on the caregiver or run 
the real risk of dissuading her and prospective litigants from resorting to the 
Family Court. The Court considered that the offence of scandalising the Court was 
a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression and survived the enactment of the 
Bill of Rights Act.   
 
There had been a movement to reform this kind of contempt of court in Australia. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 35 (1987)
765
 advocated a 
more limited version of scandalising. It proposed that it should be an offence to 
publish an allegation imputing misconduct to a judge or magistrate in 
circumstances where the publication is likely to cause serious harm to the 
reputation of the judge or magistrate in his or her official capacity. The offence 
should be indictable and should only be tried summarily with the consent of all 
concerned. The defences of fair, accurate and reasonably contemporaneous 
reporting of the legal proceedings or of parliamentary proceedings, and truth or 
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honest and reasonable belief in the truth of the allegations were suggested.
766
 
Nevertheless, the proposal has not been taken up. 
 
(iv) India 
 
In India Section 2 (c) (i) CCA 1971 deals with the offence of scandalising the 
court. It deals with publication or doing of the act that has results in ‗scandalises 
or tend to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court‘. In 
India, contempt by scandalising also has its life. However, as observed by 
Samaraditya Pal,
767
 the Indian courts have been taking inconsistent views when 
dealing with contempt by scandalising the court. The cases of scandalising the 
court in India are colourful. In Vishwanath v E.S. Venkataramaih,
768
 a former 
Chief Justice of India gave an interview which was published in several 
newspapers. In the course of the interview, he is stated to make the following 
comments: 
 
The judiciary in India has deteriorated in its standards because such 
judges are appointed, as are willing to be ‗influenced‘ by lavish parties 
and whisky bottles.  
 
The High Court held that the words complained of did not amount to contempt 
because the entire interview appeared to have been given with an idea to improve 
the judiciary. A similar approach is taken in Ish Kumar Valecha v Surjeet 
Banerjee,
769
 whereby an affidavit which contained allegations of corruption, 
impotence, cowardice, favouritism and incompetence against the judiciary was not 
found to be contemptuous.  
 
In In Re SK Sundaram
770
 an advocate sent a telegraphic communication to the 
Chief Justice of India calling upon him to step down. A contempt proceeding was 
initiated against him. In replying to a notice by the Solicitor General, he justified 
his actions by stating that he had done what he had believed to be right and fair 
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within the bounds of his knowledge of law and language. He further contended 
that the action initiated against him was on the basis of the telegraphic 
communication which would not amount to publication; hence no contempt action 
could be taken on that premise. He also contended that any personal attack upon a 
judge in connection with the office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or 
slander. The Supreme Court of India held that the contempt of court jurisdiction is 
not to protect an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from 
being maligned. Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean hostile criticism of 
judges as judges or judiciary. It is true that any personal attack upon a judge 
should be dealt with under the law of libel or slander yet defamatory publication 
in this case concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into 
contempt. It is a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on the majesty of 
justice. 
 
In Re Arundhati Roy,
771
 the Supreme Court explained that the judiciary in India is 
under a constant threat and being endangered even after fifty years of 
independence. In order to restore public confidence in the judiciary, the courts are 
entrusted with power to punish for contempt especially when the act tends to 
undermine the authority of the law and bring it in disrepute by scandalising it. The 
CCA 1971 has been enacted to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial 
process. The case at point involves a contempt petition filed by an advocate 
alleging that he was attacked by the respondent along with others when he had 
protested against a demonstration against a judgment of the Supreme Court in 
which the respondent was a participant. On issuance of a show cause notice, the 
respondent filed a reply affidavit stating that ‗the proceedings indicated a 
disquieting inclination on the part of the court to silence criticism and muzzle 
dissent and to harass and intimidate those who disagreed with it'. The respondent 
also stated that the court ‗displayed a disturbing willingness to issue notice on an 
absurd despicable and entirely unsubstantiated petition‘. The Court found the 
statements of the respondent prima facie contemptuous and initiated suo motu 
proceedings against her. The court felt that the respondent had committed 
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contempt by imputing motives to the courts for entertaining the litigation and 
passing orders against her. 
 
The respondent relied on the right to freedom of expression. However, the Court 
took a view that any expression of opinion would not be immune from the liability 
for exceeding the limits. If he tries to scandalise the court or undermines the 
dignity of the court then the court would be entitled to exercise its power. The 
Court gave higher protection to the administration of justice. The Court further 
stated that the legislature when enacting the CCA 1971 took into consideration 
some judgments of foreign courts but did not lose sight of the views, observations 
and opinions of the Indian judges. The judges took a view that in protecting the 
freedom of speech and expression, one cannot exceed the limit otherwise he can 
be subjected to contempt of court on the allegation of scandalising or intending to 
scandalise the authority of any court. The Supreme Court expressed that the 
legislature before enacting the CCA 1971 gave consideration to foreign cases and 
tried to ‗bring the law on the subject into line with modern trends of thinking in 
other countries without ignoring the ground realities and prevalent socio-
economic system in India, the vast majority of whose people are poor, ignorant, 
uneducated, easily liable to be misled.‘772 
 
In accordance to Re Arundhati Roy, in India, protecting the judiciary from any 
scurrilous abuse or comment that tends to lower its authority and integrity in the 
eyes of the public is crucial given the vulnerability of the society and incapability 
of assessing for themselves any allegations made against the judiciary. 
 
It is to note that this species of contempt remains very much alive in Singapore. 
In Singapore, it is settled law that any which publication alleges bias, lack of 
impartiality, impropriety or any wrongdoing concerning a judge in the exercise of 
his judicial functions, amounts to contempt.
773
 Contempt by scandalising is 
recently found in Attorney General v Hertzberg and others.
774
 One of the main 
issues in Hertzberg was the appropriate test for determining if the offence had 
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actually been carried out. Hertzberg, citing prior Singapore case law on the 
matter,
775
 decided that the test of liability to be applied is ‗inherent tendency to 
interfere with the administration of justice‘. The test is lower that the common law 
test of ‗real risk‘. The Court justified the rejection of the ‗real risk‘ test on the 
ground that ‗conditions unique to Singapore i.e. small geographical size and the 
fact that in Singapore, judges decided both questions of fact and law, necessitate 
that we deal more firmly with attacks on the integrity and impartiality of our 
courts‘.776  
 
In support of these justifications, the Court relied on its earlier decision Attorney 
General v Chee Soon Juan
777
 in which the Court in that case expressed that ‗the 
geographical size of Singapore renders its courts more susceptible to unjustified 
attacks‘. The Court in Chee Soon Juan relied on Ahnee778 where the Privy Council 
on appeal from Mauritius reasoned as follows: 
 
[I]t is permissible to take into account that on a small island such as 
Mauritius the administration of justice is more vulnerable than in the 
United kingdom. The need for the offence of scandalising the court on a 
small island is greater: see Feldman, Civil Liberties & Human Rights in 
England and Wales (1993), pp. 74-747; Barendt, Freedom of Speech 
(1985), pp. 218-219.
779
  
 
In Hertzberg, by referring to Ahnee, it can be questioned whether this is an 
accurate description of the situation of the present day in Singapore. Ahnee is a 
lower threshold for determining whether a court has been scandalised and may be 
appropriate in jurisdictions where the position of the judiciary is unstable and 
vulnerable to undue pressure from executive or segment of public.  
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(d) Sub judice Rule 
 
(i) England  
 
In England, most applications to commit for contempt in respect of media 
publications are based upon strict liability provisions contained in Sections 1 and 
2 CCA 1981.
780
 Under the ‗strict liability rule‘, conduct may be treated as 
contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice in particular 
legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so. Thus, this rule only applicable to 
publications that touch upon particular legal proceedings. Under the strict liability 
rule, the stricter time limits i.e. the ‗active‘ test781 and more precise test regarding 
the necessary risk of prejudice was introduced.
782
 According to Fenwick and 
Phillipson, the Act also introduced a ‗public interest‘ test designed to allow some 
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As mentioned earlier, the CCA 1981 as partly to respond to the decision of the Sunday Times case. 
The Act, according to Fenwick and Phillipson, ‗was intended to maintain the stance of the ultimate 
supremacy of the administration of justice over the freedom of speech, while moving the balance 
further towards freedom of speech‘. See Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the 
Human Rights Act (n. 607) p. 251. See also Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (n. 143) 
pp. 334-337.     
781
 Section 2 (3) CCA 1981. For criminal proceedings, the active period begins at the point of the 
issue of a warrant for arrest, an arrest without warrant or the service of an indictment (summons or 
an oral charge), and the ending point is acquittal, sentence, any other verdict or discontinuance of 
the trial. The starting point for civil proceedings is when the case is set down for a hearing in the 
High Court or a date for the hearing is fixed. The end point of the active period for civil 
proceedings comes when the proceedings are disposed of, discontinued or withdrawn. See 
Schedule 1 CCA 1981; AG v Hislop and Pressdram [1991] 1 QB 514.  
782
 Section 2(2) CCA 1981. 
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material on matters of public interest to escape liability even though it created a 
risk of prejudice to proceedings.
783
  
 
Section 2(2) CCA 1981 provides ‗the strict liability rule applies only to a 
publication which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in particular 
proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced‘. It demands a 
‗substantial risk of serious prejudice‘ presupposes that the harm could not be 
characterised as slight or minimal.
784
 In satisfying the statutory test of ‗substantial 
risk of serious prejudice‘ depends on many different factors such as the proximity 
in time between the publication and proceedings,
785
 the likelihood of the 
publication coming to the attention of a potential juror
786
 and the likely impact of 
the publication on the jurors from the time of the publication to the time of the 
trial.
787
  
 
As mentioned earlier, for conduct to give rise to strict liability, it needs to 
establish ‗a substantial risk of prejudice‘, i.e. the degree of interference, that is 
itself required to be ‗serious‘. Hence, the question whether the course of justice, in 
particular proceedings, will be impeded or prejudiced by a publication depends 
primarily upon whether the publication will bring influence to bear which is likely 
to divert the proceedings in some way from the course which they would have 
otherwise have followed.
788
 Therefore, for there to be contempt under this heading 
there must be both some risk that the proceedings in question will be affected and 
a prospect that, if the proceedings are affected, the effect will be serious.
789
 This 
                                                 
783
 Section 5 CCA 1981. See Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act 
(n. 607) p. 251. 
784
 According to Fenwick and Phillipson, Section 2(2) on its face answers to the findings on 
proportionality in Sunday Times case. In that case, in balancing the value of the speech against the 
harm under Article 10(2) ECHR, it was found that the harm caused was quite slight. See Ibid. pp. 
257-258. 
785
 See AG v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1987] 1 QB 1. 
786
 For example, the court will consider whether the publication circulates in the area from which 
the jurors are likely to be drawn and how many copies are circulated. See AG v English (n. 430). 
787
 In AG v Unger (1998) EMLR 280, it has been decided that the impact of the publication on the 
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the evidence put before them. Thus the substantial risk of prejudice did not arise. See also AG v 
MGN Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 456 where the Court emphasised that the jurors are able to ignore 
possibly prejudicial comments in the media.  
788
 Re Lornho plc [1990] 2 AC 154; AG v MGN Ltd (n. 787). 
789
 AG v News Group Newspapers Ltd. (n. 785), p. 15. In AG v English (n. 430) p. 142, Lord 
Diplock said: 
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means that showing a slight risk of serious prejudice or a substantial risk of slight 
prejudice would not be sufficient.
790
 
 
In AG v English
791
 the House of Lords defined substantial risk as excluding a risk 
which is only remote. C.J. Miller comments that the ‗substantial risk‘ element of 
the statutory test has the same meaning as the common law test interpreted by 
Lord Reid in the Sunday Times case - a remote possibility of prejudice is not 
sufficient but a small likelihood is.
792
 A similar approach was adopted in AG v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd.
793
 It was found that ‗substantial‘ as a qualification 
of ‗risk‘ does not have the meaning of ‗weighty‘ but rather means ‗not 
insubstantial‘ or ‗not minimal‘. 
 
Nevertheless, the cases such as AG v MGN, AG v Unger and AG v Guardian 
Newspapers, which were decided around the time of the inception of the HRA but 
before its coming into force, marked the turning point in the approach to the test 
of liability under Section 2 (2) CCA 1981. The judicial approach was affected by 
the imminent reception of Article 10 ECHR into domestic law. 
 
In AG v MGN, the Court found that the article creating the inference that the 
defendant in the forthcoming trial was guilty, had not sufficiently created 
substantial risk of serious prejudice, despite that the article in combination with 
other articles had led the trial judge to stay the proceedings. In AG v Unger, the 
article imputed guilt on the part of the defendant was not found in itself to create 
substantial risk due to the lapse of time.
794
   
 
AG v Guardian Newspapers
795
 gave much weight to the term ‗substantial‘ and far 
more compelling than those of AG v English. In this case, The Observer published 
an article while the trial of one Anthony Kelly, an artist who had been charged 
                                                                                                                                      
If, in a criminal trial upon indictment, it is the outcome of the trial which is put at risk, or 
the risk is that the jury might have to be discharged without proceeding to a verdict, then 
that is as serious as anything could be.  
790
 AG v News Group Newspapers Ltd (n. 785).  
791
 [1983] 1 AC 116.  
792
 C.J. Miller, Contempt of Court (n. 20) p. 231-232. 
793
 AG v News Group Newspapers Ltd (n. 785) p. 15. 
794
 See supra., (n. 787). 
795
 AG v Guardian (n. 429). 
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with stealing body parts, was in progress. The article suggesting that Kelly had 
acquired the body parts not for serious artistic purpose but because of an obsessive 
interest in necrophilia. The writer linked Kelly‘s obsession to a serial killer, 
Jeffrey Dahmer. 
 
The Court was concerned with whether the article will affect the jury thus 
impeding or prejudicing the trial, in the sense that ‗such prejudice as would justify 
a stay or appeal against conviction‘.796 The article was read by only one juror 
whom indicated to the judge that she would not be influenced by the article and 
promised not to mention its contents to fellow jurors. Furthermore, the judge also 
warned the jury that they need to try the case on the evidence alone. The article, 
on its face, was damaging to Kelly‘s case as in the jury‘s eyes it could have 
undermined his credibility. It created a risk of serious prejudice to the ongoing 
trial but the Court of Appeal concluded that the risk of prejudice was not 
‗substantial‘.  
 
In interpreting Section 2 (2) CCA 1981 as to what amount to ‗substantial risk‘, the 
Court of Appeal placed a strong reliance on the Article 10 (2) test as interpreted in 
Worm v Austria.
797
 In Worm v Austria, the test used was that of ‗likelihood‘ of 
risk which appears to mean that the risk is more likely than not to materialise. It is 
accepted that there was no necessity to show that prejudice to the proceedings had 
actually arisen. It is enough if there is likelihood that at least the lay judges would 
read the article. The test appears to mean that the risk is more likely than not to 
materialise. 
 
Worm v Austria concerned an article published during the ongoing criminal trial 
which clearly imputed guilt against the defendant. The article was highly critical 
of Mr. Androsch, a former Minister of Finance, who was charged with tax 
evasion. The Austrian Court of Appeal convicted Worm on the basis that the 
article had a potential influence on the criminal proceedings since it had the 
capacity to affect at least two lay judges involved in the proceedings. Worm 
                                                 
796
 Ibid., p. 915. 
797
 Worm v Austria (n. 556).  
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argued before the ECtHR that his conviction constituted an interference with the 
freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. 
 
In dismissing his complaint of the violation of his right to freedom of expression, 
the ECtHR noted that the interference was necessary in a democratic society due 
to the fact that politicians who are the public figures, are still entitled to the 
enjoyment of the guarantee of a fair trial set out in Article 6 (1) which in criminal 
proceedings includes the right to an impartial tribunal. It found: 
 
This must be borne in mind by journalists when commenting on pending 
criminal proceedings since the limits of permissible comment may not 
extend to statements which are likely to prejudice, whether intentionally 
or not, the chances of a person receiving a fair trial or to undermine the 
confidence of the public in the role of the courts in the administration of 
criminal justice.
798
 
 
In interpreting Article 10 i.e. in framing the law to protect the ‗authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary‘, the ECtHR provides that the States could look 
‗beyond the concrete case to the protection of the fundamental role of courts in a 
democratic society‘. The ECtHR made it clear that Article 6 will take precedence 
over Article 10 where it can be said that there is a real likelihood of prejudice.
799
  
 
Fenwick and Phillipson argue that the interpretation of Section 2 (2) CCA adopted 
in AG v Guardian, influenced by Worm afforded much higher threshold for the 
test comparing to the test laid down in AG v English.
800
 It has given due weight to 
the protection of freedom of speech.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Act also introduced a ‗public interest‘ test under Section 
5, which provides that a substantial risk of serious prejudice to a trial can be 
created but no liability may arise so long the test under this provision is fulfilled. 
Section 5 was adopted as a response to the Sunday Times case, as a measure 
intended to protect media freedom when the publication in question concerns a 
general issue of public interest. Section 5 reads: 
 
                                                 
798
 Ibid., para. 50. 
799
 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (n. 607) p. 187. 
800
 Ibid., pp. 268-279. 
 211 
A publication made as or as part of a discussion in good faith of public 
affairs or other matters of general public interest is not to be treated as 
contempt of court under the strict liability rule if the risk of impediment 
or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to the 
discussion. 
 
Section 5 does not apply if the Attorney General can show that Section 2 (2) is 
fulfilled. AG v English is the leading case on Section 5. The case concerned an 
article published by the Daily Mail in support of ProLife candidate, Mrs. Carr, in a 
contemporaneous by-election. Mrs. Carr‘s election policy was that the killing of 
deformed babies should be stopped. The article also touched upon the general 
topic of mercy killing where the journalist spoke disparagingly of what he 
described as the common practice of doctors deliberately failing to keep deformed 
children alive. The article, which was published while the trial of one Dr. Arthur 
for euthanasia was pending, found to prejudice his trial. He was standing trial for 
the murder of Down‘s syndrome babies. 
 
In determining the applicability of Section 5, Lord Diplock adopted a two stage 
approach. Firstly, it has to be determined that the article must at least be a 
‗discussion‘ which presumably means an examination by argument or debate.801 
In this case, Lord Diplock found that a ‗discussion‘ could include implied 
accusations and not merely confined to abstract debate. Furthermore, the 
discussion must be of ‗public affairs or other matters of general public interests‘. 
Mrs. Carr‘s candidature was found to be a matter of ‗public affairs‘ and the moral 
justification of the mercy killing of the deformed babies was a matter of ‗general 
public interest‘. Secondly, the Lords went to find whether risk of prejudice to Dr. 
Arthur‘s trial was merely an incidental to the discussion i.e. the candidate‘s 
election policy. In fact, the article had not used the trial as a direct illustration. On 
this point, the Court decided that the risk of prejudice to Dr. Arthur‘s trial was 
merely incidental to the main theme of the article.  
 
Therefore, in order to determine that the risk of prejudice is not merely incidental 
to the discussion, ‗a better and surer test is simply to look at the subject matter of 
the discussion and see how closely it relates to the particular legal proceedings. 
                                                 
801
 C.J. Miller, Contempt of Court (n. 20) p. 358. 
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The more closely it relates the easier it will be for the Attorney General to show 
that the risk of prejudice is not merely incidental to the discussion‘.802  
 
As discussed above, the CCA 1981 has created the strict liability provisions under 
Sections 1 and 2. Nonetheless, common law of contempt, not only generally, but 
also in the area of media publication, provided the mental element is present, has 
been retained. It is left open under Section 6 (c) the possibility of bringing an 
action under common law contempt where it can be shown there is specific intent 
to prejudice the administration of justice by the publication in question. Section 6 
(c) reads: 
  
 Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act- 
 … 
(c) restricts liability for contempt of court in respect of conduct 
intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice. 
 
The provision of the CCA 1981 left unaffected the actus reus of publication 
contempt falling outside the strict liability rule. Therefore, publications which are 
intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice may be punishable as 
contempt of court at common law.
803
 Therefore, if the proceedings which have 
been impeded were not ‗active‘ at the time of the publication, or the prejudice was 
not caused by the publication within the meaning of Section 2 (1) CCA, strict 
liability rule cannot apply, but Section 6 (c) CCA will come in. Arlidge et al 
explains that reference should be made to ECHR and HRA in situations when the 
common law contempt relating to this type of contempt is unclear.
804
 This is due 
to the backdrop of the coming of the CCA. The Parliament took in the CCA 1981, 
in particular by the adverse decision and comment in the law of contempt in 
Sunday Times case.  
 
Publication contempt, when not falling within the strict liability rule, consists of 
the usual two elements actus reus and mens rea.
805
 The actus reus of this 
contempt is the impedance of or interference with the administration of justice by 
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 Per Lloyd LJ in AG v TVS Television Ltd, The Times, 7 July 1989 which is mentioned in C.J. 
Miller, Contempt of Court (n. 20) pp. 361-362. 
803
 Section 6 (c) CCA 1981.  
804
 Arlidge, Eady and Smith (n. 19) p. 327. 
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 AG v Sports Newspapers Ltd. [1992] 1 All ER 503, p. 519. 
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the court.
806
 There are three elements to be justified if the publication is to fall 
within the area of liability preserved by Section 6 (c) CCA 1981 –specific intent to 
prejudice proceedings must be shown, proceedings are imminent, and a real risk 
of prejudice must present.
807
  
 
As discussed earlier, the required mens rea for this type of contempt is an 
intention to prejudice the administration of justice, and that ‗intention‘ refers to 
specific intent.
808
 The requirement to prove intent was reaffirmed in AG v 
Punch.
809
 In order to establish mens rea, it has to prove that the accused knew the 
publication would interfere with the course of justice by defeating the purpose 
underlying the injunction. 
 
According to Lord Reid in the AG v Times Newspapers
810
 the test of what 
constitutes publication contempt at common law is that established in R v Duffy
811
 
– that there must be a real risk of prejudice, as opposed to a remote possibility. 
The risk to the administration of justice is assessed at the time of the 
publication.
812
 Furthermore, it seems that in order for this to be the case, the 
proceedings must be ‗pending‘ or ‗imminent‘ at the time of the publication.813  
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 AG v Times Newspapers Ltd. (n. 186) pp. 206-207. For more detail on the potential actus reus 
under common law publication contempt, see Arlidge, Eady and Smith (n. 19) pp. 330-363. 
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 AG v Times Newspapers Ltd (n. 423) p.215. 
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 In criminal proceedings, at common law, pending proceedings as established in Clarke, ex p. 
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(ii) Canada and the USA 
In the USA, a different approach was taken. State courts have been denied the 
power to punish for contempt by publication unless there has been a ‗clear and 
present danger‘ to the administration of justice.814 The freedom of expression is 
taking precedence over the right to a fair trial as the courts are unwilling to use 
contempt power.
815
  
In Canada, in order to be found guilty for sub judice publication, R v Bowes 
Publishers Ltd
816
 lists the elements to be proved as follows: 
 
(i) the identity of the respondents as the ones responsible for the publication, 
(ii) that it was the activity or conduct of the respondents that brought about 
the publication, and  
(iii) that the respondents intentionally published the articles and at the time of 
publication objectively ought to have foreseen that the articles posed a 
real risk of prejudice to a fair trial for the accused.  
 
The Court in this case took a view that the risk of prejudice to a fair trial must be 
real, serious and substantial.  
 
However, in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting  Corporation,
817
 the Court 
issued a publication ban on a television programme dealing with the sexual and 
physical abuse of children in a Catholic orphanage while the trials of four 
members of a Catholic order charged with similar crimes was in progress or 
                                                 
814
 See Nebraska Press Association v Stuart 427 US 539 (1976). 
815
 A contrast view was adopted in Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991). In 
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obstruct a fair administration of justice. See Mattei Radu, 'Difficult Task of Model Rule of 
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2007) 29 Campbell Law Review 497. 
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 (1995), 30 Alta. L.R. (3d) 236 (Q.B.) p. 241. 
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 (1995) 120 DLR (4th) 12. 
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pending. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the ban could not be upheld, 
rejecting the traditional common law rule in favour of a fair trial. Lamer CJ said: 
 
The pre-Charter common-law rule governing publication bans 
emphasised the right to a fair trial over the expression interests of those 
affected by the ban. In my view, the balance this rule strikes is 
inconsistent with the principles of the Charter, and in particular, the equal 
status given by the Charter to ss.2(b) and 11(d). It would be inappropriate 
for the courts to continue to apply a common-law rule that automatically 
favoured the right protected by s.11(d) over those protected by s.2(b). A 
hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be 
avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the 
common law. When the protected rights of two individuals come into 
conflict, as can occur in the case of publication bans, Charter principles 
require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both 
sets of rights.
818
 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada set out the issue as being whether a restriction on 
freedom of expression was ‗necessary in a democratic society‘. Lamer CJ stated: 
 
The common law must be adapted so as to require a consideration of both 
the objectives of the publication ban, and the proportionality of the ban to 
its effect on protected Charter rights. The modified rule may be stated as 
follows: 
 
A publication ban should only be ordered when: 
 
(a)  such ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial 
risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available 
alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and 
(b)  the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the 
deleterious effects to freedom of expression of those affected by 
the ban.
819
 
 
His Lordship then set forth a number of alternative measures to a publication ban, 
which could reduce the prejudicial effect of media coverage: 
 
Possibilities that readily come to mind, however, include adjourning 
trials, changing venues, sequestering jurors, allowing challenges for 
cause and voir dires during jury selection, and providing strong judicial 
direction to the jury.
820
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820
 Ibid., p. 40. 
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Nevertheless the cases after Dagenais applied common law principle of sub judice 
contempt.
821
  
 
(iii) Australia and New Zealand  
 
In Australia, a publication having a real and practical tendency to interfere with 
the administration of justice in a current or pending trial is contempt.
822
 It has 
been recognised for a long time a test for liability for sub judice contempt as 
provided in Ex p. Bread Manufacturers Ltd.
823
 The balance must be maintained 
between the right of a person to contribute to the discussion of matters of public 
interest and their impact upon a pending trial. The Court held that a publication 
which has a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice by preventing 
the fair trial of any proceeding in a court is contempt if it is proven beyond 
reasonable doubt that such interference was either intended or likely.  
 
In Hinch v AG
824
 the Court concluded that the law would intervene to protect the 
administration of justice from any substantial risk of serious interference as a 
matter of practical reality. It means that when the impugned material has a real 
and definite tendency to prejudice or embarrass pending proceedings then only the 
publisher or distributor can be committed for contempt.  
 
The same approach is taken in New Zealand as seen in Gisborne Herald Co. Ltd. 
v. Solicitor General.
825
 Gisborne rejected Dagenais on the basis of influence of 
culture and values of the particular community, and the Court also described the 
approach in Dagenais as uncommon, inconvenient and expensive.
826
 As such, the 
traditional common law rule still applies.  
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(iv) India  
 
The law relating to sub judice rule can be found under Section 2 (iii) of the CCA 
1971. The provision does not use any expression like ‗substantial risk‘ and makes 
the requirement of specific intent not relevant to India since the absence of mens 
rea in the strict sense is no defence in criminal contempt.
827
  
 
In India, in determining whether the publication falls under this type of contempt, 
the question is not whether the publication does interfere but whether it tends to 
interfere with the administration of justice.
828
 The question is not on the intention 
of the contemnor but whether it is calculated to interfere with the due 
administration of justice.
829
  
 
The Act does not expressly deal with the question of liability of editor, publisher 
and reporter except that of distributor under Section 13 (3). Hence the Supreme 
Court has observed that an irresponsible conduct and attitude on the part of the 
editor, publisher and reporter cannot be consistent with good faith but was 
distinctly opposed to the high professional standard.
830
 The concerned quarters 
must ensure that information is factually accurate, facts are not distorted and no 
essential facts are suppressed. Responsibility shall be assumed for all information 
and comments published.
831
  
 
(v) The ICTY 
 
The ICTY dealt with a number of contempt cases.
832
 In relation to publication 
contempt, prosecuting journalists for contempt for revealing the identity of the 
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protected witnesses is a fairly recent phenomenon at the Tribunal.
833
 Nevertheless, 
the case of Florence Hartmann is different as it deals with the disclosure of parts 
of confidential decisions made by the Tribunal.
834
  
Florence Hartmann, a former French journalist and author, worked from October 
2000 to October 2009 as an official spokesperson and Balkan adviser to Carla Del 
Ponte, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia at The Hague. She was charged with two accounts of contempt under 
Rule 77 (A) (ii) RPE, for knowingly and wilfully interfering with the 
administration of justice by disclosing information in knowing violation of two 
decisions of the Appeal Chambers in Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic.
835
 This is 
due to her publication of a book ‗Paix et Chatiment (Peace and Punishment)‘ and 
an article ‗Vital Genocide Documents Concealed‘, allegedly to disclose 
information related to two Appeal Chambers approving black-outs and exclusions 
from critical historical war documents showing Serbia‘s involvement in the 
Bosnian war of the 1990s.  
In order for the offence of contempt to be established, the Tribunal has to evaluate 
the actus reus and mens rea of the accused in publishing the materials that contain 
the confidential information. The actus reus of this form of contempt is the 
physical act of disclosure of information relating to proceedings before the 
Tribunal, where such disclosure breaches an order of a Chamber. It has to be 
proven that there is a breach of the Order not to disclose the confidential 
information. If the breach is proved then it is not necessary to prove actual 
interference with the Tribunal‘s administration of justice. It is because the 
violation of the Order itself is interference to the Tribunal‘s administration of 
justice. As to mens rea, it has to be proved that the accused disclosed the 
information knowing it was a violation of the Order. Then, a finding of intent to 
violate the order has to be established.  
                                                                                                                                      
(IT-95-14/2-R77), Trial Chamber, 30 August 2006; Margetic (n. 731); Judgment on Allegation of 
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Hartmann‘s counsel argued that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try the matter 
as the conduct falls outside the ambit of Rule 77 RPE, among others that the 
proceedings to which the disclosure pertains have terminated. Thus, it is 
contended that the accused should have enjoyed her freedom of expression. 
Furthermore, the test for the conduct to merit contempt punishment must be of 
‗real risk‘ that the administration of justice will be seriously interfered with.  
The Tribunal rejected the arguments. The Tribunal relies on Rule 77 RPE and held 
that any knowing or wilful conduct that interferes with the administration of 
justice of the Tribunal may be tried as contempt. It is not necessary to prove actual 
interference with the Tribunal‘s administration of justice. The Tribunal was 
satisfied that the Accused had knowledge that the information was confidential at 
the time of the disclosure as the information was filed ‗confidential‘ and she 
disclosed this confidential information by publishing the said book and article.  It 
is worth to note here that she was a spokesperson for the former chief prosecutor 
and obviously had access to some sensitive and confidential documents in the 
possession of the Tribunal, even though she was not supposed to.  
As regards mens rea, the Defence counsel submitted that the Prosecution must 
prove that the accused acted with specific intent to interfere with the 
administration of justice. The Counsel submitted that the accused lacked such 
intent. However, the Tribunal ruled that it is not necessary to prove specific intent 
as having established either actual knowledge or wilful blindness to the existence 
of the Order, or reckless indifference to the consequences of the act by which the 
order is violated makes that the intent to interfere with the administration of 
justice is also established.
836
  
As to the accused‘s right to freedom of expression, the Tribunal notified that there 
is a need to balance the protection of confidential information in court proceedings 
and the right to freedom of expression. After considering the rules under the 
ECHR, the ICCPR and the UDHR, the Tribunal found that these instruments 
contain qualifications on freedom of expression in relation to court proceedings. It 
                                                 
836
 Florence Hartmann (n. 832) p. 3261. 
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was decided that the right to protect confidential information in court proceedings 
carries more weight.  
After due consideration, the Tribunal found Hartmann guilty of contempt for 
disclosing confidential information in her publications. She was sentenced to pay 
a fine of 7000 Euros.   
The Tribunal in this case applied the common law test of liability in determining 
whether the publication was contemptuous. As regards the balancing between the 
two conflicting interests, the Tribunal upheld the right to protect confidential 
information in court proceedings, at the expense of the freedom of expression. 
 
4.3.2.3 Mens Rea or Intent 
 
The status of the requirement mens rea in contempt cases in most of common law 
jurisdiction varies and sometimes is unclear. In England, AG v Times Newspaper 
Ltd
837
 stated that liability for breaking a court order is strict. All that is required to 
be proved is service of the order and the breach of the said order. It is neither 
necessary to show that the defendant is intentionally contumacious nor that he 
intends to interfere with the administration of justice.
838
 This law has been 
established in the classic case of Stancomb v Trowbridge UDC
839
 as it decided 
that if a person is restrained by an injunction from doing a particular act but he 
commits a breach of the injunction, he is liable for contempt if he in fact does the 
act. He cannot say that his act was not contumacious as he has no direct intention 
to disobey the order. It is sufficient for the court to look at his act of committing 
such breach. In Irtelli v Squatriti,
840
 the Court of Appeal held on the facts that the 
appellants had not intentionally breached an injunction and so were not in 
contempt. It establishes that there is a need to prove that the appellant did intend 
to act in contempt of the court‘s authority. The recent decision in Blue Sky One 
Ltd v Mahan Air & Others, PK Airfinance US Inc v Blue Sky Two Ltd & Others
841
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 AG v Times Newspapers Ltd. (n. 423). 
838
 See Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700. 
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 Stancomb (n. 225). 
840
 [1993] QB 83. 
841
 [2010] All ER (D) 25 (Feb). 
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stands on the same footing with Irtelli. In this case it was ruled that all that needed 
to be shown to establish that the party was in contempt in not complying with an 
order was that his conduct was intentional and that he knew the facts that rendered 
that conduct a breach of the relevant order. 
 
As for criminal contempt, it is uncertain whether it must also be proved that the 
accused intended to interfere with the course of justice. This uncertainty can be 
seen in the case of AG v Butterworth.
842
 The judges were divided in the 
requirement of mens rea in criminal contempt. Lord Denning MR. thought that in 
general, contempt required a guilty mind so that an intention to interfere with the 
course of justice is normally required. In contrast, Donovan LJ. thought that if an 
act is clearly and of itself calculated to interfere with the administration of justice 
no further evidence of intent or motive is required. As for contempt in the face of 
court, what is needed to be proved is that the accused intended to do the act in 
question and his intention is not needed. Thus, mens rea is not an element.  
 
AG v Punch Ltd & Anor
843
 deals with publication contempt whereby contempt 
proceedings were brought by the Attorney General against the editor for 
publishing an article which contained information that was prohibited to be 
disclosed as ordered by the court. In this case, the Court required the Attorney 
General to prove that the accused did the relevant act (actus reus) with the 
necessary intent (mens rea). In order to establish mens rea, it has to prove that the 
accused knew publication would interfere with the course of justice by defeating 
the purpose underlying the injunction. 
 
In England, as regards publication which falls under the strict liability rule, 
intention is not necessary and for other kinds of contempt the common law rule 
applies.
844
 In most of the common law regime as discussed above, mens rea is not 
an element. What needs to be proved is intention to publish but not beyond it.  
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844
 Section 6 (c) CCA 1981. 
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With respect to the ICTY, Rule 77 RPE specifically mentions that the Tribunal 
may hold in contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its 
administration of justice. In Prosecutor v Aleksovski,
845
 the Tribunal held that 
when the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the existence of the order, a 
finding that he intended to violate it would necessarily follow. In Prosecutor v 
Brdjanin,
846
 the Tribunal clearly stated that ‗for each form of criminal contempt, 
the Prosecution must establish that the accused acted with specific intent to 
interfere with the Tribunal‘s due administration of justice‘. Nevertheless, in 
Florence Hartmann, it is not necessary to prove intent beyond publication.  
 
4.3.2.4 Mode of Trial or Procedures 
In all jurisdictions discussed above, the procedure for committal in cases of 
contempt in the face of court is summary.
847
 Nevertheless, the concern rose as to 
the exercise of summary power due to a lack of safeguards such as a specific 
charge against the contemnor being clearly and distinctly stated and the 
opportunity of answering being given. That is to say, the alleged contemnor is 
given an opportunity to ‗show cause‘ why he should not be committed for 
contempt of court and by so doing, an attempt is made to correct any 
misapprehensions between the court and himself.
848
  
In England, the locus classicus with regard to the procedure to be adopted for 
committals for contempt in facie, is In Re Pollard.
849
 The Privy Council pointed 
out that before the alleged contemnor is convicted, the specific charge against him 
must be distinctly stated and opportunity of answering given to him. 
Consequently, the alleged contemnor must be aware that he is being charged with 
                                                 
845
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contempt and must be left in no doubt as regards what part or parts of his conduct 
the judge finds undesirable.  
Section 12 CCA 1981 provides for magistrate‘s power to punish for contempt for 
conduct committed by the alleged contemnor which wilfully insults the courts and 
its officers or wilfully interrupts the court‘s proceedings or misbehaves in court. 
Under such circumstances, the Magistrate may order the officer of the court to 
take the offender into custody and detain him until the rising of the court. The 
court may if it thinks fit, commit the offender to custody or fine him.
850
  
Another point highlighted in Re K
851
 is that the alleged contemnor ought to be 
allowed legal representation so that an opportunity of seeking and taking advice 
ought to have been given. Currently, legal aid is available for contempt by virtue 
of section 13 CCA.  Section 13 provides that in any case where a person is liable 
to be committed or fined for contempt of court, the court may order that he shall 
be given legal aid for the purpose of the proceedings.  
In Australia, the leading case on the relevant procedure for committal for 
contempt is Coward v Stapleton.
852
 It has been laid down that no person ought to 
be punished for contempt unless a specific charge against him has been distinctly 
stated and opportunity of answering the charge is given to him. Thus, he must be 
allowed reasonable opportunity to place his evidence and submission which he 
may want the court to consider.  
Similarly in Canada, as decided in Cotroni v Quebec Police Commission and 
Brunnet,
853
 no one should be found guilty of contempt unless a specific charge has 
been brought against him. The opportunity to ‗show cause‘ must also be given to 
the alleged contemnor. The importance of the ‗show cause‘ procedure is also 
recognised by the Canadian Law Commission wherein in the proposed legislation, 
recommends with regards to disruption of judicial proceedings before the court, 
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that court should call on the alleged contemnor to show cause why he should not 
be found guilty.
854
  
There were attempts to codify the law of contempt and to ensure that the alleged 
contemnor enjoys a fair and impartial trial. Bill C-19 on Contempt of Court, 
attempted such codification. It proposed, inter alia, to dispose of summary 
procedure and replace it with the ordinary procedure for criminal trials. Thus, 
when a judge is satisfied that a person‘s conduct in respect of a proceeding at 
which he, the judge, is presiding, constitutes contempt in the face of the court, he 
must first warn that person that he may be prosecuted or cited for contempt.
855
 
Notwithstanding the warning, if the person persists in conduct which, in the 
opinion of the judge amounts to contempt in the face of the court, the judge may 
cite him in writing for the offence and direct that a police officer take him into 
custody. However, before ordering that an alleged contemnor be taken into 
custody, the court must give regard to the following:  
(i) any costs or inconvenience to parties or witnesses; 
(ii)  any need to deal expeditiously with the person in respect of 
that offence; or  
(iii)  any circumstances that would render the above appropriate.  
The judge must inform the alleged of his rights, such as his right to retain counsel 
without delay, and his right to call witnesses at his trial for the offence.  
The provisions of the Bill are an improvement on the common law procedure of 
committing for contempt in the face of the court, in the sense that the alleged 
contemnor is guaranteed more rights. The provisions are less summary than the 
summary procedure of the common law.  
In New Zealand, Section 401 of the Crimes Act 1961 lays down certain 
procedures to be adopted when an alleged contemnor is to be committed for the 
offence of contempt in the face of the court. However, as previously discussed, it 
is noted that there is nothing to prevent the court from exercising its inherent 
powers as such powers are protected by Section 9 of the Crimes Act.  
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Therefore, in New Zealand, a person could be committed by virtue of the 
procedure under Section 401 or could be tried immediately under the inherent 
powers, which are preserved by the Crimes Act.  
In India, where contempt law has been comprehensively codified, the procedures 
for contempt in the face of court are to be found in Section 14 CCA 1981. The 
provision says when an alleged contempt occurs in the face of the High or 
Supreme courts, the court may cause the alleged contemnor be detained in custody 
and at any time before the rising of the court on the same day, or as early as 
possible thereafter:  
 
(i) inform him in writing of the contempt with which he is 
charged;  
(ii) afford him an opportunity to make a defence to the charge;  
(iii) after taking such evidence as may be necessary, or as may 
be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed, 
immediately or after the adjournment, to determine the 
matter of the charge; and  
(iv) the court may make an order for punishment or discharge of 
the person as may be just.  
 
Section 14 incorporates most of the principles stated in the leading English case 
Pollard
856
 but the Act requires the alleged contemnor to be specifically informed 
of the nature of the charge against him in writing as opposed to the principle in 
Pollard, where it would suffice to inform him orally. 
 
In the USA, it should be recalled that the power for punishing contempt in the face 
of the court is inherent in all courts. Such powers have been mainly regulated by 
statutes and rules of court. With reference to punishment, Section 401 18 U.S.C 
provides that a federal court may punish by fine or imprisonment such contempt 
of its authority, misbehaviour in the courtroom or near the courtroom thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice. Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that criminal contempt may be punished summarily, if the 
judge certifies that he saw or heard the alleged conduct. 
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The problem in the procedure as well as sentencing in contempt offences is due to 
the judicial utterances which are based on very broad guidelines, as judges are 
given wide discretionary to determine the matter. The common law judges have 
enjoyed virtually unchallenged wide-reaching powers to lay down broad 
principles as to what conduct should be deemed punishable as contempt, what 
special procedures for trial should be applied and what penal sanctions should be 
imposed, as well as to decide from time to time that changes should be made to 
the law and procedures. This is evident in the application of summary procedure 
as discussed under the heading of contempt in the face of the court. 
India has taken a step to overcome the matter by codifying the contempt law in 
providing certainty in the law. As regards the procedures for contempt, there has 
been no modification as to the summary powers of the court to deal with contempt 
especially contempt in the face of court. However, the Act provides for the 
procedural safeguards like in the case of contempt in the face of court, the court be 
able to deal with it after informing the person charged with contempt of the charge 
against him and after giving him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge. 
In Canada, Bill C-19 that provides for codification of the law of contempt was 
introduced to the Parliament but it has not been proceeded with. The provision in 
the Bill for continuation of the common law offence suggests repeal to the current 
law. Thus it will affect the judges‘ wide authority to deal with contempt. Since the 
Bill has not been proceeded with, the courts continue to rely on the development 
of common law and on the provision of the Charter. 
 
Placing the rules on procedures in a piece of legislation is helpful to provide 
clarity. The ICTY for instance has clearly stated the procedures to be followed in 
initiating contempt of court. Rule 77 (D) RPE explains who can initiate the 
proceedings. Rule 77 (D) (ii) RPE provides that if the Chamber considers that 
there are sufficient grounds to proceed against a person for contempt, the 
Chamber may issue and order in lieu of an indictment and either direct amicus 
curiae to prosecute the matter or prosecute the matter itself.
857
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4.3.2.5 Sanctions and Remedies 
 
In common law jurisdictions, sanctions are perceived as flexible because there is 
no maximum limit of sentencing. Sanctions rank from imprisonment to fine. 
Contempt must be serious enough to merit imprisonment. An immediate custodial 
sentence is the only appropriate sentence to impose upon a person who interferes 
with the administration of justice.
858
 In England, an order for committal must be 
for a fixed term, which must not on any occasion exceed two years in the case of 
committal by a superior court
859
 or one month in the case of committal by an 
inferior court.
860
 As an alternative or in addition to committing a contemnor, the 
court may impose a fine or require security for good behaviour. There is, however, 
no limit to the amount of fine which the superior court can impose.
861
 For the 
inferior court, there is no limit applies to the amount of the fine but the fine must 
not on any occasion exceed £ 2, 500.
862
 As a further alternative to ordering 
committal, the court may, in its discretion, adopt the more lenient remedies such 
as by granting an injunction to restrain repetition of the act of contempt
863
 or by 
ordering the contemnor to pay the cost of the application.
864
 In the USA, the 
courts may order disbarment against the attorney.
865
  Apology plays a role in 
mitigating and purging the contempt.  
 
It is worth noting that, in some jurisdictions, although there is provision regulating 
the imposition of sanction or punishment, the courts on the basis of ‗inherent 
power‘, may impose sanction contrary to what has been stated in the provision. 
The case of Chambers v Nasco
866
 as discussed above is amongst the examples.  
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4.3.3 Empirical Study of Malaysian Judicial Personnel, 
Advocates & Solicitors and Prosecutors 
 
An empirical study was conducted in Malaysia during the period of January to 
March 2009. It was carried out amongst the judicial personnel, namely superior 
court judges and subordinates courts‘ judicial officers, advocates and prosecutors. 
Advocates together with prosecutors are treated alike before the courts as both fall 
under the judge‘s contempt power.  
 
The study intends to elicit the opinion of these key players on the issues in the law 
and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia, their attitudes towards the use of 
contempt power over lawyers and also their views on what should be the best 
suggestions to address the uncertainties in the present law of contempt of court. It 
is noted that the data is not relating to statistic significance. It merely provides 
some exploratory information about the knowledge and opinions of the legal 
actors about the law and practice of contempt of court in order to give better 
insight on the main areas of concerns and possible acceptance in relation to 
proposals for reform. 
 
4.3.3.1 Research Designs 
 
The research method chosen for this study was questionnaire
867
 and semi-
structured personal interview with the judges, advocates and prosecutors. The 
questionnaire type relies on open-ended questions. It is designed as such so that 
respondents could be more expansive and express their views freely.  A postal 
questionnaire was selected as this allows the respondents to complete the 
questionnaires at their own convenience and at their own pace.
868
 However, the 
setback of this method is its low return rates. According to Uma Sekaran,
869
 the 
return rates of postal questionnaires are typically low. Hence, semi-structured 
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interviews were considered appropriate to support and to add additional points to 
the data collected. 
 
Semi-structured interviews allow lists of predetermined questions to be posed to 
the interviewees personally. It uses open-ended questions as predetermined by the 
researcher and sometimes some questions arise naturally during the interviews. 
This method was chosen because of its high validity as its probes the ideas of the 
interviewees about the phenomenon of interest, thus allowing for in-depth 
knowledge sharing. Complex questions and issues can be clarified. Furthermore, 
new ideas can also be discussed with the interviewees and can be a bonus to the 
research. 
 
Two sets of questionnaire were prepared: one set for judicial personnel and the 
other one for advocates and prosecutors. This is due to a question relating to the 
respondents‘ personal experience with contempt of court i.e. for being cited for 
contempt and for citing a person for contempt as appeared in question no. 5 of the 
questionnaire. There were 22 questions in the questionnaire as well as interview.  
The questions asked during the interviews were basically the same questions 
structured in the questionnaires. The questions were arranged in two main parts: 
questions relating to background such as the age, gender, profession etc.; and 
questions about the opinion and knowledge of the respondents on the issues of the 
law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia. 
 
4.3.3.2 Research Process 
 
Initially, before the questionnaires were sent out via post, they were sent to 
subordinate courts‘ judicial officers, advocates and prosecutors via e-mail. The 
questionnaires were placed in the mailing lists of the respondents whom were 
chosen at random regardless of their working experience. The result of this was a 
very poor return rate.  It is deduced that the less experience judicial officers and 
lawyers who are not familiar with the law and practice of contempt of court were 
not interested in participating. Contempt law is a technical and ‗specialised‘ area 
of law for the senior and experienced — with a minimum of ten years experience. 
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The method of distribution via email was found to be ineffective. Instead, the 
researcher decided to send the questionnaires via post to the respondents who 
were chosen at random but selected according to their seniority. For example, the 
prospective respondents from the legal profession were selected from the seniority 
list from the Bar Council Directory. As the respondents were senior and 
experienced, only 40 questionnaires were sent to judicial personnel of all the tiers 
of the Malaysian court hierarchy, another 40 to advocates chosen randomly in the 
Central Region, which consists of Selangor, Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur 
and Putrajaya, and 40 prosecutors at the Attorney General‘s Chambers at 
Putrajaya. The Central Region is chosen because it is Malaysia‘s populous region 
whereby the number of advocates and legal firms are bigger in this region as 
compared to other regions. It is reported that the number of lawyers in this region 
has reached to 8100.
870
 Moreover, the superior courts, namely, Federal Court and 
Court of Appeal are situated in Putrajaya. The respondents were given three 
weeks, until the end of February 2009 to complete and return the questionnaires.  
 
The semi-structured interview was conducted with 5 judges, 6 advocates and 4 
prosecutors. These interviewees were chosen due to their prominence and 
experience in the matters. There were some difficulties faced in getting 
appointments with the interviewees, especially the judges, who are very busy and 
not easily accessible. The interviewees were sent the questions before the 
interview took place to give them a general idea of what was expected from them 
during the interview. The interviews were conducted in their offices. The records 
of the interviews have been kept confidential on recorder and notes written during 
the interviews.  
 
The results are presented by means of tables. Comments from the respondents are 
quoted or paraphrased. 
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4.3.3.3 The Result 
 
(i) The Questionnaire Response Rate 
 
The response rate for the questionnaires is as follows:  
 
Table 4.2: Questionnaire Response Rate 
Category of 
Respondents 
No. of 
questionnaires 
sent 
No. of responses Percentage of 
responses (%) 
Judicial 
Personnel  
40 7 17.5 
Advocates  40 12 30 
Prosecutors 40 5 12.5 
Total 120 24 20 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows that 120 questionnaires were sent to the respondents, 40 to each 
group. Only 24 were returned to the researcher. It is acknowledged that the overall 
rate of 20% is low. However, the nature of open-ended questionnaires helps in 
providing more details of information relating to the law and practice of contempt 
of court in Malaysia. The sources of information came from the majority of the 
respondents who are experienced and familiar with this area of law which is 
perceived as specialised and technical. In addition, the interviews were conducted 
in order to support and to add extra useful hands-on data.  
 
The most notable response rate came from the advocates with a response rate of 
30%. The figure supports the Bar‘s concerns on the law and practice of contempt 
of court in which the Bar had suggested the law of contempt to be placed in a 
statute to overcome the vagueness. The figure also reflects the Bar‘s concerns 
since advocates fall under the judge‘s contempt power.  
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(ii) The Length of Involvement in the Law-Related Field and 
Experience 
 
It is useful to find out how long have the respondents been in the law-related arena 
as judicial personnel, advocates and prosecutors. The length of their involvement 
in their field would mean how well the respondents understand the subject matter 
at point and vice versa. This was highlighted in the questionnaire from Judicial 
Personnel number 7 who had between 1 and 5 years of service and states that she 
does not know much about the law of contempt. ‗Even we as magistrates do not 
know what amount to contemptuous act, procedures and standard of proof to be 
applied‘. Conceivably, due to this reason, the response rate was relatively low as 
the respondents who were not familiar with the subject matter and who rarely 
appear in the courtroom would rather not answer the questionnaires. The law of 
contempt is perceived as technical.  
 
The knowledge and experience link to the credible information and facts injected 
to this research. The data from the questionnaire are set out in Table 4.3 below: 
 
TABLE 4.3: Questionnaire: The Length of Involvement in the Law Related 
Field and Experience 
 
The Length Less than 
1 year 
1-5 years 6-10 years 10-20 
years 
More 
than 20 
years 
Judicial 
Personnel 
0 4 1 1 1 
Advocates  0 0 3 3 6 
Prosecutors 0 0 3 0 2 
TOTAL 0 4 7 4 9 
 
As for the interview, the 6 judges are among the senior judges of the Federal 
Court and the Court of Appeal as well as retired judges who held the highest 
position in the judiciary. The advocates were chosen from those who have been in 
private practice for more than 15 years. They have vast experience and some of 
them had chances to deal with contempt matters. This is also the criteria 
considered in selecting the prosecutors for interview.  
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During the interviews, the interviewees were asked about their previous 
profession. In general, some of the judges were from the private practice before 
being elevated to the Bench. The remaining judges were from the Judicial and 
Legal Service and had been prosecutors before their appointment as judges. 
Therefore, it is noted that numbers of the sample had at some point in their career 
shared the same experience of being lawyers acting before the court.  Most likely, 
any different views they might have on the material issues involved in the study 
would be because of their different personal experience during their careers, 
instead of by their careers.  
 
(iii) Personal Experience with Contempt of Court 
  
The lawyers were posed a question: ‗Have you ever been cited for contempt of 
court?‘ while the judicial personnel were asked ‗Have you ever cited a person for 
contempt of court?‘ All respondents were asked to choose either ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘ 
and to state a brief summary of the reasons for being cited for contempt, and for 
judicial personnel, for exercising contempt power. Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 below 
are the result from the questionnaire. 
 
TABLE 4.4: Questionnaire: Lawyers‟ Personal Experience with 
Contempt Citation 
 
Question 5: Have you ever been cited for contempt of court? 
Respondents Yes No 
Advocates - 12 
Prosecutors - 5 
 
 
TABLE 4.5: Questionnaire: Judicial Personnel‟ Personal Experience 
with Contempt Citation 
 
Question 5: Have you ever cited a person for contempt of court? 
Respondents Yes No 
Judicial Personnel 1 6 
 
Table 4.4 shows question 5 of the questionnaire was asked in order to find out 
whether any of the respondents had ever had personal acquaintance with contempt 
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sanctions and if so, for what reason.  The lawyers were asked whether they had 
experienced being cited for contempt. It is noted that none of the above-mentioned 
respondents have been cited for contempt of court but only two acknowledged that 
they had experience with contempt. Advocate number 1 explained that a contempt 
proceeding was initiated against him by the Attorney General for what he had said 
to the media during the trial of one high-profile case. He was given a ‗show cause 
notice‘ why he should not be cited for contempt for comments he made to the 
media on the refusal of the police to open the gates of the court compound to 
allow Bar representatives to keep a watching brief in the said trial. However, after 
his explanation to the court and the acceptance of this explanation by the Attorney 
General, no contempt was found against him. Advocate number 5 said that he was 
threatened by court with contempt and was asked to show cause. However, the 
court did not proceed with contempt citation as his case was referred to the 
Disciplinary Board for disciplinary action.  He was cleared of the allegation at the 
Disciplinary Board. However, Advocates number 1 and 5 did not explain the 
subject matter of which they were ‗threatened‘ with contempt citation. As for the 
prosecutors, none of them had ever been charged with contempt 
 
Table 4.5 shows question 5 of the questionnaire which asked the judicial 
personnel about the use of contempt power to cite the lawyers for contempt. As 
seen in the table, except Judicial Personnel number 4 who said that he seldom cite 
a person for contempt, the rest of the respondents answered that they have not 
exercised their contempt power and have not held a lawyer in contempt. Judicial 
Personnel number 7 explained that she was reminded to only invoke contempt 
sanction in exceptional circumstances and if possible to not to exercise this power. 
Besides that, she also ‗confessed‘ that she does not know much on contempt — 
from the acts that amount to contempt to the procedures to be invoked. With that, 
she would rather not to invoke contempt due to her ‗lack of knowledge‘. 
 
In the interview, none of the advocates and prosecutors has been cited for 
contempt. Advocate number 1 in the interview, however, admitted that while he 
had not experienced any contempt citation, he had experienced being threatened 
with contempt citation by the judge during the trial of one high profile case.  
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Out of the 6 judges interviewed, 3 said that they never used the power. When 
asked what they would do if they encountered a heated situation in their 
courtroom, they responded that they would adjourn the proceedings for a while in 
order to let the situation cool down and the parties calm down. Judge number 5 
was of the opinion that ‗contempt should be like a headmaster‘s unused cane. The 
cane is there but needs not be used‘. According to him, the power to invoke for 
contempt is there, but it does not need to be used often except in an exceptional 
circumstance but it is good to know that the power is there. Judge number 6 was 
of the same opinion. In addition, he considered that the judge during the 
proceedings is also at trial and he has to gain public confidence in the 
administration of justice. Thus the judge is supposed to keep his temper and retain 
his composure. On the other hand, the other 3 judges had decided a few contempt 
cases. 
 
The sample shows that contempt sanctions were used more against the advocates 
in contrast to the prosecutors, although it does not provide extensive list of 
misconduct. From the sample, the judges would either deal with a contempt matter 
personally (or the matter is moved by the Attorney General) or refer the lawyers to 
the Disciplinary Board for the misconduct. Apparently, it would be likely for 
judges to exercise contempt power if they were both comfortable with, and well-
versed in contempt law and were aware that they were able to exercise such 
contempt power.  
 
(iv) Hypothetical Reasons for Contempt Sanctions Being 
Warranted 
 
Both in the questionnaire and during the interview, the respondents were asked to 
share their opinion on the hypothetical reasons for contempt sanctions being 
warranted. The question is: ‗In your opinion, what are the main reasons for 
lawyers being cited for contempt?‘ The aim of this question is to identify the 
common reasons for contempt sanctions being warranted against lawyers. It is 
noted that some of the respondents shared the same ideas and reasons for 
contempt citation. Therefore it is useful to list the reasons given verbatim and 
comprehensively before trying to find common points. Table 4.6 is the reasons 
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stated in the questionnaire and is followed by the reasons extracted from interview 
in Table 4.7 below.   
 
TABLE 4.6: Questionnaire: Reasons for Contempt Sanctions Being 
Warranted 
 
Question 6: In your opinion, what are the main reasons for lawyers being 
cited for contempt? 
Judicial Personnel Advocates  Prosecutors 
 breach or failure to 
comply with court‘s 
order, undertaking, 
ruling and directive 
 misbehaviour  
 disrespectful towards 
the court 
 contempt in the face 
of the court 
 interference with the 
court‘s proceedings 
 interference with the 
administration of 
justice 
 deliberate action or 
omission that mislead 
the court 
 lawyers are carried 
away by emotion 
 cross the line as they 
forget their true role 
 self interest 
 political interest 
 
 flouting a court order 
 breach of undertaking 
 obstructing course of 
justice like concealing 
documents 
 inability to observe 
judge‘s rules and 
inclination 
 misleading the court 
 misbehaviour in 
courtroom 
 improperly interfere 
with court‘s process 
 inadequate preparation 
 attitude problem and 
over-consuming idea 
that they are above the 
law 
 overbearing, 
overconfident, 
snobbish, careless 
 foolish overzealous 
lawyers 
 arrogant sensitive 
judge 
 interfering, difficult 
judges who do not 
understand the needs of 
adversarial system, 
advocacy, zealous and 
trenchant 
 criticize judge 
 One of the reasons is 
that it is left to the 
whim and fancy of the 
judges in interpreting 
any act as ‗conduct 
obstructing justice‘ or 
‗interfering with the 
course of justice‘. For 
instance, it is contempt 
when counsel did not 
 disobedience of the 
court‘s orders 
 blatant disregard 
 disrupting court‘s 
proceedings 
 unethical conduct 
 impropriety of speech 
 tampering with 
evidence 
 clash of ego 
 lack of decorum 
 
 237 
give satisfactory 
explanation as to why 
his client‘s mere 
absent; mere 
application by counsel 
on good grounds to 
disqualify judge; 
extending a copy of 
letter written to the 
litigant, to the judge; 
application by counsel 
on client‘s instruction 
to disqualify Deputy 
Public Prosecutors; 
failing to attend 
hearing. 
 
 
TABLE 4.7: Interview: Reasons for Contempt Sanctions Being Warranted 
 
Judge number 1 Lawyers probably do not behave properly in court. The 
behaviour and language used tend to anger the judge. Judges 
may get emotional, being impatient. After all, it is human 
nature.  
Judge number 2 The reason can be widespread in the sense that it starts with 
the non-compliance of the court‘s order up to contempt in 
the face of the court. It can be any of the reason in between 
also.  
Judge number 3 Disobedience of the court‘s orders and interference with the 
due administration of justice.  
Judge number 4 It can be due to the disobedience of the court‘s orders to the 
interference with the course of justice 
Judge number 5 (1) Disobey the orders.  
(2) Act or conduct that interferes with the administration 
of justice. 
(3) Personality of the Bench – if the judge is less 
tolerant of certain behaviour then he is quick to use 
the weapon of contempt.  
(4) Personal clash between lawyer and judge. Fire salvo 
at each other. 
Judge number 6 (1) Look at the personality of the Bench. Some judges 
are too quick to cite lawyers for contempt.  
(2) Personality clash. Some of the judges were from 
private legal practice. Perhaps, they had personality 
clashes with some lawyers, so would take on those 
lawyers when they appeared before him. 
  
Advocate 
number 1 
The trends for citing lawyers for contempt were very 
rampant after the 1988 fiasco. One of the reasons was that 
soon after 1988, there was a judicial crisis and judges were 
unsuitable had been appointed as judges. These were people 
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of the Bar who were not necessarily outstanding at the Bar. 
It was a trend or practice especially after the crisis when the 
judiciary started to appoint its own people. These lawyers-
appointed-judges, some of them have the habit of citing 
people for contempt just to show their authority. 
Advocate 
number 2 
Disobedience of the court‘s order and interference with the 
administration of justice are just common reasons for the 
citation. However, there is also a problem with the judges. 
They may get personally involved and may lose the 
objective.   
Advocate 
number 3 
Judges are the main problem in contempt of court. They 
emotionally take on the persons themselves especially when 
exercising summary procedures which have tendency of 
abusing the power. 
Advocate 
number 4 
Misbehave before a judge. We have colourful characters at 
the Bar. There were incidences like a lawyer who did not 
know how to address the judge and to move the court, and 
also another incidence when a lawyer appeared in the 
superior court without robe i.e. he was not properly attired. 
In my dictionary, they could be cited for contempt. 
Advocate 
number5 
There were cases for judges to cite lawyers for contempt for 
petty or less serious case such as failure to attend the court.  
  
Prosecutor 
number 1 
(1) Misconduct 
(2) Concealment of information. No full and frank 
disclosure 
(3) Scandalous affidavit filed by lawyers 
(4) Contempt in the face of court 
(5) Sub judice i.e. when someone passed comments in 
the midst of the proceedings or when the trial is 
imminent 
(6) Non-compliance of the court‘s order. 
Prosecutor 
number 2 
(1) Disobedience of the court‘s order 
(2) Over-criticising the judge unnecessarily that can put 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Prosecutor 
number 3 
(1) Misconduct and misbehaviour 
(2) Non-compliance of the court‘s order. 
Prosecutor 
number 4 
Interference and disobedience. 
 
From the tables above, the differences between what the judges thought and what 
the advocates or prosecutors viewed as the main reasons for contempt sanctions 
being warranted are quite clear and to certain points they are quite distinctive. 
Generally, the majority of the respondents were concerned with respect for the 
court and its order, ethical conducts, courtroom decorum, conducts that interfere 
with the proceedings as well as with the administration of justice. At this juncture, 
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both advocates and prosecutors stressed the same concerns as the judicial officers 
that the main reasons for citation of contempt were centred and lingered around 
lawyers. However, as mentioned by the advocates in the questionnaire, ‗foolish 
overzealous lawyers, arrogant sensitive judge‘ could be the main reasons for 
contempt sanctions being warranted. 
 
A number of respondents, some of whom were from the judiciary, pointed out that 
judges are the main reason of the material issues. Looking at the response by an 
advocate in the questionnaire, he accentuated that the whim and fancy of the 
judges in interpreting any act as ‗conduct obstructing justice‘ or ‗interfering with 
the course of justice‘ was among the contributing factors for lawyers to be cited 
for contempt, apart from the inexact and arbitrariness in the law. There was a 
strained relationship between the Bar and the Bench, as portrayed by the 
responses of Advocate numbers 1, 2, 3 and 5 during the interviews.  Interestingly, 
Judge numbers 1, 5 and 6 were in mutual agreement on this point.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the approach taken by the courts in contempt cases 
seems to be connected with events outside the court. This was supported by 
Advocate number 1 during the interview when he said ‗the trends for citing 
lawyers for contempt were very rampant after the 1988 fiasco. One of the reasons 
was that soon after 1988, there was a judicial crisis and judges were unsuitable 
had been appointed as judges. These were people of the Bar who were not 
necessarily outstanding at the Bar. It was a trend or practice, especially after the 
crisis when the judiciary started to appoint its own people. These lawyers-
appointed-judges, some of them have the habit of citing people for contempt just 
to show their authority. Hence the two events i.e. the removal of Salleh Abbas in 
1988 that resulted in the finding of contempt against the then President of the Bar 
Council
871
 and the removal of Anwar Ibrahim as the Deputy Prime Minister which 
led to the finding of contempt against Zainur Zakaria,
872
 have to a large extent 
affected the relationship between the Bar and the Bench and arguably have shaped 
the development of contempt law.  
 
                                                 
871
 Manjeet Singh Dhillon (n. 8). 
872
 Re Zainur Zakaria (n. 234). 
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(v) The Necessity of Contempt Law 
 
The respondents were asked on the necessity of contempt laws in ensuring the 
court‘s orders are obeyed, in ensuring no interference with the administration of 
justice as well as protecting a right to a full and fair trial. The answers given by 
the respondents in the questionnaire are tabled in Table 4.8 below. The 
respondents were asked to give the reasons for their answer.   
 
TABLE 4.8: Questionnaire: The necessity of the Law of Contempt in 
Ensuring Obedience to Court‟s Orders, in Protecting the Administration of 
Justice from any Interference and Protecting the Right to Fair Trial 
 
Question 7(a): 
Do you agree 
that the law of 
contempt 
exists to 
ensure that 
court orders 
are obeyed? 
Judicial Personnel Advocates Prosecutors 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
 
7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5 
 
- 
 
- 
Question 7(b): 
Do you agree 
that the 
purpose of the 
law of 
contempt is to 
ensure that 
the 
administration 
of justice is 
not interfered 
with? 
Judicial Personnel Advocates Prosecutors 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
 
7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5 
 
- 
 
- 
Question 7(c): 
Do you agree 
that the 
purpose of the 
law of 
contempt is to 
protect the 
right to fair 
trial? 
Judicial Personnel Advocates Prosecutors 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
Agree Disagree Do 
Not 
Know 
 
7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
12 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results from question 7(a), (b) and (c) of the questionnaire 
regarding their perception on the need of contempt of court to ensure obedience to 
the court orders, to protect the administration of justice from any interference and 
to protecting right to fair trial. The majority of the respondents, regardless of their 
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professional positions, agreed that judicial contempt power is necessary though 
some said that it is a necessary evil.  
 
From the responses tabled in Table 4.8, the majority agreed that the law of contempt 
exists to ensure that court orders are obeyed. As regards to disobedience of court 
orders, Judicial Personnel number 4 mentioned that ‗it sounds rather funny if there 
is no law to punish those who disobey the court orders. This power is given to the 
court to make sure that orders are obeyed. Courts must be respected at all times as 
they are the final arbiters. Contempt power is the power given to the court to 
ensure due administration of justice‘. 
 
However, the respondents gave different sentiments with regard to the issue of 
contempt law and interference with the administration of justice. The majority of 
the judicial officers and prosecutors were emphatically positive that law of 
contempt is needed to ensure that the administration of justice is not interfered 
with. However, with the exception of some advocates i.e. Advocates numbers 1, 4 
and 6, who opined that the contempt power would meet its purpose if the true 
meaning of interference with the administration of justice is fully understood by 
the judges. Otherwise it would be meaningless as it depends on judges‘ arbitrary 
interpretation. Advocate number 11 explained that ‗the discretion to exercise 
contempt power lies in the hand of the presiding judge. As such, it is discretionary 
and therefore subject to his or her personal judgment. This judgment can further 
be influenced by emotion and not necessarily rationale‘. The same sentiment is 
expressed by the respondents in relating to the use of contempt of court in 
protecting a fair trial. Theoretically, the respondents agreed that the law of 
contempt seeks to protect such right.  
 
The advocates also raised concerns regarding outside influence on the judges 
which could affect a fair trial of an accused. Advocate number 9 said that ‗there 
can be instances of the executive or powerful interest or even lobbies attempting 
to interfere with the legal process for a number of reasons. This should not be 
allowed as it will interfere with a person‘s right to a fair trial‘. Furthermore, 
Advocate number 12 expressed that ‗the law of contempt of court is to protect the 
sanctity of justice. The judges cannot use it to display extensive personal ability to 
 242 
manipulate the system and instill emotional points irrelevant to a case at hand‘. 
From the responses given by the advocates it reveals that their concerns were 
related to the exercise of the power by the judges who were often perceived as 
misused.  
 
Theoretically, the law of contempt is needed for the obedience of the court orders; 
it is required so that the administration of justice is not interfered with as well as 
to protect the right to full and fair trial. In practice, however, it has too much 
discretion and influence from the third party. As mentioned by the Advocate 
number 9, it is deplorable that ‗there can be instances of the executive or powerful 
interests or even lobbies attempting to interfere with legal process for a number of 
reasons‘. During the interviews, the interviewees were asked the same questions. 
They shared the same idea and sentiments as the respondents in the questionnaire.  
 
It can be derived from the answers given that contempt power is a sword as well 
as a shield to be used by the courts when there is any disobedience of the courts‘ 
orders or when the administration of justice is interfered with. However, it must 
be borne in mind that the whole basic idea of contempt is to uphold the authority 
of the court not the personal dignity of judges. Although judges are only the 
medium for the courts to dispense justice, sometimes judges are perceived to act 
beyond it. In addition, when the judiciary does not fully enjoy the doctrine of 
separation of power, the executive may impose its influences, interests or lobbies 
to interfere with the legal process. Therefore, the authority of the court must be 
guarded from any influences. By guarding the authority of the court, the 
confidence of the public in the administration of justice is maintained.   
 
(vi) The Main Areas of Concern 
 
Under this theme, five questions were asked on the probable anomalies in the law 
of contempt in Malaysia. They are as follows: 
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(a) Overlapping between Civil and Criminal Contempt 
 
Question 8 of the questionnaire asked the respondents: ‗Do you agree that the 
dichotomy between criminal and civil contempt of court is almost imperceptible 
due to the broad concept of contempt i.e. any conduct which interferes with the 
administration of justice may amount to a contemptuous act?‘ Question 8 is 
followed by Question 9 whereby the respondents were asked ‗Should the 
distinction between civil and criminal contempt be abolished?‘ The same 
questions were asked in the interview. 
 
The aim of both questions is to inquire whether the classification of contempt as 
being civil and criminal be abolished due to its decreasing significance, as the 
demarcation line between the two has become blurred. Both involve interference 
with the administration of justice.  
 
Three selections of ‗agree, disagree, do not know‘ were given to question 8 for the 
respondents to choose from.  The answers from the questionnaire are in Table 4.9 
below: 
 
TABLE 4.9: Questionnaire: Imperceptible Dichotomy between Civil 
and Criminal Contempt 
 
Question 8: Do you agree that the dichotomy between criminal and civil 
contempt is almost imperceptible due to the broad concept of contempt of 
court i.e. any conduct which interferes with the administration of justice 
may amount to a contemptuous act? 
Respondent Agree Disagree Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel 7 - - 
Advocates 12 - - 
Prosecutors 5 - - 
 
All of the respondents agreed that the dichotomy between criminal and civil 
contempt of court is almost imperceptible due to the broad concept of contempt 
i.e. any conduct which interferes with the administration of justice may amount to 
contempt of court. The reasons given by the respondents as follows: 
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Judicial Personnel 
 It is true that the dividing line is very slim. However, civil contempt is 
different from criminal contempt. Civil contempt deals with disobedience 
while criminal contempt is contempt by interference. 
 The concept of contempt is broad as it involves the interference with the 
administration of justice  
 
Advocates 
 The division between the two types of contempt becomes blurred as it 
involves the element of interference of the administration of justice. 
However, civil contempt largely involves with non-compliance with court 
orders. 
 The dividing line can be vague and sometimes confusing. Civil contempt 
might be ‗criminal‘ contempt.  
 Because they share the same principle and the punishment to be meted out 
are similar 
 
Prosecutors 
 Breach of court orders and injunctions is also an interference with the 
administration of justice.  
 The demarcation may seem very slim but to a certain extent it is clear so to 
allow for safeguarding of all relevant interests  
 
Although the respondents were of the same opinion that the distinction between 
civil and criminal contempt has become blurred, they disagreed that the distinction 
be abolished. This is the result extracted from the answers from Question 9 of the 
questionnaire which is tabled in Table 4.10 below. 
 
TABLE 4.10: Questionnaire: The Abolition of the Distinction between 
Civil and Criminal Contempt 
 
Question 9: Should the distinction between civil and criminal contempt of 
court be abolished? 
Respondent Yes No Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel - 7 - 
Advocates 6 6 - 
Prosecutors - 5 - 
 
Three options were given to the respondents to choose from ‗yes, no, do not 
know‘ to the question ‗Should the distinction between civil and criminal contempt 
of court be abolished?‘ and the majority chose to disagree with the exception to 6 
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advocates and solicitors. The majority shared the same concern that there must be 
a distinction between the two. This is because the procedures and punishment to 
be imposed are different in both types of contempt. An alleged contemnor can be 
punished instantly if he commits a serious contemptuous act in the face of the 
court but not in civil contempt in which most of its proceedings are initiated by 
motion.  
 
The 6 advocates who opted for the abolition of the distinction between civil and 
criminal contempt shared the same reason i.e. civil or criminal contempt carries 
the same effect i.e. interference with the administration of justice. Advocate 
number 5 would like the distinction to be abolished because ‗they share the same 
principle and the punishments to be meted out are similar‘ and it is quite 
captivating when Advocate number 6 stated in the questionnaire that ‗if it is to be 
abolished, it should be done by legislation‘. 
 
The issue on the abolition of the categories of civil and criminal contempt has 
been elucidated and explained further in the interview. According to Judge 
number 2 from the interview, the existence of civil and criminal contempt arises 
because of the two branches of law – civil and criminal. The defiance of the court 
order in civil action will commence by way of civil action, thus, Order 52 RHC 
1980 will be applicable. The applicant has to apply for leave as a threshold 
procedure before proceeding to file a motion for committal order. Whereas, when 
contempt is in facie the court, the court must be able to deal with it instantly. This 
view was supported by Advocate number 2 of the interview. 
 
Judge number 2 of the interview was of the opinion that the division between civil 
and criminal contempt will continue because the parties need to know where the 
action originates despite the sanction or measure of the punishment to be imposed 
by the court. In the end it is still the same. This situation is like common law and 
equity; the two exist although the water does not mix, they do not merge but the 
ultimate result is the same that is the administration of justice. Similarly in the 
case of contempt of court, be it civil or criminal, the result is still the same. 
Advocate number 2 of the interview is also in agreement, as he said that the 
distinction should be maintained because the procedures and the type of evidence 
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used are different in civil and criminal contempt. The distinction is helpful to the 
nature of contempt.  
 
The impression gained from the answers is that the categorisation of contempt as 
has been practiced is England is well accepted in Malaysia. The respondents 
agreed that the distinction between the two types of contempt has become blurred 
in terms of sentencing, however the idea to abolish the distinction altogether is not 
affirmatively concurred. As proposed by Advocate number 6 of the questionnaire, 
‗if it is to be abolished, it should be done by legislation‘ shows that legislating the 
law would address the ambiguity and provide clearer guidance to all legal actors 
in the system. 
 
(b) Standard of Proof 
 
TABLE 4.11: Questionnaire: Standard of Proof in Contempt Cases 
 
Question 10: The Standard of proof for establishing contempt, civil or 
criminal, is “beyond reasonable doubt”- do you agree? 
Respondent Agree Disagree Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel 7 - - 
Advocates 9 3 - 
Prosecutors 5 - - 
 
Table 4.11 shows question 10 of the questionnaire relating to the standard of proof 
in contempt cases. This question was asked in order to gauge the opinion of the 
respondents on the matter, although the law on this has somehow settled. The 
reason for asking this is to show that contempt is sui generis and civil contempt is 
treated as quasi-criminal. 
 
The respondents were given three options of answers to choose from ‗agree, 
disagree, do not know‘. The majority of the respondents from the three groups 
agreed that the standard of proof is ‗beyond reasonable doubt‘ due to the fact that 
contempt entails penal punishment i.e. imprisonment.  
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Nevertheless, a small minority took a view that the Malaysian courts were 
inconsistent in approaching this issue. This view was advanced by the advocates. 
Advocate number 8 expressed his view that the standard of proof should depend 
on the nature of contempt i.e. less serious for civil contempt. It is also dependent 
on the situation or facts of the case. If it is contempt in the face of court where the 
act is an obvious obstructive act then the contemnor does not need the burden to 
prove his intent beyond reasonable doubt as his act is an obvious contemptuous 
act.  
 
The answers above could be an indicator that this issue needs to be revisited, as 
firstly, civil and criminal contempt should not merge and secondly, different tests 
and standards are used for different contempt cases, even though the Malaysian 
courts stated that the law is settled.  
 
(c) Test of Liability for Publication Contempt 
 
The question on the test of liability relates to publication contempt, namely sub 
judice comment and publication that scandalises the court. It intends to identify 
what are the test and the degree of risk of interference sufficient to constitute 
publication contempt. The question also seeks to identify what the respondents 
think should be the acceptable test for publication contempt. Three options were 
provided for the respondents to choose from ‗inherent tendency‘ or ‗real risk of 
prejudice‘ or to provide other tests that they might think suitable. The answers are 
set out in Table 4.12 below. 
 
TABLE 4.12: Questionnaire: Test of liability for publication contempt 
 
Question 11: The Proper test to determine what amounts to contempt ought to 
be- 
 „inherent tendency‟ „real risk of 
prejudice‟ 
other 
Judicial Personnel 1 
 
5 - 
Advocates & 
Solicitors 
3 9 - 
Prosecutors 1 
 
4 - 
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The Malaysian courts have applied a less strict approach as seen in Murray v 
Hiebert.
873
 The position in Malaysia as of now is that it is not necessary for the 
court to prove affirmatively that there is a real risk of interference with the course 
of justice in the proceedings in question by reason of the offending statement. It is 
enough if it is likely or tends in anyway to interfere with the proper administration 
of justice – even if the degree of risk of interference is remote. The test as it stands 
today is rejected by the majority of the respondents. The risk of interference 
should be of a practical reality and must be backed by a specific fact and fully 
supported by way of evidence and not just a flimsy idea or thought.   
 
The majority of all the respondents, regardless of their profession, believed that 
the appropriate test should be the test of ‗real risk of interference‘ as they probably 
perceive that more weight would be given to the interest of the public in 
discussing matters of public interest i.e. more safeguards on the freedom of speech 
and expression. This means that while maintaining the stance of the supremacy of 
the administration of justice over the freedom of speech and expression, it moves 
the balance further towards freedom of speech and expression.  
 
(d) Mens rea and Strict Liability 
 
The respondents were requested to give their opinion whether the criminal 
contempt of court ought to be treated as strict liability offence. The aim of this 
question is to gauge the respondents view whether mens rea is an element in 
constituting contempt of court. The answers from the questionnaires are set out in 
Table 4.13 below. 
 
TABLE 4.13: Questionnaire: Strict Liability Offence  
 
Question 12: Do you think that the Malaysian criminal contempt of court 
should be a strict liability offence? 
 Yes No Do not know 
Judicial Personnel 4 1 2 
Advocates  11 - 1 
Prosecutors 1 3 1 
 
                                                 
873
 See Chapter 3, 3.1.2.2 (ii) (b) (ii), pp. 80-82; 3.2.1, pp.93-96.  
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The question was followed up by a request to give the reasons for their answer. 
The reasons given by the respondents will be set out in detail below before trying 
to find common points and differences.  
 
Judicial Personnel 
 Much easier to deal with 
 Yes, but so long as it is confined to where there is actual interference.  
 It will cut short the procedures  
 It is a strict liability just like the case administrative in nature like breaking 
traffic rules. 
 If contempt in the face of court, it is a clear case. Then no need for mens 
rea. Res ipsa laquitor as the act tells that you are contemptuous. In that 
case, the contemnor has to apologise for the act. If he does not then he will 
remain in contempt. Burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt like in 
any criminal offence. 
 That is debatable. Cannot be strict liability. You have to find out what is 
the effect of the article – does it lower the dignity of the court? Will it 
prejudice the trial that is going to be held? Therefore, mens rea in that 
sense is important. 
 No. It is not absolute. They have to explain their conducts. The only 
difference is in contempt in the face of court whereby everything is in the 
knowledge of the judge. Thus he will act as the prosecutor as well as the 
judge. 
 Contemnor should be given right to explain 
 
Advocates  
 Defences should be available to a charge of contempt such as defence of 
innocent publication and distribution, and, fair and accurate report of 
proceedings. 
 There is a need to determine mens rea. The contemnor must be shown to 
have had the mental element of guilt.  
 Contemnors must be given the right to defend with any defences available 
to him according to the circumstances. 
 The contemnor must be given a fair trial and a proper charge against him. 
 Criminal sanctions may apply and so the standard should be kept high. 
Contempt is also a serious allegation against a lawyer as an individual 
because it impacts the perception of their ethics and morality.  
 No, given Malaysia‘s record of politically motivated prosecution. 
 Until Malaysia has an ‗open‘ society with liberal allowance for free 
speech, strict liability makes it too easy to cite persons.  
 I believe in the requirement of actus reus and mens rea in deciding the 
criminal liability of a person. 
 It is not strict liability. Strict liability is clearly statutory like some drug 
cases where mens rea is not required. Although mens rea is not needed in 
contempt cases, it is not strict liability. For example, you are filing an 
 250 
affidavit claimed to be scandalous. Then who will decide that it is 
scandalous? 
 Audi alteram partem — must have the right to be heard and innocence 
until proven guilty. 
 
Prosecutors 
 Some judges or counsels are vindictive. Mens rea must be proven either of 
intention or knowledge. 
 Test may be objective but certainly not one of strict liability. 
 Mens rea is still the main element needed to be proved. 
 It may be treated as strict liability because of no requirement of mens rea 
to be proved. In sub judice, when a comment is made while the trial is 
pending, it is contempt. However, if does not know there is a pending trial, 
it might not be contempt. To prove guilty mind, have to show there are 
knowledge and intention. If you know the case is pending though no 
intention to interfere, it is still contempt. If do not know the case is 
pending, there is likely no contempt. 
 
The issue on the requirement of mens rea in constituting contempt of court and 
strict liability offence was further elaborated by the interviewees. Table 4.13 
below shows their preference on the matter as extracted from the interviews 
conducted. 
TABLE 4.14: Interview: Strict Liability Offence  
 
Question 12: Do you think that the Malaysian criminal contempt of court 
should be a strict liability offence? 
 Yes No Do not know Others 
Judges 1 - - 5 
Advocates  - 5 - - 
Prosecutors - - - 1 
 
The interviews revealed that the requirement of mens rea and strict liability 
offence is debatable as shown in column ‗Others‘ in Table 4.14 above. Judge 
number 1 gave the opinion that contempt of court cannot fall under strict liability 
offence. He quoted an example of publication contempt in which he viewed that at 
least intent to publish the alleged scandalous article needs to be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. This view was supported by Judge number 3. He said: ‗The 
journalists are granted with freedom of speech and expression but they must 
exercise it with responsibility. If contempt of court is a strict liability offence, it 
will become a gagging order. So long as the journalist publishes the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, the publication in the public interest could be a defence‘.   
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Advocates number 1 and 3 of the interview agreed that mens rea applied 
depending on a situation. Advocate number 3 explained that in Malaysia, at 
present, intent as in contempt cases relates to the commission of the alleged 
contemptuous act which in turn interferes with the course of justice. It does not 
need to prove that the alleged contemnor intends to interfere with the course of 
justice. Advocate number 1 opined that criminal contempt as a whole should not 
be applied strictly. He suggested that strict liability should only be applicable as in 
England when the proceedings in question are active.  
 
Prosecutor number 1 of the interview was of the opinion that the matter is 
debatable. He quoted an example of sub judice contempt when a comment is made 
while a case is pending. According to him, the comment made during this period 
would amount to contempt if the alleged contemnor knows that the case is 
pending although he has no intention to interfere with the due course of justice. If 
he does not know about the pending case, most likely there will be no contempt. 
Therefore, he must be allowed to defend himself.  
 
Nevertheless, Judge number 2 of the interview maintained that contempt in 
general is a strict liability offence. He said: ‗It is strict liability as there is no need 
to prove mens rea in the sense that once you prove the actual act or conduct then it 
gives rise to liability in contempt proceedings‘. He further said that the principle 
laid down is Murray Hiebert
874
 is the principle to be applied at present until it is 
reversed by the Federal Court.  
 
The answers from the samples illustrated two main lines of contention. One, 
mainly agreed by the majority of the three professions, is that the Malaysian 
criminal contempt should not be a strict liability offence while the second group 
opined that it is strict liability offence.  
 
The main reason for the second group of respondents for holding that the 
Malaysian criminal contempt should be strict liability offence was due to non-
requirement of mens rea in proving the contemptuous act. Once the act is a clear 
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 Murray Hiebert (CA) (n. 267). 
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case of contempt and it speaks for itself, mens rea or the intention of the accused 
to interfere with the administration of justice is not an element to be proved. That 
makes contempt offence a serious offence.    
 
However, this was incongruous to what the majority of the respondents thought. 
Although the test may be objective, it is not one of strict liability offences. Mens 
rea is still one of the elements needed to be proved, either of intention or 
knowledge. It cannot be treated like other statutory offences like selling poisonous 
food or breaking traffic rules. This group contended that mens rea is an element 
especially in publication contempt. As Advocate number 1 of the interview said; 
in the case where publication tends to scandalise the court, it should not straight 
away be held as contempt. The intention of the accused to publish the word that 
tends to scandalise and intention disrepute the court with his scandalising 
statements needed to be proved in order to constitute contempt offence. Advocate 
number 3 of the interview said that as to the publication contempt, the accused 
should be allowed to put forward a line of potential defence, such as the 
publication is in the public interest, innocent publication or distribution and/or fair 
and accurate reports. This is supported by Judge number 3 of the interview when 
he said that ‗courts cannot create a defence. It needs an act of Parliament for that 
matter‘. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, mens rea is one of the two major confusions manifest 
in the law of contempt. This is proven from the result of the empirical study 
discussed above.  
 
(e) Contempt Proceedings: Summary Power and Summary 
Process 
 
One of the unique and controversial features in the law of contempt is its 
committal procedure. As distinct from the ordinary proceedings, the judge has the 
power and the option to conduct a committal proceeding summarily. A judge 
himself may initiate the proceeding without requiring the Attorney General or any 
other interested parties to commence action. Three questions were asked relating 
to summary procedure. They are as follows: 
 253 
(1) Do you feel that the summary procedure is to be used only in cases 
of contempt in the face of court? 
(2) Do you think the courts should be allowed to initiate contempt 
proceedings on their own motion for any category of contempt? 
(3) Do you think that the use of summary procedure may jeopardise 
the alleged contemnor‘s right to a full and fair trial? 
 
The questions asked endeavour to find out: 
 
(1) what the procedures are like at present,  
(2) when should the court exercise summary procedure, 
(3) whether the courts should be allowed to initiate contempt 
proceedings on their own motion for any category of contempt, 
(4) whether the summary procedure will prejudice the right to full and 
fair trial? 
 
For each question, the respondents were given three selections of answer to 
choose from ‗yes, no, do not know‘ and this was then followed up by a request to 
give reasons for their answer.  
 
TABLE 4.15: Questionnaire: The Use of Summary Power in All Contempt 
Cases  
 
Question 13: Do you think that the use of the summary power for dealing 
with all forms of contempt is justified? 
 Yes No Do not know 
Judicial Personnel 4 2 1 
Advocates  1 10 1 
Prosecutors 4 1 - 
 
The reasons given are as follows: 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 It is its nature. It has got to be forceful and speedily disposed with. 
 The court must be armed with this power so that it can deal with any kind 
of contempt. 
 Should be used in all types of contempt as contempt is serious offence. It 
must be dealt forthwith in order to give its maximum impact and to 
maintain the court‘s dignity. 
 When contemptuous acts happen in straightforward cases so as not to 
waste time when it is a clear-cut case of contempt.  
 Only in in facie contempt. Not otherwise. 
 Summary procedure should only be used in cases where there is contempt 
in the face of the court and this procedure can also be used when it is 
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imperative to act quickly to preserve the integrity of trial which is in 
progress or about to commence.  
 
Advocates  
 Not with contempt outside the court. 
 The summary procedure flies in the face of natural justice! 
 When the act is so serious but must adhere to the proper procedures. 
 The use of summary procedure extends to other types of criminal contempt 
will be easily abused. Therefore, there must have a safety clause like to 
allow any minute a stay of proceedings immediately. 
 When the act is really blatant. But before the alleged contemnor can be 
cited for contempt he must be given an opportunity to explain.  
 Only obvious cases of contempt.  
 When the act is so grotesque and proper procedures adhered to.  
 
Prosecutors 
 Contempt in the face of the court because actus reus is already proven in 
that instance. In other contempt cases, it is still an allegation.  
 Obvious case of contempt. 
 When it seriously interferes with the administration of justice and it is 
needed to protect it. 
  
 
TABLE 4.16: Questionnaire: The Use of Summary Power Only in Contempt 
in the Face of the Court 
 
Question 14: Do you think that the summary power is to be used only in 
cases of contempt in the face of the court? 
 Yes No Do not know 
Judicial Personnel 2 4 - 
Advocates  10 1 1 
Prosecutors 2 3 - 
 
The reasons given are as follows: 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 Should be used in all types of contempt as contempt is a serious offence. It 
must be dealt forthwith in order to give its maximum impact and to 
maintain the court‘s authority. 
 The court must be armed with this power so that can deal with any kind of 
contempt. 
 Summary procedure should only be used in cases where there is contempt 
in the face of the court and this procedure can also be used when it is 
imperative to act quickly to preserve the integrity of trial which is in 
progress or about to commence.  
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 Court must act immediately and instantly in contempt in the face of the 
court. The judge who presides must decide himself. 
 
Advocates  
 As all facts and circumstances are within the full knowledge and 
observation of the judge. We have to trust his sense of fairness. 
 Contempt in the face of the court needs to be dealt with immediately 
although not necessarily severely. 
 For obvious cases and only obvious cases of contempt. 
 Even though it is contempt in the face of the court, it should be heard by 
another judge. 
 The use of summary procedure extends to other types of criminal contempt 
will be easily abused. Therefore, there must have a safety clause like to 
allow any minute a stay of proceedings immediately. 
 When the act is really blatant. But before the alleged contemnor can be 
cited for contempt he must be given an opportunity to explain.  
 Must give time to prepare defence. 
 
Prosecutors 
 It is because actus reus is already proven in that instance.  
 It seriously interferes with the administration of justice which is needed to 
be protected. 
 
TABLE 4.17: Questionnaire: Suo Motu Jurisdiction in All Contempt Cases 
 
Question 15: Do you think the courts should be allowed to initiate 
contempt proceedings on their own motion for any category of contempt? 
 Yes No Do not know 
Judicial Personnel 4 3 - 
Advocates  - 11 1 
Prosecutors 4 1 - 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 Any contempt is an affront to the court and the administration of justice. If 
initiated by the court, it will be dealt expeditiously. 
 The court must be armed with this power otherwise it will be a mockery of 
the court‘s proceedings. 
 Not always. It would be better for Attorney General to initiate in order to 
avoid prejudice and bias. 
 
Advocates  
 Only in contempt in the face of the court. 
 Should be limited to contempt in facie only. 
 The Attorney General should move the court in contempt ex facie. 
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Prosecutors 
 Perhaps, more apparent in contempt in the face of the court. 
 
Tables 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show the results from questions 13 to 15 of the 
questionnaire relating to the use of summary procedure in contempt cases. The 
questions were designed to explore the respondents‘ knowledge of the procedural 
aspect of contempt of court and also to acquire their views on the correct 
procedure for contempt cases.  
 
From the answers given in the three questions above, it can be summarised that 
the majority of the respondents thought that summary procedure should only be 
used when contempt is in facie of the court and when the conducts are so 
grotesque. In this circumstance, it is imperative for the court to act quickly and to 
cite the contemnor instantly so that the trial in progress and the due administration 
of justice as a whole will not be prejudiced. In cases of contempt ex facie, the 
matter should be left to the Attorney General or to the aggrieved party to initiate 
contempt proceedings. The court can invoke its suo motu jurisdiction only in in 
facie contempt. On the other hand, the minority opined that courts should be able 
to exercise summary procedure in all cases of contempt because contempt cases 
involve the act seriously interfering with the administration of justice. This was 
the view held by Judicial Personnel and Prosecutors.  
 
Regarding the exercise of summary power of contempt, the advocates expressed 
their concerns as to the tendency of abusing summary procedures by the presiding 
judge. They stressed that those summary procedures fly in the face of natural 
justice that is the right to a fair trial, thus, at least, the alleged contemnor should be 
given an opportunity to explain, time to prepare for defence and the right to a legal 
representative of his own choice. Therefore, when the court encounters a serious 
contemptuous case in its presence and in the exercise of its summary power 
instantly, the court must not deprive the alleged contemnor from the safeguards 
mentioned above. 
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The respondents were also requested to share what they think of the courts 
initiating contempt proceedings on their own in all types of contempt cases. The 
majority of the respondents in the questionnaire agreed that courts may initiate 
contempt proceedings suo motu only in cases of contempt in the face of court 
when the conduct is so serious and grotesque.  
 
The interviews with the judges, advocates and prosecutors gave more detailed 
explanation on the procedural aspects of contempt of court. The interviewees were 
asked to share their knowledge of the procedures. Questions 13 to 15 of the 
questionnaires were also asked but the main focus during the interview was asking 
the interviewees to explain further the proper procedural aspect of contempt of 
court.  
 
In the interview, the question regarding the procedures of contempt of court at 
present was asked.  Judge number 2 explained that in ‗contempt in the face of 
court, court must be able to deal with it instantly. In the case of scandalising the 
court and sub judice comment, there are two ways it can be done. Firstly, the court 
can act on its own by summoning the alleged contemnor to show cause. Secondly, 
the Attorney General can act in the public interest and bring the alleged 
contemnor to court. There must be a proper affidavit by way of civil proceedings. 
When the judge initiates, this is the part where the court takes a positive role by 
giving the ‗show cause notice‘. This may not be the most ideal situation because 
the court may be seen as partisan‘. The explanation by Judge number 2 was 
confirmed by Judges number 3, 4, 5 and also Advocate number 2. From the 
answers, the role of the Attorney General in contempt cases is questionable. As 
stated, the Attorney General may move the court in contempt matter but in the 
present procedures as provided in Order 52 RHC 1980, it does not spell out when 
the Attorney General should initiate the proceedings. Prosecutor number 1 viewed 
that ‗when there is an interest to defend the judiciary and administration of justice. 
That is the duty of the Attorney General as the custodian of public interest‘. 
 
The interviewees were asked when summary power should be exercised. The 
majority answered that conduct that is an obvious, serious and blatant attack on 
the administration of justice such as contempt in the face of court can be dealt 
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with by the court instantly by invoking courts‘ suo motu jurisdiction. In other 
types of contempt, it is still summarily dealt with but it is for the Attorney General 
or other relevant parties to initiate the committal proceedings. The alleged 
contemnor will then be summoned to court to show cause why he should not be 
cited for contempt. Although, contempt of court is dealt summarily, Advocate 
number 3 reserved that summary contempt procedure must be used sparingly and 
with caution. In furtherance of his view, Judge number 3, Advocate number 2 and 
4 opined that the procedures should be fair and rules of natural justice should be 
safeguarded. Therefore, charge should be clearly framed and the alleged 
contemnor should be given sufficient time and opportunity to explain himself or to 
prepare defence. Above all, the right to full and fair trial must be accorded to the 
alleged contemnor. Another point highlighted by Advocate number 4 of the 
interview is that in contempt in the face of court, it is preferable for the matter to 
be decided by another judge in order to avoid bias. He supported the proposal by 
the Bar that a matter should be placed with the Chief Justice to arrange a hearing 
before another judge unless the alleged contemnor opts to be tried before the same 
judge where the alleged contemptuous act occurred. 
 
Judge number 2 of the interview further added that ‗in the exercise of this 
summary power, it is an absolutely essential virtue to remain calm, cool, collected 
and concerted and be ‗as sober as a judge‘. He said that to lose one‘s temper is to 
lose one‘s proper sense of judgment. The judge should be patient, prudent and 
wise. According to him, a sober judge shall not allow any adverse circumstance to 
obstruct or hamper the proper exercise of his judicial duties.   
 
In addition, the respondents were asked in the questionnaire to share their views 
whether summary procedures may jeopardise the alleged contemnor‘s right to a 
full and fair trial. The result is in Table 4.18 below. 
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TABLE 4.18: Questionnaire: Right to a Full and Fair Trial 
 
Question 16: Do you think that the use of the summary procedure may 
jeopardise the alleged contemnor‟s right to a full and fair trial? 
 Yes No Do not know 
Judicial Personnel 2 4 1 
Advocates  7 2 3 
Prosecutors 1 4 - 
 
From the answers given above, there were 10 respondents who agreed and 10 who 
disagreed that the use of summary procedures may jeopardise the alleged 
contemnor‘s right to a full and fair trial. A further 4 respondents were unsure. 
Therefore, there are an equal percentage of the respondents of the same opinion. 
The reasons given by the respondents are laid down as follows: 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 Even though it is dealt summarily, the contemnor‘s right to be heard is 
always given.  
 Even it is known as summary procedures, aggrieved party can always put 
forward their defence. The contemnor can purge the contempt. The court 
decision is can be appealed.  
 There is a right of appeal to correct any injustice. 
 Contempt is a serious matter. To deal with it summarily is not justified. 
Sufficient time and opportunity to answer must be given. 
  
Advocates 
 The trial may be prejudiced because the presiding judge before whom the 
alleged is committed is the interested party in the outcome of the 
decision. Therefore, he should not act as a judge, jury and witness. The 
hearing should be before a different judge. 
 Judges must not be allowed to let their emotions derail justice. 
 That is why it should be resorted to most sparingly. 
 It is not the procedure that denies rights of person, but the whole thing 
depends on the persons involved. 
 It is your conduct throughout the entire proceedings that is relevant. If a 
litigant acts contemptuously, he should be punished. 
 
Prosecutors 
 Only when it is not properly used, when all the rights and safeguards are 
denied.  
 
From the reasons given by the respondents, it can be summarised that summary 
procedures may not jeopardise the alleged contemnor‘s right to full and fair trial if 
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the proper procedures are followed. In order to accord the alleged contemnor with 
the full and fair trial, his right to be heard must always be given, considering that 
contempt is dealt with summarily. Besides that, the right to appeal against the 
decision is granted to every contemnor as a safeguard. This notion is upheld by 
the judicial personnel and prosecutors.  
 
On the other hand, Advocate number 1 of the questionnaire was of the opinion 
that summary procedure will jeopardise the alleged contemnor‘s right to a full and 
fair trial, for if it is summarily done, it will be heard by the same presiding judge 
before whom the contemptuous act was committed. ‗The presiding officer before 
whom the alleged contempt is committed may be prejudiced as he is an interested 
person in the outcome of the decision and therefore he should not act as judge, 
jury and witness. The hearing should be before a different judge‘. Another 
interesting point added by Advocate number 8 of the questionnaire is that it is not 
the procedure that denies rights of person but the whole thing depends on the 
person involved. The advocate pointed out that summary procedure might 
jeopardise the alleged contemnor‘s right if the judge is not being fair. Above all, it 
is the judges‘ perception and attitudes that determine the matter. 
 
The clue hinted at by the respondents is that failure to follow the proper procedure 
can be fatal. To a certain extent, the advocates are having doubts whether 
contempt should be dealt summarily because the alleged contemnor will be heard 
before the same judge where the alleged contemptuous act had occurred. As 
suggested by this group of respondents, the matter should be heard by a different 
judge. If so, contempt procedures will no longer be summary. Their concern 
rested on the presiding judge being judgmental. However, that cannot be the sole 
reason, as the conduct of the parties involved in the entire proceedings is also a 
contributing factor.   
The answers provided by the sample regarding the summary procedures reveal 
that there is no standard parameter in contempt proceedings. The present practices 
received a lot of comments and criticism due to those uncertainties and 
ambiguities.   
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(vii) The Ethical Conduct 
 
Contempt sanctions are usually imposed against lawyers who misbehave in the 
courtroom. The ethical behaviour of the lawyers is questioned. There are at least 
two points to ponder. First, the effectiveness of contempt sanction is questioned in 
ensuring proper conduct of lawyers. Secondly, it questions the ability of the 
Malaysian Bar as well as prosecution‘s self disciplining in dealing with their 
members‘ ethical conduct.  
 
(a) The Effectiveness of the Contempt Sanctions in Controlling 
Proper Behaviour of Lawyers 
 
Question 17 of the questionnaire was posed to the respondents which seeks to 
evaluate their opinion on the effectiveness of the contempt power and sanctions in 
controlling proper behaviour and conduct of lawyers.  The question is: ‗Do you 
think that contempt sanctions are effective in ensuring proper conduct of lawyer?‘ 
This question was also extended to the interviewees.  
 
In the questionnaire, three selections of answers were given to the respondents to 
choose from ‗effective, not effective, do not know‘ and was followed up by a 
request to give the reasons for their answer. Table 4.19 sets out the answers as 
follows: 
 
TABLE 4.19: Questionnaire: Contempt Effectiveness in Controlling 
Lawyers‟ Conduct 
 
    Effective       Not Effective       Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  5   1   1 
Advocates    4   8   - 
Prosecutors   5   1   - 
 
The majority of the respondents, with some exception by the advocates, 
considered contempt sanctions as an effective means of ensuring lawyers‘ proper 
behaviour. On the other hand, some advocates who answered in contrast to the 
majority, demonstrated a strong minority who think that contempt power is not the 
sole means in ensuring the proper conduct of lawyers. Respondents were next 
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asked to state their reasons for choosing the options provided. The list of their 
reasons is as follows: 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 Court must have this power to punish contemnor for their misconduct. 
 It is because court is in control of the proceedings. 
 Without contempt power how come the court will maintain its dignity. 
 Will face the criminal punishment i.e. imprisonment. 
 Will effect the lawyers‘ reputation. 
 Never use it but people should know that courts have this power. 
 This is subjective; it depends on the individual judge. One, who is very 
strict & fair, will be very effective. 
 The court has duty in disciplining lawyers. 
 Not wise to be used too widely. Lawyers should be trained to behave and 
conduct themselves with demeanour required. 
 
Advocates  
 The use of this power is sometimes abused. 
 If used sparingly and appropriately. 
 If properly used. Use against lawyers must be balanced with needs of 
right to criticise fairly and to speak out. 
 Lawyers act not according to fears but according to the limitations set by 
the law.  Contemptuous or not is not determined by the lawyer but 
actually by the presiding judge. 
 If it is done properly and bona fide. Because lawyers reputation are 
everything. A lawyer held for contempt clearly indicates some ethical or 
moral doing on his part. Their reputations will be affected. 
 As far as advocates are concerned, it is the embarrassment of being cited 
and losing the gravitas that the litigating public experts. 
 Lawyers are also subject to disciplinary proceedings. 
 Lawyers can be struck off the Roll. 
 To a certain extent it is effective, especially for the proper lawyers; but 
there are always rogues in every profession. 
 
Prosecutors 
 No one wants to be punished unnecessarily. 
 When it is used as a last resort. 
 Courts must have power to enforce judgment and protect administration 
of justice from any interference. 
 Courts can discipline the lawyers. 
 Easily abused and arbitrary. 
 The Bar‘s duty for its members ethical conduct. 
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The judicial officers and prosecutors advanced their views that contempt power 
must reside in courts so that the courts have some kind of means of controlling 
professional misconduct. It is part of courts‘ duty to maintain good discipline 
amongst the lawyers. Nevertheless, this power must never be abused and it must 
be exercised rarely or as a last resort.  
 
This view was further supported by the interviewees as can be seen in Table 4.20 
below. 
 
TABLE 4.20: Interview: Contempt Effectiveness in Ensuring Proper 
Conduct of Lawyer 
 
Judge number 2 Contempt sanction is one of the ways to ensure proper 
conduct of lawyers but self-restrain on their part would be 
more effective. Nowadays, we have more than 13 000 
lawyers and the background of the lawyers, their 
educational qualifications, their attitude in life, and the 
values which they adhered to in the way of conducting with 
other people. All these things play a very important part as 
to whether a person appearing in court is likely to commit 
contempt or not. 
Advocate  number 1 Lawyers by nature are not contemptuous of the court. What 
happens nowadays seems to be seen by somebody as 
contempt. For example, somebody makes a little remark 
about the court, there will be somebody who will go and 
make a police report to say that that is contempt. This is 
unnecessary. That is the reason why contempt law would 
become so uncertain. 
Prosecutor number 1 Court can discipline lawyers by way of contempt sanction 
but it is the fundamental duty of the Bar for its members‘ 
ethical conduct.  
 
It can be concluded from the reason given by Judge number 2 of the interview that 
people should know that the power is there, it can be used although is rarely being 
used. This idea is supported by a notion that there is a possible criminal 
punishment waiting and it would cause embarrassment to lawyers to be cited for 
contempt, as this indicates their ethical value is at stake. However, Judge number 
2 opined that the most effective way to ensure the lawyers‘ proper conduct is none 
other than the lawyers themselves. It is self-restraint of their part that is most 
important. This idea is supported by the notion that professional ethics and values 
are best controlled within the profession itself. This notion was supported by 
Prosecutor number 1. 
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On the other hand, a point advanced by Advocate number 1 is that although there 
are errant and rogue advocates, lawyers by nature are not contemptuous of the 
court. It again depends on the judge and their interpretation of such acts as 
whether they amount to contempt or otherwise. This advocate held that the power 
is easily abused by the judge and it is arbitrary. It can be deduced from his point 
that contempt sanctions may be one of the effective ways in controlling lawyers‘ 
ethical conduct if it is not fraught with abuse.  
 
The impression from the sample is that contempt power is essential and effective 
to control misdemeanours but it has to be resorted to as the last option when other 
means fail. Besides, the Malaysian Bar, for instance, has disciplinary power over 
advocates. 
 
(b) The Effectiveness of Self-Disciplining Ability 
 
As some issues in contempt relate to professional misconduct, questions relating 
to the effectiveness of the self-disciplining ability of the Malaysian Bar and 
Prosecution office were posed to respondents and interviewees.  
 
(i) The Malaysian Bar‟s Self-Disciplining Ability 
 
TABLE 4.21: Questionnaire: Effectiveness of the Malaysian Bar‟s Self-
Disciplining Ability 
 
Question 18: How effective do you think the Malaysian Bar‟s self-disciplining 
ability is in dealing with improper conduct of its members? 
   Effective  Not Effective       Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  1   4   2 
Advocates    7   3   2 
Prosecutors   -   3   2 
 
Table 4.21 shows the results from the questionnaire of the respondents‘ perception 
in the effectiveness of the Malaysian Bar‘s self-disciplining ability.  The results 
show that the majority of the respondents, with the exception of advocates, are 
concerned with the ineffectiveness of the Bar in disciplining its members. The 
reasons given by them are as follows: 
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Judicial Personnel 
 Many of young lawyers are lacking in their ethical values. 
 The Bar has no control over the conduct of its members. 
 The Bar will only act when there is a complaint thus too slow in taking 
action. 
 To punish people of your own kind is quite difficult. 
 
Prosecutors 
 Sometimes the punishment is too lenient. 
  It is not effective as the Disciplinary Board cannot deal with the 
misbehave lawyers as they have personal interest. 
 Slow proceedings and sanctions are not to deter people. Only reprimand. 
 There are advocates still in active practice though were charged with 
criminal offences. 
 
The majority of respondents perceived that the Bar‘s ability to control its 
members‘ ethical conduct is ineffective. The answers relayed by the judicial 
personnel and prosecutors show that the lack of ethical behaviour among 
advocates, especially young advocates, is due to the Bar itself. It was alleged that 
the Bar fails to carry-out its duty, and to a certain extent, does not practice what it 
preaches. The respondents raised concerns of bias for the profession‘s and its 
members‘ interests. The disciplinary process is slow and cumbersome, and aside 
from this, the mechanism is under-resourced.  
 
On the other hand, there were seven advocates who positively claimed that the 
Bar‘s self-disciplinary structure is effective in controlling the behaviour of its 
members. According to Advocate number 1 of the questionnaire, the advocates 
are governed by the LPA 1976 and Legal Practice & Etiquette Rules 1978 which 
encompass lawyers‘ conduct to the court, client and other lawyers. The Act and 
the Rules set out the guidelines for the conduct and the procedures and 
punishment if there is any breach of the ethical behaviour of the advocates. This 
reflects that the Bar takes a strong stand. Should anybody breach any of these 
rules they are reported straight away to the Disciplinary Board. Advocate number 
3 of the questionnaire also appeared satisfied with the way the Bar deals with its 
members‘ conduct at present. He based his opinion on his own personal 
experience in defending cases before the Disciplinary Committee. Furthermore, he 
said that the punishment meted out by this Board to errant lawyers including 
striking off the Roll has been an effective deterrent. However, it has to be borne in 
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mind that having Rules and enforcing them are two different things altogether. 
This was the concern forwarded by Prosecutor number 1 of the questionnaire.  
 
In the interview, the same question was put to the interviewees. The results are 
displayed in Table 4.22 below. 
 
TABLE 4.22: Interview: Effectiveness of the Malaysian Bar‟s Self-
Disciplining Ability 
 
Question 18: How effective do you think the Malaysian Bar‟s self-disciplining 
ability is in dealing with improper conduct of its members? 
   Effective  Not Effective       Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  1   5   - 
Advocates    3   1   1 
Prosecutors   1   1   2 
 
 
Table 4.22 shows the results from the interviews. The majority of the interviewees 
expressed the same concern: the ineffectiveness of the Malaysian Bar‘s self-
disciplining ability in ensuring its members‘ ethical conduct. Judge number 3 was 
of a view that the standard of the Bar has fallen tremendously. According to him, 
the Bar Council has lost its focus and seems to neglect the standard of the 
profession. Judge number 2 of the interview noted that how far the Bar vigorously 
exercised the power will depend on the school of thought prevailing at the Bar.  
 
Nevertheless, one interesting aspect is brought up by Judge number 3 of the 
interview when he referred to ethics teaching in law school. The lawyers-to-be 
should be taught about professional ethics before they go out and practice. These 
young lawyers, who are in practice less than 7 years, according to Advocate 
number 4 of the interview, are referred to as ―Yuppies‖ short for ―young urban 
professional‖ because they are labelled as having more interest in getting clients 
and sometimes have tendencies to compromise with the basis of professional 
ethics.  
 
There is one good point advanced by Judge number 5 of the interview. He said, ‗If 
the judge encounters lawyer‘s misconduct in his courtroom, he can report the 
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matter to the Bar. Judges are duty bound to report to the Bar. This is also one of 
the duties of the Bench in ensuring the dignity of the profession. If the Bar has lost 
its direction, it will reflect and affect the dignity of the Bench too. The Bar and the 
Bench work together. The Bar is the Bench‘s wing. The atmosphere that the Bar 
and the Bench work in is open to public viewing. So the Bench cannot have any 
member of the Bar misbehave. The Bench is supposed to police the Bar‘s conduct 
in that sense‘. 
 
(ii) The Malaysian Prosecutions‟ Self-Disciplining Ability 
 
 
TABLE 4.23: Questionnaire: Effectiveness of the Malaysian Prosecution‟s 
self-disciplining ability 
 
Question 19: How effective do you think the Malaysian Prosecutions‟ self-
disciplining ability is in dealing with improper conduct of its members? 
   Effective  Not Effective       Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  1   2   4 
Advocates    1   1   10 
Prosecutors   5   -   - 
 
Table 4.23 shows the result of the respondents‘ views on the ability of Malaysian 
Prosecution‘s self-disciplining ability in controlling its members‘ ethics and 
discipline. It is interesting to note that most of the respondents – judicial personnel 
and advocates – were unsure on the Prosecutions‘ self-disciplining ability. 
Advocates number 8, 9 and 11 of the questionnaire expressed their doubt on the 
matter as they have no idea how the Attorney General‘s Chambers handle the 
issue of misconduct of its own staff.   
 
Prosecutors agreed on the effectiveness of their office‘s self-disciplining ability as 
mentioned by Prosecutor number 1 of the questionnaire that ‗if you fall out of 
line, you lose your job‘. In order to get a better idea on this matter, during the 
interview, judges, advocates and prosecutors were asked the same question. The 
majority of the judges and advocates were unsure on the prosecutions‘ self-
disciplining ability. Some of the judges and advocates expressed their doubt as to 
whether the Attorney General would take action against his inferiors.  
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Prosecutor number 1 of the interview explained that when there is a complaint 
against a Deputy Public Prosecutor, a complaint will be forwarded to the Attorney 
General. The Deputy Public Prosecutor will be served with a ‗show cause notice‘. 
If later his gross misconduct has been proved, he will either be reprimanded or 
transferred.  
 
Hence it can be concluded from the results derived from questions 18 and 19 that 
it is the tendency of the people from their own profession to say that theirs is 
rather effective.  
 
(iii) The Judges‟ Ethical Conduct 
 
Question number 20 in the questionnaire, ‗Do you think judges should be subject 
to contempt laws?‘ was put to the respondents in the questionnaire and in the 
interview. The respondents were asked to rate their perception on the possibility 
of taking contempt action against judges. The choices of ‗yes, no, do not know‘ 
were provided. The question was designed to gauge ideas on the best method to 
govern judges‘ ethical conduct. The idea of subjecting the judges to contempt 
laws was sparked during the trial of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 when one of Anwar‘s 
counsel initiated contempt proceedings against the presiding judge for his alleged 
vulgar and contemptuous words against the counsel.  
 
The results from the questionnaire are shown in Table 4.24, whereas the results 
from the interview are provided in Table 4.25 below. 
 
TABLE 4.24: Questionnaire: Should judges be subject to contempt law? 
 
Question 20: Do you think judges should be subject to contempt laws? 
    Yes   No       Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  -   7   - 
Advocates & Solicitors 8   4   - 
Prosecutors   1   4   - 
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TABLE 4.25: Interview: Should judges be subject to contempt law? 
 
Question 20: Do you think judges should be subject to contempt laws? 
    Yes   No       Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  1   5   - 
Advocates & Solicitors 3   2   - 
Prosecutors   1   1   - 
 
The samples were also requested to state their reasons for their answers. The 
answers given by the respondents in the questionnaire, as well as in the interview, 
are set out in detail before finding common points and differences.  
 
Judicial Personnel 
 
 If at all there are errant judges, they will be dealt with under the Judges‘ 
Code of Ethics. 
 Judges‘ duty is to dispense justice. Any wrongdoing will be meted out by 
Code of Ethics. 
 Immunity should not be compromise. 
 Disciplinary action can be taken against judges by Chief Justice. 
 If a judge would commit an act that would be contemptuous, he is unfit 
to be a judge. There can be no occasion that he is to be protected if he 
acts in contempt. 
 First of all we have to find the facts as to what the judge has done to 
warrant a citation of contempt against him.  If the judge is doing his 
duties in the course of judicial proceedings then the law is very clear, 
Section 14 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 is very clear that the 
judge is judicially immune. That immunity is all progressive, it covers 
everything. I do not think there could be any contempt proceedings 
against judges. If a judge can be cited for contempt you can find no 
judges wanting to sit. Lawyers are officers of the court, they have been 
called to the Bar by the court and they have to follow decorum in court. 
Judges have the Code of Ethics; we will try to hear with every patience, 
every competence & we are going to do to the best of our ability as all 
the judges do. Unless there are facts that justify the citation of contempt 
and unless the law is changed then there can be proceedings initiated 
against the judge. 
 The judges are sitting in the court where they are the masters. We did 
with very limited exceptions but those exceptions are not supported by 
statute, at most they are supported by common law but with common law 
except for in India. Say for example, the judge were to fall asleep 
throughout the proceedings, you cannot cite him for contempt. Unless of 
course the judge goes down to the Bar table and gives the lawyer the 
biggest punch in town, then it may not be proper for him to see him up 
there. We have the Code of Ethics and we adhere to the Code of Ethics. 
So I would say that as of now no judge should be subject to the law of 
contempt. We follow closely to English law. But what happens to India 
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we do not know may be it best to confine it to Indian environment. As 
well as for Malaysia, I do not think this can be applied in whatever 
context. 
 It is a good idea weighing the way they behave nowadays. However, the 
problem of enforcement – who will charge them? Will the Attorney 
General do it? 
 
Advocates  
 
 This will check and act as deterrent for some judges who are carried 
away by their own pre-conceived prejudices and wrongly believe that 
flexing their muscles would result in speedy conclusion of the trial at the 
expense of justice. In India, a judge is liable for contempt of his own 
court or of any other court in the same manner as any other individual is 
liable. 
 If there is interference of justice by the judges. 
 Judges cannot be above the law and cannot abuse their power. 
 Of course! Witness the conduct of Tun Abdul Hamid Omar as tribunal 
chairman in the case against Tun Salleh Abbas. 
 Why not? A lot of judges misbehave too. 
 I think a judge should be subject to contempt laws if he behaves himself 
in a way that is contemptuous in his own court. I think somebody should 
charge him. But I am not sure this is something that we want as a 
statutory provision. In India there are cases where a judge can be cited for 
contempt. In Malaysia, Fernando brought a claim against the judge to cite 
him for contempt due to the words addressed to Fernando by the judge. 
This is among the cases to support that. 
 No. If a judge is corrupt, evil or stupid they should be removed (and 
jailed for the first two qualities) not subject to contempt. 
 This will destroy the sanctity and reputation of the bench. 
 It is a bit draconian. We have Judges‘ Code of Ethics and tribunal under 
Art. 125 of the Federal Constitution, and also Judicial Appointment 
Commission. 
 There is a larger issue that is the public confidence in the judiciary and 
the security of tenure of the judge. The judge must be independent and he 
must know that he is not subject to criticism, penal punishment for 
actions that he has done. He may take position because he knows the law 
better. If we extend it to judges, it will create much dispute to the whole 
framework of our legal society which is the separation of power and 
integrity of the judiciary. Judges are serious; the authority figures which 
have the authority to send a man to death, authority to say that you can be 
a bankrupt. If we were to bring judges to contempt, people would 
disregard the system and not be sure where will it all end up after that. 
Federal Constitution provides for a tribunal. Thus, a proper hearing 
should be carried and if found to be misbehaving, he should be removed. 
If contempt, the judge will go back to the Bench, go back to his job. Can 
he go back? 
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Prosecutors 
 
 Because they represent the court. 
 Lodge a complaint to the Chief Justice. Code of Ethics rules. 
 Code of Ethics is sufficient to cover the judges‘ conduct although it is not 
very detail. 
 One court can be held for contempt of another court. Thus judges can be 
liable for contempt in his own court. 
   
The idea of subjecting judges to contempt law received negative response from 
most of the respondents, especially judicial officers, prosecutors and a small 
number of advocates. However, the majority of the advocates perceived the issue 
positively. 
 
There are two main lines of argument. The first group, which mainly consists of 
advocates, embraced the idea that judges should be subject to contempt laws in the 
same manner as any other individual is liable considering certain actions by some 
judges are deemed unethical and violate the judges‘ obligations of impartial 
conduct. Certainly the judges have to maintain decorum and adherence to the 
Code of Ethics requisite for keeping the administration of justice unsullied. 
However, there are judges who tend to defy this and are sometimes even portrayed 
as abusing their powers. Therefore, any violation of the sanctity of the 
administration of justice either by those who administer it or by those for whose 
benefit it is administered should be visited with penalty. Contempt law is seen to 
be a deterrent for these judges. Moreover, they argued that in India, a judge is 
liable for contempt of his own court or of any other court in the same manner as 
any other individual is liable. 
 
Nevertheless, the other set of argument held by the majority is that judges should 
not be subject to contempt law. The reasons are, firstly, they enjoy judicial 
immunity which protects judges and other judicial officers from lawsuits being 
brought against them for official conduct in office. In Malaysia, judicial immunity 
is spelt out in Section 14 CJA 1964. According to Judge number 1 of the 
interview, that immunity is all progressive. It covers everything and cannot be 
compromised. Secondly, judges‘ ethical conduct is governed by the Judges‘ Code 
of Ethics. Any wrongdoings or unethical behaviour will be meted out by the Code. 
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They viewed that if the judges are found to misbehave, Article 125 of the 
Constitution will come into the picture. A tribunal will be appointed to carry a 
proper hearing. If he is found guilty of judicial misbehaviour, he would be 
subjected to removal from his office. Furthermore, the issue relating to 
enforcement was echoed once again. It was raised by Judge number 5 of the 
interview. He said: ‗If judges would be subjected to contempt law, what would the 
procedures be like? Who will initiate contempt proceedings? Will the Attorney 
General do it?‘ 
 
This group of respondents also pointed out there is an even a larger issue that 
needs to be considered, namely public confidence in the judiciary. Judges are the 
authority figures and if the law of contempt is extended to judges it would 
probably create much dispute to whole framework of the legal society. The 
confidence in the judiciary will be at stake and if to bring judges to contempt, 
there is a tendency that people will disregard the system. For this group, to hold a 
judge for contempt is not a good idea. 
 
(viii) Should the Law of Contempt be Legislated? 
 
The focal point of this question is to evaluate the respondents‘ opinions on the 
possibility of placing the law of contempt in Malaysia in a statutory footing. This 
issue was put forward weighing the existence of a specific statute in India and 
England, governing the law of contempt that able to guide the process, procedures 
and implementation of a proper contempt practice. It was interesting to find out 
that the sample hints in the new direction in the law of contempt of court in 
Malaysia. Judicial officers, advocates and prosecutors are generally in agreement 
with the idea of legislation.  
 
The results from the questionnaire and interview appear in Table 4.26 and 4.27 
respectively as follows:  
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TABLE 4.26: Questionnaire: Legislating the Law of Contempt 
 
Question 21: The law and the procedure for contempt of court in Malaysia 
should be defined by the statute – do you agree? 
    Agree  Disagree     Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  5   1   1 
Advocates   10   1   1 
Prosecutors   3   2   - 
 
TABLE 4.27: Interview: Legislating the Law of Contempt 
 
Question 21: The law and the procedure for contempt of court in Malaysia 
should be defined by the statute – do you agree? 
    Agree  Disagree Do Not Know 
Judicial Personnel  1  5  -  
Advocates   4  1  -   
Prosecutors   2  2  -   
 
The results derived from both tables show that the majority of the respondents, 
especially the advocates, felt that the law needs a new dimension. The majority 
viewed that on the whole, contempt law needs clarity in terms of definition and 
procedures to punishment. The reasons given by the respondents in the 
questionnaire and in the interview are listed below in verbatim. 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 
 Clarity. 
 So that there is greater certainty, clarity and less risk of falling victim to 
variable judicial ‗creation‘ of categories or scope of contempt. 
 So we can have uniformity throughout the court and everyone can read, 
understand and be alert to the written provision. 
 Give more clear meaning. Set the rules and regulations. Provide for 
standard punishment. 
 Malaysia has no legislation. It is useful for Malaysia to have one. This is 
because at present we apply common law, so the position of newspapers 
and other persons are still unclear especially in the area of criminal 
contempt. By having the Act it may be useful to have the exception for 
newspaper to publish matters of public interests. Public interest could be 
a defence of the charge of contempt. With regard to the jurisdiction and 
power of contempt, certain tribunals should be given such power. These 
issues can be done by the Act. The advantage of having the law regulated 
is that the chance of unhappy judges abusing contempt power would be 
less. The Act is in compliance with Art 10 (2) (a) of the Federal 
Constitution. This provision expressly speaks of Parliament‘s right to 
pass law governing contempt of court. Art. 10 (2) (a) prima facie seems 
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to confine to regulate freedom of speech and expression, however 
Parliament has power under List 1 to make laws relating to offences. 
Thus, it can in the exercise of that power deal with contempt of court, 
both in the sense to defend the integrity of the order passed and in the 
integrity of the procedure. 
 
Advocates 
  
 There is no stipulation anywhere what conduct amounting to contempt of 
court and the range of punishment for it. These are governed by common 
law rules. There is a wide discretion on the judiciary to determine what 
contempt is. Perception and approaches vary from judge to judge. This 
uncertain situation is unacceptable to lawyers and litigants, especially 
where the punishment is criminal in nature. It is another compounded by 
local variation of contempt law. 
 A Contempt of Court Act will precisely lay down what amounts to a 
contemptuous act. It will restrict the scope of contempt powers that is 
now vested with the judges. It will protect the public and lawyers. It will 
encourage lawyers to discharge his duty fearlessly without having to face 
constant threat of committal proceedings. 
 Bar Council has proposed this to set down safeguards and to standardise 
procedures. 
 For clarity and regularly revised. So Malaysian judges don't start making 
up their own rules as they are prone to do. 
 The Bar Council has submitted to the government a draft Act but the 
government does not seem to be interested in. 
 The procedure and the punishment may be. But not the instances of 
contempt as lawyers and their clients may be expected to invent ways 
which are as yet unknown! 
 Because this would mean careful debate about this subject; public 
scrutiny and a reasoned law-assuming Parliament is up to it. 
 For easier manhandling. 
 Good because it ensures that the party who is going to be charged 
especially in criminal offence is fully aware of the nature of the charge, 
the consequence of the charge and the procedures. Codification-you put 
in place a missionary or framework to reduce the chances of abuse on the 
part of the judiciary. 
 We need certainty. 
 Once you have it legislated, you will know exactly what and when it is 
contempt. You will know exactly where the line is drawn. It would be 
easier for the judge to codify. 
 
Prosecutors 
 
 So all will know what an offence is and what is not. 
 To avoid uncertainty. 
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The answers reveal the concern of the respondents in regard to the tendency of 
abusing contempt power by judges. By having the law legislated it could reduce 
chances of abuse triggered by unhappy judges. Judges apply common law 
contempt which results in variable perceptions, among others, on what amounts to 
contemptuous conduct.  The Act serves the purpose of clarity, greater certainty 
and uniformity in the application of contempt of court in Malaysia. By having a 
statute on contempt law, defence could be made available and this jurisdiction 
could be extended to tribunals too. However, Advocate 8 of the questionnaire has 
a reservation on this idea as he viewed that only procedure and the punishment 
may be put on statutory footing not the instances of contempt. This is because 
lawyers and their clients may be expected to invent ways which are as yet 
unknown.  
 
In contrary, few respondents, especially from judicial personnel, hesitate 
regarding the idea of legislation. Their reasons are provided below. 
 
Judicial Personnel 
 
 The statute to deal with the law & procedure will be cumbersome. Judges 
are competent enough to formulate the procedure. 
 First of all we have the substantive law of contempt as in Subordinate 
Courts Act, Court of Judicature Act and Federal Constitution. Contempt 
of court is essentially a common law phenomenon. It brings out the 
desire of the court to maintain law and order in the course of justice. So 
therefore, it is still very much of common law development. In terms of 
procedure, Order 52 of the Rules of High Courts is very clear cut. It has 
spelt out very clearly and in greatly deal what is expected of the judge 
exercising this jurisdiction to do. To say that we do not have enough law 
is not very true. We have a necessary procedural and substantive law to 
take care. The codification of the law cannot take care of every part of the 
law of contempt. It has to be supported by the common law judgment; 
still it goes to common law again. But I think what the Bar Council is 
going to do is to put a clause to cite judges for contempt. If that is the 
situation then it would be chaotic. The moment you decide to cite a 
person or judge for contempt instead of doing justice you are doing 
contempt cases every day. So those are the circumstances they have to 
consider. Of course whether or not it will come into reality it depends to 
the legislature. But I think the present law should be sustained.  
 The common law that we have now is sufficient. 
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Advocates  
 
 It will be too restrictive, denying discretionary power of the judge. It will 
also deny the independence of judiciary. 
 I am very worried of codification in the sense that, again it depends on 
the judiciary. Look at our Constitution for example some people now 
interpret it to completely ignore the Constitutional convention. 
Constitutionally, how we do it; I have discretion, I decide my discretion.  
 
Prosecutors 
 
 It looks easy but there will be another act or conduct that may not be 
covered. 
 
This group of respondents held that the law as applied at present is sufficient as it 
provides for procedural as well as substantive law. The prime reason for 
codification of the law of contempt is to get away from uncertainty and ambiguity 
due to the discretionary and flexibility approaches by the judges since contempt of 
court is a common law phenomenon. It will keep developing, thus codification is 
arguable to be able to take care of every part of the law of contempt. Even though 
the law is in a statutory form, in practice, the courts will fall back on common law 
for interpretation. Interpretation may vary and frequently it has to be supported by 
the common law judgments.  
 
The power to punish for contempt is the judicial power to inflict a penal sentence 
for the offence. There is always a possibility and tendency of this power being 
abused by unhappy judges. This is also among the reasons for the Bar to come out 
with the proposition of codifying the law of contempt. Besides to serve for clarity 
and certainty in the application of the law of contempt, the comprehensive 
codification will also reduce chances of abuse by the judges.   
 
4.4 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
FOR REFORM BASED ON LAW AND EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 
 
As already seen in Chapter 3, the unfettered discretion and unrestricted 
jurisdiction in punishing contempt by the judges have contributed to the 
uncertainties in the law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia. The law 
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and practice of contempt as it is now need to be well-defined. The Bar proposed 
codification of the law and as a result the law and procedure of contempt of court 
will be defined clearly. The Act will serve as guidelines to the legal actors, the 
press and to the public. While this thesis asserts that placing the law in statutory 
footing is important, it has also acknowledged that it could not be done overnight. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the judges should also shift their paradigm, attitudes 
and approaches in dealing with contempt.  
 
4.4.1 Defining and Classifying Contempt 
 
The Sanyal Committee in India, when considering the codification of the law of 
contempt in India, revealed that the difficulties and vagueness in the law of 
contempt starts at the definition stage itself. Contempt is a broad concept thus it is 
not possible to attempt neat and clear-cut classifications of the branches of 
contempt, as there is a possibility of new types of contempt arising in future. 
Nevertheless, in India, the Act attempts to give a characteristic definition to 
contempt of court by dividing it into several categories and the elements or 
ingredients to constitute contempt of each category are listed down. This is the 
approach in England whereby the Act defines publication contempt that may fall 
under the strict liability rule.  
 
The Bar proposed to define contempt by the method of dividing contempt into 
classified headings. This method of classification does not define contempt 
precisely but anything more precise is impossible. Therefore, the definition of 
contempt as provided for in the Proposed Act is more like the characteristic 
definition.  
 
4.4.2 Civil Contempt 
 
Civil contempt or contempt by disobedience is a less controversial area of 
contempt of court in Malaysia, although there is an issue of overlapping between 
civil and criminal contempt. As seen from the empirical result, the distinction 
between the two should be kept and contempt is regarded as sui generis. Civil 
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contempt is treated as quasi-criminal. Due to this, the Bar Council proposed the 
criminal standard of proof for civil contempt that is ‗beyond reasonable doubt‘.  
 
The Bar proposed to define civil contempt as ‗wilful disobedience of any 
judgment or any order requiring a person to do or abstain from doing a specified 
act or any writ of habeas corpus or wilful breach of an express undertaking given 
to Court on the faith of which the Court has given its sanction‘. The injection of 
the element of ‗wilful‘ makes relevant to the state of mind of the contemnor. Thus, 
with this new law, mere disobedience without a wilful element is not sufficient to 
constitute contempt.  This is the practice in all of the common law jurisdictions 
discussed above.  
 
4.4.3 Contempt in the Face of the Court (in facie) 
 
Contempt in facie has a great variety of conduct as seen in reported cases in 
Malaysia. It ranges from trivial to extremely serious cases. In Malaysia, filing an 
affidavit which the court perceived as scandalous and non-attendance of the court 
amount to contempt in the face of court that warrants summary punishment. 
 
In this type of contempt, the summary powers are used in their most dramatic 
form. The Courts are condemned for being too quick to invoke summary power 
even in those cases that are not extremely serious. Some of the criticisms of the 
existing proceedings are that the judge appears to assume the role of prosecutor 
and judge in his own cause, that the practice lacks safeguards in the sense that it 
deprives the alleged contemnor of a clear and distinct charge and also denies him 
his right to legal representation, and the contemnor usually has little or no 
opportunity to defend himself or make a plea in mitigation.  
 
The Bar proposed to define contempt in facie as provided in the Proposed Act as 
‗it is contemptuous if any person in the presence of the court engages in any 
conduct that substantially interferes with or obstructs the continuance of the 
proceedings‘. There is a geographical element in the definition of this type of 
contempt in which it mentions ‗in the presence of the court‘. Further, the act must 
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be serious enough to justify use of the contempt sanction as the Act uses the word 
‗substantial‘. Therefore, it is suggested that a person can be cited for contempt in 
the face of court when he committed the serious misconduct in the presence of the 
court that substantially interferes with the continuance of the proceedings. The 
‗presence of the court‘ means before the court, within the judge‘s sight and 
hearing. The Act does not explain whether it could extend to misconduct outside 
the courtroom but within the court‘s precinct where the alleged contumacious act 
is within the personal knowledge of the court. By looking at this provision and 
considering the reason for this proposal, among others is to avoid summary 
contempt power being exercised for filing pleadings and complaints against 
presiding officers.  
 
In England, the USA, Canada and New Zealand, the geographical element is 
significant. In general, conduct must be in the presence of the court, seen by the 
judge‘s own eyes and within his personal knowledge. Then only he can punish 
summarily. Nevertheless, in England, it extends to conduct that occurs within the 
precinct of the court which interrupts the proceedings of the court. In all common 
law jurisdictions discussed above, concern is with the seriousness of the act that 
interferes with the court‘s process and the administration of justice in general.  
 
The Proposed Act also responded to the criticism of the frequent use of summary 
power by judges, by suggesting that a judge should be required to refer the matter 
to the Chief Justice for an arrangement for the case to be heard by a different 
judge. However, option is given for the alleged contemnor to choose to be tried 
before the same judge where the alleged contemptuous act took place.  
 
The result of the empirical study reveals that the court must be allowed to initiate 
contempt suo motu and to exercise summary procedure instantly in cases of 
contempt in the face of court when the conduct is so serious and grotesque that it 
substantially interferes with the continuance of the proceedings. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the present practice, whereby the judge deals with contempt in the 
face of the court himself, should continue. This is because in most cases the 
presiding judge will have seen or heard the incident himself and will be aware of 
other relevant factors. He is in the best position to know how to deal with it. The 
 280 
threat of immediate punishment is a more effective deterrent to such grievous, 
severe and serious misconduct than a threat to refer the case elsewhere.  
 
To safeguard this, the judge should always ensure that the alleged contemnor is 
explained with clarity and specifically the charge or the nature of the conduct 
complained. He should be given an opportunity to deny or explain himself. If the 
alleged contemnor denies but the judge finds that the matter is worth pursuing, 
then the judge has to ascertain the facts and if it is criminal offence, he can refer to 
the prosecuting authorities.
875
 In the course of summary proceeding before the 
judge, the alleged contemnor must be afforded the opportunity to give evidence 
and to call and cross-examine witnesses.
876
  
 
4.4.4 Contempt By Scandalising a Court or a Judge 
 
The offence of contempt by scandalising in Malaysia prohibits a scurrilous abuse 
of a judge acting as a judge or of a court and attacks upon the integrity or 
impartiality of a judge or court.
877
 This offence extends to conduct as well as 
publication that may ‗scandalise‘ a court or a judge. This branch of contempt is 
criticised as it affects the right to freedom of speech and expression. This is 
because the test of liability to commit a contemnor for contempt by scandalising 
the court is lenient i.e. the words complained of had to possess an ‗inherent 
tendency to interfere with the administration of justice‘.  Thus, to commit the 
alleged contemnor it is sufficient that he acts in such a way that the administration 
of justice is apt to be brought into disrepute by his conduct or publication, 
irrelevant of his intention to cause the same. 
 
The Bar proposed to give a new definition to contempt by scandalising. The Act 
redefined this branch of contempt as ‗publication or act done which is falsehood 
and is intended to bring a court into disrepute‘.  This new defined criminal offence 
has injected the requirement of higher liability test and also a proof of intention. It 
requires proving the element of falsehood, thus the risk must be serious, real and 
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present danger so that the administration of justice, the judiciary or judges, will be 
brought into serious disrepute. Moreover, it has to prove that the contemnor 
intended or desired by the publication or his act, to bring a court into disrepute.  
The new law proposed by the Bar is in conformity with the standard applied in the 
USA, Canada and England. In the first two jurisdictions, the liability test is even 
higher than in England. In the USA and Canada, it has to prove that the 
publication presents real and clear danger to the administration of justice. In 
England, there must be ‗real risk of prejudice as opposed to remote possibility‘. 
The higher test imposed balances the right to free expression and its restriction by 
way of contempt of court.  
 
It is also significant as it encourages the judiciary to withstand criticisms. The 
Malaysian courts should not ‗defend‘ themselves from ‗attack‘ on the notion that 
it attacks the fabric of the society.
878
 The problem with this argument is that the 
harm complained of is difficult to show and is only assumed.
879
 Since the harm is 
not proven, there is no compelling reason to restrict such publication through 
contempt of court.
880
 Public criticism, in fact, may help the judiciary ‗up to the 
mark‘.881  
 
4.4.5 Contempt By Sub Judice Comment 
 
This branch of contempt involves publication, media and the case which is still 
ongoing and under the court‘s deliberation. Under this regime, contempt by sub 
judice comment attracts strict liability due to the proposition that a court or parties 
under legal proceeding and their witness should not be subjected to any undue 
influence, intimidation, coercion or any kind of pressure from extraneous sources.  
 
In Malaysia, contempt by sub judice comment receives criticism, especially after 
the case whereby a Canadian reporter was committed for three-month 
imprisonment for publishing an article relating to a case on trial that scandalised 
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the court and was sub judice.
882
 It is criticised, as it lies in uncertainty because it 
affects the press. It is a lack of a clear definition of the kind of statement, criticism 
or comment which will be held to amount to contempt. The Court in Murray 
Hiebert applies a lenient test i.e. ‗It is enough if it is likely or it tends in any way 
to interfere with the proper administration of justice‘.  This has limited and 
smaller the scope of the right to freedom of speech and expression.  
 
The Bar Council, inspired by the position in England that defines publication 
contempt under the strict liability regime, proposes to redefine this branch of 
criminal contempt of court by redefining the test of contempt and by limiting the 
time during which the press is at risk. Thus, the Proposed Act recommended a 
new definition to sub judice comment that is ‗publication or act done which 
interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings‘ and provide the 
requirement of ‗substantial risk‘ of serious prejudice. It makes significant changes 
to the current law which is based on the test of a ‗mere possibility‘. This Act 
proposes that the publication must present a substantial risk so that the prejudice 
to the litigation is serious in order to be contemptuous.
883
 The risk must be a 
practical risk and not theoretical risk
884
 and will seriously impede or prejudice the 
course of justice in the judicial proceedings. The empirical result shows that the 
majority of the respondents supported that the degree of risk of interference 
should be, at least, a minimal or small risk, in contrast to the ‗inherent tendency‘, 
as currently applied.  Although there is no detail discussions in the questionnaires 
and interviews on the test of ‗substantial risk of serious prejudice‘ as applied in 
England under Section 2 (2) CCA 1981, it can be derived from the response of the 
majority of the respondents that they prefer to have a higher degree of risk of 
interference than the remote possibility.  The Proposed Act also attempts to deal 
with this issue by specifying the trial is ‗sub judice‘ when the proceedings in 
question have commenced and are ‗active’ at the time of the publication.  
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Furthermore, the Proposed Act under Section 8 (2) proposed to introduce a ‗public 
interest‘ test as equivalent to Section 5 CCA 1981. It provides that, even if there is 
a real risk of prejudice to a trial in question, it cannot be treated as contempt if the 
publication is incidental to the trial in question. The ‗public interest‘ test calls for 
the balancing of the interest in the administration of justice and the interest of 
discussion of matter of public interest, which move the balance further towards 
freedom of speech and expression.  
 
Another issue of concern in relation to contempt by sub judice comment is 
relating to innocent dissemination. A person in charge of distribution of foreign 
publication may find himself liable to punishment for contempt on the ground that 
the foreign publication distributed by his agency contained offending matter in 
relation to certain pending proceedings even though he might have been 
absolutely unaware of the contents.
885
 The Proposed Act deals with this issue by 
making available a defence of innocent publication or distribution. Therefore, 
there is a complete defence to a charge of contempt for a distributor to prove that 
he had no reasonable grounds for believing that the publication that he had 
distributed contained offending matter.  
 
4.4.6 Practice And Procedure 
 
The existing summary procedures have been the subject of substantial criticisms 
as highlighted in Chapter 3. The summary procedure has been criticised as it lacks 
the usual safeguards that apply to criminal offences generally. Those safeguards 
have been identified as the presumption of innocence, the rule against bias and the 
right to a fair hearing. It has been suggested that the power of the presiding judge 
to institute proceedings where it appears to him that contempt has been committed 
and to determine liability, reverses the presumption of innocence. Judicial officers 
determining liability for contempt in the face of court in particular, gives rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge. Furthermore, the ability 
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of the presiding judge to rely upon his own perceptions raises concerns as to the 
adequacy of such perception as a basis for determining guilt.  
 
The empirical result shows that the majority of the respondents believed that 
summary power of punishment should be retained with the judge. The judges can 
only punish instanter contempt in the face of the court. In other types of contempt, 
it should be by way of motion as in Order 52 RHC. Taking into consideration 
these competing considerations, the concerns regarding the frequent use of 
contempt summary power by judges and also the empirical study, the alternatives 
for reform of procedure for contempt offences are: 
 
(1) retain the existing summary procedure, or 
(2) apply the proposal by the Bar, or 
(3) introduce a hybrid procedure.  
 
It is suggested that a hybrid procedure should be introduced modelled by the 
existing procedure under Order 52 RHC and the Proposed Act by the Bar. 
 
As regards civil contempt, it is noted that this area is of least controversial 
compared to criminal contempt. Therefore, it is suggested that the procedure 
under Order 52 RHC should be retained. 
 
There should be two different procedures to deal with criminal contempt. As 
regards to contempt in the face of the court, summary procedure should remain 
available when the alleged contemptuous conduct has occurred in the presence of 
the presiding judge and the judge considers that the alleged contempt offence 
presents an immediate threat to the authority of the court or the integrity of the 
proceedings in progress. A contempt offence may be tried by the presiding judge 
or the alleged contemnor may elect to be tried by another judge. This is different 
from the proposal in Proposed Act in which the presiding judge should refer the 
matter to the Chief Justice to set for a trial by a different judge unless the alleged 
contemnor chose to be tried before the same presiding officer. It is proposed to 
deviate from the Bar‘s proposal because the serious contempt that occurs in the 
presence of the judge within his personal knowledge is best handled by him. It 
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should be made explicit the need for the charge to be adequately particularised 
and for the right of the contemnor to be heard and to call witnesses. The 
guidelines laid down in Bok Chek Thou should be taken into consideration.
886
  
Where the court proceeds to determine a contempt offence summarily, the court 
shall inform the accused of the nature and particulars of the charge, allow the 
accused reasonable opportunity to be heard and to call for witnesses. If necessary 
the court may grant an adjournment for that purpose. After hearing the accused, 
the court determines the charge and gives reasons for that determination and 
makes order for punishment or discharge of the accused.  
 
Order 52 RHC does not provide the maximum limit of punishment. The sanctions 
and punishment are determined by the courts. The Proposed Act introduces the 
maximum limit of punishment. It is suggested the court will impose a punishment 
of imprisonment for a term, not exceeding fourteen days or with fine not 
exceeding RM 2,000 or with both. However, it is noted that the maximum limit of 
punishment is too low and it would defect the purpose of being punitive and 
deterrence. Thus, it is suggested that the maxima for contempt conviction would 
be imprisonment of one month or a fine of RM 5,000.  
 
Consideration should be given to adopting a uniform procedure for dealing with 
contempt out of the court. It is suggested the Attorney General or the aggrieved 
party will apply for a leave to move the court. Once the leave is granted, an 
application for committal supported by an affidavit verifying the facts will be filed 
in court. Then this application and affidavit will be served as a ‗charge‘ on the 
alleged contemnor. He is informed with the particulars of the charge and is 
allowed to answer the claim against him. 
 
However, in situations where the alleged contemptuous act is serious and neither 
the Attorney General nor the aggrieved party applies to commit the alleged 
contemnor, the court can act suo motu. Here, applying the current procedure under 
Order 52 r. 1B RHB is suggested. The alleged contemnor will be served 
personally a formal notice to show cause why he should neither be committed to 
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prison nor fined. The notice should detail the alleged contemptuous act containing 
the actual words and particulars of the actual conduct of the alleged contemptuous 
act. Once the notice is served on him, he has to appear before the court to show 
why he should not be committed for contempt. He is allowed every opportunity to 
make his defence. If the court is not satisfied with his explanation, the court may 
proceed to commit him. The court will fix the hearing of the matter. Nevertheless 
the alleged contemnor may apply to be heard before a different judge. 
 
 4.4.7 Ethical Conduct 
 
In the Proposed Act, the Bar Council includes suggestions for contempt against 
the Presiding Judge. The provision provides that a Presiding Judge is liable for 
contempt in his own court or any other court in the same manner as any other 
individual is liable. This issue needs to be addressed as the result of empirical 
research reveals that it is not appropriate to subject judges to contempt law as they 
should be dealt with by their Code of Ethics.  
 
The majority of interviewees, especially those from judiciary, thought that the best 
to govern their conduct is the Judges‘ Code of Ethics. Although the Code is not 
comprehensive and detailed, it is sufficient. Apart from the Code of Ethics, the 
Constitution also provides that a judge can be removed from office in accordance 
with Article 125 of the Malaysian Constitution. Article 125 (3) provides that a 
judge could be removed on the ground of any breach of any provision of the code 
of ethics prescribed under Article 125 (3A) or on the ground of inability, from 
infirmity of body or mind or any other cause, properly to discharge the functions 
of his office. In this matter there is an even a larger issue that needs to be 
considered: public confidence in the judiciary. Judges are the authority figures and 
if the law of contempt is extended to judges it would probably create much dispute 
in the whole framework of the legal society. The confidence of the judiciary will 
be at stake and if one were to bring judges to contempt, there could be a tendency 
that people may disregard the system. Thus, to hold a judge for contempt is not a 
good idea. 
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With regards to the ethical conduct of the lawyers, respondents agreed that 
contempt sanction can be used to control lawyers‘ conduct in the courtroom but it 
cannot be used as a sword of Damocles. As one of the judges in the interview 
viewed that ‗contempt should be like a headmaster‘s unused cane. The cane is 
there but needs not be used‘. At the same time, the ethics and etiquette of the 
lawyers should be controlled within the profession itself. It is worth noting the 
opinion of one of the respondents when he said that the most effective way to 
ensure the lawyers‘ proper conduct is none other than the lawyers themselves. It is 
self-restraint on their part that is most important. 
 
4.4.8 The Judges and the Contempt Power 
 
The power of contempt is a power which a judge must have and exercise in 
protecting due and orderly administration of justice. In Malaysia, it is agreed that 
the judges should not be deprived of such power. This is shown in the empirical 
result.
887
  However, the Bar views this power as fraught with possible abuse and 
misuse. The discretion permitted to judges in determining what is contempt and 
how to punish it has led some the Bar to argue that the contempt power gives too 
much authority to judges. Therefore, it is suggested the contempt power is used 
sparingly and when necessary, in an exceptional circumstance.
888
 Judge number 5 
of the interview shared his view that ‗contempt should be like a headmaster‘s 
unused cane. The cane is there but needs not to be used‘. He was in opinion that 
there is a power to invoke for contempt but it does not need to be used often.  
 
The judges also play important role in maintaining and preserving public 
confidence in the judiciary and the administration of justice as a whole. The 
judges during the proceedings are also at ‗trial‘. Therefore, they have to keep their 
temper and remain their composure. As Judge number 6 of the interview said that 
it is an absolutely essential virtue for the judges to remain calm, cool, collected 
and concerted and be ‗as sober as a judge‘. If a judge is to lose his temper, it is 
like he is losing his proper sense of judgment.
889
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As seen from the discussion on the potential foundation for reform, it is suggested 
that the judges should exercise their creativity and to strive in conformity with the 
development of the law of contempt of court in other developed common law 
jurisdictions. In the era of globalisation and the protection of human rights, the 
national judiciary should refer to the international human rights law as one of the 
tools of interpretation. The judges should be more pragmatic, rather than 
confining themselves within the ‗four walls‘.  
 
4.4.9 Codification: Serves as a Guideline for the Legal Actors  
 
This research undertakes to answer the research question: ‗Does Malaysia need to 
have its contempt laws in a statutory form?‘ in order to overcome the uncertainties 
in the said area of law. It is undeniable that the court‘s power to punish for 
contempt is a necessary tool to protect the authority and integrity of the judicial 
process. Since it developed in the hand of the judiciary the contempt power is 
vulnerable to abuse. Clarity in this area of law is required and codifying the law is 
one of the best possible solutions to this issue. It is concluded that to place the law 
in an Act of Parliament is a good idea for the sake of clarity and greater certainty. 
The empirical result reveals that the majority of the respondents succumbed to the 
idea of codifying the law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 289 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recent practice of contempt of court in Malaysia demonstrates arbitrariness 
due to the unrestricted jurisdiction of the courts in punishing contempt. The 
Malaysian law of contempt is a common law phenomenon and the courts have 
inherent power to punish contempt. Chapter 3 reveals that the Malaysian judges 
have unfettered discretion in determining contempt cases. As a result of this 
unfettered discretion, inconsistencies can be seen in determining what conduct 
amounts to contempt, application of mens rea, the mode of trial and the penalty 
that can be imposed. As a result of this, contempt of court has a potential conflict 
with freedom of speech and expression.  
 
Freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 10 of the Constitution is not 
absolute as it can be restricted by contempt of court on the basis of the protection 
of the due administration of justice. Most criminal contempt cases involve a 
balance between the right of a fair trial on the one hand and the right to freedom 
of expression on the other. It is the judiciary which performs the task of 
reconciling freedom of expression with the administration of justice. In Malaysia, 
while balancing the two interests, it is often found that the speech value is being 
lowly protected. The Malaysian contempt law has resulted in a ‗chilling‘ of free 
speech. This is evident in the matter of prejudicial publication on cases which are 
pending. The actus reus can be fulfilled if it is shown that the publication in 
question has created a tendency that the proceedings in question might be 
prejudiced. This means that the publication may amount to contempt even if the 
possibility of interference with the proceedings is remote and that the contemnors 
will be punished for the tendency of perceived evil of their conducts even though 
the perceived evil could not and would not materialise.
890
 This test targets at 
protecting the administration of justice but not at protecting the fairness of 
proceedings. A mother country, from which the Malaysian law of contempt 
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derived from, has undergone changes and developed its law of contempt to give a 
greater protection to free speech. The CCA 1981 introduces various liberalising 
factors, such as the liability test of ‗substantial risk of serious prejudice‘ and the 
public interest protection, with the intention of moving the balance further towards 
freedom of expression while maintaining the standpoint of the supremacy of the 
administration of justice over free expression. 
 
This study observes that the judges and their judicial approaches are the major 
contributors to the uncertainties in law and practice of contempt of court in 
Malaysia. This observation is highlighted in Chapter 3 and is supported by the 
empirical results tabled in Chapter 4.
891
  
 
The contempt power is a power which a judge must have and exercise in 
protecting due administration of justice. As shown in the empirical result, the 
judges should not be deprived of such power.
892
 However, the Bar views this 
power as fraught with possible abuse and misuse. The discretion permitted to 
judges in determining what is contempt and how to deal with it led the Bar to 
argue that judges are given too much authority. Even though there was a 
suggestion for the judges to use this power sparingly and when necessary,
893
 they 
are found to be too quick to draw the sword and too often to use the shield. It is 
agreed that the judges are vested with contempt power in order to protect the due 
administration of justice. Nevertheless, the judges also play important roles in 
maintaining and preserving public confidence in the judiciary and the 
administration of justice. Therefore, by using the contempt power to chill free 
speech, the purpose and function of the judges to maintain and preserve public 
confidence in them may be defeated.  
 
Having considered the anomalies in the law and practice of contempt of court in 
Malaysia and the potential foundation for reform, two alternatives are suggested to 
resolve these uncertainties. Firstly, the judges should change their attitude and 
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approaches in contempt of court, and secondly, the law and procedures for 
contempt should be placed in an Act of Parliament. 
 
5.1.1 The Judges 
 
Chapter 3 gives the background of the Malaysian law of contempt of court and 
highlights the main areas of concern in this area. As mentioned above, the judges 
are the main reason of the material issue. This can be seen through their attitude 
and approaches to contempt of court. Since the Malaysian contempt law is based 
on common law and there is no written law on the subject matter, by virtue of 
Section 3 CLA 1956, the judges may refer to English contempt cases. 
Nevertheless, the courts have to observe the cut-off period, that is, only the 
English common law decided before 7 April 1956 can be used as a binding 
authority for the courts. The cases decided after the said date are only persuasive 
in nature. The courts, in referring to English cases and other foreign materials as 
persuasive authorities, have to consider suitability of the local conditions. As 
noted, the Malaysian courts in most contempt cases refuse to follow the current 
development of contempt law of England and other counterparts, and have 
repeatedly justified taking a different approach from these counterparts on the 
basis of ‗local conditions‘. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses that the common law of contempt of court in Malaysia has 
failed to give an adequate protection to free speech. The Malaysian courts have 
failed to consider the development in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, at the 
very least, the development of the common law itself. The refusal to follow the 
development of contempt law in other common law jurisdictions is solely because 
of ‗local conditions‘, a proviso which is provided in Section 3 CLA 1956 as 
mentioned above.  
 
The Malaysian courts have failed to clarify how the conditions are different and 
why such differences are relevant. The phrase ‗local conditions‘ has been used in 
a number of cases to justify stricter approach adopted in Malaysia without 
explaining what conditions in Malaysia that should differentiate it from other 
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common law jurisdictions that adopted a more liberal approach. For instance, in 
the case of Manjeet Singh, it was stated that it was necessary to ‗take a stricter 
view of matters pertaining to the dignity of the court‘ because of local conditions. 
However, the majority judgment failed to explain the reasons for the different 
local conditions that would justify their stricter approach. The reference was made 
to The Straits Times Press
894
 and SRN Palaniappan
895
 - the cases which were 
decided in 1949. 
 
In The Straits Time Press, the refusal to follow the development in England, apart 
from the state of emergency in Malaya, the development of press, the general 
standard of education and the composition of the general public in Malaya at that 
time, in 1948, were not comparable to England.
896
 In Palaniappan, considering 
the emergency state in Malaya, it was essential that the confidence of the 
community in the judiciary and the administration of justice by the courts should 
be sustained at the highest pitch.
897
 However, it has to be borne in mind that when 
the courts decided on Manjeet Singh the state of emergency in 1948 is nowhere in 
sight, Malaya has received its independence and now is known as Malaysia, the 
press and general standard of education did not remain the same at the level 
achieved in 1948-1949. The people are now more cultured and literate. The local 
conditions changed and the justification in 1948 cases is no longer valid today. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the Malaysian courts is another reason given by the 
Court in Manjeet Singh in deviating from the decision of ex parte Blackburn. The 
judges have to take note that the law of contempt by scandalising the court as in 
Manjeet Singh has fallen into desuetude in England.  
 
Another justification given by the courts for not following the liberal approach of 
English cases is that of Section 3 CLA 1956. Section 3 provides that only English 
common law as administered in England on or before 7 April 1956 is applicable in 
Malaysia. Therefore, the cases after the effective date are not binding and are only 
persuasive. Nevertheless, the judges should not treat this provision as barring the 
courts from referring to the later and recent English authorities. As noted in 
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Chapter 3 and 4, the common law in Malaysia should not be stagnant as it should 
develop with the development of time and place. The judges should not hide 
behind Section 3 in not following persuasive authorities from England.  
 
In considering the development of contempt of court in other common law 
jurisdictions, with a main reference to England, it is noted in Chapter 4 that the 
post-1956 English authorities, in particular post-1981 are adequate in protecting 
free speech.
898
 Enhancing free expression in the administration of justice would 
aid in developing confidence in impartial justice as this would also aid in moving 
towards a more mature system.   
 
Therefore, in finding the best possible solution to resolve the anomalies in the law 
of contempt of court in Malaysia, it is suggested that the judges should refer to 
foreign materials as a catalyst in construing the Malaysian law of contempt. The 
judges need to realise that the local conditions change and the principles of law 
develop with the passing of time.  
 
By looking at the development in the foreign jurisdictions, it is obvious that the 
tradition and approaches are varied and to the certain extent, differed. The law of 
contempt develops differently from country to country as the evolution of 
jurisprudence is different and the judges who hail from different background and 
cultures do not share the same perceptions. However, this should not be a 
hindrance or irrelevant. This is because the pool of authorities from various places 
could give influential ideas. The comparative law or foreign materials enrich the 
options available to the judges. Examination of a foreign solution may help a 
judge to choose the best local solution.
899
 Moreover, it is also argued in Chapter 4 
that the Malaysian courts have been referring to foreign materials for a long time 
and are institutionally capable of doing it. When the Privy Council was the final 
appellate court in Malaysia, there has been a pool of foreign cases in the courts. 
The courts have been dealing with comparative law and it is acknowledged that 
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the courts already have some ideas in dealing with foreign materials as the basis of 
interpretation. In fact, the departure from the Privy Council gives an opportunity 
to the courts to exercise their creativity with the exposure of comparative law in 
expanding the scope of interpretation.  
 
Having said that, the judges should not confine themselves within the four walls. 
They should look and go beyond. The judges should shift their paradigm, their 
attitude; and approach the matter pragmatically. They should strive for uniformity 
and consistency with other developed common law jurisdictions and should also 
be in line with the international standard for the protection of human rights.  
 
Another point to consider in relation to the judges is the frequent exercise of the 
contempt power. The empirical study shows that the respondents agree that the 
judicial contempt power is necessary as a mechanism to protect the administration 
of justice from any interference. However, the frequent use of such power is 
perceived by lawyers as being misused by the judges. The judges are perceived as 
too quick to draw their ‗sword‘ against the alleged contemnors.  
 
Additionally, the respondents, in the empirical study, were asked whether the 
contempt sanction is an effective tool in controlling lawyers‘ behaviour. The 
majority of the respondents agreed that it is an effective tool towards unabashed 
and insolent lawyers. This is because the contempt sanction would cause 
embarrassment to lawyers being cited for contempt as this indicates that their 
ethical value is at stake. Nevertheless, the contempt sanction should only be 
invoked when the misconduct is grotesque, as it should not be used to suppress 
advocacy.  
 
However, according to some respondents, the contempt sanction is not the only 
tool to control lawyers‘ behaviour and ethical conduct. The respondents pointed 
out that in some cases of misconduct, the court should refer the misbehaving 
lawyers to their professional bodies. With regard to the advocates, the judge can 
write a complaint to the Disciplinary Board which in turn will investigate the 
complaint and later will hear the matter. The Disciplinary Board may impose 
punishment ranging from a fine to striking the person off the Roll. Nonetheless the 
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empirical result shows that the majority of the respondents, with the exception of 
the advocates, perceived the Bar‘s ability in controlling its members‘ ethical 
conduct is ineffective. The respondents raised concerns of bias for the profession 
and its members‘ interests. Although there are rules and regulations that set out 
the guidelines for the conduct, the procedures and punishment for any breach of 
the ethical behaviour of the advocates, in practice the disciplinary process is slow 
and cumbersome. Having rules and enforcing them are two different things 
altogether.  As regards to ethical conduct, the words of Judge 2 of the interview 
are echoed when he said that the most effective way to ensure the lawyers‘ proper 
conduct is none other than the lawyers themselves. It is self-restraint on their part 
that is most important. 
 
Notably, the judges are vested with the contempt power and to use it as a tool of 
controlling lawyers‘ behaviour and conduct. However, they should not be too 
quick to use this power, especially the summary power, to cite the alleged 
contemnor for contempt. This is because the summary power is opened to abuse 
as it can deprive the alleged contemnor of a clear and distinct charge and also his 
best possible defence. More importantly, punishment being meted out on the spot 
usually precludes the alleged contemnor from seeking legal advice or 
representation. In this context, the judges should only exercise the power when 
necessary and only when the misconduct is grotesque. The person‘s right to a fair 
trial and the right against bias should be safeguarded.  
 
5.1.2 Codification 
 
Another mechanism which was suggested by the Bar Council and which received 
a positive feedback from the majority of the respondents in the empirical study, is 
to place the law of contempt of court in an Act of Parliament. The empirical study 
reveals that the minority of respondents held back on the idea of codification. 
They pointed to the fact that it is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules in 
circumstances where the types of contempt that may be committed are 
unpredictable. Nevertheless, it is argued that this concern is largely illusory. In 
response, it can be stated that codification in other areas of law has been achieved 
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without adverse effect. Indeed, codification of contempt law has taken place in 
India and the UK. Compared to Parliament, the judges are limited in the amount 
of law which they can create. They can only create or change the law when the 
case is taken to court. This would not be a problem with Parliament as the law 
making process is that of Parliament. 
 
The codification is argued to bring greater certainty to the identification of the 
basis for liability and clearer guidance to participants in judicial proceedings.  As 
of now, the basis of contempt of court varies without apparent justification. In 
addition to common law, the law and procedural vehicle to deal with contempt are 
found in various places namely in the Constitution, the CJA 1964, the RHC 1980, 
the SCA 1948, the SCR 1980, the Penal Code and the CPC. By replacing the 
existing law of contempt with statutory offences, uniform standards could be 
introduced for all courts.  
 
Therefore, the Bar‘s Proposed Act can be taken as a model for reform. The Bar 
has carried-out a thorough study on the law of contempt in preparing the Proposed 
Act. The uncertainties in the law and application of contempt of court in Malaysia 
have been brought to the Bar‘s attention. In preparing the Proposed Act, the Bar 
assigned a Committee which consisted of advocates who are senior, learned and 
experienced in this area. Apart from this, the Committee had carried a thorough 
comparative study of law and practice of contempt of court in other jurisdictions 
especially in England and India, considering that these two jurisdictions have 
moved towards codifying their law.  
 
The Proposed Act is suggested to be made applicable to all courts in Malaysia 
including the Industrial courts. The Act gives a characteristic definition of 
contempt of court. Contempt is placed under five major categories. In each kind of 
contempt, the Act contains the element or ingredients to constitute contempt. Civil 
contempt is defined as ‗wilful disobedience of any judgment or any order 
requiring a person to do or abstain from doing a specified act or any writ of habeas 
corpus or wilful breach of an express undertaking given to the Court on the faith 
of which the Court has given its sanction‘. Under this new law, the element of 
‗wilful‘ is injected which connotes that there is a need to prove that the alleged 
 297 
contemnor has wilfully or deliberately disobeys the order. Thus, under this new 
proposed law, mere disobedience without wilful element is not sufficient to 
constitute civil contempt. 
 
Criminal contempt is defined as ‗publication (whether by words, spoken or 
written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or 
the doing of any act whatsoever which is a falsehood and is intended to bring a 
Court into disrepute, or interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings 
or obstructs the administration of justice in any other manner‘. There are three 
classes of action which have been classified as criminal contempt ex facie.  
 
The first category is ‗any publication or act done which is a falsehood and is 
intended to bring a Court into disrepute‘. This new definition corresponds to the 
common law offence of scandalising a court or a judge. Under this new law it is 
required to prove that the content of the publication is false and the alleged 
contemnor has intention to publish the material which contains false information 
that disrepute the administration of justice. The second category is ‗publication or 
act done which interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings‘. This 
new branch of criminal contempt deals with prejudicial publication that interferes 
with a particular proceeding. This new law resembles Sections 1 and 2 (2) CCA 
1981 under which England has recognised the rule of strict liability where the 
publication creates a substantial risk so that the course of justice in the 
proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. It applies only 
when the proceedings are active at the time of the publication. The third category 
is a catch-all provision and intends to cover the residuary cases of contempt not 
expressly covered by the definition in Section 3 (3) of the Proposed Act. It deals 
with ‗publication or act done which obstructs the administration of justice in any 
other manner‘. 
 
The proposed offence of contempt in the face of court provides that it is 
committed when a person in the presence of the court engages in any conduct that 
substantially interferes with or obstructs the continuance of the proceedings. The 
Bar Council proposes retention of the common law offence of contempt in the 
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face of court but with some modifications. It is limited in its physical scope when 
it is only confined to the misconducts in the presence of the court. 
 
As regards mens rea, the Proposed Act intends only publication or an act done 
which interferes with the due course of justice of any active judicial proceedings 
as strict liability offence. For civil contempt and contempt in the face of the 
courts, only mens rea in relation to contemptuous act is needed. However, to 
constitute contempt under the new law of scandalising contempt, mens rea beyond 
the intention to disrepute or scandalise the courts is required. Therefore, the 
criminal contempt of court will not be treated as strict liability offence.   
 
The Proposed Act also creates defences. Defences of innocent publication or 
distribution, fair and accurate report of proceedings are placed in the Proposed 
Act. Section 8 (2), which resembles Section 5 CCA 1981, provides that a 
publication made as part of a legitimate discussion of matters of public affairs or 
public interest is not to be treated as contempt if it is incidentally resulted in a 
serious interference to particular legal proceedings. This is one of the measures to 
protect media freedom.    
 
The Act also provides the procedure to be applied. For contempt in the face of the 
court, the contempt offences are tried by a different judge but the alleged 
contemnor may elect to be tried before the same presiding judge before whom the 
alleged contemptuous act has been committed. Where the court proceeds to 
determine a contempt offence a formal notice should be served and should also 
have a clause that informs the alleged contemnor of his right to file a defence and 
to a legal representation. For criminal contempt in general, the Proposed Act 
allows the court and other parties, namely the Attorney General and the aggrieved 
party, to initiate the proceedings on the matter as the provision uses the expression 
of ‗when it is alleged‘ and ‗upon its own view‘. If it is found that a person has 
committed an alleged contemptuous act, the court has to serve on the alleged 
contemnor a charge in writing containing the actual words and particulars of the 
actual conduct of the alleged contemptuous act. Once the charge is served on him, 
he is allowed every opportunity to make his defence to the charge. The new 
procedures, especially procedure to deal with contempt in facie, provide sufficient 
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safeguards against the rule against bias, presumption of innocence and the right to 
a full and fair trial.   
 
The Proposed Act tackles the issue of the maximum punishment that can be 
imposed. Appropriate maxima for contempt conviction would be imprisonment 
for a term, not exceeding fourteen days or with a fine not exceeding RM 2,000 or 
both. The Proposed Act recommends that there be comprehensive rights of appeal 
in relation to contempt cases. 
 
Although the Bar has proposed a Contempt of Court Act and in fact had submitted 
it to the government, thus far, it has not received any feedback from the 
government. The Proposed Act, in fact, bears a strong resemblance to the CCA 
1981. It is known that the CCA 1981 was introduced as partly in response to the 
decision of the ECtHR in the Sunday Times case. One might argue that if the 
Proposed Act is introduced, it would mean that the ECtHR case, in particular the 
Sunday Times case would have a strong influence on the Malaysian law, not just 
through the case law but via a statute.  The opponent to the idea of codification 
might argue that the Proposed Act should not be passed into law as it is influenced 
by the ECHR - a regional treaty to protect human rights and fundamental liberties 
in Europe. However, as argued in Chapter 4, there are attempts by non-European 
lawyers to argue cases decided by the ECtHR in their own national law due to the 
reason that the ECHR is regarded as sophisticated instruments for the international 
protection of human rights.
900
 Since the ECHR is treated as sophisticated 
instruments, it is an advantage to make it as a reference. Although on its face, the 
ECHR is not binding outside Europe, if the Proposed Act which is influenced by 
the ECHR case is to be introduced, it will open up the avenue for the Malaysian 
judges to give consideration to the foreign and international materials in 
interpreting domestic law of contempt. On this point, at least, the interpretation 
should not go below the European standard.  
 
As noted, the Proposed Act intends to move the balance further towards freedom 
of expression while maintaining the standpoint of the supremacy of the 
                                                 
900
 Supra., (n. 577). 
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administration of justice over free expression. The test of liability that requires a 
‗substantial risk of serious prejudice‘ and the public interest ‗defence‘ are amongst 
the example of liberalising factors and elements in the Act. The Proposed Act 
attempts to balance the use of the ‗sword‘ and the ‗shield‘ by the judges. The 
judges may use the contempt power, for example, to deal summarily with 
misconduct in the presence of the court, and they may also use the contempt 
power as a shield by putting a restriction to the public from discussing matters 
when there is a real case reported or pending. In this context, the contempt power 
is used as a shield to chill a person‘s right to freedom of expression. The sword is 
double-edged – it protects the administration of justice from unfair attack and it 
also protects individuals from unfair attack from the judiciary.  
 
The Proposed Act attempts to balance the two interests i.e. the protection of the 
administration of justice and freedom of expression, and it is suggested that the 
greater freedom of expression is allowed via the Proposed Act. The greater the 
freedom of expression is allowed the more confidence the public will have in the 
judiciary. The public will have the respect for and confidence in the courts‘ 
capacity to fulfil the function as the proper forum for the settlement of legal 
disputes and for the determination of a person‘s guilt or innocence. Thus, the 
judge will only be allowed to strike his sword when it is urgent and imperative to 
act and/or when there is a ‗substantial risk of serious prejudice‘ to the 
administration of justice.  
 
If the Act were to be introduced, it would allow a greater protection of free speech 
than what we have now. Having said that, the absence of a statute must be a 
matter in need of urgent reform given the uncertainties outlined in this thesis. 
Even if the Bar actively presses their case, but without a political will and 
responses from the government, the chance of the Act to be introduced is slim. 
Assuming that the Proposed Act is not introduced, there is a tendency that the 
judges will dismiss a case from a foreign jurisdiction on the ground of suitability 
of ‗local conditions‘. At this juncture, the lawyers arguing the case before the 
court have to play their role to persuade and draw the attention of the judges to 
these foreign materials as the persuasive authorities. An attention should also be 
drawn to the facts that the legal culture of resistance towards foreign materials as 
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persuasive authorities is slowly eroding in some areas of civil liberties as seen in 
Adong bin Kawau.
901
 
 
In short, it may be concluded that the anomalies in the Malaysian law of contempt 
of court can be overcome by placing the law in an Act of Parliament. 
Nevertheless, since legal reform is an arduous task in which it is unrealistic to 
expect a revision of a law to bring about the desired changes overnight, it is also 
suggested that the change should first come from the judicial personnel.  As noted 
in this study, the judges and their judicial approaches are the main reasons that 
cause the uncertainties in the law and practice of contempt of court in Malaysia. 
Their refusal to follow the current pace and development of contempt of court in 
other common law jurisdictions on the basis of ‗local conditions‘ to a certain 
extent has a significant impact on the freedom of speech and expression in 
Malaysia. The reluctance to strive for uniformity with these jurisdictions can be 
seen in the area of contempt by scandalising. The species of this offence of 
contempt of court often regarded as having fallen into desuetude in England, has 
continued to be imposed in Malaysia. Contempt by scandalising plays its role as a 
sword as well as a shield for the judges against any scandalous and abusive 
comments and criticisms against them. Hence, to overcome the inconsistencies in 
the judicial approach of contempt of court, as suggested in this study, the judges 
should shift their paradigm and attitudes when dealing with contempt. It is time 
for the judges to withstand criticism and to stop using contempt of court to chill 
freedom of speech. It is worth celebrating the view of the USA Supreme Court in 
In re Little,
902
  which states: 
 
[T]he law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may 
be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be 
men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
901
 See supra., (n. 591).  
902
 In re Little (n. 473) p. 555. 
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APPENDIX B1: 
JUDGES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
A Study of the Law and Practice of Contempt of Court in Malaysia 
 
 
The abovementioned research undertakes to study the current law and practice of 
contempt of court in Malaysia.  
 
The attached questionnaire seeks to find out about the law and practice of contempt of 
court from the perspective of the key players in the Malaysian legal system, namely, 
judicial officers, lawyers and prosecutors.  
 
All the responses will be treated in the strictest confidence and the data collected will be 
stored in anonymous form. The findings of this research will only be used for academic 
purposes as part of doctoral studies at Durham University, United Kingdom.  
 
It is realised the great pressures on your time and thank you in advance for taking the 
time to look at and respond to this questionnaire. I would appreciate it if I can receive the 
returned questionnaire within 21 days from the date of receiving the same, to this 
address: 
 Shukriah Dato’ Mohd Sheriff 
Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws 
 International Islamic University Malaysia 
P.O. Box 10, 50728 Kuala Lumpur. 
Or to the following email address; 
shukriahresearch@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
If there is any queries or would like further information, please feel free to contact me at 
any of the following emails: shukriah.mohd-sheriff@durham.ac.uk , shukriahs@iiu.edu.my, 
shukriahms@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
 
Best wishes, 
Shukriah Dato’ Mohd Sheriff 
PhD Research Student,  
Durham Law School, Durham University, UK. 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/law/postgraduate/pgresearch/ 
 
(Lecturer, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws,  
International Islamic University, Malaysia. 
http://www.iiu.edu.my/laws/directory.php) 
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QUESTIONS 
(Please tick (√ ) in an appropriate box) 
 
1. Gender: (    ) Male  (    ) Female 
 
2. Age: (     ) 20-30 (     ) 31-40 (     ) 41-50 (     ) 51-60 (    ) Above 60 
 
3. Profession: 
 (    ) Federal Court judge 
  (    ) Court of Appeal judge 
(    ) High Court judge  
 (    ) Sessions’ Court judge 
 (    ) Magistrate 
 (    ) Advocate & Solicitor 
 (    ) Prosecutor 
 (    ) Other_______________________________ 
    
4. How long have you been in this profession? 
 (    ) Less than 1 year         
 (    ) 1-5 years  
 (    ) 6-10 years 
 (    ) 10-20 years 
 (    ) More than 20 years 
    
5. Have you ever cited a person for contempt of court? 
 (    ) Yes 
 (    ) No 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for being held in contempt. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.  In your opinion, what are the main reasons for lawyers being cited for contempt? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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7. (a) Do you agree that the existence of the law of contempt is to ensure that court orders are 
obeyed?  
 (    ) Agree 
 (    ) Disagree 
 (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 (b) Do you agree that the purpose of the law of contempt is to ensure that the administration of 
justice is not interfered with? 
 (    ) Agree 
 (    ) Disagree 
 (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 (c)  Do you agree that the purpose of the law of contempt is to protect the right to fair trials?  
 (    ) Agree 
 (    ) Disagree 
 (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you agree that the dichotomy between criminal and civil contempt of court is almost 
imperceptible due to the broad concept of contempt of court i.e. any conduct which interferes 
with the administration of justice may amount to a contemptuous act?   
(    ) Agree 
  (    ) Disagree 
  (    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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9. Should the distinction between civil and criminal contempt of court be abolished? 
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The standard of proof for establishing contempt, civil or criminal, is “beyond reasonable doubt”- 
do you agree? 
(    ) Agree 
  (    ) Disagree 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.  The proper test to determine what amounts to contempt ought to be- 
(    ) the act or publication is likely or tends to interfere with the proper administration of 
       justice 
   or, 
   (    ) real risk of prejudice 
   or,  
   (    ) other: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12.  Do you think that the Malaysian criminal contempt of court should be a strict liability offence?  
(    ) Yes 
   (    ) No 
        (    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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13. Do you think that the use of the summary procedure for dealing with all forms of contempt is 
justified?  
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Do you think that the summary procedure is to be used only in cases of contempt in the face of 
the court? 
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
15. Do you think the courts should be allowed to initiate contempt proceedings on their own motion 
for any category of contempt?  
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Do you think that the use of summary procedure may jeopardise the alleged contemnor’s right 
to a full and fair trial? 
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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17. Do you think that contempt sanctions are effective in ensuring proper conduct of lawyers?  
(    ) Effective 
(    ) Not effective 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. How effective do you think the Malaysian Bar’s self-disciplining ability is in dealing with 
improper conduct of its members?  
(    ) Effective 
(    ) Not effective 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. How effective do you think the Malaysian Prosecutions’ self-disciplining ability is in dealing with 
improper conduct of its members?  
(    ) Effective 
(    ) Not effective 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Do you think judges should be subject to contempt laws?  
(    ) Yes 
(    ) No 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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21. The law and the procedures for contempt of court in Malaysia should be defined by the statute- 
do you agree?  
(    ) Agree 
  (    ) Disagree 
  (    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. If there is anything you would like to add or comments you wish to make, please do so in the 
space provided below. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
 
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX B2: 
LAWYERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
A Study of the Law and Practice of Contempt of Court in Malaysia 
 
 
The abovementioned research undertakes to study the current law and practice of 
contempt of court in Malaysia.  
 
The attached questionnaire seeks to find out about the law and practice of contempt of 
court from the perspective of the key players in the Malaysian legal system, namely, 
judicial officers, lawyers and prosecutors.  
 
All the responses will be treated in the strictest confidence and the data collected will be 
stored in anonymous form. The findings of this research will only be used for academic 
purposes as part of doctoral studies at Durham University, United Kingdom.  
 
It is realised the great pressures on your time and thank you in advance for taking the 
time to look at and respond to this questionnaire. I would appreciate it if I can receive the 
returned questionnaire within 21 days from the date of receiving the same, to this 
address: 
 Shukriah Dato’ Mohd Sheriff 
Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws 
 International Islamic University Malaysia 
P.O. Box 10, 50728 Kuala Lumpur. 
Or to the following email address; 
shukriahresearch@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
If there is any queries or would like further information, please feel free to contact me at 
any of the following emails: shukriah.mohd-sheriff@durham.ac.uk , shukriahs@iiu.edu.my, 
shukriahms@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
 
Best wishes, 
Shukriah Dato’ Mohd Sheriff 
PhD Research Student,  
Durham Law School, Durham University, UK. 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/law/postgraduate/pgresearch/ 
 
(Lecturer, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws,  
International Islamic University, Malaysia. 
http://www.iiu.edu.my/laws/directory.php) 
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QUESTIONS 
(Please tick (√ ) in an appropriate box) 
 
1. Gender: (    ) Male  (    ) Female 
 
2. Age: (     ) 20-30 (     ) 31-40 (     ) 41-50 (     ) 51-60 (    ) Above 60 
 
3. Profession: 
 (    ) Federal Court judge 
  (    ) Court of Appeal judge 
(    ) High Court judge  
 (    ) Sessions’ Court judge 
 (    ) Magistrate 
 (    ) Advocate & Solicitor 
 (    ) Prosecutor 
 (    ) Other______________________________ 
    
4. How long have you been in this profession? 
 (    ) Less than 1 year         
 (    ) 1-5 years  
 (    ) 6-10 years 
 (    ) 10-20 years 
 (    ) More than 20 years 
    
5. Have you ever been cited for contempt of court? 
 (    ) Yes 
 (    ) No 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for being held in contempt. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.  In your opinion, what are the main reasons for lawyers being cited for contempt? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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7. (a) Do you agree that the existence of the law of contempt is to ensure that court orders are 
obeyed?  
 (    ) Agree 
 (    ) Disagree 
 (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
 (b) Do you agree that the purpose of the law of contempt is to ensure that the administration of 
justice is not interfered with? 
 (    ) Agree 
 (    ) Disagree 
 (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 (c)  Do you agree that the purpose of the law of contempt is to protect the right to fair trials?  
 (    ) Agree 
 (    ) Disagree 
 (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you agree that the dichotomy between criminal and civil contempt of court is almost 
imperceptible due to the broad concept of contempt of court i.e. any conduct which interferes 
with the administration of justice may amount to a contemptuous act?   
(    ) Agree 
  (    ) Disagree 
  (    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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9. Should the distinction between civil and criminal contempt of court be abolished? 
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The standard of proof for establishing contempt, civil or criminal, is “beyond reasonable doubt”- 
do you agree? 
(    ) Agree 
  (    ) Disagree 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11.  The proper test to determine what amounts to contempt ought to be- 
(    ) the act or publication is likely or tends to interfere with the proper administration of 
       justice 
   or, 
   (    ) real risk of prejudice 
   or,  
   (    ) other: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
12.  Do you think that the Malaysian criminal contempt of court should be a strict liability offence?  
(    ) Yes 
   (    ) No 
        (    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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13. Do you think that the use of the summary procedure for dealing with all forms of contempt is 
justified?  
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Do you think that the summary procedure is to be used only in cases of contempt in the face of 
the court? 
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
15. Do you think the courts should be allowed to initiate contempt proceedings on their own motion 
for any category of contempt?  
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Do you think that the use of summary procedure may jeopardise the alleged contemnor’s right 
to a full and fair trial? 
(    ) Yes 
  (    ) No 
  (    ) Do not know 
 Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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17. Do you think that contempt sanctions are effective in ensuring proper conduct of lawyers?  
(    ) Effective 
(    ) Not effective 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. How effective do you think the Malaysian Bar’s self-disciplining ability is in dealing with 
improper conduct of its members?  
(    ) Effective 
(    ) Not effective 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. How effective do you think the Malaysian Prosecutions’ self-disciplining ability is in dealing with 
improper conduct of its members?  
(    ) Effective 
(    ) Not effective 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Do you think judges should be subject to contempt laws?  
(    ) Yes 
(    ) No 
(    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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21. The law and the procedures for contempt of court in Malaysia should be defined by the statute- 
do you agree?  
(    ) Agree 
  (    ) Disagree 
  (    ) Do not know 
Please give a brief summary of the reasons for your answer. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. If there is anything you would like to add or comments you wish to make, please do so in the 
space provided below. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
 
